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Abstract
Restrictions and permissions in information systems – Authorization – can cause problems for those
interacting with the systems. Often, the problems materialize as an interference with the primary
tasks, for example, when restrictions prevent the efﬁcient completing of work and cause frustration.
Problems are not only caused by restrictive permissions, though, but also by permissive ones, for
example, from permissions that remain assigned. In this case, the security measure becomes inef-
fective. Conversely, its effectiveness can also be impacted when staff is forced to circumvent the
measure to complete work – typically sharing passwords among each other.
This is the perspective of functional staff and the organization. There are further perspectives in-
volved in the administration and development of the authorization measure. For instance, functional
staff need to interact with policy makers who decide on the granting of additional permissions, and
policy makers, in turn, interact with policy authors who actually implement changes. If the proce-
dures of the interactions or the activities themselves incur high effort, the authorization measure will
be inefﬁcient. Similarly, developers implement the technical authorization mechanisms, and need to
interact with other stakeholders to take their problems into account to arrive at usable mechanisms.
To unravel this entanglement of problems and their interrelation, this thesis analyzes the diverse
contexts in which authorization occurs, limits the scope to organizational environments, and system-
atically examines the problems that surround the different perspectives on authorization in organi-
zational settings, deriving requirements and open research questions. Based on prior research and
original research in secure agile development, eight principles to address the authorization problems
are identiﬁed and explored through practical artifacts.
The Authorization Principles aim to foster the participation and interaction among involved and
affected stakeholders, including reducing the burden and making the abstract aspects of authorization
understandable by increasing the concreteness. Moreover, the mitigations explicitly aim to integrate
approaches from diverse disciplines, going beyond the currently predominant technical approaches,
for example, by applying socio-organizational approaches. Particularly, the behavior of individuals
in their social setting should be accounted for, and the security awareness and expertise of the in-
volved individuals should be increased. To better cope with the dynamics surrounding authorization,
it is also suggested to design the measures for dynamics and generally aim to tailor for the context
regarding procedures (formality, centralization) and tools (ﬂexibility, individuals’ expertise).
Applying the principles in the practical artifacts and drawing on the respective empirical evalua-
tions, the principles show to be useful in improving authorization measures, even though the degree
of usefulness strongly depends on the context of use. The thesis concludes by proposing to apply the
principles and its main theme – broadening security usability to the organizational – to other areas
of information security: fostering the participation between and integration of perspectives on the
security measure, and opening information security research further to interdisciplinarity.
ii
Zusammenfassung
Probleme mit Berechtigungen und Restriktionen in Informationssystemen – der Autorisierung – sind
weit verbreitet. Häuﬁg treten sie als Störung in den Arbeitsabläufen zu Tage; beispielsweise, wenn
eine Aufgabe wegen fehlender Berechtigungen nicht efﬁzient bearbeitet werden kann und diese
Frustration hervorrufen. Probleme werden aber nicht nur durch restriktive Berechtigungen verur-
sacht, sondern auch durch zu weitgehende, zum Beispiel, wenn nicht mehr benötigte Berechtigun-
gen zugewiesen bleiben. In diesem Fall leidet die Effektivität der Sicherheitsmaßnahme. Die Effek-
tivität kann allerdings auch beeinträchtigt werden, wenn restriktive Berechtigungen die Anwender
zwingen, die Autorisierung für ihre Aufgaben zu umgehen, und, als eine Möglichkeit, Passwörter
weiterzugeben.
Die geschilderten Probleme sind allerdings nur die der Organisation und der Anwender. Weitere
Perspektiven sind die Verwaltung und die Entwicklung der Sicherheitsmaßnahme. Beispielsweise
müssen Anwender sich an Verantwortliche wenden, wenn sie zusätzliche Berechtigungen benötigen.
Diese beauftragen dann technische Administratoren mit der Umsetzung der Änderungen. Wenn diese
Abläufe, Interaktionen und Aktivitäten einen hohen Aufwand verursachen, leidet die Efﬁzienz der
gesamten Maßnahme. In ähnlicher Weise müssen sich Entwickler mit Anwendern, Administratoren
und Entscheidern austauschen, um deren Probleme in die Entwicklung von benutzbaren Mechanis-
men einzubeziehen.
Um dieses Knäuel von Problemen und deren Abhängigkeiten zu entwirren, analysiert diese Arbeit
die Kontexte, in denen Autorisierung eingesetzt wird. Konkret beschränkt sie sich auf Organisa-
tionen als Umgebung und analysiert systematisch die Probleme, die dort im Zusammenhang mit
der Autorisierung auftreten. Daraus werden Anforderungen an benutzbare Autorisierung und damit
verbundene offene Forschungsfragen abgeleitet. Basierend auf bestehenden Ansätzen aus der be-
nutzbaren Sicherheit und der sicheren Agilen Software-Entwicklung werden acht Prinzipien als Lö-
sungsansätze identiﬁziert, die durch die Entwicklung von konkreten Artefakten untersucht werden.
Die Autorisierungsprinzipien zielen darauf ab, die Partizipation der verschiedenen Perspektiven
und deren Austausch untereinander zu fördern. Dazu wird insbesondere die Belastung für den Einzel-
nen verringert und das Abstrakte zur leichteren Verständlichkeit konkretisiert. Außerdem werden
explizit Ansätze aus verschiedenen Disziplinen integriert, beispielsweise soziologische und organ-
isatorische Herangehensweisen als Ergänzung der momentan vorherrschenden technischen. Das be-
trifft zum einen die Berücksichtigung des Verhaltens von Menschen in ihrer sozialen Umgebung,
zum anderen das generelle Fördern des Sicherheitsbewusstseins und der -expertise. Um besser der
Dynamik der Umgebung zu entsprechen, wird die Autorisierung als Maßnahme außerdem explizit
auf die Dynamik ausgerichtet und strebt generell eine Angemessenheit entsprechend der Umgebung
in Bezug auf Prozesse (Formalität, Zentralisation) und Werkzeuge (Flexibilität, Erfahrung) an.
Das Anwenden dieser Prinzipien in den praktischen Artefakten und die damit verbundenen em-
pirischen Auswertungen zeigen, dass die Prinzipien generell nützlich sind, um Autorisierung be-
nutzbarer zu gestalten. Allerdings hängt ihre Nützlichkeit im Einzelnen stark von der konkreten
Umgebung der Autorisierung ab. Diese Arbeit schließt, in dem sie darlegt wie die Prinzipien und
ihr übergeordneter Ansatz – die Ausdehnung der benutzbaren Sicherheit auf das Organisatorische
– auf weitere Bereiche der Informationssicherheit übertragen werden kann: Durch das Fördern der
Partizipation und des Austausches zwischen den Perspektiven auf Sicherheitsmaßnahmen und durch
eine größere Offenheit der Forschungsgemeinschaft für Interdisziplinarität.
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1. Introduction
Authority extends beyond [coercive] powers
Joseph Raz: Authority (1990, p. 15)
Authorization protects resources in information systems1 as a security measure by restricting permis-
sions. Authorization also denotes the act of granting authority to individuals or other actors to allow
them to interact with the system. Even though authorization has been an integral part of protecting
information and systems since early in the computing age2, this measure continues to trouble indi-
viduals in their daily interaction with systems. One typical problem is that if an individual lacks a
permission to carry out a task, authorization inevitably interferes with the task and causes frustration
(Whalen et al., 2006).
Even before the advent of computer systems, problems with the granting of authority have affected
societies. In ancient Rome, the authority of Emperors was based upon a complex system of public
opinion (Takács, 2009). Since Cicero, Emperors were seen as “the public ﬁgure who upheld all that
was honorable, virtuous, and worthy of imitation” (p. xx). Their natural authority allowed them to
rule. When they failed to uphold the virtues and their constructed narratives collapsed, the political
system struggled3. Modern political philosophers, such as Raz (1990), consider state authority a
paradox: People ﬁnd it “deeply disturbing. . . that one person should have the right to rule another”
(p. 3). One argument for legitimizing state authority is the need of the community to be ruled and that
complying is in the best interest of the members of the community (p. 5), particularly with respect to
its coordination. The problems surrounding authorization in information systems involve authority
of ﬁner granularity and thus different types of decisions. However, we will see in the course of this
dissertation that the underlying conﬂict of the adequacy of authority and the legitimacy of restrictions
play an important role in building effective and efﬁcient authorization measures.
The problem with the adequacy of restrictions points to conﬂicts between the security measure
and the individual’s primary task. One cause are the technical mechanisms in information systems
when they enforce a rigidness of rules that is unknown from non-technical areas. Before speciﬁcally
focusing on authorization, we need to consider the broader scope: Problems with security measures
have been known for more than a century; in the context of military cryptography, Kerckhoffs (1883)
incorporated them in his sixth principle:
“Finally, regarding the circumstances in which such system is applied, it must be easy to
use and must neither require stress of mind nor the knowledge of a long series of rules.”
Kerckhoffs emphasizes the circumstances of application. One important difference between Kerck-
hoffs’ military context and business or leisure activities relates to the priorities that are assigned to
1“Information systems” is a heavily overloaded term. In this thesis, it denotes computer-based information systems, that
is, networks of human actors and technical artifacts (Jessup and Valacich, 2008, p. 12). To instead refer to the research
discipline, it is capitalized or abbreviated “IS”.
2Multi-user systems emerged in the 1960s and required the protection of systems from users and of users from other
users (Graham, 1968).
3One example is Nero’s “performative act” as a ruler (Takács, 2009, p. xx).
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the securing of information and systems. While security breaches can critically harm businesses and
privacy incidents can seriously impact individuals, the primary goal of organizations and individuals
when interacting with a system is not security, but the original task. The effect of security having a
secondary role is furthered by the primary goals being more tangible and appearing more concrete
than the risks from security incidents (West, 2008).
In authorization, the underlying tension occurs between three distinct security goals. Availability
should ensure that information and systems can be read or interacted with if necessary. In contrast,
conﬁdentiality should guarantee that information is only retrieved by those that should, and integrity
that information is only modiﬁed as wanted. Conﬁguring permissive restrictions will make the avail-
ability of resources more likely for those that need them. At the same time, permissive restrictions
could enable unwanted access or modiﬁcation. The practical relevance of this tension could be ob-
served in the disclosure of sensitive United States military and diplomatic documents by WikiLeaks
in 2010. Following the September 11 attacks, the failure to discover the attack plans was attributed
to the restrictions on information sharing between government agencies. The National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) stated in the “9/11 Report” that it is no longer
the case that the “risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the beneﬁt of wider sharing.” This real-
ization led to the expansion of access to government databases to foster the sharing of information
between government agencies. The resulting higher availability of information is seen as one factor
that enabled the disclosure of the sensitive documents (BBC News, 2010).
To resolve the conﬂict between the security goals, this dissertation will argue, we need to improve
the usability of the security measure: A second factor in the WikiLeaks disclosure was the lack of
usability of the security measures in place so that the measures were not applied effectively. As Ker-
ckhoffs (1883) emphasizes, a security measure must ﬁt the context of use (Sasse, 2011; Sasse et al.,
2001). However, since Kerckhoffs’ time, the application of security technology, and of authorization
in information system in particular, has changed signiﬁcantly: The complexity of the context of use
increased dramatically. The context is rarely as predetermined as in Kerckhoffs’ military environ-
ment, but rather highly diverse and dynamic. Individuals who interact with systems, and have to
cope with and conﬁgure restrictions, have become signiﬁcantly more diverse with the spreading of
networked systems in the 1990s and the popularity of the Web. Instead of highly-specialized pro-
fessionals that worked with and conﬁgured computer systems exclusively for a long time, a large
proportion of the work force and society is now impacted by and conﬁgures restrictions, whether for
the shared folder at work or Social Network privacy settings at home. “Networked” environments
(Castells, 2000) and the trend to “interwoven” computing (Pallas, 2009) lead to contexts that are
difﬁcult to specify or predict. The dynamics can particularly be observed for organizations (Truex
et al., 1999) and require the restrictions to be frequently adapted to keep up with the organizational
changes (Sinclair et al., 2008).
The complexity and dynamics of the contexts are the primary reason why it is difﬁcult to compre-
hensively enforce authorization by technical means. It is difﬁcult to model adequate restrictions in
algorithmic terms. In terms of organizational economics, trying to comprehensively restrict access
through technical means will result in high coordination costs of adapting the restrictions or in the
loss of staff productivity if the measures interfere with work (Pallas, 2009). Considering the com-
plexities and the risks associated with information and systems due to the reliance of organizations
and society on networked systems for business and critical infrastructure, what is the way forward to
achieve effective and efﬁcient authorization measures? Can we ﬁnd inspiration from how authority
is addressed in other ﬁelds?
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In case of political authority, many modern societies only allow the state to employ coercive powers
to a limited extend to prevent negative collateral effects and to preserve the coercive powers’ efﬁcacy,
that is, their being obeyed more often than not (Hart, 1994, p. 103). Concerning authorization, the co-
ercive power of laws can serve as an analogy to the technical mechanisms that interfere with primary
tasks. If coercion is used excessively or inappropriately by governments, citizens will circumvent the
laws and their enforcement. Hart (1994) notes that “Laws may be condemned as morally bad simply
because they require men to do particular actions which morality forbids individuals to do.” (p. 168)
Hall (1971) gives the example of civil disobedience to rigorous abortion laws in the U.S., citing a
physician:
“where blatant injustice does exist, as is the case with the present abortion laws, I believe
it is the duty of all. . . to actively help the people who are the present victims of such
unjust laws.” (p. 104)
For authorization, we will see in Chapter 5 that functional staff are likewise creative in mitigating
authorization problems that interfere with their work and ﬁnd ways around technical restrictions,
sometimes in dangerous or inefﬁcient ways, for example, when sharing passwords with colleagues.
It is as challenging to rely solely on technical means for authorization in information systems as it is
to use pure coercion for the state.
A common approach by democratic governments is to coerce citizens only for matters for which
the citizens generally agree that coercion is legitimate. Locke (1728) argues that “nothing [is] able to
put [man] into subjection to any earthly power, but only his own consent.” (p. 223)4 In authorization
measures, this can be likened to the acceptability of the measures and depends on the perceived ad-
equacy of the imposed restrictions. However, until the late 1990s, research on authorization primar-
ily focused on the technical means of the models and mechanisms (Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen,
2007), and neglected that humans need to interact with the systems and need to conﬁgure the restric-
tions. This is part of the challenges in information security research: To achieve the re-orientation
from the often purely technical to the socio-technical (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). Beginning
with Zurko and Simon (1996), the academic community started to consider socio-technical factors
for authorization, ﬁrst in laboratory experiments on the usability of the conﬁguration tools (Zurko
et al., 1999) and on the comprehensibility of authorization concepts (Brostoff et al., 2005) and con-
ﬁgurations (Rode et al., 2006). One recurring theme is how difﬁcult the abstract representation of
restrictions is (Blackwell et al., 2008). Since the organizational practice is more complex than the
isolated editing of restrictions and, for instance, also involves coordination, a small number of studies
have recently been published on how authoring of restrictions is hindered in practice (Whalen et al.,
2006; Bauer et al., 2009; Smetters and Good, 2009).
However, focusing on formulating adequate restrictions can be likened to only address the writing
of adequate laws and neglect the legislative process. Instead, further socio-technical factors need
to be considered. For example, to adequately modify restrictions, administrators in organizations
need to be in a position to judge which permissions are needed and which would be dangerous.
For Social Networks, Acquisti and Grossklags (2005) show how users do not decide rationally on
the restrictions, but trade short-term beneﬁts for long-term privacy effects. As West (2008) argues,
4Weber (1968) is more precise here and differentiates between Power (Macht: the probability that will is carried out
despite resistance) and Domination (Herrschaft: the probability of obedience without coercion): “[E]very genuine
form of domination implies a voluntary compliance, that is, an interest. . . in obedience” (p. 212). Since domination
is more efﬁcient than directly enforcing power, those with power “employ” legitimacy – for example, every highly
privileged group develops a myth of its superiority (p. 953), as in the case of the Emperors of Rome.
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decision-making is difﬁcult in information security since primary tasks often appear more concrete
and tangible and thus receive more attention than the seemingly abstract risks.
Selectively focusing only on the managers deciding on and administrators conﬁguring restrictions
still results in an incomplete picture, though. Firstly, this only considers centralized management
of authorization and neglects the common case of delegated decision-making, for instance, when
individuals decide on who is allowed to read a speciﬁc document in the organization. Secondly, and
more fundamentally, this ignores advances in organizational culture of the last century, when the
traditional model of top-down management gave gradually way to a “Human Resource Model” in
which all members of an organization “contribute to the limits of their ability” (Miles et al., 1978).
For adequate restrictions in authorization, we need to leverage this potential. Organizationally, this
may be achieved by integrating authorization into the workﬂow of functional staff (Whalen et al.,
2006). However, an additional problem is that “different groups have different ways of knowing”
(Brown et al., 1993). For effective integration of different groups, Brown et al. (1993) thus argue for
adequate measures, aiming for “informed participation”, since “to participate fully you must be fully
informed, and to be fully informed, you must participate.”
Returning to the aspect of the adequacy of restrictions, we have to consider that its perception
is relative and is also affected by motivational factors, such as security awareness. We not only
need to take the organization’s perspective into account (the optimal security/efﬁciency trade-off),
but also regard the motivation and behavior of staff (Albrechtsen, 2008; Sasse et al., 2001). When
restrictions are adequate from the organization’s perspective but unacceptable for staff, one option
may be to explain the rationale behind restrictions to create understanding. In this way, staff may
internalize the externalities of the negative consequences for the organization (Cooter, 2006) and
might thus be more likely to accept interferences.
However, it might not be in the best interest of organizations to make employees always comply
with technical measures, since business goals at stake may overrule the risks in individual instances.
For instance, it is too costly to have staff unable to work because they do not have a speciﬁc permis-
sion after changing departments. For political authority, Thomas Jefferson even stated that “To lose
our country by scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself,. . . thus absurdly
sacriﬁcing the end to the means” (Hall, 1971). Hart (1994) uses the term Rule skepticism to describe
how jurisdiction solves these issues:
“In fact all [legal] systems, in different ways, compromise between two social needs:
the need for certain rules which can, over great areas of conduct, safely be applied by
private individuals to themselves without fresh ofﬁcial guidance or weighing up of social
issues, and the need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed, ofﬁcial choice,
issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete
case”
Transferring this paradigm to organizational authorization, we need to consider the full range
of how the risks from a misuse of information system can be reduced, not just technical means
(Latour, 1991). In sociology, the Circuit of Power model by Clegg (1989) describes how direct
commands, social norms, and formal rules or technical means interact to achieve overall authority.
In organizations, formal and informal rules can complement technical mechanisms to loosen the
reliance on technical means and on the adequacy of the encoded restrictions (Pallas, 2009). Whalen
et al. (2006) recommend that technical measures support existing social controls, resulting in more
permissive restrictions or more ﬂexible authorization measures.
Increased ﬂexibility is one example of how the overall usability of authorization depends on the
developer to design and implement adequate mechanisms in information systems. Further critical
aspects include the expressiveness or comprehensibility of the restrictions, which can cause errors
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Figure 1.1.: Perspectives in authorization and a selection of relevant research disciplines
or inefﬁciencies in their management (Bauer et al., 2009). This is in analogy to the interrelations
between laws as the restrictions that depend on adequate means for enforcement, for example, tech-
nically in case of road trafﬁc safety: speed traps and central registers for road trafﬁc offenses. Sim-
ilarly, developers implementing authorization in information systems need to closely interact with
decision makers on how restrictions are enforced in the system (He and Antón, 2009).
We touched upon the perspectives of users being restricted by, administrators conﬁguring, and
developers implementing authorization in the course of this section. The respective perspectives of
these stakeholders can be sketched as follows (cf. Figure 1.1):
• Functional stakeholders rely on the information systems, the supported processes, and con-
tained data to complete their tasks – both in direct interaction with the systems and indirectly
as managers supervising the use of the systems,
• Security management stakeholders make the decisions of what restrictions to enforce (man-
agement) and conﬁgure the restrictions in the systems (administration),
• Development stakeholders decide upon and implement authorization in information systems,
and integrate information systems in organizational infrastructures.
Stakeholders of each of these perspectives undertake speciﬁc activities, can face respective prob-
lems surrounding authorization, and take decisions that may cause problems for other stakeholders
with other perspectives, as shown in the examples in Table 1.1. In this section and in the table,
we can observe how the problems of these perspectives interrelate: For example, the functional user
might not be able to complete a task because of the restrictions that security managers implemented
accidentally due to the incomprehensible restrictions. Hence, we may need to integrate the perspec-
tives to achieve an adequate measure. We also saw how technical, organizational, and socio-technical
approaches need to be combined for effective and efﬁcient authorization measures (Figure 1.1 shows
three obviously relevant disciplines). However, there apparently is a bias towards technical research
in prior research on authorization (Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Dhillon and Backhouse,
2001), preventing the research community from solving the problems more fundamentally. This the-
sis pursues to counter the effects and integrate the perspectives and research areas to improve the
effectiveness and efﬁciency of authorization.
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Perspective Typical activity Challenges Impacts
Functional Carry out work tasks Hindered by restrictions,
circumvention of system
Reduced productivity, inef-
fective security, respectively
Security
management
Formulate restrictions,
conﬁgure authorization
Incomprehensible restric-
tion conﬁguration
Inadequate restrictions
Development Implement authorization
in system
Unknown expertise of
security managers
Incomprehensible restric-
tion conﬁguration
Table 1.1.: Examples of impacts on authorization usability
1.2. Integrating perspectives and research areas
From the discussion of the problems surrounding the usability of authorization and potential mitiga-
tions, the following two leading research questions emerge:
1. What authorization problems do stakeholders face in information systems and how do their
problems and perspectives interrelate?
2. What methods, procedures, and technologies are required to address the authorization prob-
lems and achieve usable authorization measures in information systems, and what ﬁelds of
research do we need to draw upon?
The core approach of this thesis is to integrate the different perspectives and research areas for the
analysis of the problems and their mitigation. More speciﬁcally, to guide the research, we can formu-
late hypotheses on how authorization problems manifest themselves (primarily covered in Chapter 5)
and how they can be addressed (Chapters 7 to 10):
Problem manifestation
H 1 Stakeholders face usability problems surrounding authorization from diverse and interrelated
perspectives on authorization
The example problems outlined in Table 1.1 indicate that stakeholders have different perspectives on
authorization and that the usability issues of the perspectives interrelate. This can be observed for
the impact of the security management perspective, inadequate restrictions, and its recurrence as an
issue for functional stakeholders. It is thus necessary to particularly analyze what perspectives exist
and how the respective problems interrelate to improve the usability of authorization measures.
H 2 The interaction of stakeholders between perspectives regarding authorization suffers from prob-
lems surrounding authorization
Another observation from the above examples is that the problems interfere with the integration of
the different perspectives concerning authorization. The challenge of inadequate restrictions for the
functional stakeholders in Table 1.1 is a case in point: Here, enabling the functional stakeholders
to enter the security management realm of conﬁguring restrictions may reduce friction of commu-
nication between perspectives. However, to foster the interaction, we need to solve problems with
authorization in the ﬁrst place – for example, through more comprehensible conﬁguration tools.
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Problem mitigation
H 3 Technical restrictions must be combined with non-technical approaches to improve the effec-
tiveness of authorization
Technical means are only part of the puzzle to achieve effective authorization. For example, when
restrictions are perceived as inadequate, the effectiveness of the authorization measure can be im-
paired. This can be observed in Table 1.1 for the functional staff, who circumvent the authorization
and thus reduce the overall security. One approach is to integrate technical mechanisms with further
organizational and social measures, including to establish rules of conduct and to increase motivation
for compliance through the awareness of the concrete risks.
H 4 Authorization measures that are designed to handle dynamic environments improve the ade-
quacy of restrictions
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the context of authorization measures, such as organi-
zational structures, business processes, and information systems, constantly change. In the example
of the challenges for the functional stakeholder, changing work tasks would require the restrictions
to be adapted to reﬂect these changes to remain adequate and prevent interferences with work tasks.
Authorization measures need to explicitly account for the dynamics – for example, through the addi-
tion of non-technical rules to the technical restrictions – to adequately handle the dynamics.
H 5 Involving affected stakeholders in the decision-making and authoring of restrictions improves
the adequacy of the restrictions
Functional staff often have the most precise information about what permissions their work tasks re-
quire. Selectively relying on managers or administrators may thus prevent comprehensive decisions
and reduce the adequacy of the restrictions. Instead, we need to take the perspectives and goals of
the organization, and of the affected and deciding stakeholders into account. We should strive to
integrate all stakeholders with “informed participation” (Brown et al., 1993), for example, through
concrete decision-support, comprehensible authoring tools, and light-weight procedures for changes.
1.3. Drawing on security usability and software engineering
The hypotheses name the central problems to address in this thesis and how we will approach them.
While the approaches require us to draw from several research areas, we will particularly focus on
two successful areas that address related problems in an attempt to identify principles to apply. The
ﬁrst area is security usability, that is, employing methods and techniques from human–computer
interaction (HCI) research to improve the effectiveness, efﬁciency, and satisfaction of stakeholders
interacting with security measures (Chapter 2). Security usability has incorporated numerous re-
search approaches since its inception as a research strand, beginning with the application of usability
engineering techniques to identify shortcomings of security designs and mitigations (Zurko and Si-
mon, 1996; Adams and Sasse, 1999). Since then, the security usability community has striven to
better understand mental models of security measures and to develop better mechanisms (Whitten,
2004; Brostoff et al., 2005). Researchers recently began to focus on the behavior of individuals and
their motivation through economic impacts (Beautement et al., 2008; Herley, 2010). From secu-
rity usability, models of individuals’ behavior, motivation, and stakeholder interaction are promising
starting points for the research in this thesis.
7
1. Introduction
???????????
??????????????????
?????????
???????????????????????
????????????????????????
??????
??????????????
??????????????
?????
???????????????
???????????????
?? ???????? ?????
??????????????????
???????????????
????????? ?????
?????????
??????????
?????
???????????????????????
?????????
??????????
Figure 1.2.: Methodology applied in this dissertation
Among other approaches, the hypotheses refer to the interaction of stakeholders and the adaption
to changing contexts. Software engineering has to address similar problems in the course of craft-
ing adequate systems, so that it should be useful to explore the approaches in software engineering
(Chapter 3). One aspect is how security requirements are integrated into the plan-driven software
development process (Section 3.2). Since we are interested in stakeholder integration and in han-
dling the dynamics of the context, we particularly consider agile development (Section 3.3). Agile
development methods closely integrate stakeholders from the customer and the different roles in
software development. Further key characteristics of agile methods are the empirical approach and
the iterative and evolutionary nature to adapt to changing environments. However, agile development
was not originally intended for security-critical development and there can be conﬂicts between agile
methods and secure software engineering. Since authorization is security-critical, we discuss how
agile methods need to be tailored for (Section 3.4).
1.4. Integrative information security research
The methodology applied in this thesis is depicted in Figure 1.2 and consists of three primary parts:
structuring and scoping the problem domain (primarily analytical), analyzing the problems (empiri-
cal), and exploring mitigating principles through the development of artifacts (practical/empirical):
1.4.1. Structuring and scoping the problem domain
1. Develop a context taxonomy and scope horizontally: We systematically deﬁne the horizontal
range of contexts in a taxonomy and limit the scope to a speciﬁc domain by applying the
taxonomy.
The hypotheses state that it is necessary to take an integrative approach on the broad range of prob-
lems surrounding authorization, both for the perspectives on authorization (e.g. functional, security
management, development: H1, H5) and for the research areas (e.g. socio-technical, organizational,
software engineering: H3). However, authorization is relevant in a variety of contexts. As sketched
in Figure 1.3, we can align the contexts horizontally, referring to the breadth of the ﬁeld. Problems
of the distinct perspectives are shown on the vertical axis. Since it is unrealistic to cover the entire
ﬁeld, it is common in research to divide the ﬁeld and select a part to cover. Often, the scoping occurs
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Figure 1.3.: Vertical and horizontal scoping within the ﬁeld of authorization
along the horizontal axis for a speciﬁc problem, as shown for “inadequate restrictions”, or one prob-
lem in a speciﬁc context (“inadequate restrictions” for “smartphone applications”). In our case, these
approaches would prevent an integrative approach to analyze the problems of different perspectives
on authorization. Accordingly, the approach in this dissertation is to limit the scope vertically, as
shown for the context “organization”, to allow for effective integrative research.
Following the review of related background material, we develop a taxonomy of authorization
contexts, and particularly examine organizations, that is, “systems of purposive activity of a speciﬁed
kind” (Weber, 1947), and limit the thesis’ scope to organizational contexts (Step 1). The rationale
is that many particularly challenging problems in authorization – the interaction of stakeholders and
related organizational issues – are particularly pronounced in organizations.
1.4.2. Analyzing the problems surrounding authorization
2. Analyze and model problems: Within the deﬁned scope, we empirically study the problems
thoroughly and identify structures within the identiﬁed problems and those in literature, mod-
eling perspectives on the security measure and the interrelation between problems.
For a clearer picture of the existing problems with authorization in organizations, we empirically
study the problems in a large organization. Combined with problems identiﬁed in literature on au-
thorization, we derive a model of the problems surrounding authorization in organizations.
3. Elicit requirements and detailed research questions: Based on the problem model, we de-
rive requirements for a usable measure and enrich these with existing approaches to identify
shortcomings, formulated as open research questions.
The model of the authorization problems allows us to formulate requirements for usable authorization
measures and, together with existing approaches from literature, open research questions.
4. Derive principles to address the problems: Approaches from related ﬁelds allow us to distill
mitigating principles to apply to the problems.
While the hypotheses guide the research effort, the ultimate goal is to develop and evaluate a theory of
how to approach the authorization problems. Towards this goal, we draw on the reviewed approaches
from security usability and secure agile development to derive Authorization Principles.
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1.4.3. Exploring mitigations in organizational contexts
5. Develop and evaluate artifacts: Applying the principles, we design, develop, and evaluate
artifacts that address selected open research questions.
Based on the principles and the analysis of authorization problems, we target selected open research
questions and explore mitigations to the problems by developing and evaluating six artifacts as prac-
tical contributions:
• An authorization framework to support the implementation of authorization in applications
(Chapter 7),
• An associated policy model to involve functional stakeholders in the authoring and decision-
making of restrictions (Chapter 7),
• A change support tool that suggests the abstract changes of the formalized restrictions to allow
the functional stakeholders to make more concrete changes and better integrate them in the
authoring (Chapter 7),
• The implementation and evaluation of more ﬂexible authorization, policy override, in an orga-
nizational information system (Chapter 8),
• A process model to evaluate and design adequate and effective authorization processes (Chap-
ter 9),
• A prototype and procedures to support the decisions on what permission to assign (Chapter 10).
6. Evaluate the ﬁndings on the artifacts and principles: We discuss the implications from the
ﬁndings on the artifacts and consider the usefulness of the principles, the validity of the hy-
potheses, and the gained insights on open research questions.
The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the research question and hypotheses. The discus-
sion focuses on the artifacts and, particularly, to what extent the Authorization Principles succeed in
addressing the open research questions, and the transferability of the results to other authorization
contexts.
1.5. Research contributions
The key research theme of this dissertation is emphasizing the need in information security research
to take an integrative approach and rather to focus on a smaller range of contexts than reducing the
problem scope to one perspective on a system or one research discipline. The thesis argues that the
integrative approach complements more focused research and is necessary to fundamentally solve
usability problems in information security.
Methodological contributions This thesis proposes and follows a methodology for integrative
research in information security to arrive at comprehensive mitigations for usability problems. The
integrative character of the methodology manifests itself on two levels: integrating research strands
and research disciplines, and fostering the participation and interaction of involved and affected
individuals. Speciﬁcally, we apply both approaches in three ways: theoretically by deriving and
evaluating principles that integrate research and people, empirically by analyzing usability problems
and evaluating artifacts from multiple perspectives, and practically by integrating multiple research
strands in developing artifacts that foster the integration and participation of individuals.
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Theoretical contributions The primary theoretical contribution of this dissertation are the Autho-
rization Principles to address authorization problems in organizations (Section 6.4). The principles
bring together several research strands – including research from information security, software en-
gineering, and organizational and socio-technical research. In addition, two analytical frameworks
support and structure the research in this dissertation: a taxonomy of authorization contexts (Sec-
tion 4.1) and its application to organizational contexts (Section 4.2), and a holistic model of the
problems surrounding authorization – considering the perspectives of the affected stakeholders, their
interrelation, and the interrelation of the problems (Section 5.3).
Empirical contributions Empirical work primarily serves in this dissertation to develop hypothe-
ses on what problems exist in practice – for an analysis of authorization problems in a large organi-
zation (Section 5.1) – and to evaluate the application of the Authorization Principles in the artifacts
(see below) and derive insights on the open research problems:
• Explore how different representations of authorization restrictions and modes of management
support changing restrictions (Section 7.3),
• Study the effects of the proposed authorization framework in agile development (Section 7.5),
• Examine the application of policy override in a medium-sized enterprise (Chapter 8),
• Evaluate the use of the authorization process model to describe processes in organizations
(Chapter 9),
• Explore the participatory collection of factors to support authorization decisions (Chapter 10).
In addition, we explore – as part of the background work – how agile practitioners approach security
(Appendix C).
Practical contributions The hypotheses on approaches to address usability problems and the de-
rived principles are evaluated by developing and exploring artifacts. This thesis makes four primary
practical contributions in six artifacts: the authorization framework with an accessible policy and
change support (Chapter 7), the implementation of policy override (Chapter 8), the integrative au-
thorization process model (Chapter 9), and a decision-support prototype for authorization decisions
(Chapter 10).
1.6. Publications
A number of publications resulted from the research for this dissertation:
• Bartsch and Sasse (2012). Guiding decisions on authorization policies: A participatory ap-
proach to decision support. 27th ACM Symposium On Applied Computing (SAC 2012)
• Bartsch (2012). Policy override in practice: Model, evaluation, and decision support. In
journal Security and Communication Networks (Wiley, in print)
• Bartsch (2011c). Exploring twisted paths: Analyzing authorization processes in organizations.
5th International Conference on Network and System Security (NSS 2011)
• Bartsch (2011b). Practitioners’ perspectives on security in agile development. 6th Interna-
tional Workshop on Frontiers in Availability, Reliability and Security at ARES 2011
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• Bartsch (2011a). An authorization enforcement usability case study. ESSoS 2011
• Bartsch (2010b). A calculus for the qualitative risk assessment of policy override authoriza-
tion. Received Best Paper Award at the 3rd International Conference on Security of Informa-
tion and Networks (SIN 2010)
• Bartsch (2010a). Supporting authorization policy modiﬁcation in agile development of Web
applications. Fourth International Workshop on Secure Software Engineering (SecSE 2010)
• Bartsch, Sohr, and Bormann (2009). Supporting Agile Development of Authorization Rules
for SME Applications. 3rd International Workshop on Trusted Collaboration (TrustCol 2008)
• Bartsch and Bormann (2008). Berechtigungsmodellierung im Geschäftsprozessmanagement
von KMU. D.A.CH. Security 2008
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Part I.
Security in human-computer interactions
and software engineering
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2. Security usability
First they built the road,
then they built the town. . .
Arcade Fire: Wasted Hours (The Suburbs, 2010)
As discussed brieﬂy in the introduction, if authorization causes problems – for example, interfering
with work or requiring too much effort – functional stakeholders may not the accept the measure
and, ultimately, circumvent it. The ﬁeld of Security in Human–Computer Interaction (HCISec) or
Security Usability addresses problems of this kind. The security goals are often deﬁned as the “CIA
triangle” of protecting (Conﬁdentiality, Integrity) and enabling access to information (Availability)
(Gollmann, 2011). The trade-off between conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability indicates that
the tension does not lie between security and usability as it is still often proclaimed. Instead, the
usability of security lies on middle ground in the continuum between conﬁdentiality, integrity, and
availability. Security usability optimizes security measures within this continuum and takes on two
perspectives: First, how security measures inﬂuence the effectiveness and efﬁciency of the human–
computer interaction, and the satisfaction of affected stakeholders (e.g. how much does security
interfere with work); second, how the usability inﬂuences the overall effectiveness of the security
measures (e.g. does security force stakeholders to behave in an insecure manner). Both sides often
interact: If a security measure causes excessive extra work, it might not be employed as intended,
thus reducing the overall security effectiveness.
Take, as one example of ineffective security among countless, the results from a classic paper
on security usability: “Why Johnny can’t encrypt” (Whitten and Tygar, 1999) covers the reasons
why individuals cannot use one measure to prevent adversaries from eavesdropping on their emails
(encryption) and to assure the receiver that they are the actual source of the unaltered email (digital
signature). Speciﬁcally, Whitten and Tygar (1999) explored the problems for users to employ public
key cryptography for their email correspondence. Among other issues, they demonstrated the burden
for the user: the difﬁculties to understand key validity and trust concepts; and user interface problems,
such as information overload. Moreover, the study also showed the ineffectiveness of the measure;
participants, for example, accidentally sent their private key in plain text instead of the public one.
Evidently, the security measure, including the software and support, was not appropriate for the study
participants – they were just not able to use it.
However, the ability is only part of the problem: As Adams and Sasse (1999) showed for password
usage, the motivation plays a crucial role. When the user is convinced of the need for secure behavior,
the user is more likely to accept the additional burden to a certain extent. We can thus observe two
interrelated effects: Usability problems cause mistakes that lead to the breakdown of the security
protection due to the lack of ability, and the burden prevents the effective usage of the measure if
there is insufﬁcient motivation.
How, then, do users react if they are forced to use tedious, complicated, and error-prone security
mechanisms, for example, in organizational settings? How do users balance the conﬂicting interests
of themselves and the organization, in the email case, secure communication against productivity?
How do environmental factors, such as time pressure and management pressure for productivity,
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affect the decision? How can we prevent these kinds of conﬂicts in the ﬁrst place? Another example
of this conﬂict is the forging of fax signatures in organizations. Since fax signatures are simple to
forge, it is common practice for secretaries to imitate their superior’s signature if necessary (Odlyzko,
2003). They thus decide to solve the conﬂict in favor of productivity and circumvent the security
measure of guaranteeing the authenticity of the documents. This kind of “rule bending” is essential
to efﬁcient organizations. While it is still possible to alleviate potential losses of productivity caused
by the originally intended procedure in this case, a more secure mechanism could close this “hole”. A
subsequent (more secure) mechanism might result in even more difﬁcult conﬂicts between dangerous
circumventions and degraded productivity. Instead, measures – not only the technical mechanism,
but also organizational policy and procedures – need to carefully account for the context of use and,
in this case, offer the necessary degree of ﬂexibility.
In addition to the functional perspective on security usability – completing primary tasks –, there
are further perspectives, particularly in organizations: Administrators need to conﬁgure the numer-
ous security-relevant systems – for instance, comprehend and modify ﬁrewall rules or authorization
policies. In software development, developers are tasked with implementing complex security mech-
anisms to fulﬁll security requirements; developers risk to introduce critical defects when not entirely
understanding the underlying security models, protocols, or programming interfaces. Accordingly,
security-usability considerations need to encompass not only functional users, but also related per-
spectives, for example, security administrators and software developers.
This chapter provides an overview over the broad ﬁeld of security usability, its problems and
mitigations. It starts out by describing the ﬁeld of HCI and software usability. We then discuss
the range of security usability problems before exploring the respective mitigations, both generally
and focused on authorization. Moreover, we derive principles from the mitigations to apply to our
original problems surrounding authorization.
2.1. Human computer interaction and software usability
Since as early as the 19th century, people have explicitly addressed the interaction of humans and
machines. The analyses started off from the characteristics of work environment as ergonomics
(from Latin “ergon”, “work”). Ergonomics in the modern, broader sense of humans interacting with
technology also outside of work was introduced after the Second World War, often called human
factors. Since the spreading of computers ﬁrst at work, later as part of daily life, human factors
has come to also include the study of how humans interact with computers in the ﬁeld of Human–
Computer Interaction (HCI) (Sears and Jacko, 2008).
HCI’s original goal was to bring cognitive science into software development (Carroll, 2003), com-
parable to how ergonomics introduced scientiﬁc knowledge on humans into work environment. HCI
is a very broad ﬁeld and incorporates research from a range disciplines of computer, management
and social sciences. HCI often requires (over-)simpliﬁcations to be of use for practitioners. Exam-
ples are the cognitive modeling as keystroke counting, checklist-based approaches, and guidelines of
which many are grounded more in common sense than in research (Carroll, 2003). The practitioner’s
perspective of applied HCI is often called usability engineering.
To approach usability in practice, its characteristics are often broken down into multiple concepts
that are partly overlapping. In usability engineering, these concepts are also used as usability quality
attributes to assess the usability of software systems and, in part, as high-level principles of how to
achieve usability. Practitioners and standardization bodies have arrived at different, but similar ways
of differentiating aspects of usability as shown in Table 2.1. The usability engineering practitioners’
deﬁnitions of Nielsen (1997) are both meant to work as quality attributes and principles. The list of
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Nielsen
(1997)
Dix et al. (2004) Shneiderman and
Plaisant (2005)
ISO/IEC
9126-1 (2001)
ISO 9241-
11:1998 (1998)
ISO 9241-
110:2006 (2006)
Operability Effectiveness Suitability for the
task, controllability
Learnability,
memorability
Learnability
(predictability,
familiarity, gen-
eralizability,
consistency, . . . )
Time to learn,
retention over
time
Understand-
ability, learn-
ability
Suitability for
learning, self de-
scriptiveness,
conformity with
user expectations
Efﬁciency Flexibility (sub-
stitutivity, cus-
tomizability, . . . )
Speed of perfor-
mance
Efﬁciency Suitability for
individualization
Errors Robustness (ob-
servability, recov-
erability, . . . )
Rate of errors Error tolerance
Satisfaction Subjective satis-
faction
Attractiveness Satisfaction
Table 2.1.: Usability concepts, principles, and attributes
Shneiderman and Plaisant (2005) can be mapped to Nielsen’s, but Shneiderman stresses that their
attributes are more directly measurable. In contrast, the list of Dix et al. (2004) – “Principles to
Support Usability” – aims to provide design support.
For the standards body perspective, ISO has two distinct approaches on usability. ISO/IEC 9126-
1 (2001) deﬁnes a general software product quality model and measurable quality attributes that
include usability as one of ﬁve major quality factors. The usability quality attribute only covers
part of the breadth of usability, with, for example, efﬁciency and robustness being classiﬁed under
other top-level quality attributes. Since usability even more than other quality aspects depends on
the context of use, usability attributes cannot be considered inherent product attributes only. To
account for the user perspective of product quality, ISO 9126 separately deﬁnes the “quality of use”.
The ISO 9241 series takes a different approach, aiming to provide guidance on achieving usability,
including design processes and measurement. Part 11 deﬁnes usability concepts on a very abstract
level (ISO 9241-11:1998, 1998). The principles that allow practitioners to achieve the ISO 9241-11
concepts are then described in the more concrete context of dialog design in part 110 (ISO 9241-
110:2006, 2006).
Since the aim of this thesis is to improve the state of usability in broader areas than dialog inter-
faces, we will apply the ISO 9241-11 approach of generic top-level goals to prevent a overly narrow
focus, employing the following attribute deﬁnitions, which are closely related to those in the stan-
dard. We consider the artifact broadly and include not only the technical mechanisms, but also the
organizational measure, such as related procedures:
Effectiveness The ability to complete a task entirely and accurately with an artifact,
Efﬁciency The relation of effort necessary to achieve the effective usage of the artifact, that is,
completing the task entirely and accurately,
Satisfaction The joy of the user experience to interact with the artifact.
Of the several underlying principles that can be applied to achieve those usability goals, a number
of principles are particularly important with respect to security usability:
Comprehensibility Individuals’ understanding of an artifact and the underlying model to take ad-
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equate decisions with respect to possible consequences when interaction is required (cf. “un-
derstandability” in ISO/IEC 9126-1, 2001).
Learnability The ability of individuals to acquire the expertise to efﬁciently interact with an artifact,
explicitly through training or implicitly through active use (cf. ISO/IEC 9126-1, 2001).
Flexibility A decreased rigidness of an artifact to allow for higher overall efﬁciency, for example, by
changing the normal behavior in exceptional situations (cf. Dix et al., 2004).
Robustness The tolerance of an artifact to erroneous actions or decisions. Making mistakes is an
inherent aspect of human behavior, particularly under stress and pressure. An artifact should
enable ways to remedy errors retrospectively (cf. Dix et al., 2004).
Maintainability The ability to efﬁciently operate an artifact, including, for example, adapting it to
new requirements and changes in the environment (cf. ISO/IEC 9126-1, 2001).
2.1.1. Research disciplines in HCI
One approach of this thesis is to foster the integration of research disciplines to derive more holis-
tic solutions to authorization problems. Thus, it is useful to explore the numerous research ﬁelds
grouped under HCI. The three major research areas of HCI are computer sciences, human factors
and ergonomics, and management sciences. On the technical side of HCI, researchers from the com-
puter sciences develop the models, mechanisms, and algorithms that both require and improve the
interaction. Computer scientists, for instance, strive to reduce the complexity of the interaction, and
provide for ﬂexible and robust interaction, employing diverse disciplines, such as artiﬁcial intelli-
gence and information visualization.
On the human factors’ side, fundamental research draws from the understanding of human be-
havior and mental processes (Salvendy, 2006; Sears and Jacko, 2008). Accordingly, psychology and
sociology inﬂuence HCI most and provide a wealth of research methods. Psychology itself has many
facets. For HCI, particularly the cognitive psychology with the modeling of mental processes is of
high importance. Cognitive analysis, for example, provides insights into how information displayed
on a screen will be noticed and inﬂuences the decision-making process. Over time, various mental
models have been proposed for HCI, based on theories, analogies, and representations (Payne, 2003).
According to the model of Wickens and Carswell (2006), information processing can be studied to
begin with on the level of the selective or focused attention and visual search. On a second level, the
action selection is performed, primarily affected by the choice that is given as well as the modality of
input and the feedback afterwards. Problem solving models include intuitive judgment (Kahneman
et al., 1982), the rule-based as well as complex problem solving. In “Human Error”, Reason (1990)
studied the different ways in which humans commit errors in the decision-making process. There are
approaches for the quantiﬁcation of the likelihood of human error, the errors’ relation to the context,
and models for error prediction (Sharit, 2006). Cognitive psychology is also the basis for predictive
theories, such as the GOMS model, that provide a simpliﬁcation of cognitive processes to estimate
user performance (Card et al., 1983).
In contrast to the focus on the individual in psychology, sociology studies the interaction among
individuals. The Social Learning Theory of Bandura (1986) describes the multitude of effects from
interactions and observation, and how norms and values are built. Latour (1991) refers to technology
as “society made durable”, considering technology a building block of society. Accordingly, tech-
nology is seen as a means of exercising power and inﬂuences behavior alongside direct interaction,
social norms and values, and formal rules (Clegg, 1989).
18
2.1. Human computer interaction and software usability
Anthropology takes an even broader approach than sociology in that it focuses on cultural and eth-
nic aspects (Räsänen and Nyce, 2006). Important research methods, such as ethnography, originate
from anthropology, enabling researchers to study socio-technical effects and the social context of use
in the actual environments. When employing ethnography for HCI, the “situatedness” of action can
be analyzed, for example, to improve the understanding and representation of the user requirements
(Anderson, 1997).
Since a large proportion of the use of information systems takes place in organizational contexts,
management sciences also form an important aspect of HCI. In these contexts, processes may be
established that support the usage of information systems (Zhang et al., 2006), for example, through
training and awareness programs. Zhang and Li (2004) describe a framework of HCI issues in
organizations.
2.1.2. Guidance and methods for usability engineering
The aforementioned research ﬁelds offer a wide range of empirical methods for HCI research. How-
ever, software engineers who need to craft usable systems resort to more pragmatic guidance and
methods. Guidelines describe approaches to solve speciﬁc challenges and are ideally backed by em-
pirical evidence. Shneiderman and Plaisant (2005) give an overview of well-known guidelines, for
example, for navigation and data entry. Even more comprehensive is the overview published by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which includes the supporting evidence.
Tufte has also published guidelines on information visualization (Tufte, 2000, 2006, 2007). Critics
complain that guidelines are too speciﬁc and therefore incomplete and difﬁcult to apply to usability
problems. If only based on common sense and not backed by profound evidence, guidelines may
be biased and sometimes wrong. While often meant to apply broadly, guidelines are also provided
for operating systems to achieve a consistent user experience throughout the platform (Apple Inc.,
2009). On a more focused level, companies also produce guideline documents for their internal or
external development as part of their brand development.
Principles offer more general advice on how to solve usability problems. Usability principles are
also often used to deﬁne the problem domain, for example, by Nielsen (1997), Shneiderman and
Plaisant (2005), or Dix et al. (2004). Hansen (1971) already described usability principles, stating
that developers should know the user, minimize the need for memorization, optimize operations and
engineer for errors. Shneiderman and Plaisant (2005) have a more detailed list, partly overlapping
with Hansen’s, encompassing for example the need of consistency, informative feedback, the rever-
sal of actions, and keeping the users in control of the interface. The ISO 9241-110 standard deﬁnes
similar principles explicitly for dialog interactions (ISO 9241-110:2006, 2006). Thimbleby (2010)
takes a different approach with his principles for interaction programming, emphasizing, for exam-
ple, similarity to previous versions, simple designs, and that devices should behave like and change
the real world.
While the guidelines and principles are very much motivated from pragmatic needs, theories on
usable systems are closer to the HCI foundations. Descriptive theories support the collaboration and
training of designers, explanatory theories allow them to reason about why certain designs work bet-
ter than others. Prescriptive theories suggest approaches and predictive theories allow one to estimate
performances beforehand (Shneiderman and Plaisant, 2005). An example of a predictive theory is
the GOMS (goals, operators, methods, and selection rules) theory that predicts the performance of
users in a speciﬁc design by counting mental and physical steps in solving a task (Card et al., 1983).
Apart from guidance, methods have been developed that guide not the resulting design, but the
design process. For example, participatory design focuses on the user involvement in software de-
velopment. Ethnography can more thoroughly inform the design process on problems by identifying
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unarticulated problems (Sommerville et al., 1993; Viller and Sommerville, 1999). One variant is
Contextual Design (Beyer and Holtzblatt, 1998), which is primarily based on contextual inquiry:
interviews at workplaces and observing user behavior. Its principles include the focus on the context
as a concrete and ongoing experience, and the interpretation and discussion of observances. While
participatory methods deliver more accurate information on user needs, they can lead to conﬂicting
requirements and, thus, suboptimal compromises (Ives and Olson, 1984). To solve these problems,
the Persona approach has been developed and is widely employed in practice (Cooper, 1999; Cooper
et al., 2007). Personas deﬁne a limited number of ﬁctional people precisely to focus the develop-
ment and support feature debates. Cooper et al. (2007) describe a method to develop a Persona
that includes identifying behavioral variables (activities, attitudes, aptitudes, motivations, skills) and
behavioral patterns based on rich empirical source-material such as interviews.
While Personas support the elicitation of user requirements, task analysis can be applied to accu-
rately model the context in that a product will be used. Task analysis answers the questions, who
carries out tasks (individuals, groups, technical artifacts or agents), which tasks occur (cognitive or
observable actions) and why the tasks need to be fulﬁlled (purpose of the tasks, products, satisfaction)
(Hollnagel, 2006). As an alternative to task-directed design, goal-directed design has been suggested
by Cooper (1999). Goal-directed design starts off from Personas and their goals instead of analyzing
the complex real-world setting that may lead astray from implementing the most essential features.
2.1.3. HCI research methods
The guidance for usability engineering described in the previous section has only a limited robust-
ness with respect to varying contexts of use. As a result, the usability of designs is often explicitly
evaluated as part of the development process. Similarly, to deﬁne guidance and validate research,
HCI relies on empirical studies. The goals of usability evaluations and research methods are simi-
lar, but differ in their methods and in the concreteness of the approach that is evaluated. Usability
evaluation has a more pragmatic scope, focused on identifying major problems in speciﬁc designs.
Conversely, HCI research must provide reproducible validations and thus employs more formal eval-
uation methods (Cairns and Cox, 2008).
Practical usability evaluations are conducted at different points in the development lifecycle, often
iteratively accompanying development. A simple form of usability evaluation is usability inspection
(Holzinger, 2005): domain or user interface experts review a design, a prototype, or a running ap-
plication for potential usability issues. Speciﬁc methods are heuristic evaluations, based on usability
heuristics (Shneiderman and Plaisant, 2005), and cognitive walk-through, focusing on the cognitive
load of users. Results from usability inspections are rather qualitative, generally difﬁcult to compare,
and depend on the expertise of the participating experts.
More direct usability tests with users attempt to quantify the combined performance of the system
and user (Nielsen, 1997). Measurable factors include the success rate, the total time spent, the error
frequency, and the number of help incidents. Apart from quantitative evaluations, which need to be
brought into perspective against reference products, evaluations can focus on discovering problems
(Lewis, 2006). Problem discovery tests typically employ thinking-aloud (Holzinger, 2005), resulting
in qualitative information on the reasons behind problems.
In HCI research, more formal methods are required. Controlled experiments, largely drawn from
psychology, help to evaluate interfaces and styles of interaction to understand the cognitive activities
(Cairns and Cox, 2008). Important design decisions for controlled experiments include whether they
are conducted “within” or “between” subjects and whether they take place in real environments (“in
vivo”) or in constructed ones (“in vitro”). For more realistic results than from laboratory experiments,
ﬁeld observations are also employed (Holzinger, 2005). Surveys are less resource-intensive and allow
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evaluators to capture the opinions from larger numbers of participants. Surveys may be conducted
through questionnaires, implicitly through user action logging, or in interviews and focus-group
discussions (Cairns and Cox, 2008).
Similar to usability guidance, many evaluation approaches are not backed by sound empirical ev-
idence and can result in weak research quality (Lewis, 2006). Often, the evaluations degenerate into
existence proofs with researchers identifying one way in which the new approach is superior to the
established ones. Instead, research beneﬁts to a larger extent if general insights, such as recommen-
dations are derived from rich empirical studies. For practitioners, Greenberg and Buxton (2008) note
that usability evaluations may be harmful by causing premature decisions from early evaluations.
They also argue that usability evaluations often do not adequately take the usefulness, the user expe-
rience, and the breadth of the later context-of-use into account. Particularly, interrelations between
culture and the technology is difﬁcult to estimate in usability evaluations (Greenberg and Buxton,
2008), since the interactions are complex and only occur once the artifact is deployed.
2.2. Security usability problems
While Saltzer and Schroeder (1975) formulated the classical requirements for security usability in
the 1970s, only the general prevalence of threats and the need of security for lay people since the
1990s led to increasing research on usability in security. An obvious question at this point is whether
there are differences in problems and methods from general software usability. The hypothesis is
that the security-usability problems are more critical. General usability issues primarily degrade the
performance of the socio-technical systems and impact the satisfaction of the users. In contrast, a
lack of security usability can render the security architecture ineffective (Church et al., 2008). The
“barn door property” exempliﬁes this effect: Once the horse has left the barn, closing the door cannot
undo the damage. Applying the metaphor to security usability, once critical data is disclosed or lost,
there often is no (simple) way of reversal (Whitten, 2004).
If people are overly burdened by security mechanisms, security-critical mistakes occur (Cranor,
2008; Sharit, 2006; Zurko, 2005; Reason, 1990). A similar effect is caused by a habituation of
acknowledging alerts or warnings. One example can be found in the Windows Universal Access
Control (UAC). Similar to the Unix sudo command, the Windows UAC allows applications to tem-
porarily gain elevated privileges. However, UAC password prompts appear frequently, unnerving
users and, thus, causing them to habitually allow access (DeVaan, 2009). A more deliberate form
in which security usability affects security is the circumvention of security measures, for example,
when users share passwords (Church et al., 2008). Circumvention is often caused by an unaccept-
able effort for the effective use of the measure in relation to the perceived risk from bypassing the
measure.
Jøsang et al. (2007) enumerate three ways in which users may be vulnerable from security usabil-
ity:
• The user may be unable to understand what actions are required because the user is unable to
draw the necessary conclusions,
• The user may have insufﬁcient knowledge and is thus unable to choose the correct action,
• The user may be overburdened mentally or physically to derive the necessary conclusion or
taking the action, including high numbers of repetitions.
Below, we discuss a number of reasons for security-usability failures. First, there are several
psychological characteristics of individuals that inﬂuence the perception of security and risk, and
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thus the effectiveness of security measures and its usability. Second, sociological effects of the
interactions between individuals similarly affect the behavior of individuals concerning security.
Third, as a result of the inherent complexity and abstractness of many security mechanisms, the
cognitive burden for users from security measures can be higher than for general software usability.
Additional challenges stem from the broad range of contexts of use. Security technology is often
reused in different contexts than originally envisioned (Zurko, 2005), resulting in further usability
problems. Moreover, the security requirements vary widely between users and even for individual
users (Xia and Brustoloni, 2005).
2.2.1. Psychological factors: Rationality in decision-making
Already Saltzer’s early security usability requirements draw from human characteristics by formu-
lating the psychological acceptability of security measures (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975; Bishop,
2005). More generally, cognitive psychology can explain the decisions regarding security (West,
2008). Since Kahneman and Tversky’s experiments in the 1970s, the “irrationality” of human be-
havior is accepted (Kahneman et al., 1982; Gilovich et al., 2002). They showed that humans are
not acting rationally in the sense of a homo economicus who consciously weighs the outcomes of
alternative options (Simon, 1979). Instead, people are heavily biased in their intuitive judgment, for
example, by valuing losses higher than gains (Prosperity Theory) or inadvertently factoring in prior
knowledge, even if unrelated. The main reason is that intuitive decision-making is highly optimized
through heuristics, such as, from prior knowledge.
Based on these psychological effects, we can describe the behavior of individuals that at times
seems irrational. West (2008), for example, discusses how safety is more abstract as a reward than
the primary goal, often a functional task, particularly without proper awareness of the associated
risks. In security usability literature, this effect has been termed “secondary goal problem” (Whitten,
2004; Sasse et al., 2001) – an effect well-known in ergonomics (cf. Wickens et al., 1983). For
example, when sending an email, the users’ goal is to communicate, not to encrypt and sign the
email. The integrity and conﬁdentiality of the email is only seen as the secondary goal after the
one to communicate at all. DeWitt and Kuljis (2006) show in a case study that users compromise
security to complete their work. In many environments, only a limited amount of additional effort for
security is acceptable. Beautement et al. (2008) proposes the Compliance Budget to estimate when
individuals will accept security mechanisms and at what point the “budget” of acceptable security
effort is depleted and individuals will stop complying. In a similar line of thought, Herley (2010)
argues that individuals take a very economic approach when they circumvent security mechanisms
and ignore security advice. However, the users’ framing of the decisions is bounded (Simon, 1979):
The users ignore or are unaware of the externalities from their actions, resulting in decisions that
seem “irrational” to experts.
The psychological challenges can also be considered from an explicit attack perspective: Nohlberg
(2009) describes various forms of deception that humans are prone to, ranging from a natural obedi-
ence to authority and reactions to scarcity over exploiting commitments and striving for consistency
to simple social proof.
From the software development perspective, the secondary-goal factor may also affect the require-
ments elicitation for security (Tondel et al., 2008). On a high level, abstract non-functional security
requirements compete for development resources with functional requirements that provide more
immediate and more directly measurable added value. In addition, security requirements may also
conﬂict with other non-functional requirements such as performance.
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2.2.2. The social inﬂuence on individuals’ behavior
Apart from the psychological effects, the behavior and decision-making of individuals is inﬂuenced
by peers, society and culture (Bandura, 1986; Dontamsetti and Narayanan, 2009). Effects may stem
from social norms and values; for example, the locking of desktop screens for breaks is uncon-
sciously linked to a lack of trust towards colleagues. The reason is that the social context changes
from earlier, for example, non-technical contexts, but the social norms are not following suit even
though they might not be adequate for the changed situation (Church et al., 2008). Bandura (1986)
describes with the Social Learning Theory how, for example, observational learning, self-regulation
and reﬂection, and the ﬂow of information in social networks inﬂuences human behavior. The Cir-
cuits of Power (Clegg, 1989) formulate three interacting levels on which power is enforced in society
and through technology, and thus inﬂuences behavior: The “episodic” circuit refers to actual expe-
riences, such as direct commands from superiors, “social integration” encompasses the social norms
and values, and “system integration” the technology and formalized rules. Latour (1991) considers
“technology. . . society made durable”, thus mechanisms and rules as an extension of societal norms
and values, and applies Actor-Network Theory to a hotel-key example to show how technology in-
ﬂuences behavior. Inglesant and Sasse (2011) employ this approach to discuss the compliance of
employees with security policies.
Risk perception is similarly inﬂuenced by societal structures. Adams (1995) argues that it is
difﬁcult to force people to speciﬁc levels of risk mitigation, since they are required to take risks in
everyday life, for example in trafﬁc, and unconsciously accept residual risks. According to Adams,
risk is socially and culturally constructed: people adjust to risks similar to a “risk thermostat” – with
improved security measures, people become more daring and might even neglect common sense.
2.2.3. Complexity and the incomprehensibility of the abstract
Security technology has developed through many iterations of increasing complexity to fulﬁll secu-
rity and other non-functional requirements – despite Saltzer’s demand of as simple security designs
as possible in the 1970s (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975). This effect can be observed in authorization
models, arriving at role-based models for maintainability at the cost of an abstract and less com-
prehensible model than, for example, access control lists. Similarly, simple pre-shared key schemes
for transport encryption developed into more maintainable, but more complex public-key-based sys-
tems. As a result, many users cannot comprehend today’s security conﬁguration, as shown in a large
survey among users of above-average “IT literacy” (Furnell et al., 2006). Blackwell et al. (2008)
generally argue that forcing computational thinking on humans can reduce the overall quality of the
result, since important non-computational confutations are lost. Similarly, the abstract of security
mechanisms encumbers comprehensibility.
In order to cope with this complexity the approach traditionally has been to hide the complexity
from the users, creating a gap between using security mechanisms and understanding them (Zurko,
2005). In normal operation, users usually are not required to understand the background of the
employed security technology. However, in exceptional situations, for example, in case of attacks,
security mechanisms require user intervention. Not understanding the background may then cause
the user to take wrong and potentially dangerous decisions. A prominent example is Web browsing
over TLS-secured connections. In normal operation, the complexity of the public-key infrastructure
is hidden from the user. In case of defective server conﬁgurations or attacks, warning dialogs then
require users to make difﬁcult decisions. This example also demonstrates the difﬁculty of providing
useful feedback related to security technology, an important usability principle (Whitten, 2004).
Achieving usable security is further complicated by the fact that security usability acts on multiple
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Field study Laboratory Analytical ∑
Authoring 10 10 9 29
Making 7 1 1 9
Functional 2 0 2 4
Developing 1 3 0 4
12 10 11 33
Table 2.2.: Perspectives covered by literature on authorization problems
layers. The aforementioned factors focused on the functional user of interacting with and conﬁg-
uring security mechanism for functional tasks. Centralized security administration in organizations
may partly relieve functional users from the conﬁguration burden. Here, the burden shifts to se-
curity administrators to conﬁgure the mechanisms, depending on usable conﬁguration models and
supporting tools. A study on how administrators use security tools identiﬁed the lack of knowledge,
insufﬁcient awareness, and poor strategies as reasons for vulnerabilities (Furnell and Bolakis, 2004).
Administration usability problems also occur for ﬁrewall conﬁguration, for example, due to the low-
level conﬁguration languages that require translations from high-level policies and encompass large
number of rules with hidden interactions (Geng et al., 2005).
On a third layer, the security mechanisms need to be implemented as part of the software develop-
ment. Developers often rely on security APIs and need to be careful to prevent implementation mis-
takes that might render the security mechanism ineffective. Compared to the research on problems
of functional users and administrators, there has been little work on security usability in software
development.
2.3. Problems surrounding authorization
The focus of this thesis is authorization. Accordingly, we narrow our focus from the general prob-
lems previously identiﬁed in security usability to those in the area of authorization. Speciﬁcally,
we review 31 publications that describe problems with authorization (cf. Table D.1 in Appendix D).
Going back to the rough sketch of perspectives in authorization in Section 1.1, we can structure prior
literature according to the perspectives covered. Additionally, we differentiate here for the security
management between those taking the decisions (policy making) and those modifying the policy
(policy authoring). While numerous publications cover several perspectives as being affected by
problems, policy authoring is most commonly addressed as shown in Table 2.2. In contrast, only
a small proportion of publications touch the problems of functional staff and developers and few
problems are explicitly stated for these perspectives. The argumentation of the publications is based
on ﬁeld studies (subjective or objective data from practice), laboratory experiments (data collected in
controlled environments), and analytical considerations. The context of most of the publications is
organizational, with selective publications on authorization in Grid, for ﬁrewalls, social networking,
and the authorization of applications.
2.3.1. Policy authoring
To a large extent, studies in the area of authorization usability focus on the usability of policy author-
ing interfaces. Zurko and Simon (1996) formulated the following requirements for a usable policy
authoring interface from their early study on usable security: (1) integrated management of different
policy aspects, such as rules and groups, (2) convenient interface even for complex rules, (3) consis-
tency checks, (4) high-level overview of the consequences of rules, and (5) a display of the rules that
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apply to a speciﬁc object. Whalen et al. (2006) report in their study on authorization in organizations
that users still ﬁnd it difﬁcult to manage policies. Typical problems are the high effort that needs to
be invested (Bertino et al., 2008; Gallaher et al., 2002), the complexity of rules from the high quan-
tity (Al-Shaer and Hamed, 2003) and from the requirement complexity (Smetters and Good, 2009).
Problems in authoring of policies can lead to misconﬁguration as the result of conﬁguration errors
(Smetters and Good, 2009; Wool, 2004).
One cause of problems with the authoring of policies can be found in the characteristics of the
authorization models that determine what types of rules can be formulated. Bauer et al. (2009) found
in a ﬁeld study on organizational policy-authoring that the model expressiveness is an important
factor. Coarse controls may, for example, lead to the resource owners circumventing the controls to
achieve their goals, as Ahern et al. (2007) showed for social networking authorization. Flexibility
(Bauer et al., 2008a) and the handling of exceptions (Sikkel and Stiemerling, 1998; Bauer et al.,
2009) can be necessary to efﬁciently model restrictions. Moreover, Brostoff et al. (2005) show that
the comprehensibility of the model is important in policy authoring – for example, to allow authors
to understand the role concepts, default rules, and different kinds of assignments (cf. also Inglesant
et al., 2008).
Even more broadly discussed in literature is the comprehensibility of the policy itself (Brostoff
et al., 2005). Policy authors also need to understand the consequences of their changes (Rode et al.,
2006). In some cases, there is a lack of transparency of the currently enforced policy, caused, for
instance, by a misleading presentation of the policy (Yee, 2005) or a missing visualization of the
effective permissions that are actually enforced (Maxion and Reeder, 2005). The transparency aspect
is particularly important for interrelated rules, policy conﬂicts, and their resolution (Reeder et al.,
2008, 2011). When the policy is authored as a textual representation, the rule syntax may cause
problems (Reeder et al., 2007), as can inconsistent policy ﬁles (Herzog and Shahmehri, 2006). If tool
support is provided, the tool’s usability can affect policy authors in numerous ways – for example,
when the tool uses inconsistent terms (Reeder et al., 2007), or when it lacks the information needed
to formulate the policy (Maxion and Reeder, 2005).
2.3.2. Problems for the functional, policy-making, and development perspectives
Less pronounced in literature than the usability problems for policy authors are those for functional
users, policy makers, and developers. For functional users, who need to interact with information
systems to complete their work tasks, Whalen et al. (2006) found that authorization often interferes
with their work. Johnson et al. (2009) argues that strict restrictions can have adverse effects and force
users to circumvent the authorization measures, for example, by sharing their password with people
who need access to additional resources.
Policy makers take the decisions on changes to the policy and need to prevent overly restrictive
or permissive permissions. The ﬁeld study of Bauer et al. (2009) showed that it can be difﬁcult for
multiple policy makers and authors to interact. They also found that problems with the state of the
documentation can impact the decision-making. Sinclair et al. (2008) reported that the complexity
of the risk assessment can be high, due to the dynamics in organizations, the number of roles, and
the heterogeneous applications involved.
The literature is very thin on what problems developers have with the integration of authorization
in systems. Zurko and Simon (1996) recognized that it can be difﬁcult for developers to implement
the authorization controls in applications. Herzog and Shahmehri (2006) found that not only policy
authors are affected by problematic authorization frameworks, but also the developers who need to
integrate the enforcement. In a study of enforcement integration in the Linux kernel, Jaeger et al.
(2004) showed that in multiple instances, the enforcement was not correctly placed.
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Study Study design Environment Focus/scope Findings Recommendations
Sikkel and
Stiemerling
(1998)
Subjective:
interviews
Private and
public orga-
nizations
How users
specify
policies
Policies are stated as
grants/denials, reﬁned by
exceptions, e.g. scopes
Provide expressive
model: object grouping,
scope, delegation
Whalen
et al. (2006)
Subjective:
survey,
interviews
Medium-
sized re-
search
laboratory
Individuals’
problems
from mecha-
nisms
Users manage policies,
but struggle with it;
authorization interferes
with primary tasks
Integrate with workﬂows,
support social controls,
visualize policies, and
simplify management
Bauer et al.
(2009)
Subjective:
interviews
Diverse orga-
nizations
Challenges
for policy
professionals
Problems from stake-
holder interactions and
inadequate models
Support communication
of authors, improve au-
thorization models
Smetters
and Good
(2009)
Objective:
historical
policy data
Medium-
sized corpo-
ration
Usage of
authorization
and models
Complex, rarely changed
policies, management er-
rors
Simpler models, patterns,
better management tools
Table 2.3.: Prior studies on authorization in organizations
2.3.3. Challenges in organizations
Since the primary focus of this dissertation is organizational authorization, it is useful to consider
how existing literature covers this area. A small number of studies have analyzed how challenges in
authorization actually materialize in organizations, summarized in Table 2.3. Three of the four iden-
tiﬁed studies exclusively focus on the challenges in policy authoring. Sikkel and Stiemerling (1998),
Bauer et al. (2009), and Smetters and Good (2009) examine how the expressiveness of authorization
models affect policy management and suggest model improvements. In addition, Bauer also ana-
lyzes the interactions of policy authors with different roles. In contrast, Whalen not only explores
the problems of managing authorization, but also how authorization interferes with the primary tasks
of functional users.
These studies still primarily focus on authorization usability issues on an individual level, primar-
ily with respect to policy authoring. The consequences of the identiﬁed challenges remain implicit.
Since most problems rarely become visible for management and then only anecdotally as individual
cases, the authorization issues are still largely ignored in organizations. One reason is that the scale
and the actual impacts on organizational goals are unknown. To make a case for fundamentally ad-
dressing the problems that functional users are faced with every day, the full breadth of authorization
challenges needs to be explored with their complex interrelations and, particularly, their impact on
organizational goals. This will be pursued in this thesis.
2.4. Addressing security usability problems
While early endeavors in security usability focused on what goes wrong, for example, in the case
of “Why Johnny can’t encrypt” (Whitten and Tygar, 1999) and the analysis of problems with pass-
words (Adams et al., 1997), the research gradually shifted to also include approaches to solve the
problems. Researchers created numerous guideline documents and proposed principles on how to
develop usable security mechanisms (Nurse et al., 2011): Garﬁnkel (2005) developed guidelines on
interface design for security mechanisms; Yee (2005) focused on authorization and suggests prin-
ciples such as ﬁnding “the most comfortable way to do tasks with the least granting of authority”.
Whitten (2004), on the other hand, proposes methodologies and principles, including building suit-
able security metaphors, incrementally increasing complexity, and the principle of learning “well in
advance”.
Many security usability guidelines and methodologies have a narrow scope and are based on weak
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empirical evidence. Little empirically-backed prescriptive theories have been developed for security
usability that allow developers to derive concrete approaches. In the following, we group existing
approaches under three themes: Reducing the burden of users interacting with security mechanisms,
making the abstract mechanisms and models understandable, and integrating the perspectives of
functional users, security management, and development.
2.4.1. Reducing the burden
One approach to improve the security usability is to reduce the burden that is placed on the user.
The rationale is that a high cognitive effort imposed by a security mechanism will lead to errors and
deter users from employing the mechanism. There are various ways to reduce the burden: First, the
balance between the security requirements and the usability impacts can be shifted towards usability
by applying effective risk management. Advocates of “good-enough security,” including Tognazzini
(2005) and Sandhu (2003), argue for an appropriate balance between the business needs and security
measures. Garﬁnkel (2005) similarly formulates a security design principle of “good security now”
to prevent users from ﬁnding their own, possibly even less secure, approach.
In another approach to reduce the users’ burden, Zurko (2005) demands that security-related de-
cisions should be minimized. This can be achieved, for example, by incorporating existing user
behavior in security models and thus prevent extra burden in addition to the usual tasks (Zurko,
2005). One example of this approach is implicit granting of authorization to ﬁles. Following an
email analogy, Johnson et al. (2009) propose a mechanism in which access is granted by sending a
document to a user. The general approach in reducing explicit security decisions is to make security
technology transparent for the user and thus hide its complexity to reduce the cognitive burden. This
approach is in line with the oft-demanded security that “just works”. Accordingly, Smetters and
Grinter (2002) see implicit security as one of the building blocks in useful and usable systems. In
their design proposal, security-related decisions are derived from user actions related to the primary
goal. In the domain of application authorization, Yee (2005) differentiates security by admonition
from security by designation. Security by admonition is the conventional approach, in which static
rules constrain an application and require the prior conﬁguration. In security by designation, the user
has to acknowledge each widening of the constraints as part of the work tasks, possibly implicitly as
in the aforementioned email analogy.
The latter approach aims to reduce the conﬁguration effort. The user will often need to have a deep
understanding of the complex security model to make educated decisions when conﬁguring security
mechanisms. An increasingly common approach is to provide decision support, often based on risk
assessments to allow the user to adequately take the various factors into account (Beresnevichiene
et al., 2010; Parkin et al., 2010). Circumventing the need of explicit conﬁguration, adaptive systems
respond to user actions and conﬁgure themselves accordingly (Ackerman and Mainwaring, 2005).
One of Garﬁnkel’s design principles is to develop standardized security policies that may be reused
in different application contexts and lower the threshold for understanding the conﬁguration of new
products (Garﬁnkel, 2005).
The opposite approach to reducing the end-user conﬁguration burden is the adaptability and tai-
lorability of security systems. These systems allow users modify an application’s behavior at the
surface or at deeper levels (Ackerman and Mainwaring, 2005), taking inspiration from end-user de-
velopment (EUD) (Lieberman, 2006) or “meta-design” (Fischer, 1999). The opposing principles of
reducing the conﬁguration burden and the adaptability or tailorability expose the trade-off between
the learning effort and the achievable efﬁciency at expert level. While the novice performance will
suffer from the up-front learning effort for understanding the conﬁguration mechanisms, experts will
proﬁt in the long run from very high productivity. In the end, security measures need to ﬁt the context
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(Sasse, 2011), including the experience of the involved individuals.
One approach to handle the challenge of diverse types of users is to cluster users according to their
speciﬁc goals and knowledge level to offer appropriate interfaces or adequately interpret the users’
actions (Ackerman and Mainwaring, 2005). Following this path, Whitten’s design pattern of “safe
staging” offers adequate abstraction levels of the user interface for different user groups (Whitten,
2004). Whitten argues that this approach helps to bridge the gap between novices and experts by
incrementally increasing complexity with increasing expertise.
2.4.2. Making the abstract understandable
Understanding is important on two levels for security usability: to adequately interact with the tech-
nical mechanism and for the security risks. First, understanding the security mechanism improves
the ability of users to make adequate decisions if interaction is required. Second, motivation guides
behavior and is thus an important factor for security to be effective. Understanding and being aware
of the risks from avoiding the necessary effort will often increase the motivation to behave more
securely.
Whitten (2004) argues in favor of creating understanding of the technology instead of hiding se-
curity mechanisms as proposed in the previous section. Invisible security can be dangerous since
the users are missing the crucial information of whether they are protected and adequate security
is in place (Zurko, 2005). The choice between explaining and hiding the complexity of security
technology depends on the context. Relevant aspects are, for instance, the user expertise level, the
motivation to learn and the likeliness of exceptional situations that would require user interaction.
Whitten (2004) developed narrowly scoped rules on the application behavior that is required for the
usability of invisible security: If security mechanisms fail, either the user should be disallowed to
continue or the lack of protection must be made visible to the user. Accordingly, Hertzum et al.
(2007) identify three alternatives for online-banking security: the instruction of users, the automa-
tion of tasks, and the understanding of the security technology. In instruction and automation, users
complete tasks without understanding how the security mechanisms work.
There are numerous ways of how to explain security to users, including online documentation,
context-sensitive help, and wizards and assistants (Herzog and Shahmehri, 2007). Explanations pri-
marily occur when security technology fails or warnings are displayed because of suspected attacks.
To prevent the conﬂicts between the primary tasks and the effort necessary to understand the prob-
lems, Whitten (2004) proposes the principle to learn “well in advance”. A related approach is “mas-
tery learning” through automatic training, similar to tutors, in order to expand the users’ mental
model on security tasks (Ackerman and Mainwaring, 2005).
According to Zurko (2005), people also understand physical security, at least on an abstract level,
and this should be reﬂected in information security. For example, without the knowledge of the tech-
nical details of door locks, people can decide to lock the door or keep it unlocked. However, it is
difﬁcult to directly apply behavior or knowledge from the physical world as metaphors for virtual
mechanisms (Wash, 2010). Complex, abstract, intangible risks and mechanisms are more difﬁcult
to understand for humans than concrete and real mechanisms (West, 2008; Blackwell et al., 2008).
Thus, we need to aim for concreteness to make security mechanisms and risks comprehensible. Wash
(2010) explores the mental models that people have of security to allow designers to continue from
existing knowledge. Whitten (2004) proposes a development methodology to derive appropriate vi-
sual metaphors for security technology. Hardee et al. (2006) recommend in a study of computer
risk perception to more explicitly formulate monetary and property losses in warnings. Dontam-
setti and Narayanan (2009) suggest a conscious competence model that relates users’ awareness to
their knowledge levels to design appropriate training and awareness campaigns. Roper et al. (2005)
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distinguish between the approaches of training, education, awareness, and motivation to improve
people’s behavior with respect to security. Stanton et al. (2005) propose a taxonomy of user security
behaviors along the dimensions of expertise and intention and conclude from their model that im-
proving awareness is often the least expensive way of improving security. Beautement et al. (2008)
recommend adjusting the organizational culture for a higher focus on security risks. This can also
lessen the management pressure for productivity that implicitly reduces the value of secure behavior
and counteract the individuals’ drive towards trading security for higher work efﬁciency (Zipf, 1949;
Rasmussen, 1997).
2.4.3. Integrating perspectives for participative management and development
The approaches discussed in the previous sections demonstrate that security usability requires both,
adequate management of deﬁning the needs and conﬁgurations, and adequate development on the
technical side. In case of management, the general goals are to improve expertise, awareness and
motivation among users as well as establish rules for various stakeholders. Depending on the spe-
ciﬁc context, management may take a variety of shapes. For example, in the context of society,
knowledge and awareness can be primarily inﬂuenced through broad awareness campaigns or in
education. Rules are typically established in legislation, such as in privacy regulations. Explicit
security management is more common in organizational contexts where there is more direct control
over the individuals.
To arrive at adequate decisions based on the security and functional needs, security management
requires intensive communication between the affected stakeholders (Jaferian et al., 2008). Only
close interaction can lead to the necessary balance between conﬂicting objectives, such as between
productivity and security (Besnard and Arief, 2004). Albrechtsen (2007) suggests a user-involving
approach to security management, since it can be useful to exploit the domain knowledge of func-
tional users (Church, 2008). Flechais and Sasse (2009) show in a model of the stakeholder interaction
how functional, management, and development perspectives contribute their knowledge and experi-
ence to arrive at appropriate security measures.
Accordingly, interaction not only needs to be fostered between functional user and security man-
agement, but also with the developers. Developers often need to ﬁnd trade-offs for each individual
security-usability problem and context. Karat (1989) described an iterative security-usability process
already at the end of the 1980s. A further example of a development process with a focus on secu-
rity usability is the Appropriate and Effective Guidance for Information Security (AEGIS) (Flechais
et al., 2003, 2007). AEGIS integrates security usability aspects in the requirement, design, and im-
plementation phase of software development processes and particularly emphasizes the integration
of the different stakeholders.
2.4.4. Speciﬁc approaches to the problems in authorization
Authorization has been the subject of a large number of research publications that cover approaches
in theory and practice. In this section, we examine selected relevant approaches. The selection is
aimed to provide a representative coverage of the ﬁeld even though only a small proportion of the
large body of publications on authorization can be discussed. A list of the considered approaches,
categorized by the basis of the respective argument is given in Table E.1 in Appendix E1.
In the examined literature, the coverage of authorization problems is very heterogeneous, both
in quantity and in quality. For a quantitative indication of the distribution of approaches, each is
1The table is also structured already according to and contains the authorization requirements to be introduced in Chap-
ter 6 to prevent repetition.
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Category Description Example
Concrete approach A very concrete concept or implementation of an ap-
proach to address authorization problems
Tool prototype imple-
mentation
Method A methodological approach to solve a problem Policy lifecycle model
Principle A proved approach claimed to apply for a broad range
of problems and contexts
“Make authority trans-
parent”
Recommendation Identiﬁed ways of addressing problems, often identi-
ﬁed from results of ﬁeld studies
“Integrate authorization
in workﬂows”
General approach An approach from a related problem domain, not nec-
essarily already applied to authorization in particular
Task analysis
Security best practice Often formulated in best-practice documents in stan-
dardization
“Training and aware-
ness campaigns”
Requirement Reference to more concrete requirements that provide
additional approaches to address the problems (cf. Sec-
tion 6)
–
Table 2.4.: Categories of approaches
assigned to one of the categories listed in Table 2.4. Of the 128 identiﬁed approaches, 112 directly
apply to authorization (leaving out security best practices and general approaches). 67 of these
approaches are concrete approaches or methods. Of the concrete approaches and methods, 72%
primarily address development. Even though these quantities are not based on a comprehensive
literature review, the numbers indicate a pronounced focus on development aspects and, particularly,
on the usability of policies and tools. This matches the bias in the prior research on the problems
with authorization towards authoring as seen in Section 2.3. The hypothesis of this thesis is that to
effectively solve the problems with authorization in organizations, we have to broaden this narrow
focus, considering non-technical aspects and the interrelation between stakeholders with different
perspectives on authorization (cf. Section 1.2).
2.5. Methods in research on security usability
Whereas the HCI research offers a broad range of methods to analyze and address usability problems
(cf. Section 2.1.3), security usability research has often relied on a limited set of research approaches
(cf. Table 2.5)2. Analytical research is common, in which researchers reason on observed problems
to deﬁne, for example, design guidelines (e.g. Yee, 2005). Equally common are laboratory exper-
iments, such as the well-known “Johnny” study (Whitten and Tygar, 1999). While based on more
reliable evidence than analytical reasoning, laboratory studies on security usability are problematic
regarding validity (Sotirakopoulos et al., 2011), and only offer a limited amount of insight if con-
structed as quantitative studies. The research questions in surveys are often broader and the number
of participants in the study may be larger. In-depth case studies, often based on interviews with prac-
titioners, can produce much richer results than surveys, potentially revealing underlying problems
– for example, in the study on password use by Adams et al. (1997). If adequate data is available,
objective empirical evidence may be even more reliable and can reduce biases of participants and
researchers potentially present in subjective data (cf. Ericsson and Simon, 1993). However, only a
small number of studies on security usability has been based on objective evidence.
One problem with the particular focus on analytical and laboratory research (usability evaluations)
2Since the overview of research and the applied methods in Table D.1 focuses on authorization, it shows a skewed picture
regarding the methods.
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Method/evidence Example
Analytical
Anecdotal evidence Identifying general problems in security management (Blakley, 1996)
Analytical reasoning Eliciting design guidelines (Yee, 2005)
Design activity Designing a tool for policy management (Vaniea et al., 2008a)
Subjective empirical
Laboratory experiments Evaluation of a tool for email security (Whitten and Tygar, 1999)
Survey Comprehensbility of end-user security (Furnell et al., 2006)
Field/case study Interviews on password use (Adams et al., 1997)
Objective empirical
Usage data Evaluating usage data of social network use (Ahern et al., 2007)
Artifacts Evaluating historical policy data (Smetters and Good, 2009)
Table 2.5.: Methods in research on security usability
is that the results are often limited to insights on the interaction of the individual with security mea-
sures. This psychological perspective misses the sociology component in security usability, particu-
larly the interaction of stakeholders in organizations and in society (power relations, organizational
communication). One of the themes of this dissertation thus is to broaden the research approach
and particularly consider the interaction between different stakeholders for more comprehensive ap-
proaches to usable security.
2.6. Beyond the individual: The organizational and security economics
In this chapter, we reviewed numerous approaches to identify problems with the usability of security
and to solve the problems. The approaches typically focused on the individual user – for example
reducing the burden, addressing complexity, increasing awareness, and appropriate management and
development. These individual approaches seem to be insufﬁcient to solve the problems. The narrow
perspective on the individual misses the broader picture of the context of use and fails to account for
the behavior of the individuals in the societal setting. This particularly becomes apparent when
security technology is designed with only the ability of users in mind, either for the expert or for the
“dumb user” (Sasse, 2011). This approach neglects the actual needs and primary tasks of users, and
that users often have good reasons to choose insecure behavior (Herley, 2010). A current stream of
research in security usability attempts to broaden and deepen the perspective and takes an economic
approach to model and analyze behavior – and particularly considers the context of use.
Economic security usability models focus on the analysis of individuals’ behavior and study their
cost/beneﬁt trade-offs. For safety risks, Rasmussen (1997) explains the organizational dynamics
from users (drive for least effort), management (productivity) and safety campaigns (safety). He ob-
serves that under these inﬂuences, user behavior tends to be unsafe. In information security, Besnard
and Arief (2004) apply similar approaches, discussing cognitive efforts and beneﬁts of individuals.
Beautement et al. (2008) take a broader approach with their “Compliance Budget” and particularly
focus on the perceived costs and beneﬁts and how these explain (non-)compliance with security
policies. Focusing on the perception, their model includes further external factors, apart from the
cognitive efforts, that motivate compliance, such as the culture of the organization. In addition to
the economic behavior, we need to take into account that individuals do not behave fully rational
as a “Homo economicus” (Simon, 1979), but rather base their decisions on incomplete knowledge
(Baddeley, 2011) and are affected by cognitive biases and heuristics (West, 2008).
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2.6.1. Perceived effort of secure behavior
For individuals interacting with information systems to complete tasks, behaving in a secure way and
complying with security policies often creates additional effort when compared to a system without
security mechanisms. For example, when using encrypted USB sticks, users cannot directly access
the ﬁles, but need to start a dedicated program instead (Beautement et al., 2008). Beautement et al.
(2008) lists consequences of increased physical and cognitive load, embarrassment, missed business
opportunities, and the general “hassle factor” as typical additional costs for the individual. While
many of these efforts are actual, it is necessary to stress that depending on the context, the perception
of the effort differs. For instance, having to request a password reset shortly before a deadline will
be perceived as higher hindrance than in a relaxed situation. Beautement et al. (2008) further argues
with the Compliance Budget that every effort required for compliance reduces the acceptability of
later efforts.
There are two primary means available to adjust the perceived effort (Beautement et al., 2008).
Directly, the design of the measure can be improved to reduce the cognitive load, optimize the pro-
cedures involved, or reduce the friction with the primary tasks of an affected individual. Indirectly,
training and education can both reduce the actual effort by optimizing the usage of a mechanism and
reduce the perception of the effort by reducing the perception of the obstacles from mechanisms.
2.6.2. Perceived beneﬁt from secure behavior
When individuals decide to use security measures effectively and behave securely, this may incur
individual costs as laid out in the previous section. However, individuals also beneﬁt from secure
behavior. Beautement et al. (2008) give the examples of avoiding consequences of a security breach
and of sanctions as beneﬁts. These factors mostly concern the personal security of the individual,
preventing disciplinary measures in case of breaking formal rules or coworkers’ contempt when
breaking informal rules. Personal security also encompasses dangers to the personal data of individ-
uals, for instance, when they share passwords that also give access to the data on the personal salary
in HR self-service. Beneﬁts may also be directly awarded as personal gains, for example, when se-
cure behavior is part of the personal performance objectives. More indirectly, beneﬁts occur from
internalized organizational security goals, when secure behavior reduces the risks to “their data” and
secure behavior is abstractly seen as “doing the right thing” (cf. Inglesant and Sasse, 2011).
Both personal and organizational risks have the problem of the abstract nature and the subjective
perception of risks. Generally, objective risks are difﬁcult to deﬁne and social constructivists even
deny any objectivity in risk, since risk is always based on social norms, values, and risk framing
(Arnoldi, 2009). Statman (2010) found that risk tolerance is associated with culture and that toler-
ance is relatively low for individualistic and egalitarian countries. Borge (2001) lists common risk
perception pitfalls, including overconﬁdence and optimism, faulty hindsight and pattern seeking,
and inertia that prevents adequate reactions to risks. Similarly, the risk thermostat of Adams (1999)
attempts to explain why people react irrationally with respect to risks, predicting that people are
prepared to take higher risks the safer they feel.
Organizations can increase the perceived beneﬁt in order to increase the likelihood of secure be-
havior. Beautement et al. (2008) argues, for example, that the Compliance Budget can be increased,
that is, individuals will continue longer to comply with the rules. A sociological model of inﬂuencing
individuals’ behavior is given by Clegg (1989) in his “Circuits of power” (cf. Section 2.2.2 and In-
glesant and Sasse, 2011) with its three interacting layers: the episodic layer of direct experience, the
social layer of informal social rules, and the domination layer of mechanisms and formal rules. The
episodic layer primarily acts through direct experience, for example, from commands from superi-
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ors. On the social layer, education and awareness can similarly increase the perceived beneﬁt when
organizational goals are internalized as motivation (cf. the understanding of risks as motivation in
Section 2.4.2). On the dominance layer of the circuits framework, clear formal rules, such as, or-
ganizational security policies, combined with technical measures, such as technical restrictions, and
organizational measures of effective sanctions can also increase the perceived beneﬁt from secure
behavior.
2.6.3. Organizational security
Since the behavioral models focus on the prediction of user behavior, they lack the ability to compre-
hensively support decisions on the design of security measures in organizations. To support design
decisions, we need to incorporate the goals of the organization, as, for example, proposed by Parkin
et al. (2010) in a prototype on password policies. Speciﬁcally, we need to go beyond the individual’s
trade-offs that govern the behavior and take on a systemic perspective: how to achieve effective and
efﬁcient security in the organizational or societal context.
In economic terms, the behavioral models are important since they let us consider the externalities
of security behavior, that is, how the behavior of individuals affects others. Externalities can be
positive, for example, when the behavior of one individual also reduces others’ risks, or negative,
when the behavior exposes others to risks (Pallas, 2009, Section 4.1.1). However, for organizations,
the goal is not to achieve absolute security of every individual behaving perfectly, but adequate and
efﬁcient security. Organizations aim to expend the least effort necessary to achieve effective security
according to the security needs. Pallas (2009) formulates this in economic terms: Organizations
strive for the optimum payoff from information security. Although not accurately measurable, “the
optimal level of security is reached where the marginal costs of an additional unit of security equal
its marginal beneﬁt”. He differentiates between direct costs of implementing technology as well as
the coordination, motivation, and supporting measures, such as awareness campaigns. Indirect costs
incur from averse effects of information security, such as productivity losses from the time spent on
security measures. To derive the optimal level of security, these costs need to be contrasted with the
beneﬁts. Direct beneﬁts result from the reduction of risks from additional security measures, indirect
beneﬁts from further value of the measures, for example, from certiﬁcations that are the prerequisite
for loans or contracts (Pallas, 2009).
2.6.4. An economical and organizational approach
This thesis aims to broaden the focus beyond the individual, who is the primary focus of prior re-
search on authorization. In contrast, we will take both an economical perspective on the individual’s
behavior and an organizational approach to consider the context of use. Speciﬁcally, we will start out
from the organization’s goals – for example, the level of security and productivity. Accordingly, we
will transfer the economic behavior models to an organizational perspective and model their factors
as the perceived effort of and perceived beneﬁt from secure behavior of individuals, similar to the
“perceived costs and beneﬁt” of Beautement et al. (2008).
2.7. Applying security usability to authorization
This chapter started out by reviewing HCI and software usability, listing principles, such as compre-
hensibility and ﬂexibility, as well as usability engineering and research methods. To achieve usable
authorization in systems, these principles, guidance, and methods are necessary to understand prob-
lems and improve measures. Similarly, the problems raised and the approaches presented on security
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usability in this chapter directly apply to the usability of authorization. We need to be aware of the
security risks from usability failures, psychological and socio-technical factors, the complexity of
security, and how security interacts with the primary tasks. Authorization usability can also make
use of the broad range of approaches to security-usability problems and we can derive the following
principles for improving the usability of authorization:
• Reducing the burden: A number of burdens are related to authorization measures, depending
on the individual’s perspective on the measure. A functional user, for instance, needs to request
changes to the restrictions if they are inadequate, a supervisor may need to decide whether the
request is legitimate, and an administrator needs to implement the change. Depending on
the perspective and context, this also encompasses the application of the HCI principles of
ﬂexibility and maintainability (Section 2.1).
• Making the abstract understandable: The risks and beneﬁts of restrictions as well as the tech-
nical concepts in authorization can be highly abstract. Making these abstract concepts under-
standable or turning them into more concrete problems may help with the usability of autho-
rization. Related HCI principles are the comprehensibility and learnability of the artifact.
We have seen that the separate consideration the individual behavior often falls short of address-
ing the problems effectively and efﬁciently. According to the sketch of affected perspectives in the
introduction (Figure 1.1), prior research focused primarily on the HCI part, but neglected the inter-
relation with organizational sciences and software engineering. As a result, typical approaches in
security usability (and particularly authorization) primarily focus on the ability of users and neglect
the motivational side. However, even if generally able to behave in a secure manner and even if the
extra effort is rather small, any effort will be perceived as a hassle if the rationale for this secondary
task is unclear. In addition, we can observe an ongoing drive for productivity for functional stake-
holders, increasing stress levels and limiting the ability of stakeholders to efﬁciently use the security
measures. As part of this drive, security-relevant decisions are increasingly delegated from security
experts to lower functional management. Thus, it is the responsibility of the organization to bring
the affected stakeholders into the position to balance secure behavior and the push for productiv-
ity, enabling motivational forces to cause secure behavior. For this, the behavior of users need to
be understood in the context of use of a system and organization, taking a broad range of interre-
lated effects into account, ideally applying HCI, but also organizational sciences. As discussed in
Section 2.6, we need to comprehensively model the user interaction and behavior:
• Integrating perspectives: Adequate security management and participatory development: Au-
thorization usability can also be impacted by how well the stakeholders with different perspec-
tives on the measure can interact. This may be, for example, supported by the HCI principles
of robustness and comprehensibility.
• Applying a systemic model of individuals’ behavior and take the speciﬁc context into account:
In authorization, the security needs of organizations relate, for example, to how critical data
and processes are that are governed by restrictions. Adapting authorization restrictions to
share a document among employees may incur a higher perceived effort than simply sharing
the password with the coworker. Perceiving the proper use of the authorization measures as
beneﬁcial can help to reduce these types of circumventions. We need to analyze problems and
support decisions on approaches to the problems based on systemic models of individuals’ be-
havior and organizational needs. Such holistic models can improve the design of authorization
measures when decision makers explicitly take the speciﬁc context – and its dynamics – into
account.
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kein Ding, kein Ich, keine Form, kein Grundsatz
sind sicher, alles ist einer unsichtbaren, aber
niemals ruhenden Wandlung begriffen. . . und die
Gegenwart ist nichts als eine Hypothese, über
die man noch nicht hinausgekommen ist.1
R. Musil: Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (1930)
In authorization in information systems, permissions and restrictions are technically codiﬁed. The
challenge is to arrive at adequate restrictions that reﬂect the security requirements and the functional
requirements of the stakeholders2. In most environments, we can expect the context to change,
for example, due to changes in the organizational structures or individual task assignments. These
changes, in turn, require adapting the restrictions. The process of deﬁning, assuring, and adapting
the restrictions as part of the technical artifact can be likened to the software development process,
speciﬁcally, to the process of securely developing software. In secure software development, the
challenge lies likewise in balancing security measures in the system against their impact on non-
functional requirements, such as performance and usability. Building upon the analogy between
software development and authorization, this chapter analyzes how secure software development
achieves adequate measures and how we can transfer approaches to authorization.
Software development in general has undergone several paradigm shifts since its inception, partic-
ularly regarding security. The traditional approach to software security was to rapidly ﬁx vulnerabil-
ities when discovered. Two developments have signiﬁcantly reduced the viability of this approach:
First, the likelihood of attacks has increased dramatically since vulnerabilities are exploited at sig-
niﬁcantly faster due to the systems increased interconnectedness, for example, through “computer
worms”3. Second, the potential impact of these attacks has increased to the point that “real” assets
(e.g. critical infrastructure) are threatened by “virtual” attacks4. Together, these factors have in-
creased the risk induced from a lack of software security and ultimately have led to a paradigm shift
towards more comprehensive approaches to security in the software development lifecycle (SDL).
Not only the reliability of the software has been addressed, but also the reliability of the develop-
ment processes (Gollmann, 2011). As a result, stricter development processes increasingly regulated
software development.
In a parallel development, the agile development community successfully spread the idea of dereg-
ulating the software development process, also in an attempt to improve software quality. Despite
the similar aim, the two approaches – a more regulated development model for reliable software
development and the agile principles – are in stark contrast. Agile development is claimed to have
1“no thing, no self, no form, no principle, is safe, everything is undergoing an invisible but ceaseless transformation. . . and
the present is nothing but a hypothesis that has not yet been surmounted.” (Musil, 1995, p. 269)
2Compare the discussion of the conﬂicting security goals conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability in Chapter 2.
3The Morris worm from 1988 was one of the earliest reported computer worm (Spafford, 1988).
4A widely publicized case in point is the malware “Stuxnet” that targets SCADA systems, apparently primarily uranium
enrichment facilities (Albright et al., 2010).
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several shortcomings related to secure software development. For example, heavy-weight security
methods are not applicable in short incremental iterations of agile development in the same way as
in plan-driven processes. Also, the agile development model focuses on functional requirements
and does not provide well for non-functional requirements, such as high-level quality and security
objectives. However, agile approaches have also advantages that make them particularly useful for
achieving adequate security measures, including the close customer integration.
This conﬂict makes it interesting to contrast agile security with the traditional plan-driven ap-
proaches in our search for approaches to problems surrounding authorization. In this chapter, we
will brieﬂy review secure software development methods in plan-driven development, and agile de-
velopment. Subsequently, we will explore the primarily theoretical literature on security in agile
development. We close the chapter with a discussion of how to transfer the plan-driven and agile
approaches to authorization.
3.1. Security in software development
Software security vulnerabilities are those problems of software systems that can be exploited to
degrade the system’s security and are caused by software defects (Software Engineering Institute,
2002). To classify the software defects, we may refer to categories of general software faults. How-
ever, there is a high variance in the proposed categories of software faults and no established set of
factors (Ploski et al., 2007). Since the early categorization of defects by Endres (1975) as a mix of
triggers (user error) and affected artifacts (documentation error), a number of different approaches for
systematic categorization have been proposed. Schneidewind and Hoffmann (1979) grouped defects
on the highest level primarily by (development) activity (e.g. design, coding, debugging, clerical
errors). Chillarege et al. (1992) rather differentiate on a lower level: by defect type (e.g. function,
assignment, interface) and the defect trigger (e.g. boundary condition, bug ﬁx, user code, timing).
Leszak et al. (2000) considers, among others, the development phase of detection and origin of the
defects, but also the human root causes (e.g. lack of system knowledge, individual mistake, change
coordination, lack of process knowledge).
For our purposes of secure software, one important category is the development activity from
which a defect originates: In requirements engineering, security requirements may be neglected
or risks underestimated. In the design phase, software architects may overlook deﬁciencies of the
security architecture, for example, caused by false assumptions about the security of an underlying
platform. In implementation, developers can introduce defects at the source code level, for example,
through missing validations of input data. In assurance, defects can slip through the tests because of
an insufﬁcient test coverage. In operation, conﬁguration defects can facilitate misuses of an otherwise
secure system. Lastly, activities before and accompanying the process may result in problems, for
example, when security training is skipped in the process.
Secondly, the type of defect as their human root cause (cf. Leszak et al., 2000) is important for our
perspective. Following the human error model of Reason (1990), we can broadly categorize human
root causes into lapses and conceptual errors: Unintentional errors are introduced because the action,
such as a source code change, was not as intended, often a “lapse” resulting in a syntactic error
(“Individual mistake” in Leszak et al., 2000). Intentional errors are caused by conscious actions, for
example, conceptual defects from not understanding the context thoroughly, often a semantic error
(e.g. “Domain knowledge” or “Process knowledge” in Leszak et al., 2000).
The goal of security in software development now is to minimize the number of defects of the dif-
ferent kinds in the development activities. How the defects are actually addressed depends very much
on the development process. In the following, we will brieﬂy discuss approaches in the traditional
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plan-driven processes and those in agile development.
3.2. Plan-driven software security
As elaborated in Appendix A, plan-driven software development differentiates several development
phases, such as requirements engineering, implementation, and assurance. Security SDL thus either
enrich the process itself, such as establishing risk-management process accompanying the SDL, or
modify the individual development phases with security practices – for example, by adding threat
modeling activities to the requirements engineering phase (cf. Section A.3).
For these approaches to be successful, plan-driven software development heavily relies on for-
malized processes to achieve secure software through a high level of control of the development
activities. Each step is speciﬁcally deﬁned, often in waterfall-oriented procedures. Organizational
measures are implemented to assign roles and responsibilities, and to establish accompanying secu-
rity training. Security requirements are elicited early in a development project through structured
procedures that include extensive threat and risk analysis and the turning of non-functional security
requirements into implementable functional requirements. Similarly, a security architecture is de-
rived early from the security requirements, relying on security design principles and architectural
risk analysis. Elaborate and heavy-weight assurance practices offer quality control before release
and encompass dynamic and static analysis as well as internal or external reviews and audits. In op-
eration, well-deﬁned procedures on incident management and security documentation is employed
to uphold the system security.
Overall, the plan-driven approach is based on control by extensive planning and process formal-
ization, relying on the early, complete, and precise speciﬁcation of the context-of-use and a static
development environment. However, this approach is problematic when plans need to be adapted
and when the environment changes, as is to be expected in today’s development environment.
3.3. Agile development
Agile development follows an opposing approach from the formalization and control in plan-driven
development. Instead, agile development formalizes processes only where necessary and emphasizes
informal and intensive interaction to craft systems with high business-value. Agile development
refers to a set of values shared by related development methods, such as SCRUM and XP. The Agile
Manifesto (Beck et al., 2001) lists the overarching values in abstract terms:
• Individuals and interactions over processes and tools,
• Working software over comprehensive documentation,
• Customer collaboration over contract negotiation,
• Responding to change over following a plan.
In agile development, responsiveness is emphasized over the reliability of standardized develop-
ment processes. The process is more likened to learning than to the application of prior knowledge.
Nerur and Balijepally (2007) describe agile methods as “generative” instead of “adaptive” learning,
applying double-loop learning. Also, the “command and control” approach of plan-driven models is
exchanged for a more democratic model to proﬁt from the tacit knowledge of the individuals in the
team (cf. Miles et al., 1978). More speciﬁcally than the Agile Manifesto, Highsmith (2002) states that
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the principles of agile development are to “deliver something useful,” “rely on people,” “encourage
collaboration,” “technical excellence,” “do the simplest thing possible,” and “be adaptable.”
As shown in Appendix B.2, popular methods in the agile ecosystem have a broad range of charac-
teristics. More liberal methods, such as Crystal Clear and Scrum, formalize the development process
to a lesser degree than more heavy-weight methods, such as Feature-Driven Development. Two
distinct philosophies can be contrasted here: The liberal methods with an optimistic view that de-
velopment teams are able to tailor the process to ﬁt their particular development environment in the
most efﬁcient way. Conversely, the pessimists rather specify the process in detail to prevent failures
from adaptation or problems in large or high-reliability projects.
A number of negative points have been raised since agile development spread in practice (Dybå
and Dingsøyr, 2008). One argument is the lack of empirical backing for the claims made by propo-
nents of agile development for their methods (McBreen, 2002). In particular, with the distinct agile
methods and the adaption for the individual development environment, it is difﬁcult to draw general
conclusions from the existing evidence (Keefer, 2003). Moreover, it has been argued that pre-project
release planning in market-driven development can be difﬁcult, particularly for release-content plan-
ning when the market pull needs to be balanced against the technology push (Dzamashvili-Fogelström
et al., 2010). It is also often stated that the customer is heavily burdened by the constant developer
requests, often at an unsustainable level (Martin et al., 2004, 2009). Moreover, it is put forth that
agile methods are rather applicable for projects with small teams since these do not require as well-
deﬁned communication (Cohen et al., 2004b). Lastly, opponents fear that suboptimal architectures
result from the lack of focus on design activities (McBreen, 2002).
We draw a thorough picture of the agile ecosystem in Appendix B to discuss the existing evidence,
popular development methods, and their practices. The close look at the breadth of agile development
allows us to derive two useful insights: First, despite numerous studies, the performance of agile
development in comparison to plan-driven approaches remains unclear. While the self-perception
of developers in surveys is rather positive, experimental studies show mixed results, and are also
sparse and often only apply to a limited scope. More speciﬁc studies show that the motivation may
increase, and learning and communication may improve. Generally, we can assume that universal
ﬁndings for the diverse development contexts are unrealistic: The appropriateness of agile methods
depends on too many factors. Second, general ﬁndings are complicated by the breadth of agile
methods and practices that practitioners can choose from, particularly related to the respective extent
to which they conform to the agile values. For security, it follows from the two insights that, ﬁrst,
agile development can occur in many ﬂavors and the development method needs to be chosen and
adapted to ﬁt the speciﬁc development environment. Second, positive effects on quality, motivation,
communication, and learning in agile development are promising. To extend on these insights, we
will further discuss the relation between security and agile development in the remainder of this
chapter.
3.4. Security in agile development
In literature, there is a discussion on whether agile development methods and the underlying princi-
ples are appropriate to develop secure software. One reason is that the agile development proponents
did explicitly not target high-risk software development. Kent Beck rather states in his XP book
that XP in itself is not suitable for high-reliability requirements (Beck and Andres, 2004). How-
ever, security is not only relevant for high-reliability projects, but affects most software that is being
developed.
The main issue with agile development concerning security is that the team-emphasizing, dy-
38
3.4. Security in agile development
namic and tacit-knowledge-driven methods conﬂict with the assurance activities as demanded by
traditional secure software development methods. However, there are indications that agile develop-
ment improves quality, as discussed in Section B.1. Moreover, plan-driven development also poses
challenges to secure software development that might be less critical in agile development: Early
planning of security requirements may conﬂict with the changing requirements in practice, which
agile development is better prepared for. Also, to address the challenges to security in agile develop-
ment, various enhancements have been proposed to agile methods.
In the following, we discuss the security challenges that have been reported to impact agile devel-
opment and explore the positive effects of agile development, attempting to contrast the advantages
to the challenges. In a third step, we examine the numerous proposed security enhancements for
agile methods.
3.4.1. Security challenges
Most challenges in achieving secure software development with agile methods result from difﬁcul-
ties in implementing security-related practices that were originally targeted at plan-driven software
development. In several publications, authors have studied how compatible the agile development
methods are with security practices, primarily analytically. Wäyrynen et al. (2004) analyzed how
well software development certiﬁcations for SSE-CMM and Common Criteria (CC) match with XP.
Although they found overlaps between the programs’ requirements and stock XP practices, 5 of 11
SSE-CMM process areas were not covered by XP and the semi-formal and formal design and veriﬁ-
cation requirements for CC EAL above level 4 were not present in XP. More generally, Beznosov and
Kruchten (2004) studied mismatches between XP and secure development practices, identifying 12
mismatches out of 26 practices. Similarly, Keramati and Mirian-Hosseinabadi (2008) evaluated the
compatibility of security activities with agile development. Mellado et al. (2006) compared security
requirements engineering methods for their agility value on a high level. We discuss the ﬁndings in
the following, grouped by the agile characteristics that they originate from:
Lifecycle model One of the topics that are most often cited to pose challenges to the traditional
secure development methods in agile development is the agile lifecycle model. Instead of one pass
of the typical development activities, the activities are repeated in short intervals and not in a ﬁxed
sequence. From the perspective of plan-driven secure software development, the difﬁculty is where
to place security practices in an agile process. For the auditing of agile processes, the dynamic
nature of the lifecycle can be difﬁcult to handle with the traditional measures because the process to
audit against is not as clearly deﬁned (Poppendieck, 2002). Also, in the short iteration time frames,
repeating security engineering activities as in the plan-driven model for each pass is not feasible. The
heavy-weight nature of the security activities results in difﬁculties to ﬁt the activities into the short
iteration cycles of agile development. Even more problematic are the prohibitive costs that would be
caused when involving third parties for assurance for each iteration (Beznosov and Kruchten, 2004).
Independent reviews would also cause months delay, conﬂicting with the goal of frequent deliveries
(Goertzel et al., 2006).
Agile development is tailored to react to changing requirements as part of the development model.
The continuous changes to requirements and, subsequently, to the design pose challenges to the
traditional security practices that assume constant environments. New vulnerabilities or changing
threat models would require backtracking or iterative processes and result in changes to all interme-
diate deliverables (De Win et al., 2009). The concept of up-front activities in plan-driven security
processes, such as threat modeling, conﬂicts with the emergent requirements in agile development
(Davis, 2005). However, security is also difﬁcult to retroﬁt (Chivers et al., 2005; Wäyrynen et al.,
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2004). In particular, refactoring and major design changes late in the lifecycle clash with traditional
assurance approaches (Beznosov and Kruchten, 2004; Goertzel et al., 2006). As the software artifact
is continuously changing, assurance is difﬁcult to conduct in parallel to development activities, since
there is no freeze period in the lifecycle (Goertzel et al., 2007; Beznosov and Kruchten, 2004).
Non-functional requirements, such as security requirements, also are a general challenge in agile
development (Goertzel et al., 2007). One problem is that they are difﬁcult to turn into automatic tests.
In agile development, refactoring is important to constantly adapt to changing plans and refactoring
relies heavily on testing to ensure that invasive changes do not cause regressions and, in this case,
vulnerabilities. Due to the incremental planning, functional requirements that offer more immediate
value-add often receive higher priority, and non-functional requirements are ignored in the beginning.
As a result, security and quality aspects may be postponed until late in the lifecycle (Cao and Ramesh,
2008). Generally, it has been observed that activities are difﬁcult to implement if they involve non-
functional artifacts, such as documentation (Goertzel et al., 2007).
Communication A related aspect that is often claimed to be problematic is the agile approach to
communication and documentation. Agile development emphasizes the building of rich tacit knowl-
edge through informal communication instead of formalized documentation. In contrast, security
engineering traditionally requires security documentation and speciﬁcations for traceability. For ex-
ample, the traceability of requirements (Poppendieck, 2002) allows auditors to trace functionality
back to the requirements and identify the team members responsible for speciﬁc decisions and their
implementation. Agile development, instead, emphasizes face-to-face communication, avoiding the
creation of many documents that are typically produced as part of the communication between stake-
holders and developers in plan-driven development models (Goertzel et al., 2006; Beznosov and
Kruchten, 2004). Moreover, overly verbose documentation may also be counter-productive in ag-
ile development since the system’s requirements and design are often moving targets, causing a
mismatch of documentation and implementation to an even larger extent than in plan-driven devel-
opment. Instead, agile methods often rely on implicit documentation to provide additional commu-
nication media, for example through source code and test cases.
Trust in the team and individuals Instead of sophisticated command-and-control measures to
control the developers, agile development places more trust in and responsibility on the development
team. The implicit trust in individual developers and their benevolence conﬂicts with the skeptic
approach of traditional security processes, which fear malicious developer activities (Goertzel et al.,
2006). Similarly, the objectivity of separate roles is missing in test-driven development when the
same developer conducts the quality assurance who also implemented the functionality (Goertzel
et al., 2006). Moreover, agile methods employ cross-functional teams, which often bring evaluators
and developers close together and further reduce the objectivity from the separation of developers
from evaluators (Beznosov and Kruchten, 2004). It is also argued that close customer participation
cause a lack of distance between customers and developers, limiting the ability of customers to
judge the resulting product objectively (Goertzel et al., 2006). In addition, specialist expertise of
security managers may be missing without an explicit security expert role (Goertzel et al., 2007,
2006). Following the same line of argument, pair programming only improves security if enough
team members are security aware (Wäyrynen et al., 2004).
3.4.2. Inherent positive effects on security
While the agile development community originally did not target improved security of the software,
they did aim to produce superior system quality. This goal was primarily motivated by the increased
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business value for the customer and by the increased developer satisfaction from producing high-
quality software. According to Cockburn (2001), the entire agile development process focuses on
software quality. As discussed in Section B.1, there are indications of positive effects of agile meth-
ods and practices on the quality of the developed software, primarily from case studies and developer
surveys. Quality and security are closely related: According to an analysis of vulnerability reports
by CERT, software defects cause 90% of software vulnerabilities (Software Engineering Institute,
2002). Wang and Wang (2003), from a more theoretical perspective, found tight relations between
quality attributes and security objectives. The positive effects of agile development on security, thus,
foremost relate to the prevention of security-critical defects through improved software quality. Other
general effects of agile development indirectly inﬂuence the software security, for example, through
developer motivation and commitment.
There has been little empirical research up to now on the effects of agile development on software
security. The existing studies treat this subject analytically: In an analysis of XP for its compatibility
to SSE-CMM and the Common Criteria, Wäyrynen et al. (2004) found, for example, that XP is well
aligned without modiﬁcations with 4 of 11 SSE-CMM process areas. They also reasoned that, if
test cases are considered documentation, XP could fulﬁll Common Criteria certiﬁcations for EAL
levels 1 and 2. In the following, we more generally discuss the positive effects of agile practices
on software security, based on a literature review of security in agile development and on empirical
ﬁndings on general quality attributes (cf. Section B.1):
Lifecycle model Agile development’s ability to respond to changes in the course of the SDL is
primarily due to the iterative and incremental lifecycle model. This approach can have positive
effects on reliability since it has been long known in the software development community that
prototyping and running code improves requirement engineering and reduces design errors (Boehm
et al., 1984), a potential source of security vulnerabilities. Incremental and iterative development
models can also positively affect developer motivation, for example, reducing “crunch time” and
overtime, and improving the quality of life (Robinson and Sharp, 2004; Mann and Maurer, 2005).
Higher motivation and satisfaction may improve the quality (cf. Section B.1).
The agile lifecycle model also causes development projects to be better prepared for the inevitable
changes. As with most requirements, it is questionable whether security requirements may entirely
be formulated up-front as assumed in plan-driven security processes. For example, security require-
ments need to take operational practice into account (Poppendieck, 2002). An emphasis on refac-
toring may result in a more maintainable code-base with less complexity, and higher quality and
security, since simpler designs are, among others, easier to review for security (Wäyrynen et al.,
2004). Another consequence of the lifecycle model is the high importance of automated tests (cf.
Section B.3), which may improve software quality (Hamlet and Maybee, 2001), and support ﬁnding
defects early (Berinato, 2002; Huo et al., 2004). Test-driven development has shown to improve
software quality in several studies (George and Williams, 2003, 2004; Meszaros et al., 2003).
The openness to change also encompasses the tailoring of the development process to improve it
and accommodate the speciﬁc environment. Having an adequate process is important since it is often
stated that security lies in the processes (Goertzel et al., 2008). Agile developers perceive reﬂective
process improvement to be highly efﬁcient (Talby et al., 2006).
Communication Agile development fosters the communication between stakeholders, reducing
defects by improving the common understanding of the requirements and by preventing misunder-
standings. Firstly, agile development improves the internal communication between developers (cf.
Section B.1) Studies indicate that communication-rich teams also increase the developer motivation
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(Beecham et al., 2007) as team members encourage each other (Robinson and Sharp, 2004). Informal
communication leads, on the other hand, to less documentation as the medium of communication,
and an increase of implicit documentation, such as source code or test cases. Implicit documen-
tation may reduce the number of potentially obsolete documents, which else cause defects from
misunderstandings and other typical problems found in implementation that is based on speciﬁcation
documents (Hoffmann, 2008).
The increased internal communication can also lead to improved learning, sharing of knowledge,
and spreading of security awareness. The sharing of knowledge has been indicated to increase in
agile development on the level of tacit knowledge (Bahli and Zeid, 2005). Also, pair program-
ming increases communication and explaining (Robinson and Sharp, 2005), and improves learning
(Tessem, 2003).
Secondly, communication with customers improves through agile development (cf. Section B.1).
It is well-known in software development that good designs require deep domain knowledge (Curtis
et al., 1988). Improved communication can improve the requirements deﬁnitions (Dagnino et al.,
2004) and reduce defect rates (Korkala et al., 2006). There are also secondary effects from improved
external communication: More direct communication helps the developers to understand the func-
tional users’ needs, resulting in improved usability that can prevent security-critical usage errors
(McInerney and Maurer, 2005; Hwong et al., 2004). Customer feedback also motivates developers
(Robinson and Sharp, 2004) and improves the developer conﬁdence (Hanssen and Fægri, 2006).
Trust in team and individuals In the agile methods, the principle of highly valuing the individual
can be found in the responsibility that is given to teams as a whole, commonly reﬂected in the team
structures and empowerment to self-organization (Siakas and Siakas, 2007). Self-organization and
responsibility may be found in reﬂections and retrospectives (Hazzan and Tomayko, 2003) and can
lead to higher motivation and satisfaction from the trust in developers and empowerment on the en-
gineering level (Robinson and Sharp, 2004; Karlström and Runeson, 2005; Beecham et al., 2007). In
an experiment, job satisfaction improved when the team could modify development methods (Acuña
et al., 2009).
Agile teams are usually formed with cross-functionally, emphasizing the team effort with high
involvement of all team members and shallow hierarchies. As a result, the collaboration between
team members with different functional roles is improved and defects from misunderstandings can be
reduced. In agile development, developers are often more involved in quality assurance, for example
through test-driven development (Dubinsky and Hazzan, 2006). Quality assurance by developers
may improve the awareness of quality measures (Cohen et al., 2004a) and allows the measures to be
applied earlier and more effectively.
Agile development further emphasizes the team effort through close developer collaboration,
found in its most intensive form in pair programming. Since multiple team members work together,
pair programming can be seen as implicit security reviews, both for design and implementation
(Wäyrynen et al., 2004; Beznosov and Kruchten, 2004). Even without pair programming, design de-
cisions are often discussed between team members, supported by the culture of close collaboration.
A further wide-spread practice in agile development is common code ownership, which also result
in implicit, though non-systematic, source code reviews. Generally, review activities have shown to
increase productivity, quality, and project stability (Fagan, 1986).
How inherent effects address security problems The agile methods take the opposite approach
of the plan-driven focus on command and control and detailed planning: Agile development re-
lies on the commitment and creativity of individuals working closely together, and the openness to
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changes at various stages. The empirical foundation of the claims of improved quality from agile
development remains weak, but there are indications that the defect rate is reduced in appropriate
environments. Similarly, there are several indications that agile development improves the motiva-
tion and satisfaction, which may improve software quality indirectly through increased commitment
and more efﬁcient employment of developer talent (Baddoo et al., 2006). Given that agile develop-
ment can realize those effects in a speciﬁc environment, agile methods may achieve improvements
of reliability.
Table 3.1 contrasts the security challenges from the previous section with positive effects discussed
in this section. As shown in the table, most drawbacks affect the process reliability and the missing
assurance that activities are completed as necessary and the software, thus, adheres to security stan-
dards. Related to the assurance aspect is the difﬁculty of traditional approaches to software security
to cope with the trust that is placed in agile developers. In the following section, we discuss proposed
enhancements of agile methods that address the challenges.
3.4.3. Security practices in agile development
As discussed in the previous sections, agile methods may lack proper means to address requirements
of secure software development, particularly with respect to the process reliability, requirements
traceability, and the trust in individuals and teams. Within the published work on security in agile
development, numerous enhancements have been proposed to address those shortcomings. There are
two main categories of enhancements: Either they modify the method in its entirety, or add individual
security practices. The enhancements need to be simple, have pragmatic and complete guidance on
how to apply, and adapt to the frequently changing requirements (Siponen et al., 2005).
Goertzel et al. (2006) analyzed the implications of agile principles on security and formulated
conditions under which problems may be alleviated: In 6 of the 14 examined areas, customer and
developer security awareness and commitment would help. The remaining two problematic areas
would beneﬁt from additional security documentation and high security standards on every delivered
software artifact.
Multiple analyses exist of how security practices can be applied in agile development and how
well the practices ﬁt into the agile methodology. Beznosov and Kruchten (2004) found that of 26
studied security practices, 12 are either independent of the development process or may be conducted
(semi-)automatically to ﬁt agile methods. Keramati and Mirian-Hosseinabadi (2008) examined the
compatibility of security practices according to multiple metrics, including simplicity and customer
interaction. Since a number of enhancements apply to multiple challenges, the enhancements from
literature are categorized according to the development activities in the following:
Process-spanning practices Very broad approaches to introduce security enhancements to ag-
ile development modify the method, such as the Microsoft SDL for Agile Development (Sullivan,
2008). Based on the Microsoft SDL (cf. Section A.2), the plan-driven activities are divided into “one
time,” “some sprint,” and “every sprint” activities. Developers conduct one-time activities at the be-
ginning of the project, for example, conﬁguring tools properly and creating a baseline threat model.
Every-sprint activities include, for example, updating the threat model. Most activities are in one of
three buckets of some-sprint activities: security veriﬁcation, design review, and response planning.
The developers choose one activity from each bucket for every sprint in order to limit the security
overhead.
Other suggestions on enhancements of agile processes focus on process-wide practices. Dedicated
security training (Ge et al., 2007) and systematic knowledge transfer that is achieved by rotating
security experts through programming pairs (Wäyrynen et al., 2004) increase security awareness
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and expertise. Security knowledge may also be spread through an institutionalized security-review
meeting for every sprint to address potential security implications of the user stories in the sprint
backlog (Kongsli, 2006).
To more intensively work on security aspects, development teams can insert security design, doc-
umentation, and testing sprints early in the lifecycle and before release (Beznosov and Kruchten,
2004). Addressing the challenges from frequently changing architectures, a high-level security ar-
chitecture and security principles may be deﬁned up-front before the ﬁrst iteration (Ge et al., 2007).
When developers conduct system hardening and secure deployment from early iterations on, oper-
ations may be more secure at release time (Kongsli, 2006). Particularly for documentation issues,
practitioners can also turn to more documentation-intensive agile methods, such as FDD and DSDM.
Another approach is to employ automated test suits as documentation (Wäyrynen et al., 2004).
Requirements engineering For security requirements engineering in agile development, it is often
proposed to employ modiﬁed user stories to better reﬂect security threats. Abuse(r), misuse(r) cases,
and stories have already been proposed for plan-driven secure development (McDermott and Fox,
1999). For agile development, abuser stories have the advantage of matching the already established
user story concept to describe cross-cutting development tasks (Kongsli, 2006; Boström et al., 2006).
In several studies, abuser stories were empirically tested and showed promising results (Boström
et al., 2006; Heikka and Siponen, 2006; Mellado et al., 2006).
To identify further security aspects in the requirements, methods may be applied on the sprint
backlog to systematically identify security requirements (Aydal et al., 2006). If necessary, a secu-
rity engineer on the team may help with assessing security risks and security-related user stories
(Wäyrynen et al., 2004). Instead of conducting threat modeling at each modiﬁcation of require-
ments, developers may limit the number of threat-modeling points in the process to prevent overly
frequent re-evaluations of threats (De Win et al., 2009). Lastly, it is often important to clearly mark
the dependencies between high-level security requirements and the related implementation activities
for security assurance and requirements traceability. Developers can achieve the traceability through
explicitly noting the connections between high-level security/safety requirements and user stories in
the product and sprint backlog (Poppendieck, 2002).
Design and implementation The main issues with the design and implementation in agile devel-
opment from the perspective of plan-driven secure software development are the dynamics of the
architecture and functionality. In contrast, Aydal et al. (2006) report on a case study of incrementally
introducing security through refactoring with good results. Similarly, Chivers et al. (2005) compared
different approaches of arriving at a security architecture over multiple iterations. In their study, a
top-down and up-front approach resulted in an overly complex architecture when compared to iter-
ative design. More broadly, Beznosov and Kruchten (2004) suggest to implement security practices
that are independent of the development model, such as secure design principles, coding standards,
and change management to cover SSE-CMM process areas.
Assurance To formally test and review software in agile development, a prevalent challenge is that
there is no phase in which the product is frozen. Instead, development is typically ongoing. In this
environment, it is important to (semi-)automatically apply requirements, security, and penetration
testing, and static analysis (Beznosov and Kruchten, 2004; Kongsli, 2006). Erdogan et al. (2010)
describe a testing method based on misuse cases in the product or sprint backlog, a highly testable
architecture, automatic code review, and penetration testing during sprints.
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The efﬁcacy of security enhancements The above-outlined security enhancements cover a broad
range of practices. Table 3.1 relates the enhancing practices to the security challenges from the previ-
ous sections for an indication of which challenges are addressed. The enhancements foremost target
lifecycle and communication aspects, addressing 10 of the 14 identiﬁed challenges. The challenges
that are not addressed fall into two categories:
• Challenges that stem from the increased trust in individuals, including the lack of distance
between developers, evaluators, and customers, lack of independence in testing, and implicit
trust in developers’ benevolence. These challenges are difﬁcult to address, since trust is a very
essential agile value. In projects where the individual cannot be relied upon, agile development
might not be the adequate development model.
• Challenges surrounding the process assurances: Continuous process improvement is an inte-
gral part of how high quality is achieved with agile methods. Certiﬁcation and process as-
surance programs might need to be adapted to better apply to non-plan-driven models and
acknowledge positive effects from well-suiting processes.
While the coverage of the challenges by positive effects of agile development and by enhancements
appears broad, the analyzed literature is of rather theoretical nature and the problems and approaches
are context-dependent. Thus, empirical studies in a variety of contexts are necessary to further
explore the ﬁndings that are given here. Accordingly, we address the practitioner’s perspective of
security in the next section through interviews with agile developers.
3.5. Agile security in practice
In the previous section, we showed numerous problems surrounding security in agile development
and respective approaches as present in literature. However, the analyses primarily target security-
sensitive contexts. Since our goal is to understand how to improve authorization usability in orga-
nizational contexts, we should not exclusively focus on highly sensitive contexts. Instead, we need
to understand the interrelation of security and agility particularly for projects with baseline security
requirements. For these cases, rather than asking whether agile methods are adequate, we need to
focus on how to improve the security in typical agile contexts, since the method is often a given.
The second problem with the analyses in the previous section is that they are primarily theoret-
ical. For a good grounding of how agility and security can be combined, we need to expand on
these analyses with insights from practice. Accordingly, we conducted a study on the practitioners’
perspectives on security in agile development (cf. Appendix C). The ﬁndings indicate heterogeneous
problems and approaches to the challenges in practice. Several problems, such as the problematic
customer awareness, have not been considered in the prior theoretical research. As expected, several
of the problems theorized in prior research are not applicable in non-critical environments and were
not mentioned by practitioners. More interestingly, we found a range of approaches of practitioners
that go beyond those in prior research and particularly leverage the strengths of agile development
(“close customer integration”, “spreading awareness and expertise”).
From the results of the study, we derived a number recommendations on how to approach agile
security, which may be relevant for agile authorization: First, to institutionalize the customer involve-
ment; second, to foster developer security awareness and expertise; third, to continuously improve
the process for security; and, fourth, to promote implicit documentation.
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3.6. Contrasting plan-driven and agile authorization
In this chapter, we compared the rigid, plan-driven paradigms of traditional secure software engineer-
ing with agile approaches to security. On a general software development level, Nerur et al. (2005)
contrasted key concepts of plan-driven and agile methods. Table 3.2 expands their general obser-
vations in two ways: by adding examples of plan-driven and agile approaches to secure software
engineering from this chapter and by extrapolating how these approaches apply to the development
and management of authorization policies5. The primary difference on the level of secure software
development is that agile methods are particularly suitable for dynamic and complex contexts that
may require changes to the development process as well as to the security requirements, design,
and implementation. The agile approach closely integrates customers and trades controllability and
traceability for increased motivation, productivity, and quality.
As elaborated in the introduction of this chapter, in order to derive insights on authorization, we
can consider the development of an authorization policy as a development activity analogous to
that of a software system. In plan-driven authorization, the authorization policy would primarily be
developed in a single-pass with an upfront requirements and risk analysis, and subsequent design,
authoring, and assurance activities. If requirements change, change requests would need to be issued
and pursued. A mechanistic context (cf. Table 3.2) is assumed to allow the full top-down speciﬁcation
of a policy, for example, based on interviewed stakeholders. Formal, centralized change procedures
deﬁne clear responsibilities and offer together with explicit documentation of requests the traceability
of changes.
For agile authorization, we can turn to the approaches of the agile practitioners regarding autho-
rization (Appendix C). They stated that policies need to be frequently adapted for functional changes
and from the experience in production. The practitioners also strive for simplicity of policies ﬁrst,
then adapting as needed. Customers are involved primarily through natural language discussions and
formal documents, with good experience with implicit documents.
Extending this line of thought (cf. Table 3.2), agile authorization would assume unpredictable,
continuous changes of the organizational contexts and the policies. To provide for this environment,
the following principles can be derived from agile methods:
• Close participation of different perspectives, including functional stakeholders, for decisions
and conﬁguration: The tacit knowledge of the stakeholders from different perspectives can
provide valuable input (cf. Miles et al., 1978). They should thus closely interact in activities
related to authorization, including in the decisions on, authoring of, and assurance of changes
to the policy.
• Adaptable, light-weight, informal, and decentralized measure: Policy management needs to
adapt to the speciﬁc environment. For instance, the surrounding organization – from the re-
quest of a functional stakeholder over the decision on its appropriateness to the actual change
– would tend to be light-weight, informal, and decentralized to facilitate rapid changes with
low overhead – if adequate.
• Security awareness and expertise for a broad range of stakeholders: Integration of stakehold-
ers and the decentralization of decisions and authoring requires homogeneous awareness and
expertise for the participating stakeholders.
For the dynamics of changing organizational contexts, the agile paradigm seems to be a viable
approach. However, the loss of control and traceability of changes may be inadequate for many
5For a deﬁnition of the term “authorization policy” in this thesis refer to Chapter 4
47
3. From plan-driven to agile security
Plan-driven Agile
Organizational
form/structure
Mechanistic (bureaucratic with high for-
malization), fully speciﬁable and pre-
dictable
Organic (ﬂexible and participative),
changing context
Security Well-deﬁned, constant context (risks, re-
quirements); upfront security architecture
Adapting the process, simple, incremen-
tal security design, close customer inte-
gration
Authorization Predictable, stable permission require-
ments from rigid organizational structures
and tasks
Continuously changing permission re-
quirements, unpredictable upfront, striv-
ing for simplicity
Process model Lifecycle model (Waterfall, Spiral, . . . ) Empirical, evolutionary-delivery
Security Predeﬁned and plan-driven process Adapting the process to ﬁt the context, it-
erative/incremental security design
Authorization Primarily upfront policy authoring; sta-
ble, heavy-weight/slow policy change
procedure
Evolving policy; rapid, light-weight,
adaptable policy change procedure
Management
style and roles
Command-and-control, process-centric,
individual roles – favors specialization
Leadership-and-collaboration, people-
centric, self-organizing teams
Security Well-deﬁned procedures and processes,
security expert in team
Homogeneous awareness/expertise, secu-
rity review meetings, holistic develop-
ment
Authorization Top-down elicitation of permissions; cen-
tralized, formalized process to request
policy changes
Bottom-up; decentralized, informal pro-
cess with functional stakeholders decid-
ing on changes
Knowledge
management
Explicit Tacit
Security Security documentation as interface be-
tween phases, e.g. security requirements
Developer spreading expertise, close cus-
tomer integration, implicit documentation
Authorization Additional policy documentation Policy as documentation
Communication Formal Informal
Security Security document-based, traceable re-
quirements
Implicit code reviews, security review
meetings, close customer integration
Authorization Formalized, based on request forms Informal requests
Customer role Important Critical
Security Interviewed for security requirements,
late assurance
Close customer integration, concrete re-
quirements and threats
Authorization Functional stakeholder request, review
policy changes
Functional stakeholders participate in
requesting, authoring, and reviewing
changes
Assurance
strategy
Planning, control; late assurance Continuous, rapid feedback on artifacts,
continuous testing
Security Heavy-weight manual and automatic
static and dynamic analyses, primarily
late in the lifecycle
Close customer integration, non-
functional requirements as done-
deﬁnition, automatic testing
Authorization On-request and regular policy reviews Participation of functional stakeholders
for policy changes
Table 3.2.: Plan-driven and agile approaches to secure software development and authorization
48
3.6. Contrasting plan-driven and agile authorization
organizations. For the remainder of this thesis, a number of interesting research problems arise from
this observation: While the results of the study on security in agile development indicated that agile
security can be adequate for systems development, it could be challenging to carry over this approach
to policy changes. Can the risk of intentional and unintentional misconﬁguration of authorization be
mitigated or accepted? Does the beneﬁt of rapid changes and, thus, more adequate policies offset
these additional risks? Will approaches similarly depend on the speciﬁc organizational context?
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4. Authorization in organizational information
systems
[L]aw is best understood as a ‘branch’ of justice
and that its congruence with the principles of
morality rather than its incorporation of orders
and threats is of its ‘essence’
H.L.A. Hart: The Concept of Law (1994, p. 7)
Based on a cursory examination of the problems surrounding authorization in information systems,
we formulated two research questions and six hypotheses on the problems and alleviations to address
them in the introduction. Among others, the hypotheses stated that the ﬂexibility of authorization,
and the integration of different perspectives on authorization and research disciplines would be cru-
cial to alleviate the problems. Accordingly, we identiﬁed principles on how to address the authoriza-
tion problems from the ﬁelds of human-computer interaction and plan-driven and agile development
in the ﬁrst part. Following the methodology laid out in the introduction, we at this point need to more
thoroughly examine the problems before applying the principles to authorization: We structure the
problem domain, set the scope for this thesis, analyze the problems and existing approaches in that
scope, and derive the requirements and open research questions to address.
So, what is authorization? To answer this question, it is useful to consider the broader use of
the related term “authority”. The political philosopher Raz (1990) notes three broader uses of the
term: First, a person can be an authority in the sense of being a reliable source of information. More
relevant for our context are the further two meanings: the sense of having the power to do something
(“de-facto” authority) and of actually being meant or allowed to do something (“legitimate” authority,
from being legitimized). Raz’ second two meanings can be transferred to authorization in informa-
tion systems, for instance, when users are technically able to access sensitive data (“de facto”), but
know that they should not because they lack the legitimacy. Accordingly, we will differentiate the
two forms:
• Technical authorization: Grant the authority in a way to technically (de facto) enable someone
or something – the principal – to interact in a speciﬁc way with a system,
• Legitimate authorization: Grant the authority in a way to legitimate a principal to do some-
thing; for example, explicitly and organizationally through the delegation of a task, or implic-
itly through informal rules that may have been established in a social context.
At this point, we also need to clarify the relation of technical authorization to further terms in the
area of information security, speciﬁcally access control and authentication. According to Lampson
et al. (1992), authentication and authorization are part of access control. Access control is a two-
step process: Authentication establishes the identity of the principal that requests to interact with
the information system (“Who is the principal?”). Authorization establishes whether the principal is
technically allowed to (has the authority to) do an activity in the information system (“Is the principal
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allowed to do the activity?”). In this dissertation, we will be chieﬂy concerned with authorization
and assume the identity to be securely established.
What, then, constitutes authorization in information systems? Since this dissertation aims for a
broad and integrative approach to authorization, we consider the authorization measure in an infor-
mation system to consist of more than the technical mechanism. Authorization measures encompass:
• Authorization mechanism: The technical control to enact restrictions in an information system,
• Deﬁnition of restrictions: The technical and non-technical formulation of the restrictions to be
enforced in the information system,
• Organizational measures: The management aspects that surround the mechanism and the re-
strictions, including the integration and assurance of the technical controls, the modiﬁcation of
the restrictions, and further supporting processes, such as monitoring compliance and enforc-
ing disciplinary measures.
The deﬁnition of restrictions is often referred to with the heavily overloaded term “policy”. The
McMillan Dictionary deﬁnes policies generally as “a set of plans or actions agreed on by a govern-
ment, political party, business, or other group”1. For information system security, Baskerville and
Siponen (2002) explore the different perspectives on policy and distinguish between the management
and the technical perspectives: Management policies limit activities and require tasks on an organiza-
tional level, for instance, through rules that forbid the sharing of passwords. The NIST Handbook on
computer security (NIST, 1995) has similar management-level deﬁnition of “policy,” differentiating
the scope of policies between program, issue-speciﬁc, and system-speciﬁc policies. Technical poli-
cies deﬁne restrictions that the system enforces architecturally, for example, limiting the permissions
of a user within the system. In this thesis, management-level policies will be termed security policy,
technical policies authorization policies (or simply “policy”). To formulate the informal restrictions
as technical policies, the authorization mechanism employs the policy as a model of the restrictions2
– implementing the authorization model (e.g. allowing for roles and permissions).
Starting off from these deﬁnitions, this part of the dissertation aims to clarify what constitutes
authorization in information systems, with a focus on organizations, to identify the problems sur-
rounding this measure, and to compare the problems to existing alleviations to formulate detailed
open research questions. In this chapter, we are concerned with the structuring of the problem do-
main, and explore the breadth of contexts and how we can systematically describe the contexts. We
further discuss the perspectives that stakeholders have on authorization in organizations to lay a solid
foundation for the examination of the speciﬁc problems.
4.1. Authorization contexts
When approaching authorization, we can observe a broad range of distinct contexts and designs of
authorization systems. How can we, for instance, compare policies for smartphone applications that
are formulated by the developers and acknowledged by the device users with permissions assigned
centrally for organizational shared-folders? While these authorization contexts are very different
and distinct approaches might be necessary to address usability problems in those cases, we can
also identify common problems to solve. For example, the conﬂict of availability of resources in
1http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/policy
2For one deﬁnition of the term “model” we can refer to Minsky (1965): “To an observer B, an Object A∗ is a model of
an object A to the extent that B can use A∗ to answer questions that interests him about A.”
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contrast to conﬁdentiality and integrity recurs. Similarly, decisions on the policy need to be derived
from complex factors and abstract consequences, requiring, for instance, to make the authorization
model and concepts comprehensible for decision makers and policy authors. Identifying the range
of authorization contexts will enable us to scope speciﬁc approaches and argue whether ﬁndings can
be transfered to further contexts.
Existing deﬁnitions of authorization often remain on a technical level: subjects, objects, and the
authorization model. Even when assessing authorization policies for the performance of different
models, categories for policies are limited to these technical aspect instead of considering the au-
thorization contexts (cf. e.g. Komlenovic et al., 2011). Moreover, the existing deﬁnitions also often
selectively focus on human subjects. However, to comprehensively deﬁne the context of autho-
rization as needed for an integrative approach to authorization, we are less interested in the technical
detail of the mechanism, but need to include the socio-organizational aspects of authorization. In this
section, we will thus develop a taxonomy of authorization contexts to structure the problem domain
and contexts for which we expect to design authorization measures. While systematically developed,
the taxonomy remains a hypothesis, primarily validated by its further use within this thesis: Apart
from improving our understanding of the domain, the taxonomy will also allow us to deﬁne the scope
of this thesis, estimate priorities of requirements with respect to context characteristics, and examine
the applicability of the later developed artifacts.
In order to deﬁne criteria for the taxonomy, we follow a two-step approach. First, we will identify
likely categories of contexts by examining textbook deﬁnitions of authorization and authorization
models. Textbook deﬁnitions are typically technical and rather abstract. Those models hide the
concrete context that we are particularly interested in, but since these abstractions were originally
derived from reality, we need to read the technical deﬁnitions carefully to ﬁnd aspects beyond the
technical deﬁnition. For a more complete picture, the second step is to analyze contexts in authoriza-
tion research to complete the criteria and identify the respective dimensions.
4.1.1. Context criteria in textbooks
Numerous similar deﬁnitions of the primary parts of authorization exist. Anderson (2008) describes
principals (persons, processes, machines) that have access to resources. Gollmann (2011) agrees
with this deﬁnition, and adds that “subject” is a technical representation of the principal and that the
elementary access operations are “observe” and “alter.” According to Benantar (2006), the principal
is the system representation of a “user”, a human being. According to Gollmann (2011), the resource
owner “is in charge of setting security policies” (p. 73). We generalize this concept and deﬁne the
resource owner to rather have signiﬁcant interests in protecting the resource, without a necessary
legal ownership or the ability to set permissions.
For the implementation of authorization, Gollmann (2011) distinguishes different paradigms: in
discretionary authorization, the resource owner deﬁnes the policy, often in “identity-based access
control” (IBAC) schemes. According to his deﬁnition, the opposite is mandatory authorization with
the policy given by the system. The latter strictly separates policy authoring from the principals and
thus offers a more restrictive approach, providing for higher security needs (Department of Defense,
1985). Often, Role-based Access Control (RBAC) is seen as a separate paradigm, since permissions
are only indirectly assigned to principals through roles (Sandhu et al., 1996). Through its indirection,
RBAC can handle contexts with higher complexity more efﬁciently (Sandhu and Samarati, 1994).
A further concept is that of a central point of enforcement of the authorization decision, often
termed “reference monitor” (Department of Defense, 1985) or “enforcement point” (Moses, 2005).
In his “security dimensions”, Gollmann (2011) distinguishes the scope of authorization decisions
through the placement of the controls, both on a “man–machine” scale (human, application, . . . , ker-
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Description Identiﬁed dimensions
Contingency factors
Resource owner Entity with interests in protecting the resource (not nec-
essarily the legal owner), e.g. an organization
Content, entity owner; indi-
vidual, organizational owner
Security needs The owner’s security objectives and their criticality,
e.g. from the risk of an unauthorized disclosure
Conﬁdentiality, integrity,
availability
Resource Entity to be protected by the authorization measure,
e.g. ﬁles, services, systems
Active asset, passive asset,
container
Principal Entity who requires the resource’s availability and op-
erate on or access it, e.g. employees, Web services
Human, non-human
Security exper-
tise
Expertise and awareness that can be expected from po-
tential human actors in the system, e.g. the ability to
estimate consequences of a policy change
Resource owner, principal,
policy maker, policy author
Complexity The complexity of the context, affecting the measure’s
design, e.g. the number of resources
Quantity, distribution, hetero-
geneousness, dynamics
Design parameters
Paradigm The general approach to authorization Discretionary, mandatory au-
thorization
Scope The scope that the authorization measure covers Personal, inter-personal, or-
ganizational, inter-org.
Management
model
The approach to how changes to the policy are made Roles, centralization, formal-
ization
Enforcement
model
The socio-organizational or technical means that en-
forces the authorization restrictions
Socio-organizational, techni-
cal
Table 4.1.: Authorization context criteria
nel, hardware), and whether the controls are centralized or decentralized. More organizational is the
mode of administration of the policy. Sandhu and Samarati (1994) discuss examples of management
models, including centralized, hierarchical, cooperative, ownership, and decentralized. For instance,
discretionary and decentralized models require security expertise on behalf of the owners (National
Computer Science Center, 1987).
From these deﬁnitions and descriptions of authorization measures, we derive a taxonomy of au-
thorization contexts, given in Table 4.1. The criteria are grouped into two areas: the contingency
factors that govern the design of the authorization measure and the design parameters chosen for
the measure. The two terms are borrowed from the criteria used by Mintzberg (1980) to describe
organizational conﬁgurations, similarly multi-faceted artifacts as authorization measures. While the
contingency factors should be more stable than the design of authorization measures, they are by
no means set in stone. For example, removing data from systems can reduce security needs, secu-
rity training programs can increase security expertise, and a more permissive policy can reduce the
complexities when setting individual permissions.
The taxonomy is primarily concerned with the characteristics of the context. Accordingly, a de-
tailed technical description of the authorization mechanism, such as the technical enforcement mech-
anism and the policy model, is out of scope. Indirectly, technical aspects are present as inﬂuencing
factors for the complexity characteristic, though.
4.1.2. Contexts in authorization research
With the broad range of contexts in which authorization is employed, it is challenging to create a
comprehensive overview of the research literature to validate the above-given criteria and examine
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Database Proceedings series Examined Rationale Total Applicable
IEEE – 25 most rele-
vant of 3426
Broad overview of technical
authorization papers
25 24 96%
IEEE – 25 most cited
of 3426
Important technical papers
on authorization
25 14 56%
IEEE POLICY (2002 – 2010) 25 most rele-
vant of 109
Technical venue, close to au-
thorization policies
25 25 100%
IEEE ACSAC (2006 – 2009) 25 most rele-
vant of 32
Recent publications at an ap-
plied security conference
25 18 72%
ACM CCS (1993 – 2010) 25 most rele-
vant of 253
Important, broad informa-
tion security venue
25 23 92%
ACM CHI (1994 – 2011) 20 most rele-
vant of 27
Primary venue for human-
factors, highly applied
20 8 40%
145 112 77%
Table 4.2.: Sampling of authorization research publications
the breadth of the contexts. While research is not representative for the real-world problems, pub-
lications often focus on speciﬁc areas and problems to motivate their contributions. This approach
poses a threat of missing contexts that the research community neglects. However, we can expect
researchers to be particularly interested in focusing on previously-ignored contexts if these exhibit
particular characteristics that are sufﬁciently different to motivate new research ﬁndings.
Since numerous publications relate to authorization (3,400 in the IEEE Xplore digital library,
3,800 for the ACM Digital Library), we take six samples from the two technical digital libraries,
conducting searches for “authorization”, partly limited to speciﬁc proceedings series. The individual
samplings are shown in Table 4.2 with the respective rationale, covering 145 publications in total.
Publications are categorized as applicable if they cover authorization to a signiﬁcant extent, which
was the case for 77% of the studied publications. In the remaining cases, the publications primar-
ily only touched authorization, for instance, as a motivation or future work. To arrive at a large
proportion of applicable publications, ﬁve samplings were conducted with the sort order set to “by
relevance”. For the sixth sampling, the “by citation count” sort order was applied to also include
publications deemed as particularly important by the research community. As expected, this resulted
in a lower proportion of applicability (56%). Even lower was the proportion for the very applied
human-factors-focused conference CHI (40%), where authorization was primarily only mentioned
in passing.
The applicable publications describe a broad range of application areas for authorization, ranging
from Trusted Computing-based operating-system mechanisms to distributed grid systems and from
discussions of purely theoretical authorization models to speciﬁc applications, such as health-care
information systems. The publications mention the different context criteria to varying extents as
shown in Table 4.3. While most at least mentioned the intended principals and the technical enforce-
ment of the authorization mechanism (93% and 90% of applicable publications, respectively), it was
rather uncommon to discuss the management (34%), complexity (42%), or resource owners (54%) of
the measure. Also, resources were only in half of the cases more speciﬁcally deﬁned than as abstract
“objects.” This should not come as a surprise since organizational aspects of management, com-
plexity, and resource owners are not necessary to motivate many technical aspects of authorization
contexts for technology-focused publications. Still, the publications provide a broad range of con-
texts for analysis of the criteria in the following. To support the discussion of the individual criteria
in the following, Tables 4.4 and 4.5 respectively show the contingency factors and design parameters
of exemplary contexts derived from the publications.
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Resource owner 60 54%
Resource 53 48%
Principal 103 93%
Complexity 47 42%
Authorization scope 66 59%
Management 38 34%
Enforcement 100 90%
Table 4.3.: Mentions of selected criteria, quantity and as proportion of applicable publications
Example Resource
owner
Security
needs
Resource Principal Expertise Complexity,
dynamics
Rented of-
ﬁce build-
ing
Organization
(entity, orga-
nizational)
o/++ (de-
pends on
values)
Ofﬁces (con-
tainer)
Employees
(human)
+ (concrete
measure)
Ofﬁces, em-
ployees;
turnover,
changes
Private
housing
Tenants (con-
tent, organiza-
tional)
–/o (depends
on values)
Home valu-
ables (passive)
Tenants (hu-
man)
+ (concrete
measure)
Tenants
File system File creator
(content,
individual)
Data sensi-
tivity, system
criticality
Files (con-
tainer)
System users
(both)
Files, users,
ACL entries
Smartphone
applications
Device owner
(entity, indi-
vidual)
+ (banking,
payment,
privacy, ser-
vice costs)
Personal data,
calls (passive),
messaging
(active)
Installed
applications
(non-human)
– Applications,
permissions
Shared
folders
Organization
(entity, orga-
nizational)
Business
risks
Folders (con-
tainer)
Employees
(human)
+ (trained
administra-
tors)
Employees,
folders; or-
ganizational
dynamics
Shared
folders (de-
centralized)
Organization
(entity, orga-
nizational)
Business
risks
Folders (con-
tainer)
Employees
(human)
– Employees,
folders; or-
ganizational
dynamics
Scientiﬁc
Grid
Individual
system owner
(entity, orga-
nizational)
Experiments,
computa-
tions
Computational
resources (ac-
tive)
Employees
in virtual
organization
(human)
+ (trained
administra-
tors)
Data entities,
organizations,
principals
Web site
privacy
(visitor)
Web site visi-
tors (content,
individual)
Collected
data (per-
sonal, pay-
ment data)
Personal infor-
mation, activity
log, payment
data (passive)
Operator
and partner
employees
(human)
– (visitor),
+ (policy
author)
Data types,
partners
Web site
privacy
(operator)
Web site op-
erator (entity,
organiza-
tional)
Collected
data (per-
sonal, pay-
ment data)
Personal infor-
mation, activity
log, payment
data (passive)
Operator
and partner
employees
(human)
+ Data types,
partners
User-
generated
content
Web site user
(content,
individual)
Individual
privacy
needs
Photos, mes-
sages, activi-
ties, connec-
tions (passive)
Proﬁle visi-
tors (human)
– (difﬁcult
to foresee
conse-
quences)
Data items,
contacts
Table 4.4.: Contingency factors of exemplary authorization contexts
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Examples Paradigm Scope Management Enforcement
Rented ofﬁce
building
Mandatory Organizational Centralized; CSO (maker),
admin (author)
Property owner, system
manufacturer (Physical)
Private housing Discretionary Inter-personal Decentralized; tenant (mak-
er/author)
Property owner, lock
producer (Physical)
File system Discretionary Inter-personal Decentralized; resource
owner (maker/author)
Operating system (OS)
Smartphone ap-
plications
Mandatory Personal Centralized, developer (au-
thor), device owner (grants
policy)
Smartphone OS manu-
facturer (OS)
Shared folders Mandatory Organizational Centralized; CISO (maker),
admin (author)
System manufacturer
(System)
Shared folders
(decentralized)
Discretionary Organizational Decentralized; individual
employee (maker/author)
System manufacturer
(System)
Scientiﬁc Grid Discretionary Inter-organizational Decentralized; individual
organization (maker/author)
Grid system operator
(Distributed system)
Web site privacy
(visitor)
Discretionary Inter-organizational Visitor (accepts policy), op-
erator (author)
Web site operator (Sys-
tem)
Web site privacy
(operator)
Mandatory Inter-organizational Centralized; operator (mak-
er/author)
System manufacturer
(System)
User-generated
content
Discretionary Inter-personal Decentralized; user (mak-
er/author)
Web site operator (Sys-
tem)
Table 4.5.: Design parameters of exemplary authorization contexts
4.1.3. Contingency factors
Contingency factors deﬁne the parameters and premises for an authorization measure and reﬂect the
speciﬁc environment.
Resource ownership
Gollmann (2011) deﬁnes the owner as the one “who is in charge of setting security policies.” While
in many contexts the person taking the decision – the policy maker3 – has signiﬁcant interests in the
protection of the resource (resource owner), these may be distinct: In the decentralized shared-folders
case (cf. Table 4.4), we take the perspective of the organization as the resource owner with interests
in protecting the folders, but the individual employee makes the policy decisions. Accordingly, we
deﬁne the resource owner as an entity in the authorization context whose security needs are protected
through the authorization measure. In the examined publications, owners can be grouped along two
dimensions. One dimension is their relation to the resource:
• Content owners are actors who are the owner of the content to be protected, for instance,
through explicitly or implicitly originally creating content or having the legal or de-facto own-
ership. Examples from Table 4.4 are Web site users creating content, such as messages in
forums, and Web site visitors leaving log trails.
• Entity owners control the device or system that is to be protected due to their legal or de-facto
ownership. This type of ownership can be observed in the examples for smartphone device
owners, owners of individual systems in Grids, or Web site operators. Further entity owners
mentioned in the publications are ISPs, network operators, and router owners.
3We further discuss the role of the policy maker as part of the management model.
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The second dimension refers to the type of owner:
• Individual owners are people who protect data for their individual good, for example, smart-
phone device owners.
• Organizational owners are organizational entities that group interests in the protection of re-
sources, typically entire organizations or departments in enterprises. In contrast to the individ-
ual owners, organizational owners need to establish power structures to enforce the resource’s
protection for the organization’s good.
Often, several stakeholders have interests in the protection of resources. Take, for example, the two
Web-site privacy cases in Table 4.4: One perspective is that of the visitor who has privacy concerns;
simultaneously, the Web-site operator also acts as an owner and ideally protects the collected visitor
data for its own interests and to comply with regulatory obligations. Thus, we can identify two
distinct authorization contexts in this case, depending on the chosen perspective.
Security needs and the resources to protect
A second characterizing criteria of the authorization context are the security needs of the resource
owner and, particularly, the resources that the resource owner needs to protect (Gollmann, 2011). In
the authorization examples from research, the publications mention in half of the cases more speciﬁc
resources than general “objects”. The resources in the examined publications fall in the following
categories:
• Passive assets: Content in information systems to be protected from unwanted disclosure
(conﬁdentiality) or modiﬁcation (integrity), including personal information and photos. At
the same time, they need to be accessible by those allowed to when needed (availability). In
physical contexts, passive assets can also be physical assets, such as valuables in a ﬂat.
• Active assets: Active functionality offered to principals. For instance, active assets may enable
SMS messaging in smartphones or offer computational services in Grids. For active assets, the
protection focuses on the availability of the asset (accepting and completing tasks) and its
reliability (working as expected, including the integrity of the asset).
• Containers: Not necessarily of value themselves but guard active and passive assets. Typical
examples of authorization containers are ofﬁces (having valuable assets inside) or folders (with
ﬁles inside), but also network infrastructure and databases. Choosing containers as resource in
an authorization context limits the granularity of the authorization, since decisions then apply
to each container in its entirety. Here, the protection needs of the conﬁdentiality, availability,
and integrity concerns the assets inside the container.
Similarly to the resource owner, the resource to be protected depends on the perspective on the
authorization system. Identifying a container as resource to be protected often is a simpliﬁcation
and operationalization of the authorization requirements, closer to the authorization architecture and
implementation. This can be observed in Table 4.4 for the rented ofﬁce building and private housing
examples. In the ofﬁce case, the ofﬁces are declared to be protected, which actually are the containers
of valuable assets, in the private case, the resources are the valuables themselves.
Apart from the type of resource, explicit formulation of security needs and their criticality is
sparse in the studied authorization literature. We ﬁnd considerations of security needs only for very
speciﬁc authorization contexts, such as health-care information systems, or very applied research on
the formulation of policies.
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Principals
Principals are those entities in authorization contexts that request to interact with the resource and
have (or lack) the authority to do so (Gollmann, 2011). Principals can be “users or machines”, and
are often structured into groups, roles, or similar concepts (Abadi et al., 1993). In the examined
publications, three fundamental categories of principals emerged:
• Human principals: Direct representations of people interacting with an information system,
for example, as an employee in an organization who is represented as a user in an organiza-
tional information system. Human actors can be threats to the resources for both, intentional
(malicious external attacker, insider) or unintentional (accidental, human errors) reasons.
• Non-human principals: Programmed agents that conduct tasks. Typical examples are applica-
tions installed on smartphones that interact with smartphone resources on behalf of the device
user or Web services cooperating to complete a task. Further non-human actors in the au-
thorization literature include devices (e.g. in networks) and system components. Here, the
intentional and unintentional threats are caused by the assigned tasks, programming, or modi-
ﬁcation, accidentally or maliciously threatening the resource.
• Undetermined: Varied degree of indirection between human actor and principal. For example,
in operating systems, system users can directly represent a human user or, more indirectly,
processes.
Security expertise
The examined publications offer little detail on the security expertise of the relevant stakeholders,
including resource owners, policy makers, and policy authors. This is probably due to the context-
speciﬁcness of this aspect. However, comprehending authorization measures is necessary for their
success (Brostoff et al., 2005), and we can expect a broad range of individuals – from “passive
consumers” to “domain designers” (Fischer, 1999). We thus can expect that the security expertise
of stakeholders – relative to how they interact with the system – will inﬂuence the authorization
measure design. For example, with trained security administrators as policy authors, it is more likely
that a complex authorization system will be successful than for average smartphone users.
Complexity and dynamics
Complexity characteristics govern the way in that authorization can be implemented effectively and
efﬁciently. For instance, it will be inefﬁcient to set the permissions individually for each principal in
contexts with numerous principals. As shown in Table 4.6, the studied publications mentioned four
main dimensions of complexity (quantity, distribution, heterogeneousness, dynamics), each applying
to different artifacts in the authorization context. The mentioned dimensions of complexity are:
• Quantity: Primarily increases the complexity by requiring a higher number of management
activities, such as setting permissions, and making it more difﬁcult for policy makers and
implementers to have an overview of the entire policy.
• Distribution: Deﬁnes the degree of distribution of artifacts in the authorization context. Au-
thorization contexts can be technically distributed, for instance, with distributed systems that
each require authorization policies, but also on an organizational level, with delegated, local
policy management. A higher distribution may, for example, lead to increased efforts of policy
management if the policy must be adapted at different points.
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Quantity Distribution Heterogeneousness Dynamics
Security
needs
Requirements Distributed secu-
rity needs
Types of require-
ments
Changing processes,
functionality; dynamic
decisions (delegation)
Resources Applications, ser-
vices
– Types of artifacts Changing services
Principals Users, compo-
nents
Distributed com-
ponents
– Changing users, appli-
cations
Authorization
policy
Permission entries
(granularity)
Conﬂicting poli-
cies
Types of roles and
restrictions
Policy adaption
Enforcement Applications,
services, enforce-
ment points
Distributed sys-
tems and services
Types of systems,
authorization
models
Dynamic system con-
ﬁguration, changing
systems
Table 4.6.: Complexity dimensions and respective examples from examined publications
• Heterogeneousness: Extends the complexity from the degree of distribution in that the dis-
tributed parts of the measure differ. This may, again, both apply to the technical implementa-
tion (different types of authorization models in the systems) or organizational aspects (different
types of authorization requirements). One result of heterogeneous authorization contexts is the
necessity to generalize the authorization models or manage separate policies.
• Dynamics: Refers to the changes that affect an authorization context and need to be reﬂected in
policy changes. Changes can occur for the resources (additional services to protect), security
needs (changing environments, new threats), or from changes in the enforcing systems. High
dynamics will increase the number of management activities and, together with a high quantity,
may render individual authorization approaches inefﬁcient.
The dimensions of complexities apply to criteria of the authorization context (security needs, re-
sources, principals) and of the measure design (authorization policy, enforcement). The factors of the
context and the measure design are interrelated regarding the complexity. For instance, the number
of individual resources depends both on the context (how many entities need to be protected) and the
measure design (how are the resources operationalized in the authorization measure).
4.1.4. Design parameters
While the contingency factors draw the ﬁeld of play for an authorization measure, the design param-
eters represent how the measure is actually implemented for the context.
Authorization scope
The authorization scope represents the extent that an individual authorization context covers. In
simple cases, the scope is limited to one system on which only one individual is active (cf. the
smartphone example in Table 4.5). More complex contexts may govern multiple individuals or
organizations. The following types of authorization scopes are present in the examined literature:
• Personal: Limits the applicability of authorization to the environment of individuals. Among
others, this is the case for Personal Area Networks (PAN) that connect an individual’s devices,
and for application permissions on smartphones.
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• Inter-personal: Includes multiple individuals in one context, who, for example, exchange ﬁles
in peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing or work on a shared system and mutually or unilaterally assign
permissions.
• Organizational: Covers groups of people who cooperate for a shared goal in one authoriza-
tion context. This is a very common scope, named in half of the publications that mention
an authorization scope, and encompasses, for instance, IT systems in organizations, such as
shared folders between employees. In contrast to the inter-personal scope, the stakeholders in
the organizational scope are governed by a shared organizational body.
• Inter-organizational: When organizations cooperate outside of a common organizational body
for the cooperation, the authorization scope is inter-organizational. Typical examples are cus-
tomer organizations that access their order status through their supplier’s systems or organiza-
tions that cooperate as Virtual Organizations (VO) in Grid systems.
The authorization scope affects authorization systems primarily in the way authorization and pol-
icy decisions are organized. While only an individual is involved in authorization decisions and their
consequences in personal scopes, in the other cases, restrictions affect other individuals or organi-
zations. Moreover, in the personal and inter-personal case, no coordination between stakeholders is
necessary to arrive at the policy decision of whether a permission is granted. Conversely, organi-
zations often require the interaction between several stakeholders to arrive at a policy decision. We
analyze the relationship between the authorization scope and the resource owner for the authorization
paradigm below.
Enforcement
There are two perspectives on the enforcement as part of the design of the authorization measure. On
a general level, we come back to the differentiation between legitimate and technical authorization:
• Socio-organizational means: An integral part of societies and organizations are power struc-
tures that rely on means, such as ethics, social norms, laws, and deterrence to enforce au-
thorization (Clegg, 1989; Lessig, 1998). This includes the ofﬂoading of the responsibility to
enforce authorization to another actor, such as an external service provider, as custodian.
• Technical mechanism: In information systems, technical mechanisms are often integrated to
enforce the protection. Mechanisms typically rely on an authorization model to formalize the
security needs in authorization policies that are then enforced by controls in the systems.
The technical mechanisms were the focus of the examined literature. While not the primary in-
terest for the purpose of the taxonomy in this thesis, it is nevertheless interesting to consider the
occurrences of enforcement architectures. A widespread technical concept of enforcement is the ref-
erence monitor that “mediates all accesses to objects by subjects” (Department of Defense, 1985).
Gollmann (2011) notes two characteristics for the placement of reference monitors:
• Platform: hardware, hypervisor/kernel, OS, service layer (DB, middleware, Web browser),
applications,
• Placement relative to the program: external (kernel), as interpreter (surrounds program), or
in-line (part of program).
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The examined publications mention six distinct types of enforcement: physical security (e.g. keys
to ofﬁces), operating system (ﬁle or application permissions), middleware (databases), individual
information systems (single-system applications), distributed information systems (systems of mul-
tiple components on multiple systems), and network (protecting the access to a network). The type
of authorization enforcement impacts several of the technical complexity aspects, such as the appli-
cable authorization models, the granularity of permissions, and the provisioning of policies to the
individual systems.
Management model
As part of the organizational authorization architecture, organizational measures to manage the au-
thorization policy need to be established. The number of stakeholders that must interact depends on
the type of the authorization scope. Two primary roles can be identiﬁed for the management of au-
thorization policies (Bauer et al., 2009). The ﬁrst is the role of the policy maker who takes decisions
on policy changes and thereby grants or restricts permissions. Secondly, the policy author formalizes
the decision as an authorization policy, for instance, by setting a permission in an access control list.
In many of the studied publications, the resource owner holds both roles, for example, when a ﬁle
owner decides to grant permissions to another system user and also changes the ﬁle’s permission set-
ting (cf. examples in Table 4.5). In organizational contexts, the separation of the policy maker from
the author is more common since the decisions are often taken by higher level managers and imple-
mented by system administrators (cf. shared folder example). In these contexts, we may also ﬁnd that
the policy maker is separate from the resource owner, when the organization as the resource owner
has passed on the authority to make policy decisions to individual employees, as in the decentralized
shared-folder example.
An opposite management approach for the making and authoring of the policy can be observed for
the smartphone application authorization and the visitor perspective of the Web-site privacy exam-
ples. In these cases, the application developer or the Web site operator, respectively, authors a policy
that the device user or visitor accepts as the act of decision-making.
In addition to the differentiation of making and authoring policies, the management can also be
categorized according to the degrees of centralization and formalization. According to the continuum
of centralization (Malone, 2004), policy decisions can either be taken hierarchically and centrally or
delegated to local decision makers. An example for centralized management is the shared-folder
case, where the decisions on access to individual folders is taken centrally for the organization.
In contrast, in the Grid case, decentralized management is shown with each member organization
deciding on permission for their systems. The examined publications also mention shared models,
where part of the decisions are taken centrally and more ﬁne-grained, for example, delegations, occur
locally. Generally, the degree of centralization can be measured from the proportion of organizational
coverage of individual policy makers with respect to the entire authorization scope.
The formalization similarly depends on the structures surrounding the measure. While not men-
tioned as often as the centralization of the management model, it is nevertheless a signiﬁcant aspect
of the measure design and refers to the formality of requesting changes and the associated processes.
Authorization paradigms: Discretionary and mandatory authorization
When examining the authorization contexts present in literature, particularly regarding the role of
the policy maker and its interrelation with the authorization scope as well as the centralization of
the management model, two distinct authorization paradigms emerge as key characteristic of the
authorization context. In the ﬁrst case, the policy makers in the system take discretionary decisions
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Figure 4.1.: Interrelation of discretionary and mandatory authorization contexts
on parts of the overall authorization policy. One example of discretionary authorization can be found
in the examples in Table 4.5 for decentralized shared folders, where employees set the permissions
as policy makers on individual resources. In contrast, mandatory authorization contexts have policy
makers that deﬁne overall policies for the entire authorization scope. This is the case for centralized
shared-folder example, where the CISO sets overarching policies. The primary difference is, thus,
whether the policy maker governs the entire authorization scope or only subsets of the scope.
Both terms, “discretionary” and “mandatory”, have been historically deﬁned in authorization to
refer to categories of authorization models. However, the model that is understood as Discretionary
Access Control (DAC, National Computer Science Center, 1987) is more appropriately referred to
as IBAC (Gollmann, 2011). In Mandatory Access Control (MAC, Department of Defense, 1985),
the policy is supposed to be set by the system (Gollmann, 2011). However, this assumption is
imprecise, since even then, an actor decides on the system-enforced policy. Thus, to distinguish the
authorization paradigm from the model, we will refer to mandatory and discretionary authorization
instead of “access control”.
The two authorization paradigms are reﬂected in the policy management model, either delegated
to local decision-makers, such as individual employees, or centralized in hierarchical organization.
As noted for the management model above, authorization architectures occur on a continuum of cen-
tralization. For example, centralized procedures for granular permissions can be combined with local
management of ﬁne-grained permissions. Generally, for any discretionary context, one may deﬁne
a mandatory context by taking on a higher-level perspective and establishing additional mandatory
restrictions that, for instance, impose upper limits on the ones assigned decentrally. In the example
depicted in Figure 4.1, ﬁle owners (policy makers in a discretionary context) govern the permissions
of visitors to the content of their Web sites. At the same time, the owner of the shared-hosting service
(“service provider”) represents the policy maker for the mandatory context of the system and limits
the system resources generally available to the ﬁle owners. Considering the authorization context
of a Grid of services, in which multiple system owners contribute services, would see the service
provider as a discretionary policy maker with respect to restricting the access to her service as part
of the Grid.
4.1.5. A taxonomy of authorization contexts
The above-discussed criteria together with the respective types and dimensions that we identiﬁed in
authorization research (cf. Table 4.1) represent a taxonomy of authorization contexts. The contin-
gency factors form the parameters for the authorization measure to ﬁt into, including who is inter-
ested in protecting resources and to whom the resources should be made available. The second part,
the design parameters, describe how the measure is actually designed, organizationally through the
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scope and management, and technically through the enforcement of authorization. A fundamental
design decision that interrelates with several of the other criteria is the authorization paradigm to
be applied, whether to allow individual policy-makers in the authorization system to decide on pol-
icy changes (discretionary) or whether this authority is centralized for the entire authorization scope
(mandatory). Irrespective of the paradigm, the authorization scope, the security needs of the resource
owner, and the authority of the policy maker relate organizationally as follows:
Authorization scope ⊇ Resource owner needs ⊇ Policy maker authority
In mandatory authorization, the policy-maker authority will be congruent with the authorization
scope. In discretionary authorization, the policy-maker authority will only cover part of the scope.
We can apply the taxonomy to deﬁne the scopes of application of individual approaches that
address usability problems, and, in the context of this dissertation, specify the scope of the thesis.
4.2. Characteristics of organizational authorization contexts
“An ‘organization’ is a system of purposive activity of a speciﬁed kind. A ‘corporate
organization’ is an associative social relationship characterized by an administrative staff
devoted to such continuous purposive activity.” (Weber, 1947)
For the purpose of this thesis, Max Weber’s “Corporate organization” should sufﬁce as the deﬁ-
nition of organizations. When discussing organizational authorization contexts, the primary aspects
are the posture of the organization itself and of its information systems. Regarding the former, the
Contingency Theory states that contingency factors deﬁne the most suitable conﬁguration of an orga-
nization (Mintzberg, 1980). Similarly, authorization measures in organizational information systems
need to adapt to the organizational conﬁguration for effectiveness and efﬁciency.
To situate the characteristics of authorization contexts in those of organizations, we need to re-
fer to theories of organizations. Of the several available theories, the Structural Conﬁgurations
(Mintzberg, 1980) lend themselves well: Mintzberg (1980) describes organizations through a typol-
ogy of ﬁve “pure” conﬁgurations, primarily distinguished through the organizational part (Strategic
Apex, Middle Line, Operating Core, Technostructure, support staff) that dominates the organiza-
tion4. For example, the Simple Structure is characterized by the “pull” of the Strategic Apex for
centralization, and the absence of an “elaborated” organization. In the Machine Bureaucracy, the
domination of the Technostructure leads to high standardization of work. The Structural Conﬁgu-
rations are particularly useful since their deﬁnitions cover a broad range of characteristics at a rich
level of detail (McPhee and Poole, 2000), including coordination mechanisms, design parameters,
and contingency factors.
We analytically relate the organizational contingency factors and design parameters to those from
the taxonomy of authorization contexts from the previous section (cf. Table 4.7). For example, the
authorization complexity derives, among others, from the factors “Dynamics” and “Job specializa-
tion.” The relation in Table 4.8 provides a hypothesis of the breadth and typical characteristics of
organizational authorization, further guiding the research in this thesis. Moreover, we can employ the
characteristics for a well-founded limitation of the scope of this thesis and evaluate the authorization
taxonomy through its application.
4Mintzberg later modiﬁed his conﬁgurations (Mintzberg, 1989), adding two conﬁgurations and renaming others. The
added “ideological” conﬁguration bases its coordination on the corporate culture, the political conﬁguration on each
individuals’ political power within the organization. For the authorization contexts, both will be similar to Adhocracies,
even though with more pronounced dynamics. For brevity, we will thus stay with the more compact earlier list of ﬁve
conﬁgurations.
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Mintzberg’s design parameters Mintzberg’s contingency factors
Contingency factors
Resource owner Decentralization, Unit grouping Power focus
Security needs
Resource Technical system
Principal
Security expertise Training, Indoctrination, Decentralization, Job
specialization
Complexity Decentralization, Bureaucratic/organic, Unit
size and grouping, Job specialization, Behav-
ioral formalization
Dynamics, Complexity, Size, Technical sys-
tem
Design parameters
Authorization
paradigm
Decentralization
Authorization scope Unit size and grouping, Decentralization, Job
specialization
Management model Decentralization, Formalization of behavior,
Bureaucratic/organic, Coordination mecha-
nism
Power focus
Enforcement Coordination mechanism
Table 4.7.: Relation of characteristics of organizations to authorization contexts
Simple Structure Machine Bureau-
cracy
Professional
Bureaucracy
Divisionalized
Form
Adhocracy
Contingency factors
Resource
owner
Entire organiza-
tion
Mostly entire
organization
Individual decen-
tralized units
Divisions Selective groups
Security needs Diverse Diverse Diverse Diverse Diverse
Resource Unstructured Structured Structured Structured Unstructured
Principal Diverse Diverse Diverse Diverse Diverse
Security exper-
tise
Low training,
high centraliza-
tion
Low training,
high vertical
centralization
High training,
low centralization
Medium training,
limited decentral-
ization
High training,
selective decen-
tralization
Complexity High dynamics High quantity,
high heteroge-
neousness
High distribu-
tion, high het-
erogeneousness,
medium dynam-
ics
High quantity,
selective distri-
bution, medium
heterogeneous-
ness
Selective distribu-
tion, high hetero-
geneousness, high
dynamics
Design parameters
Authorization
paradigm
Mandatory Mandatory Discretionary Mandatory Discretionary
Authorization
scope
Large Large Medium Divisions Selective smaller
scopes
Management
model
Centralized Centralized Decentralized Centralized (for
devisions)
Decentralized
–Policy maker
location
Strategic Apex Technostructure Operating Core Middle manage-
ment
Supporting staff
–Roles Separated if ded-
icated support
staff
Separated Combined Separated Combined
–Formalization Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Enforcement More socio-
organizational
More technical More technical More technical More socio-
organizational
Table 4.8.: Characteristics of authorization contexts in organizations
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The second primary aspect of organizational authorization contexts are the information systems.
In this respect, a context depends, among others, on the criticality of the contained data and the
served business processes, and the implemented authorization model (ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005).
The use of organizational information systems was, for instance, classiﬁed by Vaidya and Seethara-
man (2005) according to the scope and sophistication of use. Other dimensions include the system
ﬂexibility (Knoll and Jarvenpaa, 1994).
4.2.1. Organizational contingency factors
Organizational resource owners
In organizations, the entity that is interested in protecting resources in information systems is a unit
of the organization, such as the entire organization or a department. The resource owner is thus of
organizational type as entity and/or content owner. Applying the organizational design parameters of
Mintzberg (1980), a context’s resource owner depends primarily on the organization’s unit grouping
and size, and its vertical and horizontal decentralization. In Simple Structures the resource owner
will likely be the entire organization, while organizations of the Divisionalized Form will tend to
have separate owners per division and Adhocracies will have individual groups in the organization
as owners.
While external parties may be interested in the protection of resources – for example, customers
trusting the organization with protecting the conﬁdentiality of their data (organization as entity
owner) – we often can operationalize external resource owners by assuming additional legal con-
straints, such as service-level agreements, or similar motivations to internalize the third-party secu-
rity needs (externalities).
Security needs from risk tolerance and regulatory obligations
The security needs in organizations cover the full range of criticality. The needs depend on the or-
ganizational context and on the processes served from and data contained in the speciﬁc system.
The general security needs are governed by the organization’s tolerance for risks, the criticality of
information conﬁdentiality and availability for its goals, and the obligations for regulatory compli-
ance (ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005; Pallas, 2009). Regulations may be market-speciﬁc, such as the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act and HIPAA, or depend on the type of data, such as privacy regulations (Her-
rmann, 2007).
Organizational resources
We can expect to ﬁnd the full range of resources described for general authorization contexts in
organizations. Active assets can, for example, involve data collection functionality in applications,
passive assets can be present as documents, and the respective containers can cover entire applica-
tions or folders. An important factor is the structuredness of information in organizational decision-
making (Gorry and Morton, 1989). In organizations with primarily knowledge-based decisions, the
information will have less structure than in those with highly formalized or automated decisions. Re-
garding the Structural Conﬁgurations, the technical-system regulation and the structuredness of the
organization are the primary inﬂuencing factors, making it likely that we will ﬁnd rather unstructured
resources in Simple Structures and Adhocracies (Mintzberg, 1980).
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Individual members of organizations as principals
Of the types of principals that need to access the protected resources, we will limit the organizational
authorization contexts to contexts with human principals. The rationale is that we can expect the
organizational dynamics, processes, and decision-making to be particularly pronounced for human
principals. In contrast, decisions on the authorization of non-human principals, such as components,
will primarily be limited to system changes, such as the integration of components. Contexts with
non-human principals will thus generally lack the inherent organizational aspects of organizational
authorization and are sufﬁciently different to warrant a separate consideration.
For human principals in organizational authorization contexts, the purpose of the resources de-
termines the principals who require their availability (Gorry and Morton, 1989). For management
information systems, Gorry and Morton (1989) distinguish the purposes of operational control, man-
agement control, and strategic planning. Mintzberg (1980) deﬁnes organizational parts from which
principals may primarily originate, including the strategic apex, the middle line, and the operating
core.
Security expertise of the individuals
The security expertise of policy makers, policy authors, and principals in the organizational au-
thorization contexts can be expected to vary widely and depends on several factors, including the
organizational security-culture. Schlienger and Teufel (2003) structure security culture in three lay-
ers of “artifacts”, “values”, and “basic beliefs”. The security culture typically consists of awareness,
responsibility, ethics, and security management (OECD, 2002). These factors are inﬂuenced by the
organizational design parameters of training and indoctrination (Mintzberg, 1980). For policy mak-
ing and authoring, the security expertise of the responsible stakeholders will also be inﬂuenced by
the degree of centralization, job specialization, and the behavior formalization (Mintzberg, 1980).
Complexity of the organization and its information systems
The complexity of authorization contexts depends both on the complexity of the organization and
of the organizational information systems. According to the organizational complexity, the context
complexity will vary along the four dimensions:
• Quantity: Inﬂuenced primarily by the contingency factor of organizational size, such as num-
ber of employees, and the design parameter of unit sizes, which affects the number of employ-
ees and resources to represent in authorization for individual systems (Mintzberg, 1980). A
high organizational quantity can be expected for the Structural Conﬁguration of the Technostructure-
dominated Machine Bureaucracy and the middle management-dominated Divisionalized Form.
• Distribution: Depends on the design parameters of unit grouping (e.g. number of different
departments with separate systems) and the vertical decentralization, that is, for example, the
autonomy of departments in setting authorization policies (Mintzberg, 1980).
• Heterogeneousness: In addition to the distribution factors, which may also lead to heteroge-
neous systems, Mintzberg (1980) names the design parameters of job specialization, which
encompasses the division of labor and thus the differences in system and authorization re-
quirements within organizations.
• Dynamics: Truex et al. (1999) argue that organizations are increasingly “emergent”, that is, in
a continuous state of change to culture, meaning, relationships, and decision processes. Au-
thorization dynamics will be primarily affected by changes to task assignments and structure.
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Mintzberg (1980) already names the contingency factor of dynamic environments as reason for
adaption and, as design parameters, a low behavior formalization with unstructured work and
organic structures. For the Simple Structure, based on direct supervision, and the Adhocracy
with a high inﬂuence by support staff, the dynamics should be particularly pronounced.
Apart from the inﬂuence of the organizational complexity, the information systems to be protected
by authorization also contribute to authorization complexity. The contingency factors of technical
system regulation and complexity affect the authorization complexity (Mintzberg, 1980). The hetero-
geneousness dimension of authorization complexity is affected by the sophistication of use from the
differences in structuredness, as observed, for example, in the contrast between simple ﬁle sharing
and complex decision-making based on knowledge data (Vaidya and Seetharaman, 2005).
Knoll and Jarvenpaa (1994) propose three ﬂexibility dimensions of IT systems, of which the “Flex-
ibility in Functionality” to operate well in different environments impacts the heterogeneousness of
authorization. The other two dimensions of Knoll and Jarvenpaa (1994), “Flexibility in Use” (react
to changes in goals) and in “Modiﬁcation” (adaptable to process changes), will affect the dynamics
of authorization. More generally, Truex et al. (1999) states that in emergent organizations, informa-
tion systems follow suit or even drive the change. Traditional approaches of lengthy analysis phases,
abstract requirements, and complete speciﬁcations are replaced by “always analysis”, requirement
negotiation, incomplete speciﬁcations, continuous redevelopment, and adaptability of information
system development.
4.2.2. Design parameters of authorization in organizations
Authorization scope
In organizations, multiple individuals work together for a purpose. Since the individuals need to
interact for authorization, the type of authorization scope will thus be organizational and the scope
will cover the entire organization or organizational units. Lacking the interaction, personal and inter-
personal types of authorization scopes will be ruled out by deﬁnition. Organizational contexts will
always require a minimum of coordination between stakeholders to arrive at an authorization policy,
even if this is only an implicit delegation of the authority to a policy maker. Mintzberg (1980) deﬁned
a number of design parameters of organizations that affect the choice of the scope for authorization,
including the job specialization, the unit grouping, and the vertical and horizontal decentralization.
Larger scopes will accordingly rather be found in conﬁgurations of Simple Structure and Machine
Bureaucracy.
To reduce the complexity, we exclude inter-organizational scopes, given that these introduce ad-
ditional problems of identity management and trust, which are not core authorization problems.
With the trend towards market structures in organizations (Pallas, 2009), organizational authoriza-
tion problems will resemble inter-organizational scopes due to their loose coupling, but the orga-
nization will represent a central point of coordination. Nevertheless, external stakeholders, such as
customers, can act as principals in the organizational authorization contexts, when their access is
considered under the authority of the original organization.
The authorization paradigm and management models
The characteristics of an organization will determine to a large extent the authorization paradigm,
and the formalization and centralization of the authorization management. Pallas (2009) economi-
cally analyzed the formalization and centralization of information security in organizations and de-
scribes how organizations can rely on either hierarchical (centralized) or market (delegation) forms
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of coordination for information security. Effects such as opportunism and information asymme-
tries will cause different coordination and motivation costs. According to Malone’s Decentralization
Continuum, organizations can position between centralized hierarchies (military), loose hierarchies
(research), democracies, and markets (Malone, 2004, p. 6). The degree of centralization also affects
the authorization paradigm, more centralized organizations tending to mandatory, decentralized to
discretionary authorization.5
One of the contingency factors deﬁned by Mintzberg (1980) that inﬂuence the centralization is the
need for power in speciﬁc parts of the organization, such as by the chief executive. Of the design
parameters, the vertical and horizontal decentralization has the most direct impact on centraliza-
tion (Mintzberg, 1980). Since authorization management incurs higher overhead when centralized,
increased behavior and work formalization allows for higher centralization of policy management.
More bureaucratic organizations will typically exhibit less dynamic structures and thus reduce the ne-
cessity of policy changes, making more centralized schemes less of a burden. Similarly, the primary
coordination mechanisms of the organization can inﬂuence the policy management centralization,
with Mutual Adjustments favoring more decentralized approaches and the Standardization of Work
Processes more centralized ones. These effects are also reﬂected in the Structural Conﬁgurations,
with more centralized management to be expected when the Strategic Apex (Simple Structure), mid-
dle management (Divisionalized Form), or Technostructure (Machine Bureaucracy) dominates and
less for the domination by the Operating Core in Professional Bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1980).
The roles of the policy maker and author in organizational authorization contexts depend on the
centralization of the management, with higher centralization resulting in the policy maker to be
found higher in the organizational hierarchy. Considering again the Structural Conﬁgurations, we
most likely ﬁnd the policy maker in the Strategic Apex for Simple Structures, in the middle man-
agement for Divisionalized Forms, in the Technostructure for Machine Bureaucracies, and in the
Operating Core for Professional Bureaucracies. In Adhocracies, supporting staff that should be re-
sponsible primarily for the policy authoring may in practice also take the policy-maker role. For
more decentralized cases, we will more often ﬁnd the maker and author role combined in one per-
son, while more centralization will favor a vertical specialization of these roles, requiring only the
effort of decision-making and not the technical expertise of authoring from the policy maker.
The formalization of policy management depends on similar parameters of the organization. Or-
ganizations with higher formalization of behavior, such as Technostructure-dominated Machine Bu-
reaucracies, will tend to also formalize the authorization management. Moreover, higher degrees of
centralization and the separation of policy maker and author roles will also require more formalized
approaches to coordinate the changes of policies.
Enforcement
As noted in the introduction of this chapter, the technical authorization is only one part of the overall
approach to authorization, and thus to power and control in organizations. To consider the technical
together with the legitimate authorization, we need to examine several layers of social and technical
controls. Different perspectives on authority and control are given in Table 4.9. From the sociologi-
cal perspective, the Circuit of Power (Clegg, 1989) is a useful framework that distinguishes episodic
power relations (e.g. direct command) from those of social integration (e.g. norms) and system in-
tegration (e.g. technological measures and formal rules). Overlapping, but from a legal perspective,
Lessig (1998) introduces four “modalities” that regulate the behavior of individuals in his framework:
5It is interesting to observe how technology and information systems enabled organizations to be decentralized and agile
in the ﬁrst place, but the security mechanisms introduced to protect the very same systems best suited centralized and
bureaucratic structures.
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Clegg (1989) Lessig (1998) Pallas (2009) Mintzberg (1980)
Discipline Sociology Jurisprudence Org. inf. security Organization design
Framework Frameworks of Power Modalities Meta-measures Coord. mechanisms
Enforcement Episodic power relation – – Direct Supervision
Social integration Norms Informal rules Mutual Adjustment
System integration Laws Formal rules Standardization of
Market, architecture Architectural means work, skills, outputs
Table 4.9.: Enforcement of authority in organizations from different perspectives
laws, norms, market, and architecture. Laws are enforced centrally by the state, norms by the social
communities, markets limit individuals through monetary constraints, and architecture through “fea-
tures of the world”. We ﬁnd similar categories by Pallas (2009), deﬁning informal and formal rules,
and architectural means as “meta-measures” to enforce organizational information security.
Enforcement approaches are combined in organizations, reﬂecting the organizational context.
Mintzberg (1980) deﬁnes primary coordination mechanisms for his Structural Conﬁgurations that
may give indications of which form of authorization enforcement will dominate in an organization.
Simple Structures, for example, use Direct Supervision, while control in Adhocracies is based on
Mutual Adjustment, tending to Clegg’s episodic power relations and social integration, respectively.
Other conﬁgurations will more broadly rely on architectural means, that is, technical mechanisms.
The technical aspect of authorization measures occur on various levels in organizational infor-
mation systems. The primary level will reﬂect the information security era (Pallas, 2009): Isolated
systems were primarily protected physically, mainframes through technical approaches on the cen-
tralized system, and distributed systems through managerial means to achieve enforcement on dis-
tributed applications.
4.2.3. Organizational authorization as the scope of this thesis
The examination of the breadth of organizational authorization contexts allowed us to predict to a
certain extent what characteristics to expect in authorization measures of organizations. A summary
of typical contexts in Structural Conﬁgurations (Mintzberg, 1980) is given in Table 4.8. While the
security needs and types of principals are diverse for organizations, we can derive characteristics for
other criteria, particularly the resource owner, the complexity, and the management model.
Focusing on organizational authorization is useful to reduce the effort of vertically integrating the
research in this dissertation to cover a broad range of problems surrounding and perspectives on au-
thorization. More speciﬁcally, it allows us to limit the scope to human principals and organizational
authorization scopes. This also allows us to emphasize the particularly challenging problems of au-
thorization. In particular, we ﬁnd a broad range of socio-technical perspectives in organizational
contexts: the technical perspective of developing and integrating information systems, the organiza-
tional perspective of managing restrictions, and the socio-organizational perspective of interactions
between the individuals. We will analyze how well the insights from organizational authorization can
be transfered to further contexts, such as authorization for personal devices, as part of the concluding
discussions of this thesis. Otherwise, we will primarily focus on organizational authorization for the
remainder of this dissertation.
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4.3. Personas for Authorization Problems
The authorization context taxonomy refers to a number of criteria that relate to human actors in au-
thorization. Resource owners can be the individuals authoring content or owning devices, principals
can be individuals accessing protected resources, and, as part of the policy management, policy mak-
ers and policy authors are responsible for deciding on and formalizing authorization restrictions. We
discussed in the previous section analytically who these actors may be in organizational contexts.
For a more concrete picture of who is impacted in what ways by organizational authorization, we
need to examine actual authorization contexts in practice.
In the Authorization Problems Study, we examined how authorization affects employees at a large
organization, a European, multi-national company. The organization operates systems and maintains
information at several levels of criticality and sensitivity, involving, among others, critical operations
and market regulation as well as the sensitive personal data of employees and customers. In a study
on security compliance, 118 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with employees
from management and staff in two countries between January and September 20106. This study
thus represents a case study according to the categorization in Section 2.5. The interviewees were
recruited via the company newsletter, inviting volunteers to take part in an “IT Security Research
Study” on their experience with the security policy for a gift voucher. From the about 400 responses
within two days, participants were primarily selected on a “ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served” basis, with addi-
tional participants from later responses added for gender balance and breadth of work environments.
The interviews lasted approximately 45 minutes, 40 being conducted via telephone and 78 face-to-
face. The interview questions covered the interviewee background, experiences with the security
policy, and how it affects the primary tasks.
Independently of the interviews, the author who is unrelated to the company coded the interview
transcripts for tasks and challenges related to authorization. A common approach in HCI would
be to identify the roles of stakeholders with respect to authorization in an organization. However,
roles have the drawback of abstracting detail that is necessary to understand the behavior of people.
As an alternative to roles, usability engineers employ the Persona methodology to preserve concrete
characteristics, such as motivations and activities, of typical users (cf. Section 2.1.2 and Cooper et al.,
2007). Faily and Flechais (2011) successfully employed Personas in security engineering.
We followed the approach of Cooper et al. (2007) and identiﬁed behavioral variables, such as
attitudes, motivations, and activities, in the codes of the interview transcripts. We found 11 categories
of behavioral variables with a total of 53 variables. From common combinations of behavior variable
assignments, we derived behavioral patterns and formed ﬁve Personas, listed in Table 4.10. We then
assigned personal authorization challenges to the individual Personas. Since Personas are originally
a design methodology, it is difﬁcult to validate them outside of design endeavors. Moreover, since
the Persona methodology requires common patterns to shine through, the results will rather represent
common Personas than a comprehensive list of how people interact with authorization. In addition,
the interviews and sampling were not particularly aimed for comprehensive coverage of interaction
with authorization. Resulting from a study at a single organization, the Personas also cannot be
claimed to be representational without further validation. However, the breadth of the study should
provide a good initial hypothesis of Personas illustrating authorization problems (“Authorization
Personas”) and allow for a vivid picture of how employees are typically affected by authorization. It
is important to note that the Personas do not represent actual individuals from the study, but rather
ﬁctional constructions to exemplify the problems surrounding authorization.
6The general security compliance in the study was analyzed by Inglesant and Sasse (2011).
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Persona/-
Role
Motivation Activities Problems
Amber
Functional
staff
Personal, organi-
zational, society
risks; productivity
Share/access data,
request changes,
circumvent mea-
sure
Restrictive policies, degraded productivity,
change lead-time and effort, unclear/ineffec-
tive/inefﬁcient procedures, non-transparent de-
cisions and policies
Emily
Technically-
informed
staff
Recognition, (see
Amber)
Develop, solve
problems, make
decisions
Non-transparent policies, coarse-grained per-
missions, lack of usability and functionality,
unclear permissions, lack of high-level policy,
missing expertise, emotional costs of decisions,
informal procedures
Brandon
Personal
assistant
(see Amber) Make decisions Non-transparent policies
Lauren
Functional
manager
Personal risks
and gains, orga-
nizational/society
risks, productivity
Motivate compli-
ance, make/dele-
gate decisions, re-
view policy
Retained permissions, non-transparent policy,
inadequate model, lack of usability, decision
complexity, required expertise, inefﬁcient pro-
cedure, inefﬁcient/ineffective reviews
Nicole
Administrator,
developer
Personal and orga-
nizational and so-
ciety risks, risk
awareness
Administer/develop
applications, make
decisions, support
requests
Lack of high-level policy, cumbersome permis-
sions, conﬂict of authority
Table 4.10.: Personas related to authorization measures
4.3.1. Functional staff
Amber is a business analyst in a technical department of the organization. She uses a number of
company IT systems, for example, to share documents with co-workers and access data for analyses.
Her main motivation concerning the use of the systems are her personal productivity, but also the
general organizational efﬁciency and effectiveness, in that the necessary tasks are completed. Autho-
rization measures affect her most directly through the operational aspects of restrictive policies that
hinder her work or reduce her productivity, for instance, when she cannot access a document that was
sent as a link to her. In some cases she is forced to circumvent the authorization measures and, for
example, use the password of a co-worker to access data in the system. However, she feels uneasy
about not complying with the organization’s security policy that forbids the sharing of passwords.
Amber cares about the security of the sensitive data that she is handling, both for the risks that
the organization faces, for example, from a disclosure, but also because of the consequences to her
personally (concerning her employment) or the consequences for the society in general from the
disclosure of critical data. Due to these considerations, she tries to comply with the security policies
and requests changes to the existing permissions, but the requests can require a high effort and take
a long time to become active, both operational authorization issues. For some systems, it is not
clear to her how to request changes or it is known that not all requests succeed. Motivated to keep
their documents secure, her team decided to also protect documents in the system with passwords,
in addition to the system’s authorization, since it is not always transparent who has access.
Emily also works as a business analyst, but has more technical experience. She tries to alleviate the
problems with authorization that originate, for example, from too granular permissions or missing
functionality in their systems. Because of her interests, she was tasked to develop the SharePoint
site for her team. As a result, she also manages the permissions to the site, but lacks clear guidance
in the form of a high-level policy to whom she should grant what permissions. She generally does
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not feel she has the necessary expertise to make these decisions and it is sometimes unclear to
her which permissions need to be assigned and how to do this correctly. There are only informal
procedures for handling permission requests and she sometimes feels a high emotional pressure to
grant permissions, even though she is unsure whether the permissions are appropriate.
Brandon is the personal assistant to a manager, who has delegated the decisions on who should
receive permissions to him. He has similar attitudes towards information security as Amber, and is
particularly affected by the non-transparency of the current policy, since this makes it difﬁcult to
limit the authorized employees to those with a legitimate need.
4.3.2. Functional management
Lauren manages 40 employees in the ﬁnancial department and feels responsible for their compliance
to the security policy. She motivates her staff to comply by reminding them of why the data is
sensitive, and the consequences of non-compliance, including sanctions. She is motivated by both
consideration for her own employment (she values job security and also is rewarded for meeting
compliance related performance objectives) and an awareness of the risks to the organization caused
by non-compliance with regulations. At the same time, she also cares about the productivity of her
staff.
As part of her role, Lauren needs to make decisions about authorization policies and review ex-
isting permissions on a regular basis. In this function, she is affected by operational authorization
issues, such as the inefﬁciency of the procedures, when, for example, the procedure requires the sig-
nature of more senior personnel or from other departments. Generally, she sees the policy-authoring
aspects of decision-making as a burden, since the risk-assessment is complex and requires security
expertise. Moreover, it requires signiﬁcant technical expertise to set the permissions due to a lack
of usability of the management tool. The authorization model sometimes does not allow the pre-
cise setting of permissions or they can only be set in inefﬁcient ways, for instance, requiring her to
set numerous permissions for each individual of her staff. Consequently, she delegates some of the
decisions to her subordinates. For reviewing existing policies, the lack of transparency of the cur-
rent policies causes a high effort and even limits her ability to review. Since there are no automatic
procedures for role changes, employees will also in many cases retain their permissions. When dele-
gating functional tasks, Lauren is also affected by the lack of delegation options in the authorization
mechanism, forcing her to sometimes share her password.
4.3.3. Technical staff
Nicole administrates and develops applications as part of the information system department. Be-
cause of her detailed knowledge of the systems, she is often consulted on how policy changes can
be achieved in the system, for example, which permissions are necessary, and whether the changes
are appropriate. In effect, she takes the decision in many cases, although she is not aware of all
relevant high-level policies and is sometimes caught in conﬂicts of authority, for example, between
departments when one is more security or business-focused than the other. Nicole is also affected
by cumbersome permissions that make the policy management difﬁcult and inefﬁcient, for example,
when permissions need to be set in a number of separate applications to allow an activity.
4.4. Perspectives on authorization
Even though not representational or comprehensive, the Authorization Personas in the previous sec-
tion demonstrate the breadth of perspectives on authorization in organizations. To structure these
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Mintzberg (Machine
Bureaucracy)
Authorization Per-
sonas
NIST Handbook Varadharajan Authorization per-
spectives
Organizational part Organizational role Security mgmt. role Authorization role Perspective
Operating core Functional staff Users End user Functional
Supporting staff Administrator Technology provider Administrator Policy authoring
Middle management Functional mgmt. Functional manager Policy setter Policy making
Technostructure – Computer security
management
– Security tactics
Strategic Apex – Senior management – Security strategy
Supporting staff Developer Technology provider Developer Development
Table 4.11.: Roles and perspectives in authorization
perspectives systematically, we relate organizational parts of Mintzberg (1980) to the roles of the
Personas, security management (NIST, 1995), and prior work on authorization (Varadharajan et al.,
1998) in Table 4.11. Prior deﬁnitions of authorization roles are typically focused on the technical
aspects of principals, policy makers, and policy authors as discussed for the authorization contexts
in Section 4.1 and by Varadharajan et al. (1998). These are also the most common roles and we
similarly ﬁnd those as the Authorization Personas. However, these roles primarily cover those indi-
viduals affected by authorization and neglect the further stakeholders who may also heavily inﬂuence
authorization measures from a higher level of security management, as described, for example, by
NIST (1995). As a second problem with roles, we observed for the Personas that it is difﬁcult to
adequately capture the different forms of interaction of individuals with authorization in rigid roles:
In many cases, there is no clear distinction between the responsibilities. Instead, we deﬁne the per-
spectives of stakeholders on authorization (right-most column in Table 4.11), additionally including
the security management aspects of designing procedures and of how decisions are taken. A sketch
of how the perspectives interrelate is shown in Figure 4.2, which extends the ﬁrst sketch from the
introduction (Figure 1.1) with the additionally elicited perspectives. Speciﬁcally, we identiﬁed the
following perspectives:
Functional perspective Staff with the functional perspective have to cope with authorization re-
strictions in the information systems that they interact with to complete their functional task. As in
the case of the Persona Amber, functional staff are affected primarily by authorization restrictions,
which can interfere with the productive use of the systems. Functional staff generally strive to op-
timize their efﬁciency and may thus be averse to any external factors that impact their efﬁciency or
the established processes. When interferences with the primary tasks occur, functional staff may
ﬁnd other ways to complete their work, circumventing authorization restrictions where possible. In
these cases, they may also support the policy making and authoring perspectives in setting adequate
policies by proposing required permissions.
Policy-authoring perspective The restrictions in information systems need to be conﬁgured in
a formalized way in technical policies to be interpreted by the system. In structured organizations,
such as Machine Bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1980), we often ﬁnd the authoring perspective to be held
by security administrators from the supporting staff or technology provider, similar to the Persona of
Nicole. In these cases, the authoring of the policy is separated from the decisions on what restrictions
to implement. Conversely, depending on the degree of centralization and the technical complexity of
managing the policies, technically informed staff, such as Emily, take on this perspective as well.
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Figure 4.2.: A sketch of the interrelation between the Authorization Perspectives
Policy-making perspective The restrictions to implement need to be decided on before their for-
malization as technical policy by policy authors. These decisions can be taken at different points in
an organization. In structured organizations, we will often ﬁnd the decision to be made by a func-
tional manager from middle management, such as the Persona Lauren. In other cases, the decision
makers can also be personal assistants (Brandon) or technically-informed staff (Emily).
Security-tactics perspective Depending on the organization, formal processes may need to be
established to organize the changes of the policy and the coordination between functional staff, policy
makers, and authors as discussed for the management model in Section 4.2.2. The security-tactics
perspective is responsible for deﬁning the necessary procedures. In the Structural Conﬁgurations
(Mintzberg, 1980), this is a typical task of the Technostructure. The NIST Handbook (NIST, 1995)
assigns this perspective to the “computer security management.”
Security-strategy perspective In order for policy makers to arrive at adequate decisions on what
permissions to grant to whom, strategists need to deﬁne the parameters of these decisions, for exam-
ple, in high-level policies. The NIST Handbook (NIST, 1995) calls for senior management to take a
leading role by deﬁning these parameters together with support staff who provide risk management
and planning.
Development perspective On the systems development side, developers need to consider autho-
rization when they perform development activities to implement and maintain the systems. The
authorization-speciﬁc tasks depend on the development context. For custom-developed software,
software developers need to take authorization into account in all the development activities to reli-
ably achieve the enforcement in the system. For commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software products,
authorization development tasks in organizations are more focused on the integration into the existing
77
4. Authorization in organizational information systems
infrastructure, for example, interfacing with the identity management system and the organization-
wide policy provisioning.
4.5. Conclusion
As we saw in our analysis of authorization contexts in research, the contexts can be diverse, both in
the characteristics of the contexts (resources, security needs) and in the architectural means to protect
resources. Since our aim is to integrate different perspectives on authorization to effectively allevi-
ate existing problems, we limit the scope of authorization by focusing speciﬁcally on organizational
contexts, beneﬁting from the knowledge on organizational structures from decades of organizational
research. We employed the Structural Conﬁgurations of Mintzberg (1980) to form a hypothesis of
what authorization contexts to expect in what organization and to demonstrate that the authorization
taxonomy is useful. We found that organizational characteristics very much affect authorization con-
texts: Only the security needs and the type of principals cannot be directly related to characteristics
of the conﬁgurations.
Organizational authorization contexts are particularly interesting with respect to the interrelation
between the diverse stakeholders as demonstrated by the Authorization Personas. To systematically
foster the interaction between these individuals and integrate their tasks and responsibilities, we
deﬁned Authorization Perspectives to capture their individual points of view and structure further
research. The perspectives are not independent of the taxonomy, but can be related: Stakeholders
with the functional perspective will be principals of the authorization measure, policy authors and
makers are part of the management model. The perspectives security tactics and strategy, and devel-
opment are outside the scope of the taxonomy; stakeholders with these perspectives rather design the
measure organizationally and technically, respectively.
Having more clearly deﬁned the problem domain through the Authorization Taxonomy and the
Authorization Perspectives, we can now explore in detail what problems affect the stakeholders with
respect to authorization.
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I’m sorry, Dave. I’m afraid I can’t do that.
Kubrick: 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968)
In the previous chapter, we could observe the diversity of perspectives on authorization. Functional
staff need to cope with restrictions as part of their daily work, policy authors formalize policies,
policy makers take decisions on policy changes, and developers integrate authorization into informa-
tion systems. As we already saw for the Authorization Personas, problems can occur in a variety of
ways in these activities surrounding authorization and impact the effectiveness and efﬁciency of the
authorization measure, the authorization usability.
Particularly the authoring of policies has been in the focus of research on the authorization usabil-
ity (cf. Section 2.3). Researchers identiﬁed difﬁculties both in laboratory experiments (Zurko and
Simon, 1996; Brostoff et al., 2005) and in organizational practice (Bauer et al., 2009; Smetters and
Good, 2009; Whalen et al., 2006). However, the problems with authorization cannot be reduced to
only the usability of management tools and the authoring of policies. Models of security economics
emphasize the impact on security from usability and its interaction with productivity (cf. Chapter 2):
For example, when the request of a policy change is perceived as too much effort, employees may
rather share their password as a cheaper way of solving the problem. To understand the problems
with authorization thoroughly, we cannot selectively focus on one perspective or the policy-authoring
task, but must more broadly consider how authorization affects the different perspectives, their inter-
action, and how the problems interrelate.
In this chapter, we will analyze problems surrounding authorization with an integrative approach.
We present the results of an in-depth study on authorization problems in a large organization. Based
on the ﬁndings, we derive approaches to address the problems and a holistic model of the authoriza-
tion problems. We close this chapter with a reﬂection on how the results from this chapter relate to
the initial research questions and hypotheses on authorization problems.
5.1. Authorization problems in a large organization
The demonstrated selectiveness of the prior work with its focus on individual problems and policy
authoring calls for a broader analysis of authorization problems, particularly in organizations where
several individuals are affected by the authorization measure. Moreover, we ﬁnd only few publica-
tions that explicitly discuss the causes and effects of the problems with authorization. One example
is the study by Ahern et al. (2007) on social networking, in which they found that coarse controls
cause users to circumvent the measure. Wool (2004) argued that more complex ﬁrewall rule sets lead
to a higher number of errors in the policy. To effectively alleviate problems surrounding authoriza-
tion, we need to address both challenges: broadly cover the different perspectives on authorization,
and examine how the problems interrelate and where the problems originate. This extension of prior
research may be compared to how the “Galilean-Newtonian revolution” (Finkenthal, 2001, p. 1)
overcame the ﬂat reporting of problems to rather examine the interrelation of causes and effects in a
teleological approach (p. 44).
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To derive insights about the authorization problems of the different perspectives, their interrelation,
and their impact in practice, we conducted the Authorization Problems Study, based on interviews
on the security compliance of employees at a large organization – a European, multi-national com-
pany. The organization operates systems and maintains information at several levels of criticality and
sensitivity, involving, among others, market regulation, and the sensitive personal data of employees
and customers.
5.1.1. Study design
Scholars of social sciences have spent decades on the discussion of the adequacy of different research
methods to deliver reliable results (Bryman, 1988; Seale et al., 2007). Like for studying authoriza-
tion in practice, key characteristics of social sciences are the context-dependent, diverse, and complex
nature of research. We need to address two points here: ﬁrst, whether to employ a quantitative or
qualitative approach, and, second, what speciﬁc method to employ. Regarding the former aspect,
Bryman (1988) argues that the distinction between quantity and quality is a purely technical one –
two different ends of the spectrum of data collection strategies. He sees quantity to rather conﬁrm
existing theory, offer “hard, reliable” data, and having a general scope. Conversely, quality is more
suited for emergent theory, offers “rich, deep” data for a more speciﬁc scope (p. 94). However, the
generality of quantity is often “exaggerated” (p. 101) and it often “fails to give appropriate recogni-
tion to. . . entities which may not be directly observable” (p. 17). Quality allows us to better describe
and contextualize ﬁndings (p. 61), often used as “reconnaissance” and “initial exploration” (p. 95);
the point of qualitative research is not generalizability, but “the cogency of theoretical reasoning”
(p. 123). This matches well with the goals of the Authorization Problems Study, which explores a
breadth of problems and their interrelation not previously targeted.
The second major study-design aspect is the high-level method. Flyvbjerg (2007) strongly argues
for case-study research, despite the conventional wisdom that “a case study cannot provide reliable
information about the broader class” (p. 398). However, he argues that “formal generalization is
overvalued as source of scientiﬁc progress” (p. 395). In complex disciplines with diverse contexts,
“there does not. . . exist predictive theory. . . [only] concrete context-dependent knowledge” (p. 392),
making case studies well-suited. We also need to be careful not to consider case studies “a sample
of one,” since they include a range of people (Bryman, 1988, p. 90). Moreover, context-dependency
is vital, since – as in our study – it is often “more important to clarify the deeper causes. . . and its
consequences. . . than how frequently [the phenomena] occur” (Flyvbjerg, 2007, p. 395). Since this
corresponds with the goals of the Authorization Problems Study and since it is generally difﬁcult to
conduct studies in information security with large samples (cf. Kotulic and Clark, 2004), we decided
to conduct an in-depth case study (cf. Section 2.5).
The data collection method and sampling for the study was described already for the Authorization
Personas in Section 4.3. As detailed there, 118 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted
for a security-compliance study with 118 employees from management and staff for the study, cov-
ering the interviewee background, experiences with the security policy, and how the policy affects
the primary tasks.
According to Yin (2009), the quality of study design for case studies can be tested through four
properties: Construct validity concerns that the phenomena studied are measured in an appropriate
way. In this study, we apply a Grounded-Theory approach, which is argued for below. Internal valid-
ity ensures that causality claims are valid. In analysis, we build chains of causality and quantify their
occurrence in a variety of contexts to ensure that causalities are valid. External validity relates to the
above-discussed generalizability of the case study. Generalizability can analytically be shown to a
certain extent through the adequate selection of the case under study (Yin, 2009, p. 43). We, accord-
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ingly, chose a company that offers a broad range of different authorization contexts and document the
characteristics of the contexts to show for which contexts we expect the results to be generalizable.
Further generalizability needs to be shown in follow-up studies. Lastly, reliability ensures that the
study can be repeated in the same environment to come to the same results. We assure this property
in this study by carefully documenting the data collection and analysis strategy.
Since the sampling process induced a potential self-selection bias, the quantity of mentions cannot
be considered representative. However, the main goal of the study is not to elicit exact frequencies,
but rather to derive a thorough description of the problems and their interrelation. The diverse back-
grounds of the participants should allow us to formulate well-grounded hypotheses on the causes of
usability problems in authorization for the remainder of this dissertation and future research.
Analysis
To analyze the interview transcripts, we applied a Grounded-Theory approach (Adams et al., 2008;
Glaser and Strauss, 1967) because of its strength in systematically identifying, categorizing, and
relating the concepts brought up by the participants of the study – particularly for broad descriptions
of effects of technology and its generalization (p. 153). We focused on the authorization-related
segments in the interview transcripts, coding for authorization usability problems and their causes
and effects. For internal consistency of the coding, the author, who is unrelated to the organization
conducted the coding. Almost two-thirds of the interviewees (75 of 118) mentioned authorization
problems in one of the organizational information systems, including, amongst others, ﬁle sharing,
administrative systems, and restrictions to Web access. Since authorization segments are sparsely
distributed over the interviews, we coded in a two-stage process. In the ﬁrst pass, we assigned broad
categories of problems, for example, “policy change issue” to this quote:
“they may need temporary access. . . and a lot of the IS setup takes so long that a lot
of these are workarounds to solve a temporary problem. . . problems tend to bounce
around. . . for quite a long while”
In the second pass, we then applied open and axial coding to the identiﬁed quotes for ﬁner gran-
ularity. We established relationships between the codes through causal coding: We assigned three
types of codes to quotes: the issue (the speciﬁc problem, “Change lead time” in the above example)
as well as causes (“Multi-level procedure”) and effects of the issue (“Social circumvention: Pass-
word sharing”). Employing our analysis tool, described below, the coding allowed us to generate
causal diagrams of the authorization problems.
We were particularly interested in relating the problems to organizational goals. According to
Schermerhorn et al. (2008), organizational goals fall into a three categories: societal goals (how to
contribute to society), output goals (who is to beneﬁt from the organization, e.g. shareholders, em-
ployees, customers), and system goals that relate to the survival of an organization. Authorization is
most directly affected by system goals, including growth, harmony, prestige, productivity, proﬁtabil-
ity, and innovation. Particular priorities of the system goals depend on societal and output goals, but
also vary among departments (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969). When projecting these system goals to
authorization measures, we arrive at the following underlying organizational goals that are affected:
• Effectiveness of the security measure: The degree to which the authorization measure increases
the overall security as intended (proﬁtability, harmony, prestige),
• Efﬁciency of the security measure: The effort expended by employees in operation to achieve
effective security (proﬁtability, productivity),
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Figure 5.1.: Interrelation of categorized authorization problems
• Regulatory compliance: The compliance of the organization with laws and regulatory obliga-
tions, for example, from market regulation (survival, proﬁtability),
• Functional effectiveness: The ability of employees to complete their primary tasks despite
authorization restrictions (productivity, innovation),
• Functional efﬁciency: The effort expended by employees to complete functional tasks, partic-
ularly additional efforts caused by authorization measures (productivity, proﬁtability),
• Satisfaction: Effects on the motivation of employees, such as frustration, from authorization
measures (harmony).
Analysis tool
We coded 540 quotes in the interview transcripts, associating problems with the system context as
well as with causes and effects as tuples or triples in a spreadsheet. We explored the data with
an analysis tool that derives relationships from the coded quotes and generates diagrams using the
Graphviz tool suite1. An example of the diagrams is shown in Figure 5.1: causal edges connect
causes with problems, until reaching impacts on organizational goals at the bottom. The example
quote from above results in the edge from “Policy change issue” to “Circumvention” in the diagram.
Since our coding is signiﬁcantly more detailed, we implemented three levels of abstraction. At
the most detailed level, all identiﬁed problems are shown with their causal (“Policy change issues”
cause “Circumvention”) and is-a relationships (“Password sharing” is a “Social circumvention”). In
a more abstract representation, all is-a relationships are ﬂattened and the edges of the detailed level
lifted to their parent nodes. The most abstract form is the one shown in Figure 5.1 and only displays
problem categories. The different levels of abstraction allow us to both draw high-level conclusions
and analyze the interrelations in detail.
The darkness of the shade of the nodes in the diagrams refers to the number of mentions in the
study. Moreover, the diagrams also convey meaning through their structure, the node connectedness,
and their relative position. For example, the central location and high interconnectedness of the
1http://www.graphviz.org/
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problem “Inadequate policy” in Figure 5.1 points to its relative importance. Problems situated closer
to the top of diagrams more indirectly impact organizational goals, but have, as a consequence, a
higher knock-on effect (e.g. “Implementation issues” in Figure 5.1).
The tool further supported us by ﬁltering the diagrams in two ways: First, by system context,
allowing us to analyze individual authorization contexts. Second, limiting the diagrams to root-
cause/ultimate-impact graphs, only showing those causes and effects that directly or indirectly relate
to given problems.
5.1.2. Causes and effects
The authorization problems raised in the interviews allow us to derive general conclusions on autho-
rization problems, their causes and effects. The causal diagram in Figure 5.1 depicts the interrelation
of problems at a high level. Beginning at the impacts on organizational goals in the bottom of the
diagram and following the causal links backwards, we describe the most severe and frequently men-
tioned problems in the following:
Problematic extremes in the continuum between restrictiveness and over-entitlements
As stated for the functional staff persona Amber in Section 4.3, the primary direct impact of autho-
rization on primary tasks results from missing permissions due to restrictive policies (40 mentions),
often seen as frustrating and affecting productivity, particularly when accessing the Web (26):
“all forums are blocked which is a bit of a pain. . . you are looking for sort of technical
information. . . and you’ll ﬁnd an old forum on it and you can’t view it so you kind of get
ground to a halt”
In contrast, over-entitlements (16) affect the organizational security when users have more permis-
sions than necessary for their work. Interviewees named a number of causes for restrictive policies
and over-entitlements. The most important ones are related to the policy-change procedures as well
as to the decision-making for policy changes, discussed below. A further reason is the lack of trans-
parency of policies (13). This problem leads, for example, to over-entitlement when policy makers
cannot keep track of who has permissions on folders so that previously required permissions remain
assigned (retained permissions: 4).
Restrictiveness and over-entitlements are the two ends on the continuum between conﬁdentiality
and integrity, and availability of information that we mentioned in the beginning of Chapter 2. Both
extremes show to be problematic with respect to productivity, effective security, and stakeholder
satisfaction.
Requesting policy changes
To correct restrictive policies and, less frequently, over-entitlements, functional staff, such as Amber,
request changes to the policy as part of the authorization operation. The most frequently mentioned
problems are the required effort to request changes (15) and the change lead-time (14), that is, the
duration from requesting a change until its enactment in the system:
“if someone. . . needs to get access. . . immediately because it is job critical, then they will
use that password in the meantime while they are waiting for theirs to come through.”
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The result from those problems is that the requester is forced to circumvent the authorization mea-
sure. The perception of the lead time and required effort also deters the functional stakeholder from
requesting a permission in the ﬁrst place, for example, when convenient circumvention is possible
or the permission is only required temporarily. Similar to these issues are problems of unclear or
ineffective procedures (13):
“accesses were challenging at the time. . . knowing who you go to, ask for what and how
you know that that’s what you want. . . Shared areas were. . . problematic in identifying
where the data was, who needed to approve the access to it”
In these cases, the procedures are unknown or known not to help, thus further increasing the perceived
effort due to the need to discover the procedure, or reducing the perceived effectiveness of pursuing
a change of policy.
Making policy changes
The second perspective on problems with the change procedure is from policy making and authoring,
from those deciding on and implementing the changes to the policies. Several of our identiﬁed per-
sonas are involved in these activities, including functional managers (Lauren), technically-informed
functional staff (Emily), personal assistants (Brandon), and administrators/developers (Nicole). Here,
one issue is the informality of procedures (3), leading, for example, to non-authoritative decisions
(13):
“The responsibility in my group was just given to people that were the most computer-
savvy at the time.”
The primary challenge for policy makers is the lack of a high-level policy (5) that deﬁnes which
permissions should be granted to whom. Determined to take appropriate decisions, policy makers
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to properly evaluate requests without this kind of guidance:
“I don’t know about any policy on who should get access to my SharePoint site. It’s just
based on need.”
A common consequence is that many decisions are taken without a comprehensive consideration of
the consequences of the decisions (17):
“did somebody actually sit there and think ‘Do you need this access?’. . . I get a person
come and says ‘Hey, somebody told me I need this, can I have it? Give me this form and
I can give it to you [signed].’ ”
In this way, decisions are sometimes overly business- or security-driven, leading to over-entitlement
and restrictive policies, respectively. In other cases, decisions are solely based on formalities, for
example, neglecting to consider whether the access is actually necessary as long as the formalities,
such as a speciﬁc training, are fulﬁlled by the requesting employee.
Related to these issues is the problem of conﬂicts of authority (2), for example, in the following
example in which different departments have differing standards:
“one of the owners of the. . . shared drive, I’m one of the others, he was allowing all
these other people, saying ‘I need to put so and so on.’ Well, I said ‘Do they have the
[certiﬁcation]? . . . You’ve given them access to all that information.’ ”
In other cases, particularly when decisions are decentralized, the emotional costs of denials (2) can
be high and might even lead to policy makers taking inappropriate decisions:
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Workaround/circumvention Example Effects
Utilize tech. loopholes (6) Rename attachment extension Functional inefﬁciencies
Increase redundancy (3) Copy a document to a place which can be ac-
cessed
Inefﬁcient, non-transparent policy
Multiple accounts (2) Switch between accounts for different permis-
sions
Undermines identity scheme, inefﬁcient
Spare accounts (1) Teams e.g. prepare a number of accounts for new
temps
Potential missing traceability of activi-
ties
Make doc. public (1) Move document to a public folder to allow access Undermines policy enforcement
Share through alt. media (12) Send document by email or physically on CD,
rather than changing the policy
Loss of control over data; potentially in-
creased risk; redundancy of data
Use private device (6) Access information not available from work de-
vices from smartphone or home PC
Risks from data on devices not governed
by organization’s security policy
Use external system (2) Post documents on an organization-external sys-
tem to grant access to externals
Risks from documents outside of the or-
ganization’s security realm
Share passwords (21) Share password instead of waiting for permis-
sions to be changed
Lack of traceability/audibility; breaking
security policy
Coworkers as proxy (3) Turn to coworkers for a task due to lacking per-
missions
Potentially inefﬁcient
Share logged-in account (1) Have coworkers complete tasks at a logged-in
computer
Lack of traceability/audibility
Table 5.1.: Workarounds, technical and social circumventions of authorization measures
“there have been a couple of people that have been ‘Well, I’m not doing anything with
it,’. . . ‘Why are you so difﬁcult’
Another challenge arises from the implementation of authorization in information systems. In
systems with inadequate authorization models (11), such as only offering coarse-grained restrictions,
it is difﬁcult to enforce the appropriate restrictions.
“So all the things people are working on, everyone has access to. . . that’s the granularity
that’s given. . . because of the logistics associated with managing that sort of access.”
In some cases, the lack of usability of policy authoring also leads to high effort when employing
ﬁner-grained restrictions, thus preventing precise restrictions.
Circumventing authorization measures
The interviewees frequently reported that authorization problems, primarily restrictive policies and
the perceived effort for policy changes, lead to the circumvention of the system, for example, through
sharing passwords with coworkers:
“Sometimes people don’t have access to information that they need to do their job and
therefore the passwords are shared within teams. And I ﬂagged that before, but it does
happen, because it can take so long, months, to get something through. So it would be,
‘Use somebody else’s account.’ ”
Overall, interviewees describe a high level of compliance in the organization and, for example,
report that they generally feel uneasy when not complying with the rules. Considering the general
tendency to comply, the high number of mentions of circumventions related to authorization (58) is
interesting. The identiﬁed circumventions differ widely in severity with respect to their impact on the
organizational goals. Circumventions range from sending documents by email instead of changing
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Microsoft SharePoint Shared folders
Contingency factors
Resource owner Team, department Organization
Security needs diverse diverse
Resource Site (container) Folder (container)
Principal Employee Employee
Security expertise
—Principal diverse diverse
—Policy author – (untrained staff) + (dedicated technical staff)
—Policy maker diverse (often non-authoritative) diverse (line manager, app. owner)
Complexity High quantity, medium dynamics High quantity, low dynamics
Design parameters
Paradigm Discretionary Mandatory
Scope Organization Organization
Management model Informal, decentralized: email to as-
signed person (policy maker and author)
Formal, centralized: Forms, approval
from line manager and policy maker
Enforcement Technical: SharePoint Technical: folder access
Table 5.2.: Authorization characteristics of SharePoint and Shared folders
the policy to the sharing of passwords to grant access. We grouped the circumventions into the
following categories:
• Workarounds (13): Using technical means within the system, for example, using multiple
accounts,
• Technical circumvention (20): Using technical means outside of the system, such as sending
documents on physical media,
• Social circumvention (25): Employing social means to work around authorization measures,
such as sharing passwords.
We summarized the types of circumventions with examples and potential effects in Table 5.1 and
found that circumventions impact ﬁve of the six organizational goals, including the productivity
(security and functional efﬁciency), security effectiveness, regulatory compliance, and employee
satisfaction.
5.1.3. Authorization paradigms
In the previous section, we studied general causes and effects of authorization problems. In practice,
employees of the organization are affected by problems in a broad range of systems that inhibit
distinct characteristics with respect to the authorization context. To analyze how these characteristics
affect the problems, we selected two of the organization’s contexts – “Shared folders” and Microsoft
SharePoint – for a focused, comparative analysis. These systems are similarly broadly employed
for sharing information and were mentioned frequently, but have opposing characteristics. Applying
the previously developed taxonomy (cf. Section 4.1), we ﬁnd that the systems represent different
authorization paradigms and management models. As shown in Table 5.2, they particularly differ in
the degree of formalization and centralization of the change procedures, and in the decision-making.
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Figure 5.2.: Categorized problems with SharePoint sites
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Figure 5.3.: Categorized problems with Shared folders
Microsoft SharePoint
Microsoft SharePoint is used in the organization to share documents within teams and departments
as well as organization-wide. Departments and teams develop and operate local SharePoint sites.
This includes the management of the authorization policy that grants access to the SharePoint-hosted
resources on an employee level. Staff can request access to resources by clicking on a dedicated link
when access is denied and thus send an email to the resource-speciﬁc policy maker, who then decides
on the appropriateness of the request.
A high-level visualization of the interrelation of authorization problems for this system is shown in
Figure 5.2. The effectiveness of security and regulatory compliance is impacted most, primarily due
to permissive policies and circumventions of the authorization measures in the system. For example,
staff use email for sharing documents instead of adapting the policy. The reason often are inadequate
policies that result from problems with the change procedures and decisions, which are detailed in
Table 5.3. Implementation problems, such as usability problems with the policy management, and
the lack of transparency of the policies – preventing effective policy reviews – affect organizational
goals as well, but to a lesser degree.
Shared folders
Shared folders represent the traditional way of sharing documents in the organization and are meant
to be replaced by the above-discussed SharePoint infrastructure in the long run. Users access a
shared-network drive from their desktop through the ﬁle explorer. Authorization is primarily en-
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SharePoint Shared folders
Problem Dec. Proc. Dec. Proc.
Decentralized decisions 2
Required/present expertise 5
Lack of high-level policy 3
Non-comprehensive decision 3
Business-driven decisions 1
Coarse-grained restrictions 2 1
Lack of usability 2
Change lead-time 2 7
Required change effort 4
Ineffective change procedures 2 2
Availability of authority 2 1
Informal procedure 1 1
Inefﬁcient procedure 5
Unclear procedure 1 4
Conﬂicts of authority 1
Non-authoritative decision 5 1
Effects
Loss of traceability 2
Over-entitlement 5 8
Restrictive policy 1 6
Circumvention 8 13
Inefﬁcient security 2 5
Functional efﬁciency 3 9
23 29 9 59
Table 5.3.: Comparing mentions of problems with decisions and procedures
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forced on a folder level. In contrast to the SharePoint procedures, folder permissions are granted
to employees through a centralized process. They complete forms that are approved by their line
manager and the policy maker for the resource (cf. Table 5.2).
As depicted in Figure 5.3, the policy change-procedures (“Policy change issues”) were mentioned
in the interviews most frequently (ﬁlled in darkest shade) as problems that impact, directly or in-
directly, the effectiveness of security, productivity, and regulatory compliance. The policy change
problems are listed in more detail in Table 5.3, notably including the high perceived change effort
and change lead-time.
Comparing the paradigms
While apparently similar in terms of structures in the diagrams, there are a number of differences
when examining the problems with change procedures and policy decisions. Speciﬁcally, procedure
issues appear to be more prevalent for Shared folders (cf. Table 5.3, column “Proc.”). For instance,
the change lead-time and the required change effort is most relevant for Shared folders. Similarly,
there is less mention of circumvention and productivity impacts from hindering work or inefﬁcient
procedures for SharePoint sites.
While the SharePoint procedure has fewer negative impacts overall, there can be more severe
problems with the procedure if, for example, the responsible person does not respond:
“Sometimes you don’t get a response for months and you don’t know who to chase. At
least with the Shared folders [process] you’ve got the request number and you can ring
up about it.”
Overall, the sum of mentions of procedure issues (shown in the bottom row of the table) is lower for
SharePoint.
A second area of effects of the paradigms are the decisions on policy changes. In this case, the sum
of mentions in the table indicates that decision problems are more frequent for SharePoint than for
Shared folders. Primarily, there is a concern in the case of SharePoint that due to the local decisions
and the informal nature of the procedure, the decisions might not in all cases be adequate and the
local policy administrators may lack security expertise (cf. Table 5.2):
“A user who is not trained properly can actually give access to everything easily through
a couple of clicks in SharePoint; I think it is quite easy to not give access to the right
areas. . . because it has quite a confusing way of giving permissions”
In contrast, there is only a small number of mentions of decision problems for Shared folders.
The signiﬁcance of the authorization paradigm
Overall, our analysis indicates that the design of the authorization measure (cf. Table 5.2), particu-
larly the chosen paradigm, can have considerable effects on organizational goals. According to the
mentions by study participants, it can be more efﬁcient to have decisions taken and enacted locally
(SharePoint) than in a centralized procedure (Shared folders): change lead-times are lower, there
are less circumventions, and thus less impact on staff productivity and the effective security. Con-
versely, problems with the local changes primarily arise from overly informal procedures and a lack
of expertise in the decision-making. These ﬁndings are in line with the theory by Pallas (2009), who
predicts the trade-off between hierarchical and market forms of coordination for information security
in organizations. Particularly, we see the effects of information asymmetries in the lack of expertise
of local policy makers and the high hierarchical coordination costs for centralized decisions.
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5.2. How to address the problems in organizations
The Authorization Problems Study showed problems and their interrelation, and allowed us to com-
pare centralized/structured with local/informal procedures and decision-making. Despite the lack
of representativeness, we can derive a number of recommendations on the design of authorization
measures from the rich picture from the study:
5.2.1. Guide and monitor circumventions
Participants of our study reported numerous types of circumventions that impacted the effective secu-
rity, their productivity, and their satisfaction. We can address the negative effects of circumventions
in the following ways:
• Foster acceptable circumventions: Participants of our study reported that they would have to
wait for policies to be changed to complete their task if they did not circumvent the authoriza-
tion measure. Circumventions are thus not necessarily the inferior option, particularly when
considering the impact on productivity. However, the participants also stated that they feel
uncomfortable when they need to break a security policy in the process. To improve on this
situation and since architectural means cannot entirely prevent circumventions, organizations
should rather foster acceptable circumventions, guiding what circumventions are reasonable
and in what situations. Formal rules through security policies and informal rules through
common understanding in teams must complement architectural measures, as emphasized, for
example, by Pallas (2009) and Whalen et al. (2006).
• Monitor circumventions and the use of additional controls: Our ﬁndings on the effects of au-
thorization problems show that circumventions are a good indicator of underlying problems
and should be monitored closely to identify and solve problems in existing policies and proce-
dures. Similarly, additional authorization measures, such as passwords on shared documents,
can indicate that the available authorization models, policy authoring tools, or change proce-
dures are inadequate.
5.2.2. Establish adequate procedures
We found many cases in which the procedures for policy changes caused authorization problems.
This extends the prior work on supporting the communication between stakeholders in policy man-
agement (cf. Section 2.3.3).
• Deﬁne and communicate procedures: Procedure ambiguity and informality affected the change
operations, the interactions between the perspectives, and organizational productivity. For in-
stance, participants did not know how to request permission changes. Clearly communicating
the procedures to functional stakeholders will also lower the threshold for requesting changes.
• Reduce the (perceived) change lead-time and change effort: Circumventions were often caused
by the duration for the changes to be enacted and the effort to initiate changes. Applying
economic models to security usability (cf. Section 2.6) indicates that we need to reduce the
costs of compliance. We thus expect that a reduction of the change lead-time and effort, and
their perception may result in a reduction of circumventions.
• Adjust the degree of centralization and formalization: Our observations on the different au-
thorization paradigms show that decentralized and informal procedures can be beneﬁcial. This
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is also supported by economic models of information security management (Pallas, 2009).
However, the adequate procedures depend on the context, the involved stakeholders must have
baseline security expertise for adequate decisions (see below), and the procedures may need to
remain traceable, depending on the environment.
5.2.3. Support policy decisions
Our ﬁndings indicate that many authorization problems originate in the decision-making part of
policy management:
• Provide high-level policies and guidance on authorization decisions: Policy makers stated
that they lacked guidance on what decisions were appropriate. One way to provide support is
through high-level policies on how to decide on requests. These policies need to be adequate
for the speciﬁc context, actionable, and comprehensible. A related option to support policy
makers is to offer dedicated tools that help in the decision-making process. A comprehensible
overview of decision factors may increase the awareness for the full breadth of factors. This
follows the similar suggestions on decision support, such as for password policies (Parkin
et al., 2010) and security investments (Beresnevichiene et al., 2010).
• Increase the expertise and awareness of policy makers: Participants further stated that deci-
sions were often biased – for example, overly followed formalities, or the business or security
perspectives. Additional expertise and awareness of concrete consequences from decisions,
both of risks from grants and of functional impacts from denials (e.g. through participation of
staff), may improve the appropriateness of the decisions (cf. West, 2008).
• Improve authorization models and management tools: Participants described how they are im-
pacted by problems with the authorization model and the lack of usability of policy-management
tools. These ﬁndings support prior work on policy editing and problems in practice (Sec-
tions 2.3.1 and 2.3.3) that emphasize the necessity of appropriate editing tools and authoriza-
tion models for effective measures.
5.3. A holistic model of authorization problems
The Authorization Problems Study shows that solving the problems requires addressing several in-
terrelated aspects. We ﬁrst consolidate the identiﬁed problems with those from literature. Then, we
derive a problem model that abstracts from the individual problems to reveal their structure and to
clarify their interrelation – enabling a holistic approach to authorization usability.
5.3.1. Consolidating problems from literature and our study
Prior literature focused primarily on problems related to policy authoring and did not systematically
study the relation of authorization problems with their respective causes. Nevertheless, the identiﬁed
problems in prior literature cover a broad range. In Table 5.4, we consolidate the problems in litera-
ture and those from the Authorization Problems Study in this chapter according to the structure used
in the study: Since our focus lies on solving the problems, we group problems by the perspective that
is primarily responsible for the problem and can most directly address it, the originating perspective.
Another interesting characteristic of the problems is which perspective they affect. For problems
that are only present in literature, we analytically assigned originating and affecting perspectives to
91
5. Problems in organizational authorization
Affecting persp. Originating Liter- Mentions Disci-
D S T M A F O perspective ature in study Context plines
Development
1 Model expressiveness x x x D S M F 35 O S Se
2 Comprehensibility of model x D F L – G O A St
3 Comprehensibility of policy x x D F L A – G O Fs Fp St
4 Modiﬁcation usability x D A L A 2 O Fs Fp A St
5 Non-transparent mechanism x x x D M F L A 13 O St
6 Controls integration problems x x D F L – O K Se
Security strategy
7 Insufﬁcient decision guidance x x x S – 9 O Ds
8 Decision effort and complexity x S T D F A 2 O Ds St
9 Policy review usability x x S T D – 9 O Ds O St
Security tactics
10 Change lead-time x T – 14 O O
11 Change request effort x T – 15 O O
12 Unclear, lacking, ineffective proc. x T – 13 O O
13 Procedure circumvention x T – 2 O O
14 Ineffective procedure execution x x x T – 16 O O
15 Inefﬁcient procedure execution x T F A 8 O Fw O
Policy making and authoring
16 Non-comprehensive decision x x M S – 17 O O
17 Policy complexity x M D F A – O Fw O St
18 Over-entitlement x M A F A 16 O Fw O St
19 Restrictive policy x x M A F 52 O O St
Functional management
20 Circumvention x F A 58 O O St
Organization
21 Dissatisfaction x F M T S D – 17 O St
22 Ineffective security x F A M T S – 27 O O St
23 Reduced productivity x F M T S – 40 O O St
24 Regulatory non-compliance x F A M T S – 7 O O St
Table 5.4.: Consolidated authorization problems from literature and our study.
Perspectives: D: development, S: strategy, T: tactics, M: policy making, A: policy author-
ing, F: functional, O: organization.
Literature argumentation: F: ﬁeld study, L: laboratory experiment, A: analytical.
Contexts: O: organizational, S: social networks, G: grid, A: application authorization, Fs:
ﬁle sharing, Fp: ﬁle permissions, K: kernel, Fw: ﬁrewall.
Disciplines: Se: software engineering, St: socio-technical, Ds: decision science, O:
(socio-)organizational.
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Figure 5.4.: Layered interrelations between the problems with authorization artifacts
enable a comparison with the problems from the study. For the problems from our study, we derived
both from the identiﬁed interrelations of the problems.
Most prior literature concerns the model and tool usability, and related problems caused by the
development perspective. Problems originating from policy making and authoring are present to a
lesser extent. Only a small proportion covers the causes for problems with policy decisions (strategic
perspective), procedures (tactical), and how the daily use of authorization mechanisms inﬂuence the
organization (functional). Table 5.4 displays the type of evidence that the publications base their
arguments on (column “Literature”). While, generally, most publications in the ﬁeld of authorization
are analytical, the table shows that most problems, if reported previously, were identiﬁed empirically
in ﬁeld studies or laboratory experiments.
As indicated by the column “Mentions in study” in Table 5.4, most of the consolidated problems
were also described by our participants. In addition, our study covers a broader scope, including, for
example, problems originating from the change procedures. Due to the broad spread of participants in
the organization and no speciﬁc focus on administrative or development staff, our study emphasized
problems affecting the functional perspective. As a result, the study does not cover three problems
in prior literature that are caused by development and no problems affect strategy or tactics.
5.3.2. Identifying problem layers and perspectives
In Table 5.4, the problems surrounding authorization are structured according to their originating
perspective. Examining the relation between the originating and the affected perspective, we can ob-
serve a layer structure: Beginning at the top of the table, the development perspective, problems from
upper perspectives primarily affect those from lower ones and ultimately the organizational goals.
To visualize the layers and their relationships, we can structure the problems by the affected artifact
as depicted in Figure 5.4. Table 5.5 displays examples from our study of how the layers interact. The
problem layers correspond well with the authorization perspectives as identiﬁed in Section 4.4. Only
since the problems originating from the policy-making and authoring perspectives are closely inter-
related, these are consolidated in the policy layer, attributed to the operational security management.
A special case are the organizational problems: These problems affect the organization directly and
originate from a range of higher layers so that they were rather grouped by their effect instead of by
their origin.
Interestingly, within our study and the authorization literature, the upper three layers are seldom
affected by problems. This may result from the focus of the study and the literature. While our study
had a broader scope than the literature, it emphasized the functional perspective on problems and
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Artifact Responsibil-
ity
Activity Example problem Primarily affected Example approach
Model, imple-
mentation
Development Develop,
integrate
Unusable model or
interface
Policy making, au-
thoring
Improve model or
tool usability
Policy
decision
Security
strategy
Make high-
level policy
Missing high-level
policy
Policy making Provide high-level
policy
Change
procedure
Security
tactics
Design
process
High change lead-
time, inefﬁcient pro-
cedure
Functional, policy
authoring, making
Establish light-
weight procedure
Authorization
policy
Policy mak-
ing, author-
ing
Change
policy
Restrictive policy,
permissive policy
Functional,
organization
Grant adequate
permissions
Context and
behavior
Functional Inﬂuence
behavior
Reduced productiv-
ity, circumvention
Organization Increase risk
awareness
Table 5.5.: Artifacts in authorization and how problems with them interact
did not particularly target the development, strategy, and tactics perspectives. To properly address
problems originating from these perspectives, we will need to further investigate the respective causes
in future research. The practical contributions of this dissertation (cf. Section 6.4) in part serve this
purpose.
5.3.3. The case for a holistic approach
As Table 5.4 indicates, prior work on authorization problems primarily focused on how policy au-
thoring is affected and primarily covers problems originating from the development perspective (cf.
Section 2.3). From the interrelations between the given layers, we can expect that such a selective
approach can only solve part of the problem. There are indirect effects of higher layers that will
reduce the effectiveness of approaches on individual layers. One of the examples given in Table 5.5
is the missing guidance for decisions on the Policy decision layer that impacts the adequacy of policy
changes. If this problem exists, focusing selectively on the usability of the conﬁguration interface
might prove futile. Instead, we need to broaden the analysis and mitigation of problems surrounding
organizational authorization and need to address problems of all affected perspectives by targeting
the originating perspectives.
5.4. How the ﬁndings relate to research questions and hypotheses
We now have a clearer picture of the problems surrounding authorization in organizations. While it
is difﬁcult to claim comprehensiveness of problems in a ﬁeld as diverse as authorization, the analysis
of authorization problems in this chapter was based both on an extensive literature review and on the
in-depth Authorization Problems Study in an organization with a variety of authorization contexts.
This allowed us to enumerate a broad range of problems in organizational authorization and their
interrelations, even though, as indicated above, further research will be useful on the problems that
affect security strategy, tactics, and development. Despite this, the thorough analysis of problems can
serve as a strong hypothesis of the problems to expect in authorization and results in a solid frame-
work to structure authorization problems. Employing these results, we can now relate the ﬁndings to
the research questions and hypotheses from the introduction of this dissertation (cf. Section 1.2):
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5.4.1. Problem manifestation
Concerning the ﬁrst research question, which asks for the problems of stakeholders, the stakeholders’
perspectives and their interrelation, we ﬁrst identiﬁed the perspectives in organizational authoriza-
tion (cf. Section 4.4). Our model of the perspectives was useful for structuring the authorization
problems from literature and our study, both regarding the affected and the originating perspectives
of problems, thus supporting the perspective model. Further addressing the question, we thoroughly
analyzed the problems surrounding authorization in the previous sections; we showed their interre-
lation in the holistic problem model and argued for a holistic approach to the problems. Generally,
we can state that there is a close interrelation between the problems of the individual stakeholder and
the those of the organization. Accordingly, the organization needs to take on the challenge to solve
the stakeholders’ problems in order to arrive at effective security and high productivity. The identi-
ﬁed perspectives and the shown interrelation of the respective problems supports the hypothesis H1,
which states that stakeholders face authorization problems from multiple, interrelated perspectives.
We can also observe how problems interfere with the interrelations between the perspectives,
supporting H2. Speciﬁc examples from our study are:
• The comprehensibility of the authorization model and policy as well as the usability of mod-
iﬁcation tools and languages increase the minimal necessary security expertise of potential
policy authors and can, for instance, prevent policy makers from also authoring policies,
• The lack of transparency of the policy makes it more difﬁcult for policy makers to achieve
adequate policies and prevents efﬁcient communication with policy authors. For functional
staff, not knowing their current permissions impedes precise requests for changes from policy
makers,
• High change-request effort and lead-time, as well as unclear, lacking, and ineffective procedure
obstructs the communication between functional staff and policy makers for policy changes,
• Ineffective, inefﬁcient procedure execution interferes with the interrelation between functional
staff, policy makers, and authors when working on enacting policy changes.
In particular, we saw two extremes of problems with authorization: In centralized procedures,
problems were caused by high lead-times due to bureaucratic structures. At the other end of the
spectrum, technology enables the delegation of management tasks to non-experts through decen-
tralization and reduces those problems. However, this approach likewise fails to deliver effective
security: The tasked stakeholders neither have the time nor the expertise to take adequate decisions
on permission requests.
5.4.2. Problem mitigation
As part of our study on the problems in authorization, we only touched the potential mitigations as
targeted by the second research question in this chapter. However, Table 5.4 shows examples of how
the discovered problems surrounding authorization relate to research disciplines: We identiﬁed socio-
technical problems from several perspectives that require socio-technical studies to enable effective
and efﬁcient interaction of the affected stakeholders with the systems. For several problems, socio-
technical approaches need to be combined with organizational sciences to adequately integrate the
interaction with the systems in effective and acceptable processes and procedures. Problems from
the strategics perspective require decision science to enable and support decisions based on the risks,
beneﬁts, and the involved stakeholders. Lastly, software engineering can support the modeling of
authorization and the integration of authorization in applications.
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Moreover, the rich feedback of study participants led to a number of recommendations that we
can relate to the hypotheses on the problem mitigation. Speciﬁcally, we saw how we can address
the problems on a functional level (circumventions), tactical (procedures), strategic (decisions), and
development (authorization model and management tools). The recommendations cover all the hy-
potheses on problem mitigation. For instance, the recommendations on acceptable circumventions
combine technical with non-technical means (H3): architectural means, and formal and informal
rules, respectively. Explicitly taking the dynamics into account (H4) is at the core of the recom-
mendations on reducing the change lead-times and effort, and on appropriate centralization and for-
malization. The integration of perspectives (H5) is, for example, fostered by clearly deﬁning and
communicating the procedures, and by striving for usable editing tools and authorization models.
The recommendations thus indicate that the hypotheses on problem mitigation are adequate. To
more thoroughly explore the mitigations and test the hypotheses, we now need to take a more sys-
tematic look at the requirements that follow from the identiﬁed problems and at the mitigations of
the problems in the following chapter.
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The rest was not perfect.
Sir Francis Bacon: New Atlantis (1626)
In the previous chapter, we took an in-depth look at the problems that can occur when implement-
ing authorization measures in organizational information systems. This enabled us to address the
ﬁrst overarching research question from the introduction on the problems with authorization, the
affected stakeholders, their respective perspectives, and the interrelation of problems and perspec-
tives. Continuing from the identiﬁed problems, we will now extend on the recommendations from
the Authorization Problems Study and systematically approach the second research question: How
can the problems be solved in practice? We will take three steps towards answering this question
in this chapter. First, we derive requirements for usable authorization measures from the previously
identiﬁed problems. Second, we discuss how well the existing approaches on solving problems from
literature fulﬁll these requirements and identify shortcomings. Third, we formulate detailed open
research questions that address the shortcomings of the existing approaches.
In the introduction, we posed three hypotheses on how authorization problems might be ap-
proached (cf. Section 1.2). To explore approaches to the open research questions and test the hy-
potheses, a number of practical contributions will follow this chapter. These will be based on eight
Authorization Principles to alleviate the problems that we consolidate from generalized approaches
to security usability (Chapter 2) and security in agile development (Chapter 3). At the end of this
chapter, the practical contributions will be introduced and related to the open research questions and
Authorization Principles.
6.1. Authorization usability requirements
From the usability problems surrounding authorization that we identiﬁed in the previous chapter
based on existing literature and the Authorization Problems Study in a large organization, we derive
requirements for usable authorization measures. To illustrate that the requirements are well grounded
in the problems, the problems in Table 5.4 addressed by a requirement are referenced for each re-
quirement. First, the relation shows that all problems are covered by requirements: The requirements
are complete with respect to the problems. Second, all requirements relate to identiﬁed problems,
indicating the relevance of the requirements.
The requirements are grouped by the authorization perspective from which the requirement can be
best addressed (cf. the problem model in Section 5.3). One example is the requirement of policy and
tool usability (Req 13), which affects policy authors and makers, but can be best addressed in devel-
opment and is thus assigned to the development perspective. A special case are the organizational
requirements, which are rather abstract and can be addressed from several perspectives, and are thus
separated from the more concrete requirements into a distinct group.
Similar to the interrelation of the problems as shown in the previous chapter, the requirements
depend upon each other. The interrelation is particularly pronounced between perspectives. An
example is the requirement on decisions on policy changes (Req 6), which, for instance, depends on
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adequate decision guidance (Req 11). As a consequence, addressing a more abstract requirement,
such as decision-making, can also require addressing a more speciﬁc one, such as decision guidance.
6.1.1. Organizational requirements
Req 1 Effective and efﬁcient authorization measure
Organizations as resource owners strive to achieve both, effective authorization, that is, the actual
protection of resources as needed, and an efﬁcient measure, that is only expending the minimal nec-
essary efforts. Typical problems with the effectiveness of authorization stem from over-entitlements
as well as from the loss of traceability and control from circumvention of the measures and prob-
lematic procedures. The efﬁciency is affected by the amount of work necessary for stakeholders to
manage the measure, including the maintenance of the policy and the overhead from procedures and
policy reviews. – Problems 22, 23
Req 2 Minimal interference from the authorization measure with functional productivity
Authorization measures can incur additional efforts for individuals when pursuing functional tasks.
These are typically caused by interferences with the tasks from restrictions, requests of changes, or
circumventions of the restrictions. – Problem 23
Req 3 Conformance of the authorization measure with regulatory requirements
A host of regulations affect organizations and depend, for example, on the speciﬁc industry, such as
ﬁnances and health care (e.g. HIPAA), the form of organization (e.g. publicly listed companies:
Sarbanes–Oxley Act), and the data to be protected (e.g. privacy legislation). For organizations,
authorization can be a key measure to achieve compliance with the regulations. In these cases,
the regulations need to be upheld by the policy, and by the decisions on and procedures for changes
to the policy. – Problem 24
Req 4 Satisfaction of stakeholders affected by and interacting with the authorization measure
While employee satisfaction is only a secondary goal after, for example, shareholder value for many
organizations, the satisfaction is still a requirement for authorization measures in many contexts.
The requirement primarily addresses the inconvenience that is caused by authorization measures,
both for functional staff hindered in their work, and for policy makers and authors in deciding on and
conﬁguring restrictions. – Problem 21
6.1.2. Functional – Context and behavior
Req 5 Acceptable circumventions of the authorization measure
For the overall effectiveness of the authorization measure, organizations may need to prevent cir-
cumventions of the measure, such as the sharing of passwords. Conversely, for the overall efﬁciency
of the functional work, an organization may also foster acceptable circumventions. Both can be
achieved, for example, through improved procedures, increased awareness for the involved risks,
formal/informal rules and social controls, and the monitoring of circumventions. – Problem 20
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6.1.3. Policy making and authoring – Authorization policy
Req 6 Precise and efﬁcient decisions on policy changes
Precise decisions on restrictions increase the effectiveness of the measure (reduce over-entitlements)
and the efﬁciency of functional tasks (reduce overly restrictive rules). It is also necessary to limit the
effort expended on making the decisions to reduce the overall overhead of the authorization measure.
Potential approaches are to reduce the complexity of decisions or to increase the concreteness of the
considered risk and beneﬁt factors. – Problems 16, 18, 19
Req 7 Precise and efﬁcient policy reviews and compliance monitoring
Many organizations also task policy makers with regularly reviewing policies to ensure that the
entitlements remain adequate. Policy makers may also need to decide in retrospect whether activities
of functional users are compliant with the organizational rules as part of the monitoring of activities.
In both cases, the decisions need to be made precisely and efﬁciently for an overall effective and
efﬁcient measure. – Problems 9, 18
Req 8 Precise and efﬁcient authoring of policy changes
The decisions on policy changes need to be formalized in technical authorization policies so that they
can be interpreted by the information systems. Imprecise changes can endanger the effectiveness of
the measure, for instance, through mistakes in the editing of the policy. A high effort for changes
reduces the measure’s overall efﬁciency. – Problems 17, 18, 19
6.1.4. Strategics and tactics – Policy decision and change procedure
Req 9 Clear, effective, and efﬁcient procedures for requesting changes to the policy
One problem for functional staff when encountering an inadequate permission is how to request
the change of the permission. Process designers need to assure the awareness for the respective
procedures and design them in a way that requests result in changes if adequate. The effort to trigger
and the time to complete the procedure also needs to be adequate. – Problems 10, 11
Req 10 Adequate, effective, and efﬁcient processes for policy changes
Policy changes often involve multiple stakeholders, from the requesting person over policy makers
to the policy authors who implement the change. The processes for coordinating the changes need to
have adequate degrees of centralization and formalization to achieve the necessary traceability and
reliability of procedures at an acceptable overhead for policy makers and authors. – Problems 12,
13, 14, 15
Req 11 Strategic guidance for precise and efﬁcient decisions
Policy makers need to be brought into the position to make precise and efﬁcient decisions on policy
changes and on the appropriate usage of permissions. Depending on the context, policy makers may
require implicit or explicit guidance on what constitutes adequate usage of the system. Organizations
can, for instance, provide high-level policies to support policy decisions that consider the risks and
beneﬁts of entitlements – but also the decision effort. – Problems 7, 8, 9
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6.1.5. Development – Implementation
Req 12 Adequately expressive and comprehensible authorization model
The authorization model deﬁnes the form of the entitlements and restrictions in a policy. Problems
can occur when the expressiveness prevents the formulation of the necessary restrictions or when the
available constructs result in overly complex policies, reducing the effectiveness or efﬁciency of the
measure, respectively. Similarly, incomprehensible models may cause mistakes by policy authors or
require overly high management effort. – Problems 1, 2
Req 13 Comprehensible policy, and effective and efﬁcient policy modiﬁcation
Policy authors and makers need to understand a policy to review it or to implement changes correctly.
Depending on the context, policy authors and makers need an adequate representation, and effective
and efﬁcient tools that increase the comprehensibility of the policy, and improve the precision and
efﬁciency of changes. – Problems 3, 4
Req 14 Transparent, effective, and efﬁcient authorization mechanism
The implemented authorization mechanism in an application needs to support the authorization
model and the procedures for policy changes. For example, the ﬂexibility of the model may re-
quire additional interaction with functional staff to delegate permissions. Missing transparency of
policy decisions may limit the usefulness of this kind of model functionality. – Problem 5
Req 15 Precise and efﬁcient integration of authorization controls
As part of systems engineering, authorization controls need to be integrated in systems to reliably
enforce the policy and thus enable an effective measure. For an efﬁcient measure, the effort for the
integration needs to be acceptable. – Problem 6
6.2. Requirement priorities
The authorization usability requirements cover a broad range of aspects. When designing authoriza-
tion measures, the individual requirements need to be prioritized according to the speciﬁc authoriza-
tion context. In the following, we will analyze what priorities can be expected for the requirements
in a variety organizational and non-organizational contexts.
6.2.1. Organizational contexts
For the priorities in organizations, we can apply the context characteristics described in Section 4.1 to
give an estimation of how the requirement priorities are affected by context characteristics as shown
in Table 6.1. For each of the characteristics, it is indicated whether a high value for the characteristic
increases the requirement priority (+) or reduces it (–). Table 6.2 additionally relates the requirements
to organizational conﬁgurations as deﬁned by Mintzberg (1980), estimating increased (+), neutral (o),
and reduced (–) priorities. Speciﬁcally, the context characteristics are:
• The security needs of the authorization context, encompassing both the risks from missing
protection and the need for the availability of the protected resources. The security needs are
particularly important for requirements that inﬂuence the authorization effectiveness, such as
an effective measure (Req 1),
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Security needs Complexity Dynamics Expertise
Req 1 Authorization measure + +
Req 2 Functional productivity + + +
Req 3 Regulatory requirements +
Req 4 Individual satisfaction
Req 5 Circumventions + + –
Req 6 Policy decisions + + +
Req 7 Reviews and monitoring + +
Req 8 Policy changes + + +
Req 9 Change requests + +
Req 10 Change procedures + +
Req 11 Decision guidance + + + –
Req 12 Model usability + + –
Req 13 Policy and tool usability + + –
Req 14 Mechanism usability +
Req 15 Controls integration + +
Table 6.1.: Requirement priorities by authorization context characteristics
• The complexity of the authorization context, including quantities and heterogeneousness of
permissions, important for requirements related to the making of decisions and changes,
• The dynamics of the authorization context, which cause higher number of changes and thus
affect many requirements since most include efﬁciency aspects of policy management,
• The organization’s security culture and the level of security expertise and awareness of the in-
volved stakeholders, inﬂuencing, for instance, how likely circumventions are (Req 5) and how
much decision guidance is necessary (Req 11). Whether requirements are affected depends on
the level of expertise in the roles of decision makers, functional, and technical staff.
When examining how the organizational conﬁgurations affect the requirement priorities (Table 6.2),
we can observe that only the requirement on functional work is broadly important (four of ﬁve con-
ﬁgurations) in organizations. The priorities of the other requirements vary between conﬁgurations.
For the conﬁgurations, the Professional Bureaucracy and the Adhocracy stand out with a high num-
ber of important requirements. The former because of its dynamics, the latter because it is highly
heterogeneous.
6.2.2. Non-organizational contexts
While this dissertation focuses on organizational authorization, it is useful to compare how the re-
quirements relate to non-organizational contexts. Table 6.3 shows which requirements are particu-
larly important for the example contexts from Section 4.1. We only leave out the ﬁle system example
due to its generality and the organizational sharing examples as these are covered by the previous
section.
The physical access contexts both are rather static and simple so that most requirements are gener-
ally less critical. In contrast, the smartphone and the Web 2.0 contexts demonstrate how many of the
requirements can be important for very different contexts. No pattern emerges of individual require-
ments generally being of higher criticality, again indicating the high dependence of the priorities on
the speciﬁc environment.
101
6. Requirements and approaches
Simple Structure Machine Bu-
reaucracy
Professional
Bureaucracy
Divisionalized
Form
Adhocracy
Req 1 Authoriza-
tion measure
+ (efﬁciency for
dynamics)
+ (efﬁciency for
dynamics)
Req 2 Functional
productivity
+ (interference
from dynamics)
+ (interference
from heteroge-
neousness)
+ (interference
from heteroge-
neousness)
+ (interference
from dynamics)
Req 3 Regulatory
requirements
Req 4 Individual
satisfaction
+ (powerful
Technostructure)
+ (powerful
functional staff)
+ (staff-
dependent)
Req 5 Circumven-
tions
+ (dynamic) + (heteroge-
neous)
– (high func-
tional expertise)
– (static) + (dynamic)
Req 6 Policy
decisions
o (dynamic, but
little complex)
+ (heteroge-
neous)
+ (heteroge-
neous)
o (quantity, but
static)
+ (dynamic,
heterogeneous)
Req 7 Reviews
and monitoring
+ (high quan-
tity)
Req 8 Policy
changes
+ (dynamic) + (heteroge-
neous)
+ (heteroge-
neous)
o (quantity, but
static)
+ (dynamic,
heterogeneous)
Req 9 Change
requests
o (dynamic, but
informal)
+ (heteroge-
neous)
+ (heteroge-
neous)
– (static) + (dynamic,
heterogeneous)
Req 10 Change
procedures
o (dynamic, but
informal)
o (formal, but
static)
– (informal) o (formal, but
static)
o (dynamic, but
informal)
Req 11 Decision
guidance
– (expertise
through cen-
tralization)
o (heteroge-
neous, expertise
in Technostruc-
ture)
+ (heteroge-
neous)
o (quantity, but
static)
o (heteroge-
neous, but ex-
pertise)
Req 12 Model
usability
o (dynamic, ex-
pertise through
centralization)
o (heteroge-
neous, expertise
in Technostruc-
ture)
+ (heteroge-
neous)
+ (high quan-
tity)
+ (dynamic,
heterogeneous,
expertise)
Req 13 Policy
and tool usability
o (dynamic, ex-
pertise through
centralization)
o (heteroge-
neous, expertise
in Technostruc-
ture)
+ (heteroge-
neous)
+ (high quan-
tity)
+ (dynamic,
heterogeneous,
expertise)
Req 14 Mecha-
nism usability
+ (dynamic) + (dynamic)
Req 15 Controls
integration
+ (heteroge-
neous)
+ (heteroge-
neous)
+ (heteroge-
neous)
Table 6.2.: Requirement priorities for organizational conﬁgurations (for the characteristics of the
conﬁgurations see Mintzberg, 1980)
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Physical of-
ﬁce
Physical pri-
vate
Android
smartphone
Web privacy
(visitor)
Web privacy
(operator)
Web 2.0
Req 1 Authoriza-
tion measure
o (often rather
static ofﬁce
allocation)
- (typically
low values,
infrequent
changes)
+ (diverse
asset values,
changes in
apps)
- (diverse se-
curity needs,
low dynam-
ics)
- (diverse se-
curity needs,
low dynam-
ics)
+ (dynamics
of content
creation)
Req 2 Functional
productivity
o (static, low
complexity,
diverse needs,
high availabil-
ity)
- (low values,
static, simple)
o (diverse
asset values,
changes in
apps, low
complexity)
- (diverse se-
curity needs,
low dynamics,
low complex-
ity)
- (diverse se-
curity needs,
low dynamics,
low complex-
ity)
+ (high avail-
ability, high
dynamics)
Req 3 Regulatory
requirements
o (diverse) - - + +
Req 4 Individual
satisfaction
+ (selling
point for app
market)
- - + (selling
point of plat-
form)
Req 5 Circumven-
tions
- (rather con-
trollable, high
relative exper-
tise)
- (high rela-
tive expertise)
- (n/a) - (n/a) - (n/a) + (other ways
of sharing)
Req 6 Policy
decisions
- (simple
decisions)
- (simple
decisions)
+ (difﬁcult
decisions)
+ (difﬁcult
to predict
consequences)
Req 7 Reviews
and monitoring
- (n/a) - (n/a) + (difﬁcult
to monitor,
review)
+ (difﬁcult
to monitor,
review)
Req 8 Policy
changes
- (simple
controls)
- (simple
controls)
- (simple
controls)
- (simple
controls for
individual
items)
Req 9 Change
requests
- (infrequent
changes)
- (infrequent
changes)
- (n/a) + (complex:
consent from
all existing
users)
+ (contract
negotiations)
- (simple
requests)
Req 10 Change
procedures
- (infrequent) - (infrequent) - (integrated) + + - (integrated)
Req 11 Decision
guidance
- (simple
decisions)
- (simple
decisions)
+ (complex
factors: con-
sequences)
+ (complex
factors: con-
sequences)
Req 12 Model
usability
- (simple
requirements)
- (simple
requirements)
+ (compre-
hensibility:
func. users)
+ (compre-
hensibility:
func. users)
+ (compre-
hensibility:
func. users)
Req 13 Policy
and tool usability
- (simple
requirements)
- (simple
requirements)
+ (compre-
hensibility:
func. users)
+ (compre-
hensibility:
func. users)
+ (compre-
hensibility:
func. users)
Req 14 Mecha-
nism usability
- (simple
requirements)
- (simple
requirements)
- (simple
requirements)
Req 15 Controls
integration
- (simple
requirements)
- (simple
requirements)
- (largely
framework-
based)
Table 6.3.: Requirement priorities for non-organizational contexts
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6.3. Gaps in literature and the open research questions
Based on the existing approaches (cf. Section 2.4.4 and Appendix E), we examine the approaches for
their coverage of the problems and requirements, and identify shortcomings, for which we formulate
open research questions. Depending on the depth of prior work for a requirement, the questions
vary in concreteness, either aiming to further explore the current practice, or to advance speciﬁc
approaches through more thorough research.
When discussing approaches, the interdependence between requirements becomes apparent. The
more abstract requirements, such as those from the organizational perspective, are generally ad-
dressed more directly through approaches related to more concrete requirements. To prevent repeti-
tions of the approaches, we will thus rather relate approaches only to the most concrete requirement
that the approaches apply to. The dependencies on more concrete requirements are also noted among
the approaches listed in Table E.1.
Since the requirements and the analysis of approaches cannot be comprehensive due to the large
number of authorization-related publications, the open research questions cannot be claimed to be
representative or comprehensive. While a broad coverage of literature has been achieved by system-
atically reviewing literature on the individual requirements, there remains the threat that the areas
covered by practical contributions in this thesis have received more attention than others. More gen-
erally, it is epistemologically difﬁcult to reach a comprehensive coverage of the open questions, since
every in-depth study of a research question will result in discovering further questions (cf. Popper,
1935/2002) or will even lead to a shift in the research paradigm with new questions (cf. Kuhn, 1970).
The detailed research questions can thus only represent a snapshot based on the state of the ﬁeld at the
time of writing. However, since the open research questions have been systematically derived from
the literature review and the requirements, the questions offer solid guidance for further research.
6.3.1. Organizational perspective
Req 1 Effective and efﬁcient authorization measure Little prior work generally aims at how to
achieve adequate authorization, that is, at effectively protecting resources while keeping the overall
effort low. Most existing literature is more speciﬁc and approaches can be found, for instance, for
the functional perspective and the adequacy of circumventions (Req 5), but also for policy authoring
and making on making changes (Req 8) and decisions (Req 6). However, the speciﬁcness of the
concrete approaches often neglect the overarching problems in organizational authorization and how
to address them at an organizational level, speciﬁcally:
Q 1.1 What type of organization requires what authorization measure and what are the inﬂuencing
factors?
Moreover, more practically:
Q 1.2 How can we support the design of adequate authorization measures?
Req 2 Minimal interference from the authorization measure with functional productivity There
are few publications on the disruptions of functional work from authorization. While Whalen et al.
(2006) formulate the recommendation from their empirical study to integrate authorization-related
activities into the workﬂows and Johnson et al. (2009) propose the principle of minimal friction, there
are little concrete approaches on the organizational level. We can ﬁnd those for the more concrete
requirements on which this requirement depends, for instance, on integrating functional staff into
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decision-making (Req 6) and policy authoring (Req 8). For a more complete picture of the nature
and impact of disruptions, we need further empirical work:
Q 2.1 How disruptive are authorization measures with what characteristics and in what contexts,
and how can we reduce the disruptions or their impact?
Req 3 Conformance of the authorization measure with regulatory requirements While au-
thorization is an important measure for many organizations to comply with high-level regulatory re-
quirements, little work speciﬁcally addresses the relation between regulations and authorization. The
requirements on effective authorization (Req 1), and, particularly, compliant procedures (Req 10) and
policy decisions (Req 6) provide general approaches on how to honor regulations as part of autho-
rization. However, it should be useful to also speciﬁcally address the relation of regulations with
authorization, both in decisions and procedure design:
Q 3.1 How can regulatory requirements be enforced in authorization and employed in decision guid-
ance?
Q 3.2 How do procedures need to be structured to comply with regulations and how do regulations
need to be structured to allow procedures to comply with them?
Req 4 Satisfaction of stakeholders affected by and interacting with the authorization measure
Similar to most of the organization-level requirements, we also ﬁnd little work directed at studying or
improving the satisfaction of stakeholders with respect to authorization. We can expect that increased
efﬁciency, particularly of functional work (Req 2) and circumventions (Req 5) for the functional
perspective, and an efﬁcient overall measure (Req 1) will positively inﬂuence satisfaction. For a
more speciﬁc exploration of the causes of dissatisfaction and its effects, we need to explore the
problem further:
Q 4.1 In what ways does the satisfaction of functional staff interrelate with functional disruptions,
security awareness and expertise, and organizational culture?
Q 4.2 How is satisfaction impacted for the authoring and making of policies?
Q 4.3 How does satisfaction inﬂuence the effectiveness of the measure?
6.3.2. Functional perspective
Req 5 Acceptable circumventions of the authorization measure There are little concrete ap-
proaches directly addressing the problems with the circumvention of authorization. Apart from
reducing disruptions (Req 2), the Authorization Problems Study and best practices recommend in-
creasing the risk awareness, providing guidance on circumventions, and monitoring and penalizing
non-compliance. To address the problems with circumventions, we need a more comprehensive
understanding under what conditions they occur:
Q 5.1 Under what conditions will individuals resort to circumventions?
There are a number of options to improve the adequacy of circumventions, including awareness
campaigns, security policies, and decision guidance, but we need to study their efﬁcacy:
Q 5.2 How must mitigations to undesirable circumventions be designed to be effective and efﬁcient?
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6.3.3. Policy making and authoring
Req 6 Precise and efﬁcient decisions on policy changes The most concrete prior work on policy
decision-making can be found for the systematic elicitation of authorization requirements through
methods (Neumann and Strembeck, 2002; He and Antón, 2009) and requirement analysis (Koch and
Parisi-Presicce, 2003), but apart from the approach by Takabi and Joshi (2010), these are primarily
applicable in one-off policy creation. More speciﬁcally aimed at the practical decisions, Whalen
et al. (2006) recommend to employ less restrictive controls and support social controls. The results
of the Authorization Problems Study further call for decision guidance (Req 11) and expressive
models (Req 12). Church (2008) advocates an increased integration of functional staff in decisions,
supported by approaches of Rode et al. (2006) and Karp and Stiegler (2010), and the usability of the
mechanism implementation (Req 14). However, to more fundamentally address problems in making
policy decisions, we need to better understand the decisions in practice:
Q 6.1 How do policy decisions take place in practice and what information is employed?
Req 7 Precise and efﬁcient policy reviews and compliance monitoring Reviews of policies
are a long-standing best practice in information security management, described, for example, in
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 (2005). The speciﬁc approaches on reviews for authorization and its practice
have not received as much attention. Sinclair et al. (2008) report how self-reviews of functional
staff worked well in a ﬁnancial institution. On the technical side, we need to consider the usability of
review tool support (Req 13). In addition, we must also study the organizational side of authorization
reviews:
Q 7.1 How must review procedures be designed to be effective and efﬁcient?
Q 7.2 How can different perspectives cooperate for effective and efﬁcient reviews?
Monitoring functional staff to discover non-compliant behavior is equally established in security
management (ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005) and has been discussed for authorization as part of the
enforcement (Sandhu and Samarati, 1996; Røstad and Edsberg, 2006), involving misuse and anomaly
detection that needs to be implemented as part of the authorization controls (Req 15). Two aspects
particularly warrant further research: the use of anomaly detection and the way to employ results for
policy improvements:
Q 7.3 How can IDS/SIEM paradigms be applied to authorization, for instance, in risk-based audit-
ing?
Q 7.4 How can problems with the authorization measure be extracted from activity logs?
Req 8 Precise and efﬁcient authoring of policy changes While most of the prior work on mak-
ing policy changes has occurred on a technical level, a small number of publications also directly
addresses the question how changes can be made effectively and efﬁciently. One important approach
is to increase the concreteness of the policy and changes, in line with Blackwell et al. (2008). They
generally argue that forcing computational thinking on individuals can reduce the overall quality of
the result since important non-computational confutations are lost. Approaches to more concreteness
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have been presented by Inglesant et al. (2008), using examples, and by Johnson et al. (2009), employ-
ing an email-sending metaphor for granting permissions. The principle of “security by designation”
by Yee (2005) has similar aims.
A second approach is to reduce the complexity of policies as recommended by Wool (2004), rely-
ing on an expressive model (Req 12) and ﬂexible or permissive decisions (Req 6). More generally,
comprehensible policies and usable editing and supporting tools (Req 13) should be useful. The
latter may also help to integrate functional staff into security management (Church, 2008) and sup-
port the interaction between policy making and authoring (Req 10). While the technical aspects are
well covered and continue to receive attention, we still need to extend the research on the integrative
aspects of policy authoring:
Q 8.1 How do policy authors interact with policy makers and functional staff for implementing
changes?
6.3.4. Security tactics and strategy
Req 9 Clear, effective, and efﬁcient procedures for requesting changes to the policy Similar
to the requirement on functional work (Req 2), there is only little prior work on how functional staff
requests changes to policies. The Authorization Problems Study resulted the recommendations on a
reduced change effort, procedure awareness, and procedure adequacy. Given the lack of substantial
work in this area, we need to further explore the problems surrounding change requests and how the
conditions for change requests can be improved:
Q 9.1 How do requests for changes to the policy take place in practice and what are the obstacles
for functional staff?
Q 9.2 How can we foster adequate requests for changes from functional staff?
Req 10 Adequate, effective, and efﬁcient processes for policy changes Processes and proce-
dures for the coordination of policy changes have been covered by process models on several levels
(Dai and Alves-Foss, 2002), including management-focused (Rees et al., 2003; OGC, 2007c) and
technical models (Kern et al., 2002; Mönkeberg and Rakete, 2000). Similarly concrete are the best
practices on change management (ISSEA, 2003; Joeris, 1997) and validation plans (ISSEA, 2003).
These approaches are based primarily on analytical work and selectively focus on speciﬁc perspec-
tives. More generally and arguing empirically, Sinclair et al. (2008) recommends process-based role
management, that is, integrating the role management in organizational processes. Our study simi-
larly indicated the need for adequate procedures and for the awareness of these. To provide concrete
guidance on how to design change procedures, we need to address additional questions on practical
problems with authorization processes:
Q 10.1 How formalized and centralized should procedures be in what context?
Q 10.2 How can we uphold the procedures and prevent procedure circumventions?
Organizations often have already established related processes, such as Information Security Man-
agement (ISMS) and incident/issue management processes, that partly overlap with authorization
management:
Q 10.3 How can the authorization procedures be integrated with related organizational processes?
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Req 11 Strategic guidance for precise and efﬁcient decisions One approach to guide decisions
on policy changes is from existing organizational structures and functional processes, for example,
through role mining (Bertino et al., 2008), task mining (Kern et al., 2002), or the use of organizational
structures in role-based authorization (Moffett, 1998; Crook et al., 2003). Apart from these very
technical approaches, decision guidance can also be based on the security needs and risk assessment
as best practices suggest (ISSEA, 2003; ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005), or on creating awareness for
the consequences of decisions, proposed for online social networks (Ahern et al., 2007). Ahern et al.
(2007) and our study also recommend to provide concrete decision-support, based on prior decisions
and risk assessment, respectively. Nissanke and Khayat (2004), for example, implemented a risk-
based policy analysis, Molloy et al. (2008) a market-based decision-support, and Zhao and Johnson
(2008) a game-theoretical model for guidance. However, the existing approaches do not address
more fundamental questions that are necessary for employing decision guidance in practice:
Q 11.1 What kind of guidance for authorization-related decisions is effective and efﬁcient?
For effective support of decisions, irrespective of whether, for example, tool-based or as high-level
policy, we must base the guidance on the risks and beneﬁts of permissions:
Q 11.2 How can the information that is required for decision guidance be elicited?
6.3.5. Development
Requirements in the development realm are well covered with technical approaches. However, many
of the implemented approaches do not address the actual needs in practice and lack empirical backing
regarding the elicitation of the problems and the validation of approaches in practice.
Req 12 Adequately expressive and comprehensible authorization model Regarding the effects
of the authorization model on the overall authorization usability, we primarily ﬁnd approaches in
three categories. First, Blakley (1996) recommends to reduce the cognitive effort and improve the
learnability and maintainability of authorization models. More concretely, Smetters and Good (2009)
derive the recommendation to use simpler models and policy patterns from their ﬁeld study. Reeder
et al. (2008, 2011) have particularly aimed at the conﬂict resolution in the authorization model in
laboratory experiments. However, we also need to study other complexity aspects of models that
inﬂuence cognitive effort, for instance, inheritance structures in role-based models:
Q 12.1 What are the complexity characteristics of authorization models and how do the character-
istics inﬂuence policy making and authoring?
A second area of approaches cover the model expressiveness, including recommendations on pro-
viding ﬁne-grained controls (Sikkel and Stiemerling, 1998; Ahern et al., 2007), the handling of un-
expected situations (Sikkel and Stiemerling, 1998; Bauer et al., 2009), and advanced concepts, such
as authorization based on presence, logging and notiﬁcations on access, and asking for permission
(Bauer et al., 2008a; Kim et al., 2010). For the integration of non-experts into the policy authoring,
we need to extend these lines of research to derive insights on how the expressiveness of models
interacts with complexity and usability:
Q 12.2 How do the factors of the expressiveness of models, the complexity, and policy authoring
efforts interrelate?
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The third aspect is a special case of model expressiveness, the ﬂexibility of the model. There have
been several analytical and technical publications on reducing the rigidness of policies, including
delegation (Ahn et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2009), risk-based (Cheng et al., 2007), and audit-based
authorization (Cederquist et al., 2007). Field studies on ﬂexible authorization are scarce, although
policy override has been studied for health care environments (Denley and Smith, 1999; Ferreira
et al., 2009). We need to extend this work and more generally understand how ﬂexibility affects
practice in different contexts:
Q 12.3 How effective are ﬂexible models in practice regarding security, exceptional situations, and
the reduction of disruptions?
Req 13 Comprehensible policy, and effective and efﬁcient policy modiﬁcation Of the large
amount of literature on development-related authorization requirements, most are related to the us-
ability of policies and supporting tools. One broad area are policy-editing tools, with recommenda-
tions, for instance, on simpler management tools (Whalen et al., 2006) and laboratory experiments,
such as on the transition between authoring phases (Vaniea et al., 2008b). In this area, many ap-
proaches provide for the presentation and visualization of the policy (Maxion and Reeder, 2005) and
consequences (Rode et al., 2006), or provide editing support, such as through assistance (Cao and
Iverson, 2006).
A second category are supporting tools, for example, for role mining (Kuhlmann et al., 2003),
policy analysis (Fisler et al., 2005), and assurance tools (Schaad et al., 2006). The third category
relates to the policy language usability with, for instance, laboratory studies on the use of controlled
natural language (Inglesant et al., 2008). For all three categories, the approaches are primarily of
analytical and technical nature or are conﬁned to laboratory experiments. For improved integration
of the different perspectives on authorization, we, in addition, need to study the use of these tools in
practice and particularly the interrelation between stakeholders:
Q 13.1 How effective are editing support and other supporting tools in integrating functional, policy
making, and authoring perspectives?
Req 14 Transparent, effective, and efﬁcient authorization mechanism Approaches on the us-
ability of the enforcement and decisioning mechanism in authorization measures primarily focus on
transparency aspects. Whalen et al. (2006) suggests based on her ﬁeld study to make authorization
decisions visible to improve the understanding of the actual conﬁguration. Similarly, Johnson et al.
(2009) proposes the principle of transparency for authorization and Yee (2005) to make authority
transparent. In implementations, approaches either explain decisions (Kapadia et al., 2004; Becker
and Nanz, 2008) or suggest responsible policy makers to turn to (Bauer et al., 2008b).
A second area of mechanism usability is the support of interactive decisions (Bauer et al., 2008b)
and delegation functionality of the model through delegation assistance (Brucker et al., 2009) or
reactive delegation (Bauer et al., 2008b). However, most of these approaches are analytical works
only and lack the validation in practice. Moreover, the focus on implementing transparency and
delegation in mechanisms results in a lack of approaches on how to handle other model functionality,
in particular, further variants of ﬂexibility, and on how to involve functional staff through adequate
mechanisms:
Q 14.1 How can the mechanism leverage the ﬂexibility of models, foster change requests, and inte-
grate functional staff with policy makers and authors?
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Another aspect of the mechanism implementation that has not been researched thoroughly is how
resource owners build trust in the mechanism that the mechanisms actually enforce policies as de-
ﬁned, for instance, in third-party software products:
Q 14.2 How can a resource owner assure the reliability of authorization mechanisms?
Req 15 Precise and efﬁcient integration of authorization controls A broad range of differ-
ent approaches to the integration of controls have been proposed and used in practice, including
OS-based (Harrison et al., 1976), language-based (Goguen and Meseguer, 1982), aspect-oriented
programming (Kiczales et al., 1997), and API-based controls (Gong and Ellison, 2003). Beznosov
et al. (1999) formulated the principle of decoupling authorization from business logic and the sepa-
ration of the policy from the enforcement. To support the integration of controls, Jaeger et al. (2004)
suggested a static analysis tool that particularly targets authorization enforcement and Priebe et al.
(2004) proposed security patterns for controls integration. From the management perspective, best
practices on the maintenance and review of controls (ISSEA, 2003) and technical vulnerability man-
agement (ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005) have been established. Lately, He and Antón (2009) showed
how policy speciﬁcation can be included in the software development lifecycle. However, most of
the existing techniques and approaches are only based on analytical works, so that more empirical
work is necessary to thoroughly understand the problems and the efﬁcacy of mitigations, such as
usable enforcement APIs and analysis tools, in practice:
Q 15.1 How can the integration of authorization measures be supported in practical systems devel-
opment?
Extending the work by He and Antón (2009) who integrated policy deﬁnition in the systems de-
velopment, we need to further study the interaction of different perspectives on authorization, for
instance, how requests for policy changes by functional staff can affect the controls integration:
Q 15.2 How can the different perspectives interact for more effective and efﬁcient controls integra-
tion?
6.4. Principles to address the problems
The open research question in the previous section indicate that substantial additional work is nec-
essary to more fundamentally address problems in authorization. Hypothesis H5 states in the intro-
duction of this dissertation that we can improve authorization by fostering the interactions and the
participation between perspectives. This approach is reﬂected in several of the formulated research
questions, for instance, on changing the policy (Q8.1), on reviews (Q7.2), and on policy/tool (Q13.1)
and mechanism usability (Q14.1). We need to explore the integrative approach in practical artifacts
to test the hypothesis.
While the integrative approach is the main theme of this thesis, we also formulated two further hy-
potheses on problem mitigation and identiﬁed a number of useful principles from security usability
(Section 2.7) and agile security (Section 3.6). Consolidating the hypotheses and principles, we arrive
at eight partly interrelated Authorization Principles to address the problems. We relate the principles
to the recommendations that we derived from the feedback of the participants in the Authorization
Problems Study (cf. Section 5.2). The principles are particularly aimed at authorization in organiza-
tions. In the conclusions, we will analyze how well they apply to other authorization contexts and
other security measures.
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P 1 Fostering the interaction between and participation of stakeholders from different perspectives
on authorization through the integration of the perspectives – H5, security usability, agile security
In security usability, problems have been addressed by increasing the participation of the perspec-
tives on security measures (cf. Section 2.4.3). Similarly, in secure agile development, the customer is
closely integrated (cf. Section C.3). We generalize these approaches as fostering the interaction and
participation1. One goal is to overcome the “symmetry of ignorance” between perspectives through
explicit “knowledge integration” (Fischer, 1999). Secondly, we strive for “informed participation,”
which requires adequate “entry points” to the measure for each perspective and the measure to sup-
port the communication (Brown et al., 1993) as a “boundary object” (Star and Griesemer, 1989).
P 2 Reducing the burden on individuals from authorization measures – Security usability
In many areas of security usability, problems have been addressed by reducing the overall burden
of affected individuals (cf. Section 2.4.1). This, for example, includes more usable conﬁguration
tools and support for security decisions. This principle also supports the principle P1 by reducing
the obstacles of participation, for example, when providing decision guidance as proposed in the
recommendations.
P 3 Making the abstract aspects of authorization understandable by increasing the concreteness –
Security usability
It has been accepted in security usability that we need to create understanding in many areas of
security to improve the usability (cf. Section 2.4.2). This can, for example, be achieved through
training or adequate metaphors. This principle supports principle P1, because understanding the
concepts is often a prerequisite for “informed” participation (cf. recommendations on expertise).
P 4 Combining the technical and non-technical in multidisciplinary approaches – H3
HCI has employed a broad range of non-technical research approaches to solve the problems that
occur when people interact with information systems. Since research in authorization is currently
still dominated by technical approaches (e.g. mechanisms and models), this principle states that we
need to broaden the approach, as reﬂected by the range of disciplines in the recommendations.
P 5 Taking the behavior of individuals in their social setting into account – Security usability
Current approaches to security usability attempt to predict the individual’s behavior (e.g. behavioral
economics). We need to draw on cognitive psychology (e.g. heuristics and bounded rationality;
Kahneman et al., 1982; Simon, 1979), but also need to consider the subjective (Pace, 2004) and
social/collective experience (Razavi and Iverson, 2006). For example, we can foster informal rules
to motivate acceptable circumventions (cf. recommendation on circumvention).
P 6 Fostering the security awareness and expertise of stakeholders from different perspectives on
authorization – Agile security
In secure agile development, we found that it is important that the stakeholders in the process are
aware of security risks (cf. Section C.3). Similarly, all stakeholders involved in authorization may be
required to take important decisions, such as, whether to respect authorization decisions. Thus, we
propose to increase the awareness and expertise of the different perspectives for an overall improved
measure and, for example, provide decision guidance as proposed as part of the recommendations.
1An approach also known from management sciences to improve decisions, compare Miles et al. (1978).
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Table 6.4.: Authorization Principles applied in the practical contributions (x: primary, o: secondary)
P 7 Designing authorization measures for dynamic environments – H4, agile security
Authorization contexts can be dynamic (Sinclair et al., 2008) so that we need to assume subsequent
changes to permissions. Agile development accepts changing requirements as a given and optimizes
the development process for that. Similarly, we should design authorization mechanisms, processes,
and tools in a way to accommodate changes (cf. e.g. the recommendation on circumventions).
P 8 Tailoring the authorization measure for the context – Agile security, security usability
Agile methods adapt to the speciﬁc environment to achieve effective and efﬁcient security, and us-
able security technology takes the context into account. Authorization measures similarly need to be
tailored for the context – for example, regarding the organizational overhead, formality, and central-
ization (cf. recommendation on procedures), or adequate tools for the involved stakeholders.
To explore these principles and the open research questions, the following practical contributions
are made in this thesis:
1. Improved authorization development (Chapter 7): An authorization framework that aims to
address problems with authorization in three ways: (1) improve the implementation and subse-
quent modiﬁcation of authorization enforcement in software development, (2) integrate func-
tional, policy-making, and policy-authoring perspectives through an accessible policy, and (3)
provide change support to make the policy changes more concrete.
2. More ﬂexible authorization (Chapter 8): A policy override model and implementation that
allows functional staff to extend their permissions temporarily within well-deﬁned bounds.
3. Improved authorization procedures (Chapter 9): The Integrative Authorization Development
Model for Usability (INDUSE) supports the design and evaluation of adequate processes and
procedures related to authorization and explicitly emphasizes the interrelation between the
perspectives on authorization.
4. Decision guidance (Chapter 10): A decision-support prototype and method collect, evaluate,
and present the factors required to make well-founded decisions on policy changes.
The aim of the selected practical approaches is not to comprehensively solve the remaining prob-
lems with authorization entirely. Instead, the contributions explore particularly interesting problems
and the usefulness of the Authorization Principles. Table 6.4 shows which of the principles are ap-
plied in which of the contributions. The principles are broadly, but heterogeneously covered. While
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Table 6.5.: Coverage of research questions by the artifacts (x: primary, o: secondary)
the principles of interaction and participation, reduced burden, and designing for dynamics are ap-
plied in several contributions, the principle of awareness and concreteness are more speciﬁc and
covered to a lesser extent.
Table 6.5 relates the artifacts in the practical contributions to the open research questions that the
contributions apply. The matrix shows a heterogeneous coverage of questions, with primary cov-
erage for questions from policy authoring/making, strategics/tactics, and development. Secondary
coverage is spread over all perspectives, although four questions lack any coverage, including ques-
tions on circumventions (Q5.1), monitoring (Q7.3), and mechanism reliability (Q14.2), and should
thus be addressed in future research.
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Exploring the integrative approach to
authorization usability
115

7. Integrating authoring, making, and
development: An agile authorization
framework
“It is possible,” says the gatekeeper,
“but not now.”
Franz Kafka: Before the Law (1915)
When authorization mechanisms are integrated into information systems to satisfy security needs,
the development of the mechanism and the surrounding tools affects the effectiveness and efﬁciency
of the entire measure (cf. the interrelation of problems in Chapter 5). It is important that the policy
can be continuously adapted to improve its precision and account for the changing needs. The policy
makers depend on an adequate authorization model to formulate the restrictions to be enforced,
requiring expressiveness and ﬂexibility to fulﬁll the security needs (Req 12, Q12.2, Q12.3). Reviews
will be necessary periodically to assure that granted permissions correspond to the current needs.
When policy makers suffer from a lack of transparency or comprehensibility of the policy, it is
difﬁcult to take correcting decisions (Req 14, Q14.1, Req 13).
Similarly, policy authors who technically formulate the restrictions must understand the policy
before making changes. Particularly for dynamic organizations without formal processes, it is nec-
essary to negotiate the adequate formulation of the restrictions between policy makers and authors.
In these contexts, it may be of help to employ the policy as the basis for the discussions (Q8.1).
When actually conducting the changes, the efﬁciency of the change can be impacted by complex or
incomprehensible authorization models (Req 12, Q12.1).
System developers work on a lower level but are not independent of the policy making and author-
ing. They integrate the controls in the system to enforce the policy when applications are developed
or integrated in existing authorization infrastructure (Req 15, Q15.1). The developers’ tasks interre-
late with those of policy makers and authors (Q15.2), since, for instance, when the necessary control
is missing in the application control ﬂow, restrictions in the policy will not be enforced. Concerning
the enforcement, the primary problem for developers is the reliable and efﬁcient integration of the en-
forcement controls, otherwise rendering the mechanism ineffective, as, for example, found by Jaeger
et al. (2004) in Linux kernel modules, or caused by unanticipated control ﬂow for architectural en-
forcement measures (Sohr and Berger, 2010). This can be particularly challenging with continuous
changes to the system or restrictions.
To address these problems, the authorization framework declarative_authorization aims to
integrate the perspectives of the policy making, authoring, and development to arrive at mechanisms
that enable an efﬁcient and effective authorization measure (P1). The framework provides the tech-
nical basis for the stakeholders’ interaction: For policy makers, an accessible policy and a supporting
tool for policy changes should enable a greater participation in policy authoring and reduce the pol-
icy makers’ and authors’ burden (P2). The supporting tool particularly increases the concreteness of
policy changes, leading from concrete change goals to respective change operations (P3). Moreover,
the increased participation and improved comprehensibility should enable more adequate change
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procedures and the decentralization of policy changes, if appropriate for the authorization context
(P8).
When integrating authorization controls in systems, developers beneﬁt from the interaction with
policy makers and authors (P1). The close integration of the policy speciﬁcation with development
should lead to more effective and efﬁcient implementation of enforcement controls (He and Antón,
2009), since developers can better react to changing requirements. Developers further beneﬁt from
an adequate framework through reduced effort for the integration of enforcement (P2). The multi-
disciplinary approach of software engineering and the socio-technical should result in an effective
and efﬁcient controls API (P4). The API is particularly designed to support dynamics in software
development and cope with system and policy changes through a consequent separation of concerns
between the policy and the enforcement (P7).
Overall, the authorization framework strives to support stakeholders from the development, policy-
authoring, and policy-making perspectives. This chapter1 describes the three primary approaches that
the framework takes. The chapter ﬁrst describes the authorization-policy side, including the underly-
ing model, the policy language, and the tools that increase its comprehensibility. Further supporting
the policy making and authoring, the change-support tool is subsequently presented. We discuss the
speciﬁc strengths and weaknesses of textual and graphical representations and of change support
based on formative evaluations with policy makers and authors. The third main section covers the
integration of enforcement controls and the evaluation of the framework’s ability to support this task.
7.1. Towards a comprehensible authorization policy and model
Policy makers decide on what restrictions to enact in a system and policy authors technically for-
mulate those restrictions in policies. A usable, that is, effective and efﬁcient authorization model
can support these tasks, increase the comprehensibility, reduce the overall burden, and improve the
interaction of stakeholders. For this reason, the declarative_authorization framework aims to
provide the following contributions, detailed in the following:
• A simple, yet maintainable authorization model that increases the effectiveness and efﬁciency
of policy changes,
• A readable policy language that reduces the thresholds for working with the policies and sup-
ports the participation of functional users,
• A graphical representation of the authorization policy to offer a more abstract, but in some
contexts more appropriate representation of the policy,
• A testing framework to continuously assure that the policy conforms to the original intentions.
7.1.1. Authorization model
The authorization model governs the structures and the expressiveness that are available to formulate
restrictions to enforce by the authorization mechanism (cf. Chapter 4). While not as thoroughly
researched as editing tools for authorization policies, authorization models have still received a fair
amount of attention in security-usability research. For models of privacy policies, Reeder et al.
(2007) identiﬁed ﬁve usability challenges: Policy authors need to be able to efﬁciently group objects,
1Parts of this chapter are based on publications in the proceedings on CollaborateCom 2008 (Bartsch et al., 2009, on the
authorization framework), ARES 2010 (Bartsch, 2010a, change support), and ESSoS 2011 (Bartsch, 2011a, enforce-
ment study), which have been extensively revised for inclusion here.
118
7.1. Towards a comprehensible authorization policy and model
?????????????????? ???????????????
?
????
??????????
??????????
??????????
??????????????
??????????
?????????
???????? ??????
Figure 7.1.: Role-based access control model
use consistent terminology, understand the default rules, uphold the policy structure, and solve rule
conﬂicts. In case of role-based policies, Brostoff et al. (2005) found that the primary challenges
for policy authors lie in understanding the policy structure and the overall authorization paradigm.
Inglesant et al. (2008) describe an iterative process of policy development that is necessary for users
to understand the model.
Further research studied what constructs policy makers actually require (Sikkel and Stiemerling,
1998). For instance, for physical security Bauer et al. (2008a), identiﬁed policy operators, such as
logging and notiﬁcations of access. For home security, Kim et al. (2010) additionally found “asking
for permissions” and presence as authorization concepts. Generally, the model expressiveness must
meet the demands of the speciﬁc context, often requiring ﬁne-grained controls (Ahern et al., 2007)
and ﬂexibility (Bauer et al., 2008a). Model expressiveness can be in conﬂict with the comprehensi-
bility when increasing complexity, and thus needs to balanced for the speciﬁc context. Smetters and
Good (2009) argued, for instance, for simpler, pattern-based models. Reeder et al. (2011) focused
on conﬂict resolution techniques in authorization models and found in their study that participants
understood speciﬁcity-based resolution best.
The authorization model of declarative_authorization continues this research strand and
aims for simple, yet maintainable and ﬂexible policies. The model is similar to the well-known and
wide-spread Role-based Access Control model (RBAC; Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992), shown in a basic
variant in Figure 7.1. From left to right, the RBAC model assigns each user to a number of roles,
which, for instance, represent job functions in organizations. Roles, in turn, group permissions that
deﬁne the ways in which users of the role (e.g. with the speciﬁc position) are allowed to interact with
the system. Permissions consist of a speciﬁc activity that a user may carry out and a speciﬁc object
to which the permission applies. A role hierarchy allows a role to include permissions of a child role.
Similarly, permissions may inherit from child permissions.
The declarative_authorization model is based on the RBAC model and is depicted in Fig-
ure 7.2. Instead of composing permissions of object and activity, the framework combines ob-
ject types (contexts) and activities with constraints to increase the maintainability, for example,
“allow access to all conferences that the user is signed up for.” Permissions on individual ob-
jects are realized through context authorization constraints. Authorization constraints are a com-
mon concept for RBAC models to increase the policy ﬂexibility (Bertino et al., 1999). In case of
declarative_authorization, constraints act upon a speciﬁc context object that the authoriza-
tion should be decided for. For example, in a conference management application, when deciding
whether a user is allowed to access a speciﬁc conference, a constraint could check that the conference
is already published.
An example policy for a simple conference management Web application that conforms to the
authorization model, but for brevity forgoes the user assignments, is shown in Figure 7.3. Three
roles are displayed in ellipses, a Guest role that all not-logged-in users are assigned to and should
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Figure 7.2.: declarative_authorization authorization model
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Figure 7.3.: Example authorization policy
only allow limited viewing of conference content, an Attendee role for users that would like to attend
conferences and a Conference organizer role for administrative staff. Through role inheritance, the
attendees have the same permissions as guest users, indicated by the edge between Attendee and
Guest. The larger rectangles represent object types that privileges should apply to. Activities that act
on objects of the different types are shown inside the type rectangles and constitute in association
with the type the permissions. Permissions are assigned to roles as shown in edges between roles
and permissions. For example, a guest user may read conferences, while conference organizers may
manage conferences. There also is inheritance among permissions, indicated through edges between
permissions, so that the “manage” permissions include “create”, “read”, “update”, and “delete”.
7.1.2. Policy language
The general policy structure as deﬁned by the authorization model informs the representation of the
policies. General goals for policy representations are to provide for the documentation of restrictions
and support a common understanding as part of the communications of the policy-making and au-
thoring stakeholders (Bauer et al., 2009). Languages for authorization policy speciﬁcation are usually
deﬁned as domain-speciﬁc languages (DSL; Consel and Marlet, 1998), either in textual or graphi-
cal forms. For textual policies, which we focus on in this section, Inglesant et al. (2008) proposed
“controlled natural language” to reduce the distance between the author and the policy deﬁnition (cf.
Pane et al., 2001). For the usability of an authorization language, the distance between the mental
model of humans and the syntax is important. Adequate representations depend on the context –
for example, less detailed and complex, but more comprehensible representations of authorization
policies can lower the threshold, support the communication about, and the development of policies.
Generally, policy development should offer the appropriate level of detail to each of the stakeholders
(Dai and Alves-Foss, 2002).
The declarative_authorization policy language follows these aims to make policies compre-
120
7.1. Towards a comprehensible authorization policy and model
Listing 7.1: Example authorization rules
1 au tho r i z a t i on do
2 r o l e :guest do
3 has_permiss ion_on :conferences , : to => :read do
4 i f _ a t t r i b u t e :published => true
5 end
6 has_permiss ion_on :talks , : to => :read do
7 i f _ p e rm i t t e d_ t o :read , :conference
8 end
9 end
10
11 r o l e :attendee do
12 i n c l ud e s :guest
13 has_permiss ion_on :conference_attendees , : to => :create do
14 i f _ p e rm i t t e d_ t o :read , :conference
15 end
16 has_permiss ion_on :conference_attendees , : to => :delete do
17 i f _ a t t r i b u t e :attendee => i s { user }
18 end
19 end
20
21 r o l e :conference_organizer do
22 has_permiss ion_on :conferences , : to => :manage
23 has_permiss ion_on :conference_attendees , : to => :manage
24 has_permiss ion_on :talks , : to => :manage
25 end
26 end
27
28 p r i v i l e g e s do
29 p r i v i l e g e :manage , : i n c l ud e s => [:create , :read , :update , :delete]
30 end
hensible and support discussions on policies while enabling the formulation of policies that adhere
to the framework’s authorization model. The authorization policy is formulated from the perspec-
tive of the roles, to which the allowed privileges (activities) on contexts (object types) are assigned.
The policy language – while based on the syntax of the Ruby programming language (Flanagan and
Matsumoto, 2008) – is aimed to be a human-readable and intuitively comprehensible textual DSL.
Similar to a controlled natural language (cf. Inglesant et al., 2008), the language’s syntax is derived
from natural language and can be read in form of sentences, for example: “Role conference organizer
has permissions on conferences to manage” in the following listing:
r o l e :conference_organizer do
has_permiss ion_on :conferences , : to => :manage
end
The more comprehensive example in Listing 7.1 shows the authorization rules for the diagram in
the previous section (Figure 7.3). Two types of authorization constraints are present in the exam-
ple: if_attribute constraints restrict permissions through conditions on the attributes of a speciﬁc
object. One example in line 4 restricts guests to only access those conferences that are marked “pub-
lished.” Similarly, attendees should only be able to unregister themselves from conferences, thus
the rule in line 17 only allows attendees to delete a Conference attendee object (i.e. withdraw their
attendance) if the object is associated through the attribute attendee to the current user. The attribute
conditions may be nested, so that, for example, it is possible to allow attendees to unregister all users
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from their company:
has_permiss ion_on :conference_attendees , : to => :delete do
i f _ a t t r i b u t e :attendee => {:company => i s { user .company } }
end
The expression in curly brackets is evaluated at the time of the authorization decision so that dynamic
contextual information, such as the current user’s company in this example, can be compared to
attributes. To formulate the conditions on attributes, the policy language offers a number of operators
apart from the equality operator is in this example. Other operators are derived from set theory, such
as contains and intersects_with, or compare values, such as greater_than.
The second form of constraints are if_permitted_to rules that impose restrictions based on the
current user’s permissions regarding associated objects. In Listing 7.1, guests may only read talks
if they are also allowed to read the associated conference (line 7). The attribute reference may be
nested similar to the attribute rules.
The authorization constraints are formulated in DSL statements instead of direct Ruby expressions
to more ﬂexibly employ the constraints. The constraint semantics allow not only to decide speciﬁc
authorization requests, but also to derive the obligations under which a user is permitted to access an
object type. This ability is used to generate database query conditions – for example, only query for
conferences that the current user may read.
Symbols beginning with colons (:guest), the block delimiters do/end, and hash associations (=>)
are visible indications that the policy language is based on Ruby syntax. There are three reasons
for using Ruby syntax. First, Ruby’s metaprogramming features facilitate the implementation of
a simple and readable DSL. Second, the robust Ruby parser can be used to interpret the policy
deﬁnition and generate rich error messages. Third, the declarative_authorization framework
itself is implemented in Ruby, facilitating the integration of the Ruby DSL parsing. However, since
the policy is internally transformed into a tree structure, applications based on other platforms could
equally well employ the policy language, for example, through appropriate Ruby bindings.
7.1.3. Graphical representation
To further improve the comprehensibility of the authorization policy, the framework can generate a
graphical representation of the policy. Such a diagram (shown for the example policy in Figure 7.3)
reduces the cognitive effort for policy authors to understand the interrelations of roles and permis-
sions. The representation is more abstract than the textual policy and, thus, conveys a reduced amount
of information – for example, it only indicates the presence of authorization constraints through dots
on role–permission assignments, but not the actual constraints. On the other hand, this abstraction
allows policy authors to focus on more essential aspects of the policy. In the example, the inheritance
of guest permissions by attendees and its consequences are clearly visible. An important second ad-
vantage of the graphical representation is that it may lower the threshold for non-technical users to
discuss the policy.
Despite the abstraction from the complete policy, larger policies may result in overloaded diagrams
with excessive numbers of nodes and edges. To counter overloaded diagrams, the graphical represen-
tation allows to reﬁne the diagram generation. First, users can “drill down” and limit the diagram to
speciﬁc roles and object types. Second, the user may choose to display the effective permissions of
the roles instead of only directly assigned ones, adding inherited permissions to the diagram. Third,
the user can toggle whether all permissions should be displayed with the full permission hierarchy
or only those that are assigned.
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# setup speciﬁc objects: an_attendee, a_talk
the_user an_attendee do
should_be_allowed_to :read, :conferences
should_not_be_allowed_to :update, :conferences
should_be_allowed_to :read, a_talk
should_not_be_allowed_to :update, a_talk
end
Figure 7.4.: Example of an authorization policy test case
7.1.4. Policy testing
The complexity of the policies can make it difﬁcult to grasp the multitude of side effects that an
individual change has. For authorization policies, formal analysis of access control policies can
guarantee that properties of the policy remain intact (Dougherty et al., 2006; Li and Tripunitara,
2006), including the identiﬁcation of conﬂicts and suboptimal structures. Further approaches for
property validation are model checking – for example, based on the analysis of UML models (Schaad
et al., 2006; Sohr et al., 2008). In model checking, all possible states are checked for whether certain
properties always hold.
In software engineering, a well-known assurance approach is the dynamic analysis (cf. Sec-
tion A.3). Instead of static analysis, which is solely based on the program text, dynamic analyses ex-
amine executed artifacts, for example, through automated test cases. Carrying over testing from soft-
ware engineering to authorization-policy development can have similar positive effects of detecting
unintended side effects of modiﬁcations (Hwang et al., 2008). The declarative_authorization
framework offers a testing framework based on the Ruby programming language to enable readable
test cases. A set of example policy tests are shown in Figure 7.4. For a speciﬁc user, positive (“should
be allowed”) and negative (“should not be allowed”) permission tests are speciﬁed. The test cases
either apply to general object types, for example, all :conferences, or speciﬁc objects, such as a
speciﬁc talk.
The readability of the test cases is an important aspect to tightly integrate the functional perspective
in the development of authorization policies. In contrast to the authorization policy, which contains
abstract rules, tests focus on speciﬁc cases. While abstract rules in policies can be difﬁcult to un-
derstand for non-technical stakeholders (cf. Blackwell et al., 2008), these example-like test cases
may be closer to the mental model of functional stakeholders. The test cases may thus also serve as
additional documentation and basis for discussions, complementing the authorization policy.
7.2. Change support for concrete policy-authoring
One problem with the management of policies can be that the rules and structures are rather abstract,
depending on the authorization model. For a role-based policy, permissions cannot be directly as-
signed, but require the policy author to transfer the concrete change goals (“Person X needs to be able
to do Y”) into changes to the abstract user–role and role–permission assignments. Generally, tool
support for the creation of policies has been studied extensively in prior work. Zurko et al. (1999)
developed a policy editor for policies similar to RBAC based on usability testing and user-centered
design, which allowed novice users to produce meaningful results in under one hour. Herzog and
Shahmehri (2006) studied the usability of the Java policy tool and criticized that help on semantics
was missing and that the tool promotes lax policies. Reeder et al. (2008) found that the formulation
of speciﬁc and effective permissions in “expandable grids” vastly improves the visualization and
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Figure 7.5.: Change options for granting Modify (“update”) to the attendee (“an_attendee”)
authoring of policies when compared to abstract rule formulation.
However, typical editing tools do not achieve an increased concreteness. Instead, the concreteness
usually remains on the level of the model. When the models are concrete, policy authors need to
directly assign permissions to users. The result is a high number of rules that is difﬁcult to main-
tain with the continuous changes to policies caused by organizational changes. Therefore, it is not
only necessary to improve the user interface on a superﬁcial level, but also to address the underlying
complexities. While originally introduced to improve the policy’s maintainability, RBAC, as a typ-
ical authorization model, inhibits a complexity that, conversely, often leads to deteriorating policies
(Bertino et al., 2008). Moreover, the abstractions of RBAC reduce the policy’s comprehensibility.
As pointed out earlier, Blackwell et al. (2008) generally argue that forcing computational thinking on
stakeholders can reduce the overall quality of the result, since important non-computational confu-
tations are lost. Similarly, the abstract nature of the RBAC model encumbers effective participation
(P1).
To overcome the abstractness of typical authorization models, Cao and Iverson (2006) suggested
the intentional access management (IAM) as a design principle that supports the policy decisions by
deriving changes from the stakeholders’ expressed intentions. The IAM model is based on the idea
that the intentions of stakeholders are collected and evaluated by a “consensus model” to remove
inconsistencies and conﬂicts. From the consensus model, policies for different authorization models,
such as ACL and RBAC, are derived. The IAM prototype implementation targets WebDAV autho-
rization and is only geared for comparatively simple ACLs. The IAM algorithm follows a simple
ﬂow chart of seven questions to derive the policy changes, such as “Does group X3 exist such that
X3 is denied privilege Y to object Z and I have the privilege to modify group X3?”. Consequently,
IAM cannot present change suggestions that require to take multiple intentions into account, such
as, “Grant privilege X to user Y, but not to user Z”.
The Change Assistant – developed in parallel to IAM – extends the ideas of IAM with more
general change goals. In contrast to IAM, the Change Assistant focuses on helping a policy author
to choose from the multitude of options to modify a policy for given goals. The following example
policy for a simple conference-management Web-application illustrates the range of options. In the
system, a user with an Attendee role should receive permissions to modify conferences. The role
Attendee includes the role Guest, the privilege Manage includes Modify. As depicted in Figure 7.5,
the following options are available to reach the desired modiﬁcation:
1. Assign an existing role to the user that has the manage or modify privilege (Conference orga-
nizer, Administrator),
2. Add privileges Modify or Manage to roles Attendee or Guest,
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3. Add privileges Modify or Manage to a new role for users with conference-modiﬁcation per-
missions and assign the role to the user.
Even in this simple example with only four roles, there are already eight possible modiﬁcations of
the policy. Security experts may intuitively rule out some options in this simple example, but might
need support in more complex cases to choose the best-suited option. When working closely together
with functional staff, even explaining an existing policy can be difﬁcult. Thus, ﬁnding and keeping
up with the wealth of modiﬁcation options will overwhelm functional staff, who prefer simple and
more speciﬁc but often unmaintainable access control lists.
Irrespective of the individual’s perspective, the effort for policy modiﬁcations is signiﬁcant (Gal-
laher et al., 2002) and building the role model is stated to be the most expensive part of introducing
RBAC (Bertino et al., 2008). One option to reduce the effort of policy modiﬁcations are supporting
tools. According to Kern et al. (2002), the entire role lifecycle needs to be supported with change
management tools. The purpose of the Change Assistant is to support policy changes comprehen-
sively and concretely. This section describes the algorithm and tool that suggest change options for
speciﬁc change goals and support stakeholders to choose between the change options, taking the
side effects into account. An artiﬁcial-intelligence algorithm is employed to generate the possible
sequences of policy modiﬁcations to reach a given goal. The modiﬁcation goal is speciﬁed by test
cases for authorization rules (cf. Section 7.1.4). To support domain as well as security experts in
choosing the most suitable modiﬁcation for the speciﬁc goal, a prototype GUI facilitates the usage
of the Change Assistant.
7.2.1. The Change Assistant algorithm
To suggest possible modiﬁcations to achieve a goal and to show their consequences, the Change As-
sistant algorithm offers change support. In practice, there is a limited number of atomic modiﬁcation
operations that may be applied to the authorization rules. Kern et al. (2002) deﬁne role management
as creating new roles, users, or permissions as well as the connection/disconnection of users and roles
or roles and permissions. In the Change Assistant algorithm, the following operations are employed.
For removing permissions:
• Remove role assignments from users,
• Remove permissions from roles,
• Modify role or privilege hierarchies.
For extending permissions:
• Assign roles to users,
• Assign permissions to roles,
• Modify role or privilege hierarchies,
• Introduce new roles.
The overall goal of the modiﬁcations is speciﬁed in test cases, described in Section 7.1.4, of users’
allowed and disallowed actions. The general idea of the Change Assistant is to combine the change
operations into sequences of modiﬁcations so that the sequences fulﬁll all the given test cases.
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Candidate : AuthRules×P (User)×Modiﬁcations
AuthRules : P (Role×Privilege×Type)
Role : Set of all system roles
Privilege : {create,update, . . .}
Type : Set of all system object types
User : Set of all system users
Modiﬁcations : SpeciﬁcOperation∗
SpeciﬁcOperation : AbstractOperation×Parameters
AbstractOperation : Set of abstract operations (Sect. 7.2.1)
Parameters : Parameters of abstract operations (Sect. 7.2.1)
TestCase : {allow,prohibit}×User×Privilege×Type
Figure 7.6.: Types used in the Change Assistant algorithm
The Change Assistant algorithm is based on the well-known best-ﬁrst search algorithm A* and
planning algorithms from AI (Russell and Norvig, 2003). The main algorithm for the Change As-
sistant is shown in Figure 7.7, the types in the algorithm are given in Figure 7.6. The algorithm
works as follows: Beginning with an initial candidate derived from the original state, the given test
cases are solved by generating new candidates with modiﬁcations. Each modiﬁcation is derived in a
two-step process: First, the algorithm chooses general modiﬁcation options, abstract operations, that
match the ﬁrst failed test. Then, each abstract operation is expanded into speciﬁc operations (gen-
erate_speciﬁcs_for): From an abstract operation (e.g. “Remove a Permission from a Role”) speciﬁc
operations are derived that solve the failing test (e.g. “Remove Permission Read from Role Orga-
nizer”). The abstract operations’ expansions are listed below. Apart from atomic abstract operations,
compound operations are employed that combine multiple operations to guarantee solving one test
in each step. Compound operations signiﬁcantly reduce the number of branches in the decision tree.
Speciﬁc operations are applied to previous candidates to arrive at new candidates. The validity of
each new candidate is tested according to three properties:
• The candidate must not reverse any of the previous operations,
• The candidate must not contain any operation that the end-user has prohibited (cf. following
section),
• The candidate is rejected if it is a superset of an already known valid solution, that is, the
candidate only adds further, unnecessary operations.
If the new candidate has no more failing tests, it is added to the list of valid solutions. Otherwise, it
is added to the list of candidates for further modiﬁcations in subsequent steps. A heuristic function
is used to sort the remaining candidates (Russell and Norvig, 2003), so that the most promising
candidates are considered ﬁrst. The heuristic function is based on the remaining failing tests and the
invasiveness of earlier changes, deﬁned for a given candidate c as:
f (c) = |failing_tests(c)|+
|steps(c)|
∑
i=1
step_weight(c, i)
The weight of a step (invasiveness) is assigned individually to the abstract operation.
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Input: candidates = [[current_auth_rules, users, /0]],
non-empty(test_cases)
Output: non-empty(solutions)
while non-empty(candidates) and steps < max_steps do
candidate ← remove-ﬁrst(candidates)
if is_positive(last_failing_test(candidate)) then
abstract_operations ← positive_abstract_operations
else
abstract_operations ← negative_abstract_operations
end if
for abstract_operation in abstract_operations do
speciﬁc_operations ← generate_speciﬁcs_for(candidate, abstract_operation)
for speciﬁc_operation in speciﬁc_operations do
if speciﬁc_operation is prohibited by user or reversal of previous operation
or superset of known solution then
next
end if
new_cand ← apply(candidate, speciﬁc_operation)
check(new_cand, test_cases)
if empty(failing_tests(new_cand)) then
append(solutions, new_cand)
else
append(candidates, new_cand)
end if
end for
end for
candidates ← sort_by_heuristic(candidates)
end while
Figure 7.7.: Change Assistant algorithm
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The runtime effort of the Change Assistant algorithm depends on the number of test cases. Each
test case results in one branching of the decision tree. Negative tests have a static branching factor
of two with only two different operations available. For positive tests, the branching factor depends
on the existing authorization rules: the number of roles as well as the inheritance levels in privileges
and roles. To guarantee the termination of the algorithm, a maximum count of considered candidates
is enforced. With the best candidates being considered ﬁrst, it is sufﬁcient to search only part of the
solution space.
The current implementation of the Change Assistant algorithm is aimed at the framework’s autho-
rization model. Since the authorization model is similar to the standard RBAC model, the proposed
algorithm should be applicable with minor modiﬁcations to other RBAC models.
Abstract operations
As described above, test cases are either positive (“should be allowed”) or negative (“should not
be allowed”). For both types of test cases, there are abstract operations that have the according
effect for solving the failing test. From abstract operations, speciﬁc operations are derived, deﬁning
the speciﬁc modiﬁcations to apply to the authorization rules. First, abstract operations and derived
speciﬁc operations for positive tests are described, followed by those for negative tests. For each
abstract operation, the parameters are formally described that deﬁne the speciﬁc modiﬁcations. The
following functions are used in the descriptions:
SelfOrDescendantsR : P (Role)→ P (Role)
SelfOrAncestorsR : P (Role)→ P (Role)
SelfOrDescendantsP : P (Privilege)→ P (Privilege)
SelfOrAncestorsP : P (Privilege)→ P (Privilege)
AssignedRoles : User → P (Role)
RolesSatisfy : Privilege → P (Role)
RolesPrivileges : P (Role)→ P (Privilege)
Operations to solve positive tests
Assign Privilege to Role This operation needs to consider which privileges are to be assigned to
which roles. All the roles assigned to the user in the current test case and descendant2 roles may be
used. As privilege, the privilege in the test case and its ancestors are considered. Put formally:
ParametersAPR : User×Privilege → P (Role)×P (Privilege)
ParametersAPR(user,privilege) = SelfOrDescendantsR(AssignedRoles(user))×
SelfOrAncestorsP(privilege)
Assign Role to User The operation selects existing roles and assigns one to the user in the test
case. Only roles are considered that include the test case’s privilege or its ancestors. In addition, all
2Ancestors include the role or privilege, descendants are included. For instance, the role Guest is often a descendant of
User, User an ancestor of Guest.
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ancestor roles can be employed.
ParametersARU : User×Privilege → P (Role)
ParametersARU(user,privilege) = SelfOrAncestorsR(RolesSatisfy(privilege))
Create Role and Assign Role to User This is a compound operation that creates a role, assigns a
privilege to the role and then assigns the new role to the user in the test case. The operation has to
select the privileges to assign to the new role. The privilege is chosen from the one in the test case
and all ancestor privileges.
ParametersCRARU : User×Privilege → P (Privilege)
ParametersCRARU(user,privilege) = SelfOrAncestorsP(privilege)
Assign Privilege to Role and Assign Role to User For this compound operation, one of the
present roles is assigned to the user in the test case. To solve the failing test, the operation also
assigns a privilege to the role. As privileges, the privilege in the test case and its ancestors may
be used. All roles are considered that are not yet assigned to the user and that together with their
descendants do not satisfy the privilege.
ParametersAPRARU : User×Privilege → P (Role)×P (Privilege)
ParametersAPRARU(user,privilege) = (Roles−AssignedRoles(user)−RolesSatisfy(privilege))×
SelfOrAncestorsP(privilege)
Operations to solve negative tests
Remove Privilege from Role This operation identiﬁes the privilege to remove and the role to
remove it from to solve the failing test. It searches all roles of the user in the test case and their
descendants for the test’s privilege or one of its ancestors. If the user has the privilege through
multiple roles or privileges, this operation removes all of these.
ParametersRPR : User×Privilege → P (Role)×P (Privilege)
ParametersRPR(user,privilege) = (AssignedRoles(user)∩RolesSatisfy(privilege))×
(SelfOrAncestorsP(privilege) ∩
RolesPrivileges(AssignedRoles(user)∩RolesSatisfy(privilege)))
Remove Role from User The failing test is solved by removing the role(s) from the test’s user that
satisfy the privilege of the test. The operation identiﬁes all roles of the user that have, directly or
through a descendant, the privilege or an ancestor of the privilege assigned.
ParametersRRU : User×Privilege → P (Role)
ParametersRRU(user,privilege) = AssignedRoles(user)∩RolesSatisfy(privilege)
Examples
To demonstrate how the Change Assistant algorithm works, we come back to the example above.
The user Attendee 1 with the role Attendee should receive the permissions to modify conferences.
This goal is formulated as a policy test (“Attendee can modify conferences” – cf. Section 7.1.4). As
129
7. Integrating authoring, making, and development: An agile authorization framework
?????????????
???????????????? ???????????????????????? ??????????????????????
??????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ???
Figure 7.8.: Simple Change Assistant example
depicted in Figure 7.8, the algorithm starts out with the original policy. This is the initial candidate.
When this candidate is checked against the goal test, the test fails. To solve this failure, the abstract
operations for positive test cases are considered. In Figure 7.8, abstract operations are shown as
octagons.
Each of the chosen abstract operations is instantiated for the failing tests into speciﬁc operations,
shown in Figure 7.8 in the lower row. Speciﬁc operations are validated as described in the previous
section. Each valid speciﬁc operation is then applied to the initial candidate to create new candidates.
The new candidates are checked against the policy tests. With all of the test cases succeeding on
the generated candidates, no further operations are necessary and the identiﬁed approaches may be
presented to the user.
In a more complex example, the intended policy change may be indicated through several test
cases. While there might be one attendee who should be able to modify conferences, maybe others
should not. In this case, adding the role Conference Organizer to Attendee 1 still solves all policy test
cases in one step. However, adding the permission to the attendee role would, for example, require
removing this role from the other users. Thus, for each candidate with remaining failing test cases,
suitable abstract and speciﬁc operations are generated and applied as described above. In this way,
the algorithm creates valid solutions with multiple modiﬁcation steps.
7.2.2. The Change Assistant user interface
The above-described Change Assistant algorithm takes existing authorization rules and goal tests
that specify the intended changes as inputs and derives several possible suggestions. To formulate
the conditions as test cases and evaluate the resulting suggestions, functional stakeholders need ad-
ditional support that a graphical user interface (GUI) provides.
We integrated the Change Assistant GUI into the authorization framework. The Change Assistant
user interface adheres to the principles of Programming by Example (Myers et al., 2000; Lieberman,
2001). The GUI is integrated into the Web application as part of the authorization management back-
end. In Figure 7.9, the GUI is depicted as part of a demo application for managing conferences3.
The GUI works in four steps:
1. Choosing the permission that should be changed, such as “creating conferences” in the demo
application. Although the Change Assistant algorithm supports the mixing of different per-
missions in the test cases, the GUI currently limits the tests to one permission to improve the
comprehensibility of the interface.
2. Answering basic questions to improve the result by taking the intentions of the stakeholders
into account. Currently, the stakeholders are queried whether they aim to affect only a few or
many system users. Choosing one of the two options causes a higher weight on the affected
user count in the evaluation of the solution.
3declarative_authorization Demo Application at http://github.com/stffn/decl_auth_demo_app
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Figure 7.9.: Change Assistant GUI
3. Deﬁning the test cases by deciding which system users should or should not have the above-
chosen permission. Yellow markers show for the users whether they currently have the per-
mission. Typically, stakeholders deﬁne permission tests for several users, both positive and
negative, to improve the precision of the algorithm suggestions. It also helps to indicate for
which users the permissions should remain unchanged.
4. Requesting, reviewing and reﬁning the resulting suggestions. The suggestions are listed, or-
dered by the complexity of the changes and the number of affected users. Similar results are
grouped if the same abstract operations are used. A graphical representation may be requested
for each of the suggestions to better understand consequences of the changes. In addition, a
list of effective changes can be shown. To improve the results, speciﬁc operations may be pro-
hibited, removing all suggestions that make use of the operation. The prohibitions may either
be very speciﬁc (“Don’t assign role Admin to User A”) or partly deﬁned (“Don’t assign role
Admin”). The stakeholders may repeat this step in a drill-down process until the suggestion
count is decreased to a reasonable number and they arrive at a decision.
7.3. A comparison of the modes of policy management
The previous sections introduced three modes of policy management: A textual and a graphical rep-
resentation, and a tool that supports policy changes based on concrete change goals. These artifacts
lend themselves to explore the weaknesses and strengths of the different modes of policy manage-
ment, and how the modes affect the interaction between stakeholders. Moreover, the modes are based
on one authorization model so that we can also examine what problems surface when authors interact
with the model. We thus primarily target the following three research questions in this section:
• How well can authors interact with policies through the different modes of management and
what strategies do they apply? (Q13.1)
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• How well do the modes support the interaction between policy maker and author? (Q8.1,
Q7.2)
• How does the comprehensibility of the authorization model inﬂuence the policy management?
(Q12.1)
7.3.1. Study design
Considering the richness of the research questions, similar argumentation for qualitative research as
for the Authorization Problems Study (cf. Section 5.1.1) applies here. More speciﬁcally, we need
to qualitatively evaluate the artifacts to “look more closely at how things work (or do not work).
This can later lead to improved understanding of causal mechanisms” (Kelly, 2007, p. 470), instead
of only “does it work?” (p. 468). Accordingly, we conducted a formative evaluation with a small
number of carefully sampled participants who interacted with the artifacts to complete tasks. This
study thus falls into the category of subjective, empirical laboratory studies (cf. Section 2.5).
Experiment procedure In the introductory phase, to prevent biases, it was explained to the par-
ticipants that the experiment did not aim to identify the best management mode, but elicit problems
with the different modes of managing policies. The participants answered semi-structured questions
on their context, including their organization and position, and what authorization contexts they in-
teract with. They were then introduced to the role-based authorization model through a diagram of
an unrelated policy and to the overall scenario (described below) through a process diagram.
In the main part of the experiment, the participants were walked through one example problem
and completed one task on their own for each management mode (Cairns and Cox, 2008). They
were asked to think out loud while solving their task and report any problems that they encounter.
Additional in-situ questions were posed to clarify their approach, explore problems, or obtain their
opinion. The experiment ended with closing questions on the satisfaction with the management
modes and on whether the modes would be adequate in the participant’s context.
Scenarios The overall scenario was that of a small manufacturing company with 20 employees
and the procurement process in the resource-planning tool of the company. The existing process was
presented to the participants as a process diagram of six steps, beginning with creating a purchase or-
der and ending with approving the payment. The exercises were each presented as concrete problems
– for example, that a speciﬁc user complains about the time that orders take because of the delay at
the procurement. The task was then twofold: First, identify the current permission situation (“Who
holds the permission currently?”); second, how could the policy be changed to address the problems
(“How could the permission be granted to the requesting person?”).
The textual representation of the policy was presented to the participants as a syntax-highlighted
printout (cf. Section 7.1.2) that contained German comments and a printout of a table showing the
user–role assignments. For the graphical (cf. Section 7.1.3) and change-support mode (cf. Sec-
tion 7.2), participants interacted with a laptop. The example policy had seven roles with a total of 41
permission statements on role–permission assignments and role inheritance.
The experiment design of using one policy for the entire experiment could result in a learning
effect that simpliﬁes each subsequent task. However, different policies would have caused overly
high cognitive effort for readjustments and could have resulted in confusion. Also, it is realistic for
policy authors to become familiar with a policy, even though this impedes a direct comparison of the
performance with the different modes. We countered learning effects by carefully formulating the
tasks to affect different parts of the policy.
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Code Position Organization Authorization context
A1 Administrator Home care, 50 employees Primarily ofﬁce staff (10 users)
A2 Administrator University department Building access control (1000),
research group systems (20)
A3 Research scientist Personal/family context Home systems (4)
M1 Managing stakeholder ISV, process visualization, 10
employees
Access to ofﬁce documents,
source code repository (10)
M2 Managing director Technical quality assurance, 50
employees
Business system (50)
Table 7.1.: Participant sampling for policy-change study
Participant sampling Flyvbjerg (2007) argues that “when the objective is to achieve the great-
est possible amount of information on a given problem. . . , a representative case or random sample
may. . . not be the richest in information” (p. 395). In this case, “information-oriented selection” is
more suitable than “random selection” (p. 396). To achieve a precise “information-oriented” sam-
pling, participants were recruited from the personal environment of the researcher. According to
Nielsen and Landauer (1993), a rather small number of carefully selected participants sufﬁce in in-
depth usability studies to discover the problems. We thus recruited a small number of practitioners
from a variety of backgrounds (cf. Table 7.1), where they either act as policy maker or policy au-
thor. While the number of participants cannot provide comprehensive or representative results, the
careful sampling allows us to elicit useful, exploratory ﬁndings on the interaction with the different
modes of policy management. Moreover, our recruitment strategy can result in a bias of the partic-
ipants. However, the study design should counter this threat through a rich qualitative interaction
between interviewer and participant. Another threat is the slight technical bias in the sampling, so
that additional problems may be expected with policy makers with less technical afﬁnity.
Analysis The evaluation sessions were audio-recorded and transcribed. In a Grounded-Theory
approach (Adams et al., 2008; Glaser and Strauss, 1967, cf. Section 5.1.1), the transcripts were
then openly coded for problems (encountered or stated obstacles), opinions (emotions or valuations),
and observations (insights from observing participant behavior), resulting in 171 raw codes. The
raw codes were consolidated in axial coding by code category (e.g. “cognitive load”) and detailed
code (e.g. “text scanning”) and associated with the management mode. While the transcripts were
in German, coding and consolidation was conducted in English and quotes in the following were
translated into English.
7.3.2. Textual: High cognitive load when the structure is unknown
Cognitive load and incomprehensible policy
The participants experienced a high cognitive load while completing the exercise on the textual
representation of the policy. One problem was that they needed to “scan” the text to, for example,
ﬁnd occurrences of permissions, particularly, since the structure of the policy was unknown:
M1: “If I know the text, it is something different. . . I ﬁrst need to ﬁnd out about the
structure”
Without knowing the structure, the participants were lacking a clear overview of the policy and, thus,
had problems to elicit the alternative change-options and weigh them because of the perceived high
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number of options. When rather “simple” tasks require overly high cognitive effort, it impacted the
satisfaction:
A2: “I wasn’t aware that they inherit from [role], that makes sense, but I need to read
the hierarchy out of this, that’s annoying”
The cognitive load also affected the comprehension of the policy. In case of the hierarchy, it
occurred several times that participants overlooked an inheritance, as shown in the previous quote.
Similarly critical was the perception of the consequences from the lack of overview:
A1: “Here, I am afraid: I would notice it two, three times, but then the error occurs that
I overlook one [permission]”
This also led to issues with the identiﬁcation of the consequences (M1). Moreover, participants had
problems with the syntax and semantics of the statements in the policy. For example, M2 did not
notice the difference between system identiﬁers of roles and their descriptive string. For semantics,
most problems related to the lack of connection between the system representation and reality, for
example, for permissions:
M2: “OK, one would need to have a look what actually is meant with ‘create’ and
‘approve’. . . accepting a delivery can have to do with several things. . . what is it that
one does when one accepts a delivery, you’d check the delivery note. . . ”
Diverse problem-solving strategies
We also observed a number of problems in the problem-solving approaches. Common problems
were that participants (1) resorted to confabulation (arriving at conclusions independent of the facts),
(2) made changes without actually understanding them, and (3) employed “satisﬁcing” (choosing an
alternative without comprehensively evaluating the consequences, cf. March et al., 1958):
M1: “Following logics, if [the manager] is at the top, then ‘employee’ has to be the
lowest level, so everyone in-between should also have the ‘employee’ role”
The cause for the satisﬁcing and confabulation could be the aforementioned high cognitive effort and
the abstractness of the policy:
M2: “One would tend to assign everything to the employee role, because that’s quick
and simple, then you don’t think much about the consequences, because the roles are
not as visible”
Apart from these problematic problem-solving strategies, participants reported a number of further
approaches to lower the effort of policy management, enumerated in Table 7.2. The diversity of
strategies highlights how context-dependent the interaction with a textual policy is.
Context dependency
Despite the problems, participants saw the textual representation as useful given the right context-of-
use, that is, conversely, they saw it as inadequate for “lay users”:
A1: “Only we are able to do this. . . you cannot show this to anyone else, they panic”
But adequate for experts:
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Mechanistically following a sim-
ple pattern
“Then I scan [the text], search for ‘deliveries’, then I match the verb. . . I
do this purely mechanistic” (A2)
Scanning the comments “I looked at the comments, that’s the simplest” (A3)
Creating and employing rich ad-
ditional media
“If I would work more often with this, I’d ﬁrst draw myself an inheri-
tance tree” (A2)
Transferring the problem to real-
ity for concreteness
“One needs to think how this is achieved in the warehouse, maybe with
a red cross [on the crate], I just imagine such a dusty warehouse” (A1)
Relying on documentation to un-
derstand the semantics
“Reading the manual; for the Wikis that we employ here, I regularly
forget how one formulates the ACL” (A2)
Relying on expertise of the pol-
icy, information system, or do-
main
“Then, I know already what [the requester] means if he says he should
be able to access this room or that wiki, then I know what domain
this pertains. . . and there is no question [what permission is meant]. . . I
know the system because I do this all the time, so I know this automati-
cally already” (A2)
Table 7.2.: Problem-solving strategies for textual policies
A3: “Using the text, one may proceed more strategically, there is less danger to overlook
something, because it is all listed there. . . but I also do a lot with conﬁg ﬁles”
And for frequent changes:
A2: “If I do this three times a day, it would sufﬁce to edit the text ﬁle. That may be
quicker, I can see on the ﬁrst look what I need to see”
7.3.3. Graphical: The beneﬁts of the bigger picture
When using the graphical representation of the policy, participants still partly found it difﬁcult to
comprehend the policy, for example, concerning the semantics of the policy. While there were no
problems with understanding the hierarchy, it was still difﬁcult in some cases to have an overview
over consequences from changes. This primarily occurred when participants used the option of
zooming to only show individual roles.
The problem-solving approaches were different for the graphical representation. In contrast to
the cognitive load to gain an overview from the text, participants were delighted that it was more
pleasant, simpler, and quicker to use the diagram and gain an overview:
M1: “[In the diagram, it] is all clear, simpler; if I know the text by heart, have in front
of me all the time, that would also be fairly quick, but in this way, I see it on the ﬁrst
look, who has got which permissions and what happens if I move one”
Having the entire policy in one picture showed to be useful, for example, when A2 needed to refer
to the “bigger picture” before being sure that he did not overlook something. The diagram was even
seen to be a necessary complement to the text:
A1: “[For the text], I would need to do something manually in parallel, I would draw
such a diagram”
Moreover, the bigger picture created a sense of security (A1: “I would not want to zoom, I feel
more secure [with the overview]”). In contrast to the textual form, participants did not resort to
confabulation. It still was difﬁcult to identify all change options, though. However, the graphical
representation was perceived to be more accessible:
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M2: “For the decision maker it is more real, not as virtual, more tangible, because there
are also names of the users with the roles, that makes it more concrete”
Generally, as already indicated in the above quote of M1, the adequacy of the graphical represen-
tation really depends on the context of use, for example, the expertise of the policy author and the
frequency of changes:
A2: “Currently, since the system is new, [the diagram] is a supporting tool. If I do this
three times a day, it would sufﬁce to edit the text ﬁle. That may be quicker, I can see on
the ﬁrst look what I need to see”
Participants also stated doubts on the viability of the graphical approach in other contexts, consider-
ing its scalability:
A2: “If that are 120 [employees], it does not work anymore. . . and with one additional
role, this would get confusing again; if I added 10 new roles, it would not work anymore”
7.3.4. Change support: Supporting, but abstract
When employing the change-support tool, the participants followed a different strategy. The difﬁ-
culty here is not to identify options – these are provided by the system, including alternatives that
the participants did not come up earlier (M1: “Ah, a new role, that is another idea”). Similarly,
consequences of changes are easier to elicit:
M1: “This is great, because it showed me [the options] comparatively quickly and
surely, I did not need to think myself, I could not overlook consequences. I could live
with missing alternatives, but missing consequences would be risky”
Thus, participants could focus on the weighing of the alternatives:
A1: “But then they can create suppliers, that would not be good, would it? So rather
a new role, but that could get annoying, because that would create a ﬂood; and then
everyone likes to have something. . . It would be best to give the individual employee the
permission, but then again you get quarrels”
The general strategy is to “play” with the tool, for example, through excluding those alternatives that
are irrelevant, reducing the suggestions to those that need to be assessed (cf. Section 7.2.2). Playing
with the tool and the output is perceived to support both the policy author and the interaction with
the policy maker:
M1: “If someone needs to decide on this, then he will ask ﬁrst for the consequences. . . not
approximate [consequences, but clear]. . . For discussions, this is the only reasonable
thing, I could print this out and hand this over. And I can play with this and try out what
the consequences are”
However, A1 noted that he does not believe non-technical policy makers could “cope” with the output
from the tool.
The preference for the textual or graphical representation of the change consequences corre-
sponded to the opinion on the textual and graphical management mode. While A3 prefers a textual
listing “to then see which permissions he is granted overall,” M2 beneﬁts more from a graphical
view:
136
7.3. A comparison of the modes of policy management
M2: “That she may actually do everything then, that is not as clear [in the textual listing
as in the graphical view], that it is very much”
Participants categorized the change-support tool as “helpful” (A2), even fascinated from the tech-
nology (A1). Interestingly, there are conﬂicting opinions on the feeling of security that the tool
provides. On the one hand, M1, as quoted above, would use the output to ofﬂoad responsibility
when interacting with the policy maker. Similarly, A1 feels secure because of the mechanism:
A1: “Here, I can be sure that the objects were checked already by the machine, I can be
very sure. While with the text ﬁle. . . ”
Conversely, the abstraction from the actual policy created the need to consult the textual policy (A1,
A2) and even reduced the feeling of security for other participants:
A2: “We don’t see the roles that people have indirectly; we don’t understand why the
person has the permission. . . For an administrator. . . it is important to have as much
information as possible – one doesn’t like surprises, such as: ‘Oh, why is he able to do
that’ ”
Further critical points addressed the technical feasibility of the tool, concerning the scalability as
well as the number and relevance of the generated alternatives:
A2: “It surprises me that the two should get different roles. . .With more users you’d
have millions of [suggestions]. . . Could become unusable because there are too many
options that are irrelevant”
7.3.5. Discussion
Management modes have fundamental strengths and weaknesses
Each policy-management mode showed speciﬁc weaknesses, particularly with respect to the com-
prehensibility of the policy and consequences of changes. While these were particularly pronounced
for the textual representation, we found problems with the policy semantics for all modes. Other
problems depend on the focus of the individual mode; for instance, some participants had difﬁculties
in identifying and weighing alternative change-options for the textual and graphical representations,
but not for the change support.
The speciﬁc weaknesses and strengths of the approaches also resulted in different problem-solving
strategies: The textual representation already required a high cognitive effort to elicit alternatives,
leading to satisﬁcing and confabulation. The graphical representation provided the bigger picture of
the policy, which helped to induce a feeling of security when considering the entire policy. It was
also seen as more concrete than the textual policy where roles and users are separated. In contrast, the
change-support tool allowed the participants to focus on weighing alternatives, but it also abstracted
detailed information and required trust in the algorithm.
Independent of the management mode, technical challenges occurred due to the speciﬁc authoriza-
tion model that limited the model expressiveness and, for example, did not allow to directly assign
permissions to users. For the graphical mode and the change-support tool, participants also stated
doubts about the scalability of the approaches with larger numbers of users, roles, and permissions.
Despite these doubts, the participants tended to be more satisﬁed with these modes than with the text
policy. However, these opinions seem to correspond strongly with the participants’ backgrounds and
preferences.
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Validity of the ﬁndings
The ﬁndings are based on subjective empirical data, thus relying on honest feedback by participants.
There is a controversy on the value of rich, qualitative empirical evidence (Adams et al., 2008).
However, it is difﬁcult to design objective experiments that are representative without overly limiting
the scope or only resulting in binary ﬁndings. Thus, subjective empirical research is more suitable
in the exploratory phase that policy usability is in. The subjective approach was also chosen for its
richness that allowed to explore the reasons for problems and derive recommendations.
Further threats originate from the participant recruitment strategy: For a precise sampling of the
participant backgrounds, the participants were recruited from the researcher’s personal environment.
General, personal connections can lead to a sampling bias, since participants may make statements
in a way to please the researcher. However, the rich qualitative setting allowed to detect dishonest
statements. Moreover, this effect was further countered by a clear statement at the beginning that
the study was not to establish the best way of policy management, but to contrast strengths and
weaknesses of the different modes.
Despite the recruitment strategy, while providing a broad range of backgrounds, the small sample
prevents a comprehensive coverage of the variety of authorization contexts in practice. For example,
the policy makers in the study had a rather high technical afﬁnity. We can assume even more prob-
lems with the syntax primitives of the textual policy for less technical afﬁnity. However, the diversity
covered already allow for useful ﬁndings without the claim of comprehensiveness or representative-
ness. Related threats may be caused by choosing one speciﬁc authorization model (role-based) as
the technical background of the study. The ﬁndings may not apply to simpler models. However,
role-based authorization is wide-spread and very relevant in practice.
Lastly, the speciﬁc experiment procedure poses a threat to the validity. A bias may be introduced
into the reported problems from the sequence of management modes: Participants could have become
used to the tasks and the policy. Quantitative results (purposely not employed in the ﬁndings) on
problems and the general cognitive load from the tasks may have been inﬂuenced by this effect.
We counteracted this effect with independent scenarios, although they were all based on a single
policy to prevent confusion from changing policy or excessive cognitive load from switching context.
Also, due to the limited number of participants, a between-subject study design was not an option.
However, we focused on rich feedback and largely ignored quantitative results so that the effects
should be contained.
Overall, despite these threats and a lack of comprehensiveness and representativeness, the rich-
ness of the ﬁndings should offer good hypotheses for further research at the current state of research
on policy management. Follow-up studies with further improved artifacts should comprise a larger
number of participants from a broader range of contexts and a more robust experiment design, for
example, with changing sequences of modes or a between-subject design for more comparative re-
sults.
Recommendations on the design of policy management
Considering the reported problems and further comments and opinions by the participants, we can
derive general recommendations on how to design policy management:
• Support policy decision: As reported by participants of the study, an often important aspect of
making changes is to weigh the different options of achieving a change goal. When identifying
alternative change options and their consequences incurred a high cognitive load or the options
were too abstract and could not be systematically compared, assessing the risks showed to be
138
7.4. Effective and efﬁcient integration of enforcement controls
difﬁcult (P2, P3). Moreover, participants noted that they would beneﬁt as policy authors from
a support of the interaction with policy makers by the change tool (P1).
• Take the context into account: Despite the small sample, the study demonstrated how different
the authorization contexts of policy authors are and how the differences affect the requirements
and preferences regarding policy management. While rich, graphical representations were ap-
preciated for some contexts, textual ones were seen as more appropriate for others (P2). Men-
tioned or observed factors that inﬂuence the appropriateness include the policy-author prefer-
ence and expertise (domain, policy, change mode), the policy complexity (change frequency,
quantity of users, roles, permissions), and the complexity of the authorization model (e.g. role
inheritance). The design of the policy management tool, particularly its mode, must reﬂect
the context (cf. the authorization taxonomy for context characteristics in Section 4.1; P8). The
modes may complement each other, allowing the policy author to choose the adequate tool
depending, for example, on the task, expertise, and feeling of security.
• Support the problem-solving strategies: Depending on the management mode and the partici-
pant background, participants employed a variety of problem-solving approaches. Extending
the previous recommendation, we also need to support the speciﬁc strategies of policy au-
thors and makers (P2, P8). For example, in unknown textual policies, the study showed that
it is important to support the text scanning and the building of a mental model of the policy
structure.
• Improve the user experience: The study revealed several ways in which the modes inﬂuence
the experience and satisfaction of policy authors: Annoyances were, for instance, caused by
inconsistencies of terms, missing information, or when apparently simple tasks, such as under-
standing the inheritance structure, required excessive cognitive effort. Conversely, the satis-
faction was improved from the feeling of being in control, and when tasks could be completed
quickly with little effort (P2) – potentially reducing the threshold for making changes (P5).
Participants also responded positively when a tool was intuitive, when it fascinated them, or
when they could “play” with it.
7.4. Effective and efﬁcient integration of enforcement controls
The previous sections focused on how the authorization framework can support policy makers and
authors in managing the policy. From the development perspective, a framework can support the
integration of enforcement controls. Developers can improve the software quality through increased
reliability of authorization – employing, for example, a usable API for the controls. The main fo-
cus is the enforcement effectiveness through the precise implementation of enforcement, and the
enforcement efﬁciency, from a low effort (Req 15, Q15.1). The main challenges in authorization
enforcement are the correct placement of enforcement statements. Errors in placement were, for
example, found in Linux kernel modules (Jaeger et al., 2004). Similarly, measures to enforce autho-
rization as part of the architecture may be circumvented by accident through unanticipated control
ﬂow (Sohr and Berger, 2010).
Another challenge lies in changing authorization requirements. With inappropriate enforcement
models, the developer needs to modify enforcement statements for changes to the permissions. For
the enforcement modiﬁcation, the developer has to identify the relevant enforcement points in the
program code by inferring the control ﬂow paths and has to understand the parts in the code where
the enforcement is to be changed. Frequently, information on why a certain state is reached is missing
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in development (Ko et al., 2007). The API design also affects the enforcement comprehensibility,
improving the understanding of the consequences of enforcement statements (Clarke, 2004; Stylos
et al., 2006). It is particularly difﬁcult to achieve adequate authorization enforcement in software
evolution, which often requires program comprehension for further development (von Mayrhauser
and Vans, 1995).
Therefore, enforcement was ideally implemented once and could be left unmodiﬁed even when
authorization requirements change (Beznosov et al., 1999). Vice versa, the authorization policy
would not need to be modiﬁed even with functional changes as long as the authorization requirements
remain unchanged. Loose coupling of authorization policy and enforcement is needed, following the
principle of the separation of concerns (De Win et al., 2003). Systematic authorization enforcement –
for example, in the form of reference monitors – were the ﬁrst step in this direction (Anderson, 1972).
Current authorization enforcement mechanisms come in a variety of approaches, often applied in
combinations (Pandey and Hashii, 1999). Operating system-based enforcement relies on operating
system mechanisms that check permissions on the level of ﬁles or processes (Harrison et al., 1976). In
runtime system-based mechanisms, the running program is encapsulated and every call to a protected
component is ﬁrst checked against a reference monitor; an example is the Java security model (Gong
and Ellison, 2003). For language-based approaches, a compiler generates additional enforcement
code for the speciﬁed authorization policy (Goguen and Meseguer, 1982). Similarly, aspect-oriented
programming (AOP) can be employed to enforce authorization at the join points (Kiczales et al.,
1997). A related approach is the transformation of program bytecode to enforce program behavior,
for example in Java programs to secure hosts against potentially malicious mobile code (Pandey and
Hashii, 1999). In these approaches, the program code is regarded as potentially hostile, requiring
external supervision. In contrast, many authorization decisions are taken in program code for external
users, permitting a cooperative approach of program code and authorization. In these API-based
approaches, enforcement hooks are placed into the source code – for example, as checkPermission
calls in Java (Gong and Ellison, 2003) or as security hooks in the Linux kernel (Jaeger et al., 2004).
The problem with these approaches is that they are often very complex and difﬁcult to comprehend
in the program code, require a high effort (e.g. AOP), or do not separate the concerns. This is
where the enforcement mechanism of declarative_authorization starts off from, offering the
following characteristics:
• Low-threshold authorization enforcement to motivate the implementation of enforcement early
in the development and reduce the effort for precise enforcement. One approach is “conven-
tion over conﬁguration” that prevents redundancy in enforcement statements by leveraging the
information on the context,
• Separation of concerns for authorization to reduce the enforcement maintenance effort and
authorization-related defects. This principle works in two directions: Functional changes
should not require unnecessary policy changes and policy changes should not require enforce-
ment changes,
• Code as documentation through comprehensible policy and enforcement code, which provide
more current information than secondary documentation.
declarative_authorization targets Web applications, so that the enforcement is structured by
the model–view–controller (MVC) approach, which is typical for Web application platforms. The
framework provides for enforcement on each of those layers. The enforcement points are shown
in the schematic diagram in Figure 7.10. The controller layer receives client HTTP requests and
implements the business logic. Here, the primary enforcement occurs: The controller coordinates the
140
7.4. Effective and efﬁcient integration of enforcement controls
??????????? ?????????? ?????
????
?????????????
????????
????????????????? ???????????????
Figure 7.10.: Enforcement points in declarative_authorization
requests and often relies on the model layer that provides access to the application data. The model
interfaces with databases, implementing an object-relational mapping. This is a second enforcement
point, for example, limiting the retrieved data according to the permissions of the requesting user.
Data from the model is passed back to the controller, which then generates the views to be sent back
as results to the client. The authorization policy can also be enforced in views to hide restricted
elements, such as links to restricted functionality.
To support the effectiveness and efﬁciency of authorization in software development, the ease
of its integration in the application is important. Imposing a reduced overhead for enforcement
allows the authorization infrastructure to be integrated early-on and reduces the potential defects
from authorization that is implemented as an afterthought. The main principle that is followed on
the different enforcement layers is reducing redundancy and adhering to the principle of convention
over conﬁguration. Simple and concise enforcement declarations take advantage from best-practice
conventions, reducing explicit conﬁguration that can be derived from the context of the enforcement
statement. For more complex cases, detailed conﬁguration options provide the necessary ﬂexibility.
In the following, we discuss the respective enforcement controls on each layer.
7.4.1. Controller
In MVC architectures, controllers are responsible for the business logic and the coordination of
incoming requests and are thus the natural place for the ﬁrst line of defense. In case of HTTP
requests, URIs are routed to the controller actions, such as “list” (generates a list of items) or “show”
(showing one item’s details). The enforcement can be imposed as a control for each of the actions
and is then enforced prior to the execution of the business logic. declarative_authorization
provides ﬁlters that are established with the filter_access_to statement. General enforcement for
all actions set up with one statement as shown in the following example:
class ConferencesController
filter_access_to :all
def index
# ...
end
end
When the “index” action in the example’s ConferencesController is called by a request to
display a listing of conferences, the authorization is enforced before the control is passed on to the
“index” method. The authorization framework derives the necessary permission “index conferences”
from the controller name and the requested action. If the permission has not been directly or indi-
rectly assigned to any of the current user’s roles, the request will be denied. By default, authorization
constraints (e.g. “may only read published conferences”) are not considered since context object
cannot always be derived from the request to check the constraints against. The “index” action in
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the example is one of these cases. In case of “show” actions that directly target one object to be
displayed, authorization constraints may be checked as well.
A common implementation pattern for Rails controllers are resource-oriented actions that cor-
respond to the REST HTTP methods and implement seven actions mapped to the CRUD (Create,
Read, Update, Delete) activities. The methods that require authorization-constraint checks can
be deduced for the conventional methods. Accordingly, the authorization framework provides the
filter_resource_access statement as an alternative that sets up the necessary ﬁlter conﬁguration
and object loading for the individual REST actions.
Even with only one-line enforcement statement on the controller layer, developers may still in-
troduce defects – for example, through missing individual actions. To provide a simple overview
of the established ﬁlters, declarative_authorization offers an analysis of the controller-level
authorization enforcement and displays the coverage for each of the controller actions in a textual
representation, differentiating between enforcement with and without authorization constraints.
7.4.2. Model
The model level of the MVC architecture provides the link to the application’s data. Here, a second
line of defense can be established with additional authorization enforcement – in two ways: First,
programmatically restrict the results of database retrievals to those objects that the current user may
access. In the conference-controller example in the previous section, this type of model enforcement
can be employed to limit the conferences that are shown in the listing:
class ConferencesController
filter_access_to :all
def index
# @conferences = Conference.find(:all, :conditions => ...)
@conferences = Conference.with_permissions_to(:read).all
end
end
Without the framework-provided enforcement with_permissions_to that imposes limitations on
the database query, the conditions would need to be explicitly stated for each role, as demonstrated in
the commented line. Instead, for a guest user and the policy given in Listing 7.1, the conditions would
thus be set to only retrieve published conferences. While similar query rewriting has been described
already as early database-speciﬁc security mechanism (Stonebraker and Rubinstein, 1976), we in this
case reuse the rules on multiple layers. The important effect for developers is that they do not need
to adapt the enforcement statement to changing policies, such as new roles or additional constraints,
in multiple places.
The programmatical restrictions on database queries are most relevant for reading operations. For
create, update, and delete actions that typically operate on individual objects, the framework pro-
vides the statement using_access_control on the model layer. The statement activates permission
checks on those actions, so that, for instance, a conference may only be saved if the current user has
the permission to update conferences. In practice, this approach may be too restrictive. There are
cases in which users should not be able to edit objects directly, such as conferences, but the appli-
cation should nevertheless be able to update the object for administrative tasks in their requests, for
example, updating a timestamp of the last access.
7.4.3. View
The majority of authorization is enforced on the controller and model layer. Nevertheless, the view
may contain data that should only be displayed to users with certain permissions. In addition, the user
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interface often needs to be adapted according to the current user’s restrictions – for example, only
showing menu items of actions that the user is allowed to access. View enforcement restricts which
part of view templates and thus which data is rendered. declarative_authorization provides
the permitted_to? statements for this, which either operate on general object types, such as “read
conferences”, or speciﬁc objects, such as “edit this conference”.
7.5. Enforcement usability in practice
To assess the impact of authorization on software development and the usability of the enforcement
API, we studied the development of a custom Web application for a medium-sized enterprise (50 em-
ployees) from the automotive-supplier industries. The application supports the company’s business
processes – among others, the collection and reporting of quality-assurance results. In particular,
the aim was to improve the understanding of how the loose coupling of policy and enforcement
affects real-world software development in a case study. The approach is an in-depth analysis of
authorization through an examination of a project’s source-code repository. At the time of examina-
tion, development had been ongoing for 2.5 years with small teams that employed agile development
practices. The application had been in full productive use for 1.5 years.
The case study has the following research goals: First, what is the actual impact of authorization
on agile software development? The hypothesis is that agile development causes frequent changes
of functional requirements, including authorization requirements – that is, requirements related to
permissions in the system. Thus, a substantial part of the software development should affect au-
thorization (Hypothesis HE1). Second, how does a loose-coupling authorization framework help
in authorization development? When policy and functional changes are fully coupled, all policy
changes would affect functional code and all functional changes to enforcement would affect the
policy. Conversely, with perfect loose-coupling, we can expect that changes only affect either the
authorization policy or the functionality (HE2). Third, which properties of authorization frameworks
positively or negatively affect software development? Despite loose coupling, we can still expect
that there are authorization-enforcement modiﬁcations for authorization requirement changes and
vice versa (HE3).
7.5.1. Study design
Similar to the Authorization Problems Study (cf. Section 5.1.1), we here also need to conduct an
in-depth analysis for meaningful results and are constrained in the number of available organizations
as cases. Accordingly, we conducted a case study on one development project. For the study, we
analyzed the version-control-system commits to the development branch of the Subversion reposi-
tory (Collins-Sussman et al., 2004) over almost 1.5 years – beginning with the introduction of the
declarative_authorization plugin in the project, which superseded a very simple authorization
mechanism. We target the efﬁciency aspect of developer usability and, thus, would need to study the
effort that developers spend on different tasks. Since development effort is difﬁcult to assess directly,
the analysis is based on commit counts and the relation between the commits that touch authorization
development aspects. The rationale is that a developer generally risks to introduce defects and spends
effort if a commit affects authorization, impacting the effectiveness and efﬁciency, respectively. We
focused on two distinct aspects, policy changes and changes to authorization enforcement, and man-
ually coded commits according to the reasons of modiﬁcations. Since a commit may contain several
changes, all coding was non-exclusive.
Firstly, we determined the total number of commits on the development branch. For policy
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Functionality Changes to the policy due to changes to the functionality of the application, e.g.
the adding of a new function
Authorization
bugﬁxes
Authorization policy modiﬁcation to ﬁx problems caused by the policy, e.g. when
a user is supposed to be able to access a function but is not
Authorization
refactoring
Changes to authorization policy without affecting the semantics of the policy, e.g.
for cosmetic or readability reasons
Authorization
requirements
Modiﬁcations related to changed permissions without further application function-
ality changes, e.g. when a role receives an additional permission
Table 7.3.: Categories of reasons for authorization policy changes
Functionality Functional changes to the application that affect enforcement controls in the
source code, e.g. when a new function is added and it needs to be protected
with enforcement controls
General refactoring General application refactoring that affects enforcement statements in the code,
but does not change the functionality of the application
Authorization bugﬁxes Changes that affect enforcement code and are caused by problems with permis-
sions of users, e.g. when a user is supposed to be able to access a function but is
not
Authorization refactor-
ing
Refactoring of application code that is due to changes in the authorization struc-
tures, e.g. a change in the role structure
Authorization require-
ments
Changes in enforcement that result from changes of permissions, e.g. when a
user should be able to complete additional tasks
Table 7.4.: Categories of reasons for authorization enforcement changes
changes, we analyzed commits to the authorization conﬁguration ﬁle and coded the commits into
categories (Table 7.3) using the commit log entries, inspection of the version differences, and devel-
oper knowledge of underlying reasons for the changes.
For enforcement, we automatically analyzed the differences between versions and considered a
commit enforcement-related if the changeset contained a change line with an enforcement statement.
All enforcement commits were manually veriﬁed and categorized according to Table 7.4.
7.5.2. Analysis
The analysis of the commit quantities are shown in Table 7.5. For each commit type, a line lists the
quantity and, if applicable, the ratio against the total commit quantity and against the enforcement
or policy-related commits. Commits were not exclusively coded, so that the ratios do not sum up to
100%. Accordingly the commit counts cannot be aggregated directly, so that the table additionally
contains aggregations of the raw categories:
• Requirements-related: Commits to the policy that are motivated by changes to functionality or
authorization requirements,
• Non-functional: Commits that change the policy to modify the application behavior without
involving changes to the functionality of the application (authorization bugﬁxes or authoriza-
tion requirements),
• Authorization-only: Commits that change enforcement controls and are motivated by changes
to authorization (authorization bugﬁxes, refactoring, or requirements),
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# of total of enforcement/
commits commits policy commits
Total commits 610
Total authorization-related 137 22.5 %
Policy-related 58 9.5 %
Functionality 17 2.8 % 29.3 %
Authorization bugﬁxes 8 1.3 % 13.8 %
Authorization refactoring 15 2.5 % 25.9 %
Authorization requirements 33 5.4 % 56.9 %
Requirements-related 44 7.2 % 75.9 %
Non-functional 39 6.4 % 67.2 %
Enforcement-related 116 19.0 %
Functionality 52 8.5 % 44.8 %
General refactoring 35 5.7 % 30.2 %
Authorization bugﬁxes 11 1.8 % 9.5 %
Authorization refactoring 20 3.3 % 17.2 %
Authorization requirements 9 1.5 % 7.8 %
Authorization-only 37 6.1 % 31.9 %
Non-authorization 83 13.6 % 71.6 %
Table 7.5.: Quantities and proportions of the commit reasons
• Non-authorization: Commits that affect enforcement controls and are caused by changes to
functionality (functionality or general refactoring).
Generally, almost a quarter (23%) of all commits were related to authorization, almost 10% to the
authorization policy. From the quantitative results in Table 7.5, we can derive several more speciﬁc
ﬁndings:
• Changes to the requirements caused changes of the policy: 7% of all commits (76% of all
policy-related commits) affected the policy and resulted from changed requirements (autho-
rization and functional).
• Changes to the application behavior often only required to modify the policy: In two thirds of
the commits relating to the policy, authorization behavior was changed without functionality
changes.
• Changes to permissions more often affected the policy than enforcement: There were 33 com-
mits caused by authorization-requirement changes on the policy compared to only 9 for en-
forcement. Only 8% of the enforcement commits were related to authorization-requirement
changes without further functionality changes.
• Most enforcement changes were necessary as part of the functional development: 72% of
all enforcement-related changes were for general refactoring or functional changes (“Non-
authorization”), thus could not be replaced by only changing the policy even for perfect loose
coupling.
• Functional changes were more likely to affect the enforcement than the policy: While 9% of all
commits changed enforcement because of functionality changes, functionality changes caused
policy changes only in 3% of all commits.
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Figure 7.11.: Distribution of reasons for enforcement commits over time
Although, in perfect loose-coupling, no authorization-related modiﬁcations of enforcement should
be necessary (HE2), one third (32%) of the enforcement changes related to authorization bugﬁxing,
refactoring and requirement changes (“authorization-only”). We analyzed the reasons of authoriza-
tion enforcement changes further by examining the distribution of commits over time:
• Authorization-related enforcement commits primarily occurred in the transitional period: The
monthly commits relative to the total number of enforcement commits are shown in Fig-
ure 7.11. In the diagram, the most striking development is that authorization-related enforce-
ment commits were decreasing after the ﬁrst ﬁve months. This indicates that there was a
transitional period after the introduction of the framework, in which most of the authorization
refactoring occurred. Later, the authorization enforcement stabilized and less refactoring was
necessary.
• Authorization-related enforcement commits were in some cases required to address autho-
rization problems: A closer examination of the remaining enforcement changes indicates that
when authorization problems needed to be ﬁxed, originally missing or wrong enforcement
controls needed to be added or modiﬁed. In particular, the authorization framework allows to
place either very speciﬁc controls, aimed, for example, at a concrete object, or general checks
for a permission without a relation to an object. Thus, if a more concrete authorization check
became necessary, more general controls needed to be modiﬁed.
7.5.3. Discussion
The ﬁndings are for the most part in line with the expectations. A considerable part of the devel-
opment was related to authorization as expected from agile development, which causes frequent
changes to functional and authorization requirements over time (HE1). Functionality-related autho-
rization changes affected enforcement to a higher degree than policy. Similarly, policy modiﬁcations
are more often caused by authorization requirement changes. This indicates a loose coupling between
policy and enforcement that improves the developer usability by reducing effort and preventing errors
(HE2). We still found authorization-requirement commits that affected enforcement and vice versa –
an indication that the loose coupling is not perfect. The primary reasons were a large amount of tran-
sitional work in the ﬁrst months after the framework introduction. To a lesser extent, enforcement
changes were also necessary to fulﬁll changing authorization requirements (HE3).
Since we conducted a single-project case study, there are several threats to the study validity. For
the scope validity (external validity, cf. Section 5.1.1), the results are mainly applicable to custom-
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developed business Web applications that involve a non-trivial amount of authorization, which pre-
vents the deﬁnition of the entire authorization requirements in advance. The speciﬁc development
process is also important, since the agile methods in this project caused continuously changing func-
tional and authorization requirements. As most plan-driven development processes also have chang-
ing requirements (Lehman, 1980), the effects should be similar in other process models. The speciﬁc
development context could also pose a threat to the validity since the development was conducted
in the university realm. However, the development was very focused on the product owner’s re-
quirements and was conducted by skilled developers of at least two years of experience with the
development framework. Lastly, the speciﬁc programming language, Web development platform
and authorization framework may have affected the results. We analyzed whether changes to the
framework resulted in additional refactoring but the API was rather stable and only one commit was
caused by the refactoring of the application code due to a non-backward compatible change to the
framework. There was no authorization refactoring from newly introduced framework functionality.
Still, future research should include studying other authorization frameworks and platforms.
Other threats to validity are posed by the study author’s involvement in the development (reliabil-
ity). While it is common in the social sciences to conduct empirical work with active involvement
of the study authors, for instance in action research (Cairns and Cox, 2008), it is less common in
computer science. Still, the involvement should not have signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the results as the
analysis was fully conducted post mortem and, more importantly, the analysis was only decided after
the studied period was over. Thus, the author should not have been biased in development. Moreover,
the developer involvement in the study was inevitable as the coding of commits was only possible
with knowledge of the system and the course of the development.
Lastly, threats to the construct and internal validity originate from the methodology of analyzing
commit quantities instead of the actual development effort as indicated in the methodology section.
Generally, the metric of commit quantity is no quantitative measure of the work effort, but gives an
abstract approximation through the frequencies of occurrences. If authorization was touched in a
development step, a developer needed to invest cognitive effort. To rule out issues from large and
infrequent in contrast to small and frequent commits, we also analyzed the number of enforcement
changes per commit. While means on the change quantities are problematic because of our non-
exclusive coding, the categories of enforcement changes showed similar patterns of commits with
high (up to 40 changes, six commits with more than 20 changes) and small numbers of changes. The
large ones were mostly merge commits, encompassing several changes in one commit. On the other
hand, the combination of changes into single commits can be expected to have occurred randomly
and should thus not have impacted the validity of the ratios that were the foremost source for the
ﬁndings.
Despite the threats to the validity, the richness of the analyzed data on the development process
should offer a good hypothesis as the basis for future research on the integration of enforcement
controls.
7.6. Implementation and real-world use
The declarative_authorization framework is implemented as a plugin for the Web development
platform Ruby on Rails (Ruby et al., 2011). Making use of Ruby’s metaprogramming features,
the framework integrates on the controller and model layers into the Rails infrastructure. When
integrated as a Ruby gem in a Rails project, developers need to provide the current user and the
user’s roles through a predeﬁned interface to the authorization framework.
The declarative_authorization Rails plugin has been published in 2008 as open source under
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the liberal MIT license that does not restrict the usage of the framework. Since then, the framework
has developed into a moderately successful open source project as the second most-used authoriza-
tion plugin in the Rails community with, at the time of writing in November 2011, over 95,000
downloads from the central Ruby extension repository rubygems.org4. The framework is hosted on
the Git-based source code hosting platform Github5 and has more than 1000 “watchers” on Github –
developers who are interested in updates and news on the project. More than 20 external developers
have already contributed bug ﬁxes and extensions through patches. The Github issue tracker provides
management of bug reports and feature requests. A Google-News-hosted mailing list6 offers public
support for usage-related questions.
7.7. Conclusion
The authorization framework declarative_authorization aims to improve authorization usabil-
ity through increased participation of and interaction between perspectives in authorization. Firstly,
it supports policy making by integrating functional staff into the process, providing a comprehensi-
ble authorization model and policy language, and supporting tools, including change support. We
explored the strengths and weaknesses of different modes of policy management and the model in
formative evaluations with practitioners, contrasting textual and graphical representations and the
change-support tool:
Q13.1 How effective are editing support and other supporting tools in integrating functional, policy
making, and authoring perspectives? The study indicated how difﬁcult and inefﬁcient it can
be to directly interact with textual policies in certain contexts – for instance, when policy
authors only seldom need to change the policy (P8). It was shown how additional modes of
policy management can improve the policy comprehensibility and reduce the cognitive load for
identifying change options and their consequences (P2). Adequate supporting tools may not
only increase the authors’ feeling of security and the precision of consequences (concreteness,
P3), but also allow them to focus on the main task – the communication and negotiation of
changes –, and to ofﬂoad responsibility to the tool to a certain extent (P1). As formulated
in the recommendations (cf. Section 7.3.5), supporting tools need to account for the speciﬁc
context, support the policy author’s and maker’s problem-solving strategy, and improve the
user experience to successfully support the editing and the interaction between stakeholders.
In future work, we should extend the research on the semantics of permissions. For change
support, the cognitive gap between the system permissions and the author’s or maker’s mental
model of the application needs to be bridged. One approach could be to couple the change
support more tightly to the application for easier selection of the desired permissions that are
to be modiﬁed (cf. Karp and Stiegler, 2010). Explaining denials of authorization decisions
could offer another starting point (Q14.1: Becker and Nanz, 2008; Bonatti et al., 2006).
A rather technical challenge that needs to be further explored is the scalability of the graphi-
cal representation and the change-support algorithm. For example, to improve the relevance
of change-support suggestions, the risks and beneﬁts of the suggestions could be estimated
(Q11.1, Q11.2, cf. Chapter 10). Finally, the evaluation of the modes of policy management
needs to be extended by studying their applicability in a broader range of contexts and their
impact in practical settings on actual change requests in organizations.
4http://rubygems.org
5http://github.com/stffn/declarative_authorization
6http://groups.google.com/group/declarative_authorization
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Q8.1 How do policy authors interact with policy makers and functional staff for implementing
changes? / Q7.2 How can different perspectives cooperate for effective and efﬁcient reviews?
Adequate representations and supporting tools showed to be useful to make the policy more
comprehensible and easier to modify when the representations ﬁt the context (P8). While re-
views were not the focus of the studies, we can expect that the problem-solving approach will
differ between conducting reviews and enacting changes – but also need to be adequately sup-
ported according to the context. The ﬁndings indicate that it can be dangerous or inefﬁcient if
basic tasks, such as establishing the inheritance hierarchy, require an excessive amount of cog-
nitive effort. However, even though adequate means may lower the threshold of participation,
the ﬁndings also indicated that integrating with policy makers can be generally problematic
in some contexts due to low technical afﬁnity. There are also general problems with policy
comprehensibility – for instance, due to the policy semantics – that threaten the effective man-
agement and integration of perspectives (P2, P1).
Q12.1 What are the complexity characteristics of authorization models and how do the characteris-
tics inﬂuence policy making and authoring? Only a few of the reported problems related to
the authorization model. For instance, participants had problems to understand the concept
of the role inheritance and of the distinction between user–role and role–permission assign-
ment. However, the problems with the comprehensibility of the policy and the consequences
of changes were caused to a larger extent by the semantics of the permissions and the inadequa-
cies of the management modes (P2). Since the conducted empirical work only touched upon
the aspects of the model and language usability, these aspects need a further thorough eval-
uation in future work to identify the speciﬁc factors that impact the policy comprehensibility
(Q12.1) and how this relates to the model’s expressiveness (Q12.2).
The second usability perspective that the framework targets is the development perspective. The
framework was designed to support efﬁcient modiﬁcations of the policy and of program code with en-
forcement controls. It implements a separation of concerns so that authorization requirement changes
only require a limited amount of enforcement changes – and functional changes only require minimal
policy changes. The in-depth case study of software development with the authorization framework
in Section 7.5 resulted in a number of ﬁndings:
Q15.1 How can the integration of authorization measures be supported in practical systems devel-
opment? The separation of concerns between the policy and the enforcement reduced the
necessary changes to the program code from policy changes, thus reducing the overall imple-
mentation effort and better suiting the dynamic environment (P2, P7). However, even a frame-
work that implements a loose coupling between policy and enforcement can incur enforcement
changes for reasons that are purely related to authorization – for example, in transitional peri-
ods or when the enforcement statements need to become more speciﬁc. Research is needed to
identify ways of further reducing the dependencies between policy and enforcement and thus
the authorization logic in program code.
Q15.2 How can the different perspectives interact for more effective and efﬁcient controls integration?
Through the loose coupling of policy and enforcement, the developers were less dependent on
early and stable requirements, both in case of the policy and the system functionality. Thus, the
system and the policy could evolve over time with intensive interaction based on experiences
with the actual system (P1). In future research, we can further study this relation between the
interaction of developers with policy makers and the development work.
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8. The ﬂexibility of social controls: Policy
Override
The ﬁrst was never to accept anything as true
that I did not clearly know to be such; that is to
say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and
prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my
judgement than what was presented to my mind
so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground
of doubt.
Descartes: Discourse on the Method (1637)1
In The Use of Knowledge in Society, Hayek (1945) argues that in economies, the information for
making choices is present locally on the spot and not centrally where the plans usually are made2.
Similarly, many decisions about authorization restrictions are made far from the functional staff’s
workplaces where those decisions impact authorization usability from the functional perspective,
when, for example, they interfere with the primary tasks in an organization (cf. Section 4.4).
Even if the functional staff participate in the authoring of authorization policies, staff typically
only take common processes into account and cannot anticipate exceptions to the rule or future orga-
nizational changes. In practice, every once in a while, users need privileges that are not assigned at
the time to complete the work at hand (cf. Authorization Problems Study, Chapter 5). According to
Sinclair et al. (2008), reasons are the dynamic organizational processes and the organizational com-
plexities that cause frequently changing authorization requirements. Depending on the procedures
for policy changes and organizational security policies, inadequate permissions bring functional staff
into uncomfortable situations of deciding whether to comply with the security policy (Beautement
et al., 2008). According to the Authorization Problems Study, complying with the security policies
leaves them with the following options:
• Follow the organizational procedures to have the privileges extended – while appropriate for
longer-term changes in organizational processes, the lead time for the permission change may
be too long for time-critical tasks, the effort for the change process may be overly high for
one-time requirements, and secondary security risks arise from the accumulation of over-
entitlements (Sinclair et al., 2008),
• Turn to coworkers with the necessary privileges who then conduct the task in their name –
inefﬁcient, since identifying permitted users can be time-consuming and the identiﬁed user
needs to switch context to validate and complete the task,
• Ignore the task, for example, due to the level of frustration with long-running change proce-
dures – thereby possibly causing a severe impact on the organization’s business goals.
1Descartes (1850, p. 61)
2This chapter is based on two publications: the policy-override model was ﬁrst proposed at SIN 2010 (Bartsch, 2010b),
the evaluation in practice appeared in an earlier form in Wiley’s Security and Communication Networks (Bartsch,
2012).
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As Beautement et al. (2008) argue with the Compliance Budget model, the decision of whether to
comply is, among others, governed by the security motivation and previous effort to comply. Accord-
ingly, the consistent compliance in this kind of cases will require additional motivational measures,
such as awareness campaigns, or result in less compliant personnel in the long run. For authoriza-
tion usability issues, the affected stakeholders typically have several options of non-compliance that
have drawbacks from the organization’s point of view. Two frequent examples of the several that we
observed in the Authorization Problems Study are the following:
• Socially circumvent the security measure and request the credentials of a permitted user to im-
personate that user in the system – a practice that undermines the traceability of activities, may
affect the organization’s compliance to regulations, and can have uncontrollable consequences,
• Evade the restrictions by technically circumventing the information system, for example, using
email rather than a document management system to share information – often inefﬁcient,
since this causes redundant copies of documents and incurring additional risks from the loss
of control of the data.
In terms of the authorization requirements, the aforementioned problems relate to the overall se-
curity effectiveness and efﬁciency (Req 1), the measure’s interference with functional work (Req 2),
and the impacts on employee satisfaction (Req 4). To address problems with circumventions, we also
need to adequately design the measure (Q5.2, Req 5). Can we achieve more ﬂexible authorization
that matches the ﬂexibility of social controls?
One approach is to reconsider the authorization paradigm and take both the least-privilege prin-
ciple (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975) as known from conventional authorization schemes as well as
the most-tolerable privilege into account. To these ends, Sikkel and Stiemerling (1998) describe
a physical approach that allows users to cope with exceptional situations by placing an enveloped
super-user password in a safe. Similarly, ﬂexibility of authorization in information systems can
also be increased by not entirely deﬁning restrictions a priori. Jones and Rastogi (2004) name four
forms of controls (corrective, deterrent, detective and preventive), which may be used to support the
practice of informal delegation with formal bounds and safeguards. For example, a speeding-ticket
analogy can be employed to reduce the improper use of authorization (Zhao and Johnson, 2009).
Povey (2000) calls these ﬂexible approaches optimistic security.
According to Stevens and Wulf (2002), authorization approaches can be categorized as the tradi-
tional ex ante, deﬁned in advance, as well as ex post, decided after the activity, and uno tempore,
deciding just-in-time. Ex-post authorization can be implemented through system activity auditing
(Cederquist et al., 2007; Jajodia et al., 1995; Røstad and Edsberg, 2006). The prohibitively high au-
diting effort prevents a wide-spread usage of audit-only authorization. However, in combination with
explicit authorization override, the optimistic authorization approach may be viable. The override
models establish a soft boundary at the normal least-privilege privilege extent and a hard boundary at
the most-tolerable privilege extent, thus implementing both the need-to-know and the must-not-know
principle (Badger, 1990; Rissanen et al., 2004; Cheng et al., 2007). While speciﬁc models exist – at
times called Policy Override, Authorization Escalation, or Break-glass mechanisms – little research
has been conducted on how they can be successfully implemented in organizational practice.
This chapter addresses the challenges how to employ policy override in practice: The chapter de-
scribes a model and an implementation of policy override for the declarative_authorization
framework (cf. Chapter 7). Both are evaluated in the context of an SME Web application for insights
on the effects of policy override. The primary interest lies in how useful the ﬂexibility of the model
is in practice (Q12.3, Req 12). Moreover, we discuss how the mechanism can support the authoriza-
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tion measure, for example, by bridging the gap between functional staff and policy makers (Q14.1,
Req 14), and how policy makers can be supported in monitoring the use of policy override (Req 7).
8.1. Prior work on policy override
8.1.1. Earlier practical application
Policy override is an authorization mechanism that is already in use in health care applications. Ac-
cordingly, most literature on practical experience with override and its implementation is from health
care environments. Denley and Smith (1999) report on the experience from implementing override
as addition to other authorization mechanisms in clinical information system. Medical personnel not
previously connected to a patient is presented with a warning that an override action is possible but
will be logged. They report about 50 override actions a day, mostly from less computerized staff.
Røstad and Edsberg (2006) analyzed the audit logs of a clinical information system’s policy over-
ride. The system has predeﬁned reasons for override and the user may access the document for set
periods. The study states a very high usage frequency of override mechanisms with records of over
50% of patients in contact in the study timespan being accessed in override mode. The high count
of override accesses suggests that no appropriate auditing is possible. There also is a U.S. HIPAA
(Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) document on the usage of policy override in
health care (HIPAA, 2009).
Longstaff et al. (2000) describe a complex UML electronic health record model as an enhancement
of UK’s Healthcare Model with RBAC3-styled authorization as deﬁned by Sandhu et al. (1996).
For the case of patients not able to communicate or not willing to cooperate in a risky treatment,
policy override is available to access conﬁdential information with logging and automatic notiﬁcation
of clinical governance and the patients’ general practitioner. Two different types of override are
described: speciﬁc override, which allows access only to the parts that the user would have been able
to read in his role, if the user had a connection to the patient. The second type is general override,
permitting access to all information in a patient’s electronic record.
Outside of healthcare institutions, Stevens and Wulf (2002) report on an authorization case study at
a steel mill that analyzes inter-organizational cooperation and competition from a CSCW perspective.
From the results of the study, they implemented an authorization scheme that allows to authorize
access manually or in retrospect, but do not evaluate its application.
Thus, the small body of literature on the practical application of policy override is limited to one
speciﬁc domain: health care. Since policy override entails additional risks for organizations, it is
vital for the organizations to weigh the risks against potential gains. This consideration is rather
straight-forward for hospital health-care information systems with the high potential gain of saving
life. For other environments, the decision is not as clear-cut because organizations need to balance a
possibly increased insider threat against the reduced interferences from authorization with functional
work. This chapter thus aims to provide insights on when and how policy override is appropriate and
beneﬁcial.
8.1.2. Existing models
Further literature on policy override discusses speciﬁc models and mechanisms. Badger (1990) pro-
posed a formalism for the recovery of a system from the state of override in a mandatory access
control system. The mechanism allows to relax constraints of the policy and reports in detail which
parts of the policy was violated while in the state of override. Povey (2000) introduces policy over-
ride as Optimistic Security and formulates requirements. One of those requirements is a mechanism
153
8. The ﬂexibility of social controls: Policy Override
for reverting illegitimate actions in retrospect. His approach is a formal database model of trans-
actions based on the Clark-Wilson integrity model for guaranteeing system integrity. Jajodia et al.
(1995) suggest a formal model for auditing transactions in databases.
Ferreira et al. (2009) propose an obligation-based policy override approach. Brucker and Petritsch
(2009) model policy override for XACML with SecureUML, including a low and high emergency
mode. Cheng et al. (2007) analyze the economic aspects of access governance to propose an adap-
tive, risk-based authorization mechanism. They use risk quantiﬁcation for risk/beneﬁt analysis with
“risk credit lines.” Based on Multi Layer Security (MLS), the Fuzzy MLS system has hard and soft
authorization boundaries to enact the appropriate amount of authorization. Instead of quantifying
risk, Zhao and Johnson (2009) employ a game-theoretical approach to model incentives in policy
override authorization. They discuss information governance and a speeding ticket analogy to en-
force the proper employment of override possibilities by users. The details of the game theory model
are described in Zhao and Johnson (2008).
Johnson et al. (2009) take on an economic perspective as well and compare the effects of strict and
centrally-managed ﬁle access control with the failures of centrally-planned economies. They give
a comprehensive overview of possible consequences of strict policies and argue that some control
over authorization should be left with the individual document owner. They deﬁned the requirements
ownership, freedom of delegation, transparency, dependability, and minimization of friction. As a
natural user interface, Johnson et al. designed the delegation by the email sending metaphor, but
have problems when implementing it in the Windows shared folder domain. Their approach differs
in that they simplify delegation, which is sufﬁcient for ﬁle sharing as there is at least one person
involved who already possesses read permissions. However, authorization override is more global in
its application scope and is not limited to ﬁle sharing.
Rissanen et al. (2004) also propose adding override to authorization mechanisms and offer an
algorithm to identify users responsible for auditing policy overrides. Lastly, Cederquist et al. (2007)
describe a formal audit-based authorization mechanism that requires justiﬁcations from users. The
domain of their approach is similar to Johnson et al.’s in that users directly interact with each other.
Cederquist et al. show the framework’s viability through an example from a consultancy ﬁrm.
The models and mechanisms in the referenced works are rather complex and tend to involve addi-
tional factors, such as the quantiﬁcation of risks. However, to apply policy override in practice, the
complexity may be hindering and make it even more difﬁcult to estimate the consequences of policy
override. Thus, we aim to reduce the complexity of the model in this chapter and only minimally
extend the well-known RBAC model.
8.2. A simple policy-override model and implementation
When creating an application’s authorization policy, policy makers may conduct interviews as well
as task and process analysis to identify functional needs. Figure 8.1 shows an abstract example of a
role’s requirements lightly shaded on the left side. Depending on the effort and the analysis approach,
the resulting authorization requirements may or may not be accurate. In the ﬁgure, the actual needs
are shown with a dotted line.
The next step for policy makers is to formalize permissions from the authorization requirements.
In most cases, the permissions will not exactly match the requirements, since authorization models
are typically coarse when compared to the identiﬁed requirements due to the abstractions in the
model. The default permissions are shown as white area in Figure F.2. In conventional authorization
models, the individual has to cope with these permissions. As stated in the introduction, for any
missing permissions in daily routine or exceptional situations the individual needs to request changes
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Figure 8.1.: Abstract example of a role’s hard and soft boundary
or circumvent authorization.
When using an application that supports policy override, the functional staff may have the ad-
ditional option of overriding denied permissions. This integrates functional staff into the policy
making of their individual permissions (P1). As proposed by Cheng et al. (2007), we introduce a
soft boundary as an addition to the hard boundary in conventional authorization models. As shown
in Figure 8.1, the soft boundary separates the default permissions from those that can be gained
by overriding the policy. The overriding of the policy offers the ﬂexibility necessary for dynamic
environments (P7).
Policy override reduces the burden of the policy makers and authors to adapt the default per-
missions for exceptional cases (P2). It also fosters “rational” staff behavior and offers a convenient
alternative to circumvention (P5). Any activity in override may be subject to more scrutiny than stan-
dard activities, for example, through logging and auditing. The logging as organizational and further
social controls should limit the use of override when not actually necessary, combining technical and
non-technical approaches (P4).
The hard boundary marks the limit of privileges gainable through policy override. Anything
beyond the hard boundary is thought to be of too high risk to allow the speciﬁc role to have access to
it. Note that it may be appropriate to disallow any override for certain roles so that the hard and soft
boundary are identical.
8.2.1. Authorization model
To implement policy override, the authorization model needs to be adapted. The authorization model
used here is based on a conventional RBAC model with hierarchies, RBAC1, after Sandhu et al.
(1996), which is comprised of the following elements:
• User, representing the principal requesting access; Role, grouping speciﬁc functions of users;
Permission, allowing access to objects; and the Session of a user acting in a system
• Assignments of permissions to roles: PA ⊆ Permission×Role
• Assignments of users to roles: UA ⊆User×Role
• Role hierarchy, that is, roles inheriting permissions from ancestor roles, as a partial order
RH ⊆ Role×Role, with role dominance, denoted by the symbol ≥
• Junior roles, that is, all roles transitively inheriting from a given role:
JuniorRoles : (Role,Session)→ P (Role), with (r,s) 	→ {r′|r ≥ r′}
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• The session’s user: SessionUser : Session → User
• The session’s activated roles: SessionRoles : Session → P (Role), with
SessionRoles(s)⊆{r | ∃r′[r ∈ JuniorRoles(r′,s)∧ (SessionUser(s),r′) ∈ UA]}
• The permissions of the user in the current session: SessionPermissions : Session→P (Permission),
with
s 	→{p | (p,r) ∈ PA ∧ r ∈ ∪r′∈SessionRoles(s)JuniorRoles(r′,s)}
To implement policy override, an additional role relation is introduced to deﬁne to which roles a
user may extend his privileges. This Override Roles relation is then used to modify the available
roles that can be activated when the session is in override mode:
• Override roles: OR⊆ Role×Role is a relation that deﬁnes to which role the holder of the ﬁrst
role may extend her privilege in case of override
• IsOverrideMode : Session→ bool is a predicate that indicates whether a user has activated the
override mode on a speciﬁc session
• JuniorRoles is redeﬁned to return roles in the override hierarchy if the override mode is active
for the current session:
(r,s) 	→
{ {r′ | r ≥ r′ ∨ ∃r′′[(r′′,r′) ∈ OR∧ r ≥ r′′]}, if IsOverrideMode(s)
{r′ | r ≥ r′}, else
The policy override modiﬁcations do not affect authorization constraints, which are enforced as
usual and are for brevity not included in the deﬁnition.
8.2.2. Implementation in the authorization framework
To implement the policy override model in declarative_authorization, introduced in the pre-
vious chapter, two steps are necessary. First, the authorization model and policy language need to
support the override options. Second, the decisioning needs to take the override options into account.
For the model modiﬁcation, the original authorization model, shown in Figure 7.2, was only slightly
extended. As depicted in Figure 8.2, override roles may now be assigned to the roles. Users that
are assigned to a role can thus override to any override role of the originally assigned role, including
the role inheritance. The override option is not transitive so that, when the policy is represented as a
graph, only one override edge can be on any path from the user to a permissions.
In the declarative_authorization policy language, the keyword overridable_to is added to
the available statements in the roles block. This statement represents the override edge between the
role that is to be extended and the override role. In the example in Listing 8.1, conference organizers
can override to the permissions of the administrator role, which allows them to modify system users.
This might, for example, be useful to allow the quick modiﬁcation of speakers in urgent cases.
In decisioning, the main modiﬁcation is to have an override status for the session, which is honored
in each decision. In the override case, overridable roles of directly assigned roles as well as of
inherited roles are added to the available roles and are handled as if assigned to the current user.
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Figure 8.2.: declarative_authorization model, extended for policy override
Listing 8.1: Policy override example in authorization rules
1 au tho r i z a t i on do
2 r o l e :administrator do
3 has_permiss ion_on :users , : to => :manage
4 end
5
6 r o l e :conference_organizer do
7 ov e r r i dab l e _ t o :administrator
8 has_permiss ion_on :conferences , : to => :manage
9 has_permiss ion_on :conference_attendees , : to => :manage
10 has_permiss ion_on :talks , : to => :manage
11 end
12 end
8.3. Policy override in practice
In case of innovative security measures, such as optimistic security and policy override authoriza-
tion, practical experience with the technology in actual organizational contexts is crucial to judge
the approaches’ appropriateness and guide further research. However, the existing publications on
the experience with policy override mechanisms and auditing is still limited to only a few domains
(Røstad and Edsberg, 2006), discussed in Section 8.1. The aim of the evaluation in this section thus
is twofold. Firstly, the evaluation should enhance the understanding of employing policy override in
business Web applications of small and medium enterprises. Secondly, the evaluation should show
the viability of the above-described policy override model. To pursue both aims, we implemented
policy override through an extension to declarative_authorization in the business Web appli-
cation described in Section 7.5. Apart from the changes in the decisioning and the policy, three
application-speciﬁc implementation tasks had to be completed:
• Implementation of an override activation mechanism: We opted to place a well-visible button
with the German label “Ausnahme-Modus” (“Exception mode”) in the top navigation area of
the Web application. When in override mode, the background of the header bar is colored red
to signal the exceptional state.
• Implementation of an auditing mechanism: We extended the existing application log viewer to
display the activities in override and, thus, support the task of auditing override sessions. An
additional ﬁlter option allows the supervisor to limit the displayed actions to those in override
mode.
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• Signaling the override sessions to the supervisor for review: The task management infras-
tructure in the application displays a symbol for pending tasks in the top area of the Web
application. We add a task for each override case to users with a speciﬁc role in the branch of
the user who entered the override mode.
8.3.1. Study design
For similar reasons as for the Authorization Problems Study (cf. Section 5.1.1), we conduct this
study as case study: First, only one organization was available as a study object; second, an in-depth
analysis of the phenomena is more important than the generalization of the results. We combined
quantitative and qualitative research for the practical evaluation of the model and implementation
(cf. Section 5.1.1). First, we quantitatively analyzed the application log that records the activities in
the Web application and speciﬁcally marks the override activities (objective empirical data, cf. Sec-
tion 2.5). The analyzed log spans the calendar year 2010. The override options were implemented
at different times for different roles but all well before the start of 2010. Its implementation was
communicated to functional users together with other functionality changes. From this source, we
derive quantitative data on the affected users and actions together with the proportion in policy over-
ride mode. Since each HTTP request causes a raw action entry, the action quantities may be skewed
from the different counts of HTTP requests that depend on the individual task in the application. As
a consequence, we group the raw actions into activities by user and day, providing an alternative
representation of how frequently override is used. The quantitative results should provide a good
overview of the usage of policy override. Since policy override should only be necessary for tem-
porary authorization inadequacies or exceptional situations, the hypothesis is that individual users
employ policy override sparsely only (HPO1).
The second source is qualitative: Five affected stakeholders were interviewed on their experience,
both users employing override and a superior responsible for acknowledging the use of policy over-
ride (subjective, empirical case study, cf. Section 2.5). The sampling is based on the quantitative
results and includes the different kinds of users as identiﬁed by their assigned roles and override
usage proﬁles. The short, semi-structured interviews of about 15 minutes were analyzed from audio
recordings and notes for each interviewee. The interviews with functional users focused on (1) the
reasons for employing policy override and (2) the consequences that they drew from using it. The
hypotheses are that users employ override for temporary authorization inadequacies and exceptional
situations (HPO2) and that users strive to have authorization inadequacies changed and exceptional
situations better handled in the application if they recur (HPO3).
For the superior, the questions involve (1) the practice of acknowledging override situations and
(2) consequences from the superior’s perspective. For this perspective, the hypotheses are that the
superiors can adequately judge whether employing override is reasonable (HPO4) and that they will
try and reduce the number of override occurrences by discussions with the users, changes of the
business process, or modiﬁcations of the authorization policy or functionality of the application
(HPO5).
To ensure the validity of the results, we need to consider the quality of the study design (Sec-
tion 5.1.1, Yin, 2009). Regarding the construct and internal validity, we chose to analyze both ob-
jective quantitative and additional qualitative interview data to ensure the causality. For the external
validity, the interviewees, whereas small were chosen to represent the different kinds of override
users in the case study. The setting of the case study was speciﬁc to business Web applications
and the domain of SMEs so that the generalizability is primarily limited to this domain. Lastly,
the reliability was ensured by evaluating objective data in a well-described way. Thus, even if the
generalizability of the study is limited, the rich exploratory results can inform the development of
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By users In Of those 2nd half Of those
with over- override w/override with over- 2nd half w/override
Total ride option mode option ride option in override option
Act. users 46 26 9 34.6% 22 8 36.4%
Activities 2713 2145 150 7.0% 1030 149 14.5%
Actions 534735 488373 47830 9.8% 249483 47787 19.2%
Table 8.1.: Quantitative analysis of activity and action log
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Figure 8.3.: Override use in comparison to normal use over time
policy-override implementations.
8.3.2. Quantitative analysis
The quantitative analysis should provide an answer to the questions who used policy override how
often and when. Table 8.1 shows the quantities of usage of users, activities and actions. Of the 46
total active users in the period, 26 had the option of using override, of whom one third actually used
override. Surprisingly, of the activities and actions by users with the option to enact override, 7%
and 10% were conducted in override mode, respectively. The proportions roughly double when only
considering the second half of 2010. In contrast to HPO1, these results indicate that override was
used not only in exceptional cases but as a convenient option to complete the daily tasks.
The results of concentrated use in the second half require further analysis. In Figure 8.3, the
weekly use of override is compared to normal use with lines for proportions and points for action
quantities. The chart shows that, indeed, all signiﬁcant override activities occurred in the second half
of the year, although the total usage of the system remained similar to the ﬁrst half. Moreover, from
week 26 onwards, the proportion of override use is, apart from a few spikes, constantly hovering
around 20% of actions.
The last approach to the quantitative analysis is a closer look at the distribution among the users
who employed the override mode, as shown in Table 8.2. Secretary F and Operator A can be excluded
from the analysis since the action counts indicate that they entered it accidentally or only tested the
override mode. From the other users, we can make out one project manager (B) and four secretaries
with signiﬁcant proportions of override activity. Another secretary and project manager sporadically
used policy override.
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Total Override
Pseudonym activities actions activities actions
Project Manager A* 75 3633 1 1.3% 43 1.2%
Project Manager B 115 1645 5 4.3% 60 3.6%
Secretary A* 237 77495 2 0.8% 12 0.0%
Secretary B* 246 99509 22 8.9% 6133 6.2%
Secretary C 34 12050 5 14.7% 573 4.8%
Secretary D* 246 54358 70 28.5% 26008 47.8%
Secretary E 134 45161 43 32.1% 14994 33.2%
Secretary F 23 6260 1 4.3% 2 0.0%
Operator A 2 6 1 50.0% 5 83.3%
Table 8.2.: Override activities and actions by user
8.3.3. Qualitative analysis
For an analysis of the reasons behind the surprisingly intensive usage of policy override by individual
users and how the superiors judged the override usage, ﬁve stakeholders were interviewed. Four of
the interviewees were override users from different branches, marked with an asterisk in Table 8.2,
and one was a superior, responsible for acknowledging the override use in one branch.
Secretary D stated that her override usage began with a short-term vacation replacement on short
notice for colleagues at a different branch. Normally, she would not have the necessary permissions
for the tasks at the other branch, so she used the override mode. Although the vacation replacement
ended, she continued to ﬁll in for the other branch because of the high workload there. Since no
appropriate role for the access to multiple branches existed, an alternative would have been for her
to use multiple logins. Switching logins is quite a hassle, though, so she preferred the override
mode for quickly completing tasks at different branches. Other exceptional situations for her to use
the override mode are, for example, when the responsible project manager is not in the branch and
certain tasks need to be completed quickly. Interestingly, she uses secondary credentials of project
managers for these tasks despite the possibility of using override for those. She did not know that the
override mode would also apply there and does “not have the time to experiment to ﬁnd that out”.
She also stated that she “just used it and it’s OK”, fearing that any consequences from the recurring
override usage would impact her productivity.
The reasons for Secretary B are similar, generally using the override mode “as ﬁll-in” for other
branches and to not “log out and in again” for cases for which she has a secondary login. While
she did not remember to have explicitly discussed the override usage, she had, in fact, indicated to a
superior that it would make sense to receive permissions to all branches. But policy override is “an
alternative to that” so that she did not further pursue the request.
Secretary A’s override usage override is closer to the original intention of policy override. As the
quantitative analysis shows, she only used policy override in two occasions. She says that normally,
she is “not missing any permissions” in daily work and only used policy override for convenience to
create a new user for which she would else have needed to turn to her superior. From her perspective,
many “normal” users should not have all permissions in override and “rummage wildly around the
system or change things,” though. For her, it is difﬁcult to assess the risks. Project Manager A
has a similar override usage pattern with only one activity in the studied period. In his case, the
application would not allow task assignments to arbitrary users, but only to those with speciﬁc roles,
and adding roles to users is only allowed to administrators. By using the override mode, he was
able to assign the role. Subsequently, the functionality was changed to not require the additional role
to be assigned. For him the positive side is that the override mode allows more ﬂexibility without
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generally loosening the restrictions.
In an interview with one branch manager who was in charge of acknowledging the override activ-
ities, he could largely recall who used the override mode and for what reasons. He was aware that
some functional users employed override already over a long time regularly and stated that with “so
many actions, it is difﬁcult to relate them and evaluate whether the actions are OK.” This also per-
tained the difﬁculty of estimating the risks. While acknowledging works ﬁne generally, it is difﬁcult
for him to review the speciﬁc actions that are taken in override mode. The review tool would need
to better summarize the activities to allow effective reasoning. Moreover, he said that the original
aim was to “look at the override usage and draw consequences from it” but with the large number of
acknowledgments, he got accustomed and did not “pay attention to it anymore.”
8.3.4. The consequences of inadequate organization
From the quantitative and qualitative analysis, we can observe two ways in which policy override
was used in the studied application. One was for exceptional situations when, for example, the re-
sponsible user was not present and a task needed to be completed quickly, in line with the hypothesis
HPO2. For these cases, the main challenge for the users was to understand which activities they
can conduct in override mode. In other cases, the application functionality was not prepared for
changes in the workﬂow, so that the override mode helped until the functionality was changed. The
second general way of employing override was the intensive and regular usage over a long period
without modiﬁcations being pursued to remedy the situation, contradicting HPO2, HPO3 and HPO5,
but without malicious misuse. Superiors became accustomed to the acknowledgments. Functional
users did not have any incentives to require changes either, even fearing that their productivity could
be impacted by any changes. Also, no harm was seen in using override, although superiors invested
considerable effort in acknowledging override activities. Acknowledging the speciﬁcs of override
activities was difﬁcult, partly contradicting HPO4. Superiors need a good review tool that summa-
rizes override activities for better evaluation. Similarly, the responsible person needs to estimate the
risks and beneﬁts from override.
Overall, the study shows a mixed result on the use of policy override. The mechanism certainly
came in handy for functional staff to complete work in exceptional situations, thereby increasing
productivity of the staff and resulting in less need for policy changes. However, because of the
organizational inadequacies surrounding the mechanism, it was used far too often and in ways not
originally foreseen – even though not maliciously –, potentially increasing the risk to the system to
an unexpected level.
8.3.5. Recommendations on the implementation of policy override
From the results of the policy override evaluation, we recommend to pay attention to the following
aspects when deploying policy override in applications:
• Awareness for appropriate override usage and availability: We, for example, saw in the study
how staff used override excessively and, conversely, was unaware of override options. Ac-
cordingly, we need to improve users’ awareness for when using policy override is appropriate
to inﬂuence their behavior (P6, P5). Similarly, users need to understand which additional
activities are available in override mode, for example, through visualization in the application.
• Adequate tool support: Policy makers, for example, had problems with the override-review
tool. We need to provide an adequate tool that summarizes the actions taken in an override
session in a comprehensible manner – enabling frequent use (P2, P7).
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• Organization for consequences: The study showed how override can become the normal mode
of operation. We, thus, need to make the provisions to guarantee that changes are enacted
when override use is recurring. There are multiple options to achieve this goal, including the
following:
– Technically through indications on which override reasons recur and thus require conse-
quences (P2),
– Technically through further measures that raise the awareness of hidden costs incurred
from repeated override use, such as an override budget that needs to be explicitly in-
creased by superiors when used up (P5, P6),
– Organizationally through procedures and responsibilities for reactions to recurrences
(P8), or,
– Through incentives for users to reduce the override usage (P5, cf. above).
The consequences from recurring override usage can involve the modiﬁcation of either the
application functionality, the authorization policy, or the business processes.
• Decision support: Participants saw problems in estimating the beneﬁt and risk from policy
override. We need to provide support for the estimation of these consequences from policy
override to support the decisions on the policies (P2)3.
8.4. Conclusion
Authorization ﬂexibility is one of the ways of increasing authorization usability for dynamic con-
texts (P7). The policy makers beneﬁt from a reduced workload from unnecessary policy changes
for exceptional cases and the functional staff are less often hindered in their daily tasks by overly
strict policies. This chapter presents a simple policy-override model and its implementation within
an authorization framework. We discussed the evaluation of one year of use of the model and imple-
mentation in the context of a business Web application at a medium-sized enterprise:
Q2.1 How disruptive are authorization measures with what characteristics and in what contexts, and
how can we reduce the disruptions or their impact? Policy override resulted in less interference
with the primary task for functional staff (Req 2). When responsible individuals were not
available, but time-critical tasks needed to be completed, the override mode helped (P2, P7) –
and allowed staff to participate in policy making by extending their permissions (P1). In this
way, policy override increased the ﬂexibility of authorization and reduced the gap to social
control. However, we also observed that staff need to be aware of when override is available
and appropriate. Accordingly, policy override cannot simplistically rely on social controls
that are already established in an environment. The technical mediation appears to hamper
the direct transferring of social controls from reality to the system. Instead, policy override
requires adequate organizational measures in addition to the technical mechanism. We need to
further explore these organizational measures in future research.
Q4.1 In what ways does the satisfaction of functional staff interrelate with functional disruptions,
security awareness and expertise, and organizational culture? / Q4.2 How is satisfaction
impacted for the authoring and making of policies? As a result of the reduced interference and
the more convenient ways of completing work, policy override was generally seen positively
3We demonstrate one approach to policy-override decision-support in Appendix F.
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by functional staff (Req 4, P5). Policy makers were less content with policy override, since
the high number of override events required a considerable amount of effort. They missed the
adequate tools that would enable efﬁcient and effective control over override activities (Req 4).
In future research, we should explore how the satisfaction of staff and policy makers changes
from a usage pattern as intended and effective and efﬁcient review tools, respectively.
Q1.1 What type of organization requires what authorization measure and what are the inﬂuencing
factors? For the observed case – a medium-sized enterprise with only a limited amount of
formal structure –, the study indicates a reduction of the overall effort expended for the autho-
rization measure due to less need for policy changes (P2, P7). This points to override being a
useful design aspect for these kinds of organizations. However, we also noticed the side effects
from the unintended usage pattern, potentially reducing the effectiveness of the authorization
measure (Req 1). Further research on the adequacy of policy override thus not only needs to
cover a broader range of organizational contexts, but also how improvements are affected from
a more intended usage pattern. We may then consider quantitative evaluation of the advantages
as well.
More speciﬁcally, a number of insights can be derived on acceptable circumventions (Req 5),
monitoring (Req 7), and model (Req 12) and mechanism usability (Req 14):
Q5.2 How must mitigations to undesirable circumventions be designed to be effective and efﬁcient?
Policy override was shown to be a viable way of reducing unintended and uncontrolled cir-
cumventions. Functional staff chose to use policy override rather than sharing passwords (P5).
However, the study also demonstrated how without adequate organizational measures, such
as procedures to react to override use and awareness building for when override is adequate,
override will be used in unintended ways.
Q7.4 How can problems with the authorization measure be extracted from activity logs? As we
observed in the study, the monitoring and review of policy-override activities was hindered
in its effectiveness by a lack of usability of the necessary tools (P2). As stated in the rec-
ommendations on override in practice, an adequate tool needs to summarize activities in a
comprehensible way for effectiveness and efﬁciency.
Q12.3 How effective are ﬂexible models in practice regarding security, exceptional situations, and
the reduction of disruptions? The study showed that the ﬂexibility brought about a number
of improvements for the authorization measure and its adequacy in case of changing business
processes and exceptional situations. However, it also requires accompanying measures to
ensure an overall gain in security effectiveness and efﬁciency.
Q14.1 How can the mechanism leverage the ﬂexibility of models, foster change requests, and integrate
functional staff with policy makers and authors? One problem for the use of policy override
was for the functional staff to realize in which situations override may be of help (P1). This
demonstrates that the mechanism needs to be appropriately integrated and provide the neces-
sary information. Future research needs to address how to visualize the additional possibilities
through override as part of the default user interface, for example, through explanations of
denials (Kapadia et al., 2004; Bonatti et al., 2006; Becker and Nanz, 2008).
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9. The twisted paths of obtaining permission:
Integrative authorization processes
HAL: This mission is too important for me to
allow you to jeopardize it.
Kubrick: 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968)
The Authorization Problems Study in Chapter 5 demonstrated that the adequacy of an authorization
measure depends to a large extent on the adequacy of the surrounding procedures for requesting
and granting permissions: The dynamics of organizations require the frequent adaption of the pol-
icy (Whalen et al., 2006). We saw that if the lead time or the effort for policy changes is too high,
functional staff might not request the changes, but rather fail to comply with the security policy (cf.
Beautement et al., 2008). This problem also recurred in the study on policy override in Chapter 8, in
which the lack of adequate processes created security risks due to missing reactions on the overuse
of policy override, and due to functional staff not requesting the necessary changes to the policy.
Similarly, Sinclair et al. (2008) described that entitlements often remain assigned despite organiza-
tional changes. Moreover, policy management can suffer from problems in the interaction of policy
makers and authors (Bauer et al., 2009). Thus, adequate authorization procedures are crucial for the
organizational productivity and security (Req 1).
However, we also observed in the Authorization Problems Study how diverse authorization con-
texts are, reﬂecting the characteristics of the organization and the information systems. Small,
informally-run companies beneﬁt from a small organizational overhead, while highly structured,
large enterprises require reliable, traceable processes. The problem is thus what the adequate form
of authorization measures is for a speciﬁc context (Q1.1) and how we can support its design (Q1.2).
It is particularly important to arrive at the adequate degree of formalization and centralization of the
authorization processes (Q10.1, Req 10). To keep the overhead at an acceptable level, it may be
necessary to integrate authorization processes with further IT management processes (Q10.3). As
indicated by the study on policy override, the threshold for functional staff needs to be low (Q9.1,
Req 9). For regulated contexts, process designers must consider how to fulﬁll regulatory require-
ments through adequate processes (Q3.2, Req 3).
A very important aspect is the interaction of the involved stakeholders: One reason for the prob-
lems in the policy-override study was that there was insufﬁcient interaction between functional staff,
and policy makers and authors. Similarly, Bauer et al. (2009) found that it can be problematic that
multiple stakeholders are involved and that the decisions on the policy are separated from the imple-
mentation (Q8.1, Req 8). Likewise, reviews need to be coordinated so that policy makers have the
necessary information to judge on the necessity of permissions (Q7.1, Q7.2, Req 7). This also relates
to the problem of how policy decisions are taken and by whom (Q6.1, Req 6).
The interaction is not only important between functional staff and policy makers and authors, but
also with developers (Q15.2, Req 15). The evaluation of the controls integration for the authorization
framework in Section 7.5 demonstrated that it is difﬁcult to achieve a complete separation of concerns
between enforcement and the policy, despite the framework’s loose-coupling approach. Flechais
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Figure 9.1.: Authorization development processes
and Sasse (2009) argue for security usability that all the different stakeholder perspectives need to
contribute their tacit knowledge for a usable measure.
Despite these challenges regarding the interactions, the ﬁeld of research on authorization is miss-
ing a broad and integrative perspective on the processes. Rather, the ﬁeld is often selectively focused
on developing policies or on the systems-engineering part of implementing authorization in systems.
Systems-development aspects are often seen only as one step in the policy-development process,
such as by Rees et al. (2003), instead of as a process in its own right. To improve the understanding
of authorization processes and foster the interaction of stakeholders with different perspectives, the
Integrative Authorization Development Model for Usability (INDUSE) is proposed in this chapter1.
This chapter begins by brieﬂy discussing existing authorization process models and how the ﬁeld
of organizational communication approaches processes. Subsequently, INDUSE is described through
authorization activities, interrelations, and the derived process deﬁnitions. We also consider how
INDUSE interacts with other IT management processes. Particularly, we study how well the model
applies to authorization processes in practice for a broad range of organizational contexts.
9.1. Authorization process models
There are several existing authorization development processes that exclusively focus on the policy
lifecycle and provide for speciﬁc aspects of the lifecycle at different management levels as depicted
in Figure 9.1. According to Dai and Alves-Foss (2002), the policy lifecycle encompasses the estab-
lishment, maintenance, and analysis on the tactical level as well as the speciﬁcation, reﬁnement, and
integration of policies on the operational level. Rees et al. (2003), instead, propose a framework for
the security policy lifecycle on the strategic level closer to business management, implementing a
Plan–Do–Check–Act cycle.
On a tactical level, but from an IT-operations perspective, the ITIL process “Access Manage-
ment” includes receiving and validating change requests, granting permissions, and monitoring the
operation (OGC, 2007c). Closer to operation is ISO/IEC 29146 “A framework for access manage-
ment”, which will focus on technical aspects of the policy management processes when completed
(ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 Secretariat, 2009). However, those approaches are too narrowly focused on
1This chapter is based on a publication in the proceedings of the International Conference on Network and Systems
Security (NSS 2011: Bartsch, 2011c), which has been revised and extended for inclusion here.
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the policy management to capture the full breadth of authorization procedures in practice and lack
the interrelation with functional users and systems development. Kern et al. (2002) deﬁne a lifecycle
for role-based authorization and consider the interrelation between stakeholders from administration
and development, albeit, on a technical level. More practical and even closer to the technical level,
Mönkeberg and Rakete (2000) describe a system and process for the management of roles for several
parallel systems.
General security-management processes have broader approaches, but consider authorization only
abstractly. ISO/IEC 27002:2005 (2005) provides guidance on achieving security goals in several ar-
eas, including access control and human-resources security2. In IT management, ITIL (OGC, 2007c)
and CobiT (IT Governance Institute, 2007) deﬁne processes and activities that can support authoriza-
tion management, for example, request fulﬁllment, incident/problem management, and conﬁguration
management.
On the development side, He and Antón (2009) suggested the integration of authorization policy
design in the systems-development and requirements-engineering process, but neglect to provide for
the authorization procedures as part of the operation of the system. As a more general process models
for secure systems development, SSE–CMM only touches upon authorization as part of the controls
to be implemented (ISSEA, 2003).
The discussed process models are either too abstract to adequately describe the actual interrela-
tions in authorization procedures in practice, or they focus on speciﬁc areas or technologies and,
thus, cannot support the analysis of the interrelation of different perspectives. Instead, an integrative
approach is required, as proposed with INDUSE.
9.2. Organizational communication
The interactions between different actors to request and change permissions are primarily necessary
due to the separation of different tasks in the process. Stakeholders with the functional perspective,
in general terms, may not grant the permissions to themselves, but need to request them, leading
to a number of steps until the permission is technically granted. We can distinguish two reasons
for this: First, since authorization is a means of enforcing authority, the assignment of permission
must obviously be separated from the use of the permission, often following the differentiation of
work into “managerial” and “labour,” one dimension of differentiation by Weber (1947). Second,
the process of changing permissions can be sufﬁciently complex that it requires specialist expertise.
Complexity of work leads, according to Smith (1776), to the differentiation of labor for increased
productivity. This differentiation requires coordination and integration of the tasks, leading, in turn,
to organization and the deﬁnition of processes (Monge and Contractor, 2000; Weber, 1947).
In Chapter 4, we predicted how the degree of differentiation and further characteristics of orga-
nizational conﬁgurations inﬂuence the authorization measure. In Chapter 5, we then observed in
the Authorization Problems Study the actual effects of the characteristics of authorization contexts:
Among other, formalization led to high change lead-times and decentralization to informal processes.
In organizational communication, Barnard (1938) considers informal organization as “the conditions
under which formal organization may arise” (p. 116). Despite this need of informal interactions to
base the more formal ones on, he also argues that “informal organization compels a certain amount
of formal organization, and probably cannot persist or become extensive without the emergence of
formal organization” (p. 117). Organizational communication research has pursued the importance
of informal and its relation to formal interaction extensively, for example, mapping email communi-
cation in organizations to formal structures (cf. Monge and Contractor, 2000). To similarly analyze
2The interrelation of INDUSE with related IT and security management processes is discussed in Section 9.4.
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Problems Problems Problems
F.1 18, 19 A.1 8, 18, 19 D.1 1, 2
F.2 18, 19 A.2 17 D.2 1, 2, 3
F.3 18, 19, 20 A.3 18, 19 D.3 5, 6
A.4 18, 19 D.4 6
A.5 18, 19, 20 D.5 6
Table 9.1.: Problems addressed by INDUSE activities (cf. Table 5.4)
the formality and centralization of authorization processes, we will start by identifying the activities
in processes surrounding authorization measures (the differentiation of work) with the associated
roles before we explore actual processes in practice.
9.3. INDUSE: An integrative authorization process model
INDUSE is a descriptive model of authorization procedures in organizations that focuses on the in-
terrelations between stakeholders and activities, fostering the participation of functional staff, policy
makers and authors, and developers (cf. Principle P1). It is derived from the authorization prob-
lems identiﬁed in Chapter 5, and from literature on concrete authorization activities and high-level
processes (cf. Sections 2.4.4 and 9.1).
INDUSE goes beyond the existing process models by offering both a broad, integrative perspec-
tive on the activities and the level of detail to effectively describe real-world authorization proce-
dures. INDUSE takes a software-engineering perspective on authorization: The model considers
the authorization policy an artifact that is adapted with the changing context, with policy defects
impacting productivity and security (cf. Chapter 3). The model follows agile development models
in that it emphasizes the integration of and communication between stakeholders, and the context-
speciﬁc tailorability of the process, covering light-weight as well as rather formal procedures (cf. P8,
Section 3.6; Highsmith, 2002). Through adequate procedures and improved interaction, the model
particularly aims to suit dynamic environments (P7).
In Figure 9.2, the INDUSE activities are shown for the stakeholder perspectives, indicating the
expected ﬂows of information between perspectives as interrelations (cf. Tables 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4).
The activities address the problems identiﬁed in Chapter 5 from the Authorization Problems Study
and relevant literature. As shown in Table 9.1, the activities address problems originating in the
development, policy authoring and making, and functional perspectives. Of these problems, only
Problem 4 (usability of the modiﬁcation tools) is out of scope of the activities, since these tools are
considered to be rather static. The problems of the organization, strategy, and tactics perspectives are
more generally covered by applying the INDUSE model (cf. Section 9.3.4).
The perspectives in Figure 9.2 are derived from the general perspectives on authorization (cf. Sec-
tion 4.4), with policy making and authoring combined into an administrative perspective for brevity.
Functional stakeholders primarily use information systems to complete work tasks. Administrative
stakeholders decide on and author policies. Developers integrate authorization in information sys-
tems. Security tactics and strategy perspectives are outside the scope of INDUSE, but can employ
the model to evaluate existing processes for potential improvements and comprehensiveness (cf.
Section 9.3.4). The activities are assembled into processes, such as, for example, separate systems-
development and policy-management processes, not necessarily adhering to a strict sequence of the
activities.
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Figure 9.2.: INDUSE activities and interrelations
F.1 → A.1 Task descriptions and security needs
F.2 → A.1 Policy decision problems
F.2 → A.4 Policy speciﬁcation problems
F.2 → D.4 Defects related to decisioning and enforcement
F.3 → A.5 Indications of inadequate restrictions
Table 9.2.: Information ﬂows from the functional activities
9.3.1. Functional activities
F.1. Deﬁne security needs
To enable well-founded decisions on what permissions to grant, functional stakeholders need to
provide information on the security needs of resources, including who requires the availability of
resources to carry out functional tasks and how critical the integrity and conﬁdentiality of the re-
sources are (ISSEA, 2003)3. Eliciting the needs can be supported through task analysis (Hollnagel,
2006) and should also take the system’s purpose and the legal context into account (ISSEA, 2003).
According to ISO/IEC 27002:2005 (2005), business requirements for authorization include the risks
that information is facing, relevant legislation, contractual obligations, and general compliance re-
quirements.
3Compare the deﬁnition of security needs as part of the Authorization Taxonomy in Section 4.1.
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A.1 → A.2 Policy decisions
A.2 → A.3 Policy design
A.2 → D.1 Model expressiveness requirements for policy design
A.3 → A.2 Problems with policy design
A.3 → A.4 Policy speciﬁcation
A.3 → D.3 Speciﬁc requirements on controls architecture
A.3 → D.4 Speciﬁc requirements on provisioning and controls
A.4 → A.1 Problems with decisions
A.4 → A.2 Policy design problems
A.4 → A.3 Policy speciﬁcation problems
A.5 → A.4 General authorization problems
A.5 → F.3 Dissemination and disciplinary measures
Table 9.3.: Information ﬂows from the administrative activities
F.2. Functionally assure authorization
Functional stakeholders can be integrated into the assurance (in contrast to administrative assurance
in A.4) and assess whether policy changes are adequate concerning their primary tasks, functionally
assuring changes (ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005). Typical means are acceptance tests (Boehm, 1988)
and reviews of authorization policies, either as a sign-off step in the process or in regular self-reviews
(cf. Sinclair et al., 2008). Information on discovered defects need to ﬂow into administrative and
development activities, as listed in Table 9.2.
F.3. Functionally operate systems
The goal of functional stakeholders is to complete their primary tasks. The functional operation
enables them to cope with interference from authorization measures, for example, when they are
unable to complete a task because of missing permissions, and provides efﬁcient and effective ways
to address the problems, for example, through change requests. In certain contexts, the efﬁciency
losses due to inadequate authorization policies can be reduced by implementing more ﬂexible au-
thorization models. This includes delegation mechanisms that allow staff to grant the permissions
to those usually not permitted (Ahn et al., 2003; Brucker et al., 2009). Policy override, as described
in Chapter 8, goes one step further and enables staff to temporarily extend permissions on their own
(Cederquist et al., 2007; Denley and Smith, 1999; Povey, 2000). In contrast to the acceptance tests
in the previous activity, this activity targets the continuous challenge of functional stakeholders in
practice.
9.3.2. Administrative activities
A.1. Make policy decisions
Policy makers need to make decisions on how the policy should govern the activities of users in
systems, for instance, only allowing speciﬁc users to read sensitive data. The decisions may be
taken on different levels of abstraction: high-level, business-focused (“enforce the need-to-know
principle”) as well as low-level decisions focused on speciﬁc permissions and role assignments (“HR
users may access personnel data”). The decisions are based on the functional security needs and
adhere to the strategics on how to take policy decisions. Policy makers often apply the need-to-
know and least-privilege principles. Decisions can also be based on organizational structures in top-
down approaches (Crook et al., 2003) and often also account for the risks involved (ISSEA, 2003;
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ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005). One control to elicit the risks is the screening of employees (ISO/IEC
27002:2005, 2005, 8.1.2).
A.2. Design the policy
The design of the policy deﬁnes the overall approach to authoring the policy, including, for example,
how the organizational structures should be mapped to the policy (Crook et al., 2003). For role-based
authorization, the design can be derived in role mining from the users’ tasks or permissions (Bertino
et al., 2008) as part of a role engineering process (Neumann and Strembeck, 2002; Kern et al., 2002).
A.3. Author the policy
Adhering to the policy design, policy authors actually implement the policy and, for example, assign
permissions to roles and roles to users. The policy speciﬁcation occurs on multiple layers: Close
to the strategic layer, policies consist of abstract business rules, while, for example, role authoring
and role assignment result in more concrete policies. Ideally, policy changes should be traceable, for
instance, through conﬁguration management (ISSEA, 2003, BP 01.02).
A.4. Assure authorization
To verify that authorization has the intended effect, policy authors and makers can conduct assurance
activities to guarantee, for example, that an implemented policy complies with higher-level policies
and that the concrete changes correspond to the decisions. Assurance can be conducted on the policy
decisions, the policy design, and speciﬁcation. Policy makers can conduct policy reviews, as sign-
off of changes or at regular intervals (ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005). Static or dynamic analysis can
be conducted for implemented policies to assure speciﬁc characteristics. Validation and veriﬁcation
plans can deﬁne what artifacts should be assured by whom with what practices and at what points
(ISSEA, 2003).
A.5. Operate authorization
The operation of authorization supports the technical authorization mechanism. Close to the mech-
anism, the monitoring of access violations, abnormal activities, and non-compliance with security
policies can help to identify inadequate policies and other defects (ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005,
13.1.1). One consequence from incidents is to trigger assurance activities to improve existing policies
and more generally learn from the incidents (ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005, 13.2.2).
On a management level, incidents can require disciplinary measures as deterrent and further con-
tainment activities (ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005, 8.2.3). Appropriate training and awareness cam-
paigns can prevent incidents in the ﬁrst place (ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005, 13.1.2). Roper et al.
(2005) distinguish between the approaches of training, education, awareness, and motivation to inﬂu-
ence the behavior with respect to security. For disciplinary and dissemination measures, interaction
with functional staff (F.3) is necessary.
9.3.3. Systems development activities
D.1. Elicit authorization model requirements
Development stakeholders deﬁne the requirements that the authorization model needs to fulﬁll with
respect to the targeted policy design: For instance, whether a role-based policy should be imple-
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D.1 → D.2 Authorization model requirements
D.2 → A.2 Available policy constructs
D.2 → D.3 Decisions to be enforced for authorization model
D.2 → D.4 Authorization model
D.3 → D.4 Enforcement architecture
D.4 → D.5 Decisioning and enforcement implementation
D.5 → D.2 Authorization model defects
D.5 → D.3 Enforcement architecture defects
D.5 → D.4 Decisioning and enforcement defects
Table 9.4.: Information ﬂows from the development activities
mented or how dynamic the policies are. This interrelates closely with the policy design activity
(A.2), which informs the required authorization constructs used in the authorization policy.
D.2. Select/design authorization model
Development stakeholders have to choose an adequate authorization model that addresses the re-
quirements from D.1. Existing authorization models include identity-based (e.g. ACL) and manda-
tory (e.g. BLP: Pernul, 1995), role-based (Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992), attribute-based (e.g. XACML),
and a broad range of other approaches (Samarati and de Vimercati di Vimercati, 2001; Antoniou
et al., 2007), as well as extensions, regarding, for example, delegation in RBAC (Ahn et al., 2003;
Zhang et al., 2003).
D.3. Design enforcement architecture
For the enforcement architecture, developers design how the authorization decisions are enforced
in the program control ﬂow, for example, implementing reference monitors for complete mediation
(Anderson, 1972; Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975). Enforcement approaches include runtime-system
mechanisms, such as in Java (Gong and Ellison, 2003), aspect-oriented programming (AOP: Kicza-
les et al., 1997; Ancona et al., 1999; Ray et al., 2004), and enforcement hooks in the source code
(Gong and Ellison, 2003; Jaeger et al., 2004). Typically, the architecture implements a separation
of concerns for the authorization decision and enforcement (Beznosov et al., 1999; De Win et al.,
2003).
D.4. Implement decisioning and enforcement
Based on the algorithms deﬁned by the authorization model, the decisioning is implemented and
derives whether to allow or deny an access request, based on a given policy, for example, whether
speciﬁc data may be displayed to a user. For the enforcement of the decisions, developers often
insert enforcement controls in the program control-ﬂow (Gong and Ellison, 2003; Jaeger et al., 2004).
When integrating a system in an existing authorization infrastructure, the central policies need to be
distributed to the system and mapped to the respective authorization model (Mönkeberg and Rakete,
2000).
D.5. Assure and maintain decisioning and enforcement
The authorization-speciﬁc assurance and maintenance practices follow the typical secure systems
development (cf. Section A) and are thus consolidated in INDUSE. Assurance should be based orga-
nizationally on a veriﬁcation and validation plan (ISSEA, 2003) and technically on dynamic (testing)
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and static analysis (Ganapathy et al., 2006). Maintenance similarly requires secure systems develop-
ment practices, for example, vulnerability management (ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005).
9.3.4. Strategic and tactical perspectives
INDUSE supports the design and evaluation of authorization processes (tactics), including the deﬁ-
nition of how decisions are taken (strategy). The stakeholders from the tactical perspective compose
processes from sequences of activities, assigning responsibilities (ISO/IEC 27002:2005, 2005, 6.1.3),
as well as deﬁning process inputs and outputs, and process performance indicators (OGC, 2007a).
Process triggers act as the starting points for policy changes, for example, from organizational or
from functional software changes.
Often, multiple interrelated processes need to be established in parallel. In small organizations
with one systems development project, one operation (policy management) and one development
process may sufﬁce. For larger organizations with several levels of hierarchy, layered processes are
more appropriate. For example, high-level policies at a strategic level, close to business goals can be
managed in a process independent from the changes to roles that follow organizational changes to
accommodate the different change frequencies. On the development side, one development process
could be instantiated per software development or integration project.
9.4. Interrelation with IT management processes
Authorization processes are not executed in pure vacuum. Instead, organizations typically establish
related processes for designing and maintaining IT systems (IT management) to control risks to
information systems (Information Security Management Systems, ISMS), to manage changes to
information systems (conﬁguration or change management), and to develop the systems (secure
systems development). To explore the interrelation with existing processes and the re-use of artifacts
from related processes, we consider the touch points of INDUSE with process models from those
areas.
The method applied to arrive at a mapping is to explore the major guideline or standard documents
for each area, either relating each given procedure or activity to an INDUSE activity or noting it as not
covered. There are two primary types of interrelation: A procedure or activity can either be a high-
level deﬁnition of the INDUSE activity and trigger the latter, or an enabling method that produces an
output to be employed in an INDUSE activity.
9.4.1. IT management
Two very broad frameworks for the IT management processes are ITIL and CobiT. The IT infras-
tructure library (ITIL, Version 3, OGC, 2007b) deﬁnes multiple layers of IT service management, in-
cluding the Service Strategy, Design, and Operation (cf. Table 9.5). As part of the service deﬁnition,
broad functions and processes can trigger the authorization activities that are suggested by INDUSE.
For example, ITIL application management can result in systems development activities and service
change management in activities on the operations side. Conversely, ITIL also provides enabling
functions, processes, and activities that support authorization development activities. Examples are
the request fulﬁllment, event/incident/problem management, and conﬁguration management. Apart
from the general IT management processes, ITIL also deﬁnes a speciﬁc authorization process with
the Access Management process. Generally, ITIL provides broad support of the INDUSE activity
Operate authorization (A.5), but only shallow and high-level support on the policy authoring (A.3),
systems development, and the functional perspective. Most direct interrelations are on the Service
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Transition and Service Operation level. Service Strategy, Service Design, and Continuous Service
Improvement can support the deﬁnition and improvement of the overall INDUSE process.
The Control Objectives for Information and related Technologies (CobiT, IT Governance Institute,
2007) more directly focus on the development and maintenance of IT management processes. It is
structured in four primary domains, Plan and Organize, Acquire and Implement, Deliver and Support,
and Monitor and Evaluate. Similar to ITIL, CobiT deﬁnes processes, such as “Manage changes”
and “Acquire and maintain application software”, that will trigger INDUSE activities. Again, many
of the INDUSE-related CobiT activities can serve as enabling processes to INDUSE activities. The
interrelation is most pronounced for policy decisions (A.1) and operating authorization (A.5), while
the interrelation for development is rather at a high level. Many high-level IT management processes
of CobiT, mostly from “Plan and Organize”, “Deliver and Support”, and “Monitor and Evaluate”,
provide support for the process management and can be applied to INDUSE processes together with
the CobiT process control objectives and maturity model.
9.4.2. Information security management
Information security management deﬁnes processes to continuously improve an organization’s infor-
mation security. On a high level, these management processes follow a Plan–Do–Check–Act (PDCA)
cycle to guarantee the systematic and continuous planning, implementation, assurance, maintenance,
and assessment of security measures. The ISO/IEC 27001:2005 (2005) standard “Information secu-
rity management systems – Requirements” deﬁnes the requirements for Information Security Man-
agement Systems (ISMS), employed, for example, for the certiﬁcation of ISMS processes. Most
of the process management requirements in ISO 27001 are out of scope of INDUSE because of
their high-level management perspective. INDUSE-based authorization processes integrate with a
ISO 27001-compliant ISMS and complement the ISMS processes.
ISO/IEC 27001 is mostly concerned with the process management. Conversely, ISO/IEC 27002:2005
(2005) on the “Code of practice for information security management” is closer to practically enact-
ing the security goals and thus to INDUSE, relating speciﬁcally to access control, risk assessment,
security policy, human resources security, and the information systems lifecycle. ISO 27002 primar-
ily offers enabling procedures. A projection of ISO 27002 practices to INDUSE activities is shown
in Table 9.6. ISO 27002 overlaps with INDUSE on the security needs (F.1) and policy decisioning
(A.1), specifying best practices on how to elicit high-level requirements, assess risks, and consider
compliance. For the administrative perspective, support can be found for the authorization operation
(A.5). In addition, there are practical recommendations on access control in systems development
and general development aspects. Since ISO 27002 has a very broad scope – for example including
physical security – much of the standard is out of scope for authorization development, since INDUSE
is foremost targeted at authorization in information systems.
The ISF Standard of Good Practice (SGP, ISF, 2007) is similar to ISO 27002 in that it advises
approaches of how to practically achieve adequate information security. The SGP document struc-
tures the practices into multiple perspectives, of which end-user environment, security management,
critical business applications, computer installations, and systems development relate to INDUSE. In
detail, there is similar overlap as with ISO 27002, although SGP has a broader scope in the area of
systems development.
ISO/IEC 27005:2008 (2008) deﬁnes the requirements for a risk assessment process. In INDUSE,
risk assessment is foremost applied as part of the policy-decisioning activity (A.1), for which ISO 27005
provides high-level support.
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INDUSE activity ITIL CobiT
F.1 Security needs Requesting access (SO/AM/E) Information architecture (PO2/E); Ensure
compliance with external requirements
(ME3/H)
F.2 Assurance Veriﬁcation (SO/AM/E)
F.3 Operation
A.1 Policy decisions Providing rights (SO/AM/E); Removing or
restricting rights (SO/AM/E); Request fulﬁll-
ment (SO/E); Change management (ST/H)
Assess and manage IT risks (PO9/E); Man-
age changes (AI6/H); Ensure systems secu-
rity (DS5/E)
A.2 Policy design Providing rights (SO/AM/E)
A.3 Authoring Technical Management (SO/E); IT Oper-
ations Management (SO/E); Conﬁguration
Management (ST/E)
Manage the conﬁguration (DS9/E)
A.4 Assurance Service validation and testing (ST/H) Ensure systems security (DS5/E), compli-
ance with external requirements (ME3/H)
A.5 Operation Monitoring identity status (SO/AM/E); Log-
ging and tracking access (SO/AM/E); Even-
t/incident/problem management (SO/E); Ser-
vice Desk (SO/E); Technical Management
(SO/E)
Enable operation and use (AI4/E); Ensure
systems security (DS5/E); Educate and train
users (DS7/E); Manage service desk and in-
cidents (DS8/E), problems (DS10/E)
D.1 Model requirements Application Management (SO/H); Conﬁgu-
ration Management (ST/E)
D.2 Model design Application Management (SO/H)
D.3 Enforcement archi-
tecture
Application Management (SO/H); Conﬁgu-
ration Management (ST/E)
Manage the conﬁguration (DS9/E)
D.4 Implementation Application Management (SO/H); Conﬁg-
uration Management (ST/E); Deployment
Management (ST/H)
Acquire and maintain application software
(AI2/H), technology infrastructure (AI3/H);
Install and accredit solutions and changes
(AI7/H); Manage the conﬁguration (DS9/E)
D.5 Assurance & main-
tenance
Application Management (SO/H); Deploy-
ment Management (ST/H); Service valida-
tion and testing (ST/H)
Acquire and maintain application software
(AI2/H); Enable operation and use (AI4/E);
Install and accredit solutions and changes
(AI7/H); Ensure systems security (DS5/E);
Manage problems (DS10/E)
Table 9.5.: Interrelation of INDUSE activities with IT management processes
ITIL: ST: Service Transition, SO: Service Operation, AM: Access Management;
CobiT: PO: Plan and Organise, ME: Monitor and Evaluate, AI: Acquire and Implement,
DS: Deliver and Support;
Type of interrelation: E: enabling, H: high-level process
175
9. The twisted paths of obtaining permission: Integrative authorization processes
INDUSE activity ISO 27002 ISO 10007 ISO 21827/SSE-CMM
F.1 Security needs Organization responsibilities
(6.1.3); Responsibilities for asset
management (7.1); Human re-
sources responsibilities (8.1.1),
screening (8.1.2); High-level,
business requirements (11.1);
Compliance (15.1)
Security needs (PA10); Respon-
sibilities (BP01.01); Awareness
(BP01.03)
F.2 Assurance System acceptance (10.3.2) Veriﬁcation/validation (PA11)
F.3 Operation Human resources: management
(8.2.1), awareness (8.2.2)
Awareness (BP01.03)
A.1 Policy deci-
sions
Risk assessment (4.); Risks from
externals (6.2.1); Removal of per-
missions (8.3.3)
Identiﬁcation (5.3);
Change control (5.4)
Awareness (BP01.03); Impact
(PA02), risk (PA03), threat
(PA04); Security input (PA09)
A.2 Policy design
A.3 Authoring Privilege management (11.2.2) Identiﬁcation (5.3);
Change control (5.4)
Security conﬁguration manage-
ment (BP01.02)
A.4 Assurance Review of access rights (11.2.4);
Auditing controls (15.3.1)
Change auditing (5.6) Manage controls (BP01.04); Veri-
ﬁcation/validation (PA11); Assur-
ance argument (PA06)
A.5 Operation Disciplinary process (8.2.3); In-
cident management: reporting
events (13.1.1) and weaknesses
(13.1.2); Learning from incidents
(13.2.2);
Security posture (PA08); Security
input (PA09)
D.1 Model require-
ments
Systems security requirements
(12.1)
Identiﬁcation (5.3);
Change control (5.4)
Security conﬁguration manage-
ment (BP01.02)
D.2 Model design
D.3 Enforcement
architecture
D.4 Implementa-
tion
Asset labeling and handling
(7.2.2); Application access re-
strictions (11.6.1); Access control
to program source code (12.4.3);
Change management (12.5.1)
Identiﬁcation (5.3);
Change control (5.4)
Security conﬁguration man-
agement (BP01.02) Awareness
(BP01.03)
D.5 Assurance &
maintenance
Auditing controls (15.3.1); Tech-
nical vulnerability management
(12.6)
Change auditing (5.6) Manage controls (BP01.04); Veri-
ﬁcation/validation (PA11); Assur-
ance argument (PA06)
Table 9.6.: Interrelation of INDUSE activities with security, conﬁguration management, and develop-
ment processes (with references to sections in the standards)
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9.4.3. Conﬁguration and change management
Conﬁguration and change management generally affects the authorization processes in two ways.
First, change management is an integral part of systems development and thus affects the authoriza-
tion decisioning and enforcement development by triggering policy changes as a high-level process.
Secondly, authorization policies and related documents need to be included in the change manage-
ment to provide traceability of authorization policy-decisioning and authoring (enabling/supporting).
Joeris (1997) presents a conceptual model of change management for software conﬁguration man-
agement. In his model, change management may be process- (activity, change) or product- (product-
state, object) centered. Conﬁguration management is broader in scope, encompassing all products in
an organization, but focuses on the integration aspects.
ISO 10007:2003 (2003) “Quality management systems – Guidelines for conﬁguration manage-
ment” describes conﬁguration management processes at a high level. Table 9.6 shows how the
ISO 10007 process activities can be mapped to the INDUSE activities. Conﬁguration management
affects INDUSE in the two ways indicated above: The authorization policy and program source code
may be seen as a conﬁguration artifact under conﬁguration management together with the related
documents, such as requirements. The primary aim is to provide increased reliability and account-
ability for changes applied to the artifacts. The conﬁguration items need to be identiﬁed and placed
under change control for all INDUSE activities that produce evolving artifacts. In assurance activities,
change audits are conducted. The practices from ISO 10007 offer guidance on how to implement the
related INDUSE activities from the change-management perspective (enabling/supporting).
9.4.4. Secure systems engineering
INDUSE signiﬁcantly overlaps with systems development processes. General software engineering
processes as described in Sections 3.3 and A.1 relate only at a high level to the INDUSE activities,
though. Closer are secure systems engineering processes. The Systems Security Engineering Ca-
pability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), published as the ISO/IEC 21827 standard (ISSEA, 2003),
describes a broad secure-systems engineering model. SSE-CMM is foremost described through
security engineering practices, called “Base Practices”, from 22 process areas (PA). Additionally,
“Generic Practices” deﬁne capability-related practices, such as “allocate resources”, that follow the
CMM approach and are orthogonal to the base practices.
A projection of SSE-CMM practices to INDUSE activities is shown in Table 9.6. SSE-CMM
covers authorization development on a high level, but does not provide equivalent base practices
for all INDUSE activities. For example, the functional operation activity (F.3) has no high-level
equivalent, although awareness practices support the INDUSE activity. Detailed approaches can be
found for requirements elicitation, policy decisioning, and assurance activities.
Since SSE-CMM covers a broader scope, several of SSE-CMM’s Base Practices have no counter-
part in INDUSE. PA07 and PA12 to PA22 apply to project management and the organization, out of
scope of INDUSE. Similarly, the Generic Practices may be employed to assess the capability maturity.
In general, SSE-CMM appears to complement INDUSE well with process management activities, par-
ticularly for organizational, project management, and process assessment aspects. Moreover, Base
Practices on requirements engineering, risk assessment, and assurance can serve as implementation
guidance.
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Case Systems Type of development Users Roles
Large bank 200 banking systems Custom and COTS 50000 n/a
Central uni. IT E-learning, email, . . . Custom and COTS 37000 10
Hospital Numerous medical systems COTS 3500 900
Regional bank Ca. 150 banking systems Custom and COTS 3000 100
Food industry Navision-based ERP Individualization 1000 200
University admin. SAP-based ERP Individualization 200 800
Charity org. Business Web application Custom 150 20
Quality assurance Business Web application Custom 100 16
Table 9.7.: Authorization contexts
9.5. Authorization processes in practice
Since there is little prior research on authorization processes in organizations, we study in the fol-
lowing the processes relating to authorization. The primary purpose of the study is to systematically
explore the processes in diverse environments and provide a basis for further research into authoriza-
tion procedures. This includes studying (a) how policy changes occur in practice, and (b) how actors
and activities interrelate. As secondary aims, the study evaluates the ability of INDUSE to describe
diverse authorization processes and to support gap analyses by indicating potentials of improvement.
9.5.1. Study design
Research instruments
The primary source of the study are semi-structured interviews of between 30 and 90 minutes with
stakeholders close to IT or organizational management (subjective empirical case studies, cf. Sec-
tion 2.5). We chose a qualitative approach with interviews, since these are beneﬁcial for exploratory
work (Cairns and Cox, 2008, cf. Section 5.1.1). The interviews covered the authorization context
(type of system, number of users), the policy-change procedures (change activities, responsibilities),
and the interrelation with systems development (systems integration, enforcement implementation).
As a secondary source, we reviewed process documents relating to authorization for two of the stud-
ied organizations.
Sampling
Organizations are generally reluctant to disclose information related to the sensitive subject of infor-
mation security unless there is a trust relationship with the researching party, making broad empirical
studies in this ﬁeld difﬁcult. Kotulic and Clark (2004) advise to focus on a small number of in-depth
analyses with carefully selected organizations. In this study, we likewise focus on a small number
of cases, applying a careful, “information-oriented” sampling (cf. Section 7.3.1) to cover a broad
ﬁeld of organizational contexts (cf. Section 4.2). We operationalized the authorization contexts into
two sampling dimensions: Organizational complexity (number of users) and estimated risk-level
(business risks, regulations). Eight organizations were individually contacted through personal con-
tacts for this study (cf. Table 9.7), distributed according to the sampling dimensions as depicted in
Figure 9.3.
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Figure 9.3.: Sampling of organizations in study
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Figure 9.4.: Example of procedure visualization based on INDUSE activity model
Analysis with INDUSE
The goal of the analysis is to understand the processes and interrelation of activities concerning
authorization, both on the formal and informal level. From the detailed interview notes and the
process documents (where available), we extracted data on the processes into a spreadsheet and
graphically modeled the activities and interrelations of each case, as shown in one example for the
regional bank in Figure 9.4. We systematically analyzed the processes in the following categories:
• Process characteristics: Process formality, triggers, and instantiation,
• Perspectives and stakeholders: Presence of perspectives, and the respective roles and tasks of
stakeholders,
• Activities and interrelations: Coverage of INDUSE activities, interrelations between activities.
Study design quality
Following Yin (2009), the quality of the study design may be ensured through four tests (cf. Sec-
tion 5.1.1). The construct validity is ensured in this study by employing the INDUSE framework for
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Case Systems dev.
proc.
Operational process Degree of
formality
Process triggers
Large bank Per-system Central and per-system Formal Software, organizational
Central uni. IT Local Central and local Informal Software, organizational
Hospital Per-system Central and local Formal Organizational, review
Regional bank Per-system Central Formal Software, organizational,
review
Food industry Central Central Informal Software, hindrances
University admin. Central Central Formal Software, organizational,
hindrances
Charity org. Central Central Informal Software, hindrances
Quality assurance Central (w/role
modiﬁcations)
Central (role assign-
ment)
Informal Software, hindrances
Table 9.8.: Authorization process characteristics, cases ordered by number of users
analysis, which is derived from a broad set of literature on authorization. The internal validity is
addressed by the use of rich semi-structured interviews, which allow us to conclude causalities from
the descriptions of the interviewees. While the subjectivity of interviews may cause in places im-
precise individual descriptions, the larger picture as a hypothesis for more comprehensive research
should be unaffected. The external validity is affected by the limited number of cases in the study.
However, the careful sampling should result in a good spread of cases to provide a solid descrip-
tion of current authorization processes, even though neither comprehensive nor representative. The
generalizability is naturally limited to the covered range of cases, as described above. Lastly, the
reliability of the study is ensured by carefully collecting and systematically analyzing the data based
on the INDUSE framework. Thus, the study should be able to provide a rich hypothesis for future
research on authorization procedures.
9.5.2. Findings on authorization procedures
Process characteristics
Depending on the organizational context, authorization processes are deﬁned in varying degrees of
formality, from implicit (“lived”) processes to those laid out in process documents. As shown in
Table 9.8, larger organizations in this study are more likely to have a formally deﬁned process. Of
the four largest contexts, only one, the central university IT, has an informal process, largely because
of the focus on the identity-management and infrastructure part of authorization. Likewise, three of
the four smallest contexts only have informal processes.
Four different triggers for policy changes can be observed in the organizations (cf. Table 9.8):
1. Functional software changes (7 cases) that, for example, require new roles for added function-
ality or require role modiﬁcations to preserve behavior,
2. Organizational changes (5), for example, when business processes are restructured or addi-
tional departments need to gain permissions to complete tasks,
3. Hindrances affecting functional stakeholders (4) in their primary tasks,
4. Policy reviews (2) that are regularly conducted to identify inadequate and out-of-date permis-
sion assignments.
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Case Functional Administrative Development
Large
bank
Functional dep.: provides func-
tional role concept, requests
change, QA
Functional admin.: role con-
cept; Central admin.: implements
changes
Developers: integrate enforce-
ment
Central
uni. IT
Admin.: assigns role to func-
tion/person; Local admin.: man-
age role subtree
Developers: design role subtree
Hospital Line manager: requests role
change; key user: signs off; re-
quester: QA
Role admin: coordinates, changes
roles; Local admin: assigns role
Developers: integrate external
systems
Regional
bank
Functional dep: requests role
changes, signs off role changes,
reviews policy
IT: manages role; Org. manage-
ment: assesses risk, restructures,
reviews
Developers: modify system, re-
quest new roles
Food in-
dustry
Functional department: informal
requirements
Admin: manages roles Developers: integrate enforce-
ment with functional changes
Uni. ad-
min.
Line manager and key user: re-
quest change; func. user: reports
defects
Admin: changes roles, validates
requests, corrects roles after up-
dates
Developers: implement system
update
Charity
org.
Functional dep: discusses policy
change; func. user: QA, reports
defects
Functional consultant: design, im-
plement policy; conduct QA
Developers: implement authoriza-
tion model and enforcement
Quality
assur-
ance
App. owner: requests user story,
discuss auth. reqs; end user: re-
port problems
Developer/admin: modiﬁes roles;
App. owner: assigns roles
Developers: implement authoriza-
tion with functionality
Table 9.9.: Stakeholder roles and tasks by perspective
Organizations mostly establish separate processes for systems development and operational policy
management (cf. Table 9.8). Only in the agile-development case of the quality-assurance company,
the systems development process includes role modiﬁcations, although roles are assigned in an op-
erational process. In the further three of four smallest cases, one central software development and
one central policy management process are established. In larger cases, separate processes for role
modiﬁcations, role assignments, and user creation are instantiated, in part running locally, such as
in the hospital case. In cases with numerous systems, several systems development processes are
established in parallel.
Perspectives and stakeholders
As shown in Table 9.9, in seven of the eight cases, all three INDUSE perspectives are present in
the process descriptions. Only the central university IT lacks the functional perspective due to the
focus on the infrastructure. Overall, the functional activities often relate to requesting authorization
changes (5 cases), either directly or through discussions about functional requirements with devel-
opment stakeholders. Other activities are quality assurance of changes (3), sign-off of requested
changes (2) and reporting inadequate or defective restrictions (3). In two formal cases, technically-
trained “key users” support policy changes and reviews. Only in the three smallest cases, functional
staff are broadly explicitly incorporated in the process.
Stakeholders from the administrative perspective are either from the central IT departments or de-
centralized into local functional departments. In the case of the regional bank, organizational man-
agement staff is responsible for explicit requirement and design activities. In structured processes,
such as the large bank and the hospital case, stakeholders from central IT and local administrators
are both involved and interact in administrative activities, with more complex and critical activities
centralized. For example, while role assignments are conducted locally in the hospital context by
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F.1 F.2 F.3 A.1 A.2 A.3 A.4 A.5 D.1 D.2 D.3 D.4 D.5 Interrelations
Large bank x x x x x o x F.1→A.1→A.2→A.3,
A.2→D.4→A.3
Central uni. IT o x o x x D.2→D.4, D.2→A.2, D.2→A.3
Hospital x x o x x o o F.1→A.1→A.3, F.2→A.3,
D.4→A.3
Regional bank x x x x x x x F.1→A.1→A.2→A.3,
A.4→A.3, D.2→A.2, F.2→F.1
Food industry x x o x o o F.1→A.1→A.3, F.3→A.3,
D.4→A.3
Uni. admin. o x x x o A.1→A.4→A.3, F.3→A.3,
D.4→A.3
Charity org. o x o o x x x o o o x F.3→A.1, F.2→A.4→A.2,
D.1→A.1
Quality assurance x x o o x o o x F.1→A.1, F.3→A.3, F.3→A.1,
D.2→A.2
Table 9.10.: Activities covered by the studied processes (o: partly, x: mostly/fully; informal interre-
lations set in italics)
the associated role administrators, roles are only modiﬁed centrally. Explicitly assigning responsible
stakeholders to roles is a common practice for formal contexts (2 of 4 cases).
Authorization-related software development activities are mostly embedded in the general soft-
ware development activities. In three of the smaller cases, the administrative perspective and the
development perspective are partly merged. This results either from in-house development (food
industry) or from the policy management as part of the software development (quality assurance).
Activities and interrelations
Assessing which of the studied processes covers which INDUSE activity, as shown in Table 9.10,
can offer insights into the process characteristics. Several processes lack or only partly cover the
authorization activities in the areas of explicit decision-making (A.1; 3 full, 4 partly of 8), design
(A.2; 3/2), and assurance (A.4; 4/0). None of the processes take the monitoring of authorization,
disciplinary measures or awareness/training (A.5) into account. The analysis of the activities also
indicate speciﬁc focuses of the processes. For example, the central university IT has only few func-
tional and administrative activities due to their infrastructure focus, the hospital case few develop-
ment activities, employing mainly COTS systems.
The formally deﬁned and informal interrelations between activities, listed in Table 9.10, show how
diverse the authorization procedures are in practice. In six processes, there are formal or informal
ﬂows from security needs (F.1) to the administrative activities. In the other cases, the processes seem
to be more development or administration-focused. While interrelations are mentioned between
systems development and administrative activities in all cases, for example, to reﬂect new or changed
functionality in roles, eight of the nine mentions are informal ones. In the university administration
case, the lack of a formal interrelation frequently causes problems of missing permission in operation
after software updates.
9.5.3. INDUSE as a means to describe diverse processes
The study shows how broad the range of authorization processes is in actual organizations. We em-
ployed the INDUSE analysis method laid out in Section 9.5.1 to systematically describe and compare
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the processes. The process characteristics supported the categorization of processes (formality, in-
stantiation) and indicated potential improvements (triggers). Perspectives and stakeholders showed
how the processes are constructed in terms of centralization and how the perspectives are interre-
lated. Activities and interrelations provided details on the focus of the processes and the informal
and formal interrelations, suggesting additional formal relations. The informal relations between
development and operation show that the integrative modeling approach, including development, is
indeed necessary.
While several of the identiﬁed interrelations are not directly suggested by INDUSE, most unex-
pected ones represent short cuts of INDUSE interrelations, for example, F.2→A.3 for the hospital
case where INDUSE suggests F.2→A.4→A.3. Unexpected interrelations are present between func-
tional stakeholders (F.2→F.1) for reconsidering functional needs after reviews and from software
requirements to policy decisions (D.1→A.1) when functional feature discussions lead to authoriza-
tion changes. The expected INDUSE interrelations should thus be considered as lower bounds at the
current stage and need to be extended in further research.
While the study focused on authorization contexts in organizational environments today, INDUSE
should also be applicable to future environments. One development in organizations is increasing
its degree of distribution, requiring local decision-making to lower security-management costs (Pal-
las, 2009). As shown for the hospital case, where stakeholders from functional departments have
administrative perspectives, this can be modeled well with INDUSE. Similarly, distributed services
(cloud computing) can be modeled as individual systems as in the case of the large bank. Processes
in federated authorization architectures can be represented as distributed decision-making and dis-
tributed systems development, and need to consider the provisioning and merging of policies for
individual systems. Another development are privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs), which cause
additional high-level requirements, for example, from contracts with customers, to be incorporated
in the policy-decision and model-requirement activities. Future technologies to guarantee these con-
tracts can be integrated as part of the development activities.
9.5.4. Designing processes for interaction and participation
From this study, the following recommendations on authorization process design can be derived:
• Integrate functional staff: Only half of the organizations in the study explicitly integrate func-
tional users. The example of the charity organization indicates that it can be useful to motivate
functional users to express their problems with authorization measures. In other cases, existing
informal interactions could proﬁt from a formalization to make them more reliable (cf. Sec-
tion 9.2; Principles P1, P8). According to security usability models (Beautement et al., 2008),
acting early to increase the measure acceptability will not only improve the productivity, but
also increase compliance and thus overall security (P5).
• Establish operative activities: None of the studied organizations has operative measures for
authorization (F.3, A.5) in place. However, monitoring authorization problems and behavior
(e.g. circumventions; P5) will help to react quickly and to take consequences (P7), and in-
creasing awareness will further improve acceptability and thus overall security (West, 2008,
P6).
• Integrate systems development: Considering the full authorization lifecycle, including the sys-
tems development aspects (Hu et al., 2006; Kern et al., 2002), can reduce inadequacies of
policies (P1). One negative example is the university administration case, where productivity
183
9. The twisted paths of obtaining permission: Integrative authorization processes
of functional users is impacted after software updates because permissions are missing (P7).
This could be addressed by a formalization of these interactions (P8).
• Improve stakeholder interaction: Interrelations are not only important between perspectives,
but also within perspectives, for example, when local and central administrators cooperate. As
seen in the central university IT case, it can be problematic if there is no deﬁned channel for
interactions (cf. Section 9.2; P1, P8; Bauer et al., 2009; Flechais and Sasse, 2009).
9.6. Conclusion
The process model INDUSE describes authorization processes and aims to foster the integration of
different perspectives on authorization through adequate and ﬂexible processes. The model is fo-
cused on structuring the key characteristics of the authorization processes, namely the activities,
stakeholders, and interrelations. These process primitives can then be used to evaluate existing pro-
cesses for comprehensiveness through control and data ﬂow as shown in the evaluation for eight
organizations from practice.
Q1.1 What type of organization requires what authorization measure and what are the inﬂuencing
factors? The study reinforced the insight that adequate authorization processes are essential
for adequate authorization measures (P8). For example, participants reported the interference
with functional work when procedures are inadequate. The study showed that important factors
include the organization’s size, its conﬁguration (formality, centralization), and the focus of the
authorization measure (e.g. on systems integration). Further research is needed to explore the
relationship between organizational factors and authorization-process design.
Q10.1 How formalized and centralized should procedures be in what context? The characteristics of
the processes for the different contexts in the study also indicated relations between attributes
of the organization and the formality and centralization of processes: Larger organizations
have more formally deﬁned processes and more complex processes and more dynamic smaller
organizations rather informal processes (P7). The ﬁndings from this study may serve as a hy-
pothesis for further examination of these relations. Moreover, organizational research should
also aim to explain what the characteristics of effective and efﬁcient procedures are in what
contexts.
INDUSE was successfully used to describe the authorization processes in the studied organizations,
indicating the usefulness of the model for further tasks:
Q1.2 How can we support the design of adequate authorization measures? The study showed that
a process model, such as INDUSE, can be employed to describe a broad range of authorization
processes to identify potentials for process improvement, indicating activities and interrela-
tions that could be more explicitly modeled in the process (P1, P8).
Q3.2 How do procedures need to be structured to comply with regulations and how do regulations
need to be structured to allow procedures to comply with them? While this chapter did
not directly address this question, INDUSE may serve as the basis for deﬁning procedures
that comply to regulations. The regulations could state requirements on the activities and
characteristics, such as the degree of formality, that the processes have to fulﬁll (P8).
Authorization processes often need to be integrated with other organizational processes. We exam-
ined how INDUSE relates to processes from IT, information security, and conﬁguration management
as well as secure systems development:
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Q10.3 How can the authorization procedures be integrated with related organizational processes?
INDUSE as one authorization process model relates primarily in two distinct ways to other
processes: One form are activities that offer infrastructural support to authorization tasks,
such as conﬁguration management, or to speciﬁc challenges, such as risk assessment. The
second form are higher-level processes that need to encompass authorization activities, such
as in the case of information security management processes, and can use INDUSE to more
concretely specify the procedures. Practitioners will proﬁt in both ways: from consulting other
process models for enabling procedures and the management of INDUSE processes, and from
the integration of INDUSE processes in the broader IT process landscape of the organization.
From the studied processes in practice, we can derive further insights:
Q9.1 How do requests for changes to the policy take place in practice and what are the obstacles for
functional staff? In the study, we saw a number of different ways for functional staff to request
changes, for example, informal discussions or informally turning to a designated key user who
then triggers a formal process. However, well-deﬁned change procedures can only be found
in half of the cases and we recommend to explicitly “integrate functional staff” and “establish
operative activities” (F.3; P1). Further research is needed to identify the characteristics of
effective and efﬁcient change requests.
Q6.1 How do policy decisions take place in practice and what information is employed? The
decision-making on policy changes differs among the studied organizations. Smaller and less
formal organizations tend to have more dynamic and informal decision procedures in discus-
sions (P7), while more formal contexts deﬁne key users and role owners who, in cooperation,
decide on policy changes (P8).
Q8.1 How do policy authors interact with policy makers and functional staff for implementing
changes? Depending on the decision-making procedures, policy authoring may occur ad hoc
(directly by the policy maker) or in deﬁned interactions between local and central administra-
tors. One recommendation derived from the study is to make these stakeholder interactions
explicit (P1, P8).
Q7.1 How must review procedures be designed to be effective and efﬁcient? / Q7.2 How can different
perspectives cooperate for effective and efﬁcient reviews? Only very formal contexts had
deﬁned procedures for regular reviews or sign-off procedures as part of policy changes. While
this may not be appropriate for all organizations, the study indicates that some can proﬁt from
explicitly integrating functional staff into the review process (P1, P8).
Q15.2 How can the different perspectives interact for more effective and efﬁcient controls integration?
While we can observe informal relations between operational and development perspectives
for all studied organizations, these are in only one case explicit. Considering potential conse-
quences of the missing feedback loops, we recommend to foster the interaction and make it
explicit (P1, P7, P8).
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[S]hutting up the houses was perfectly
insufﬁcient [to prevent the spreading of the
infection]. Indeed it seemed to have no manner
of public good in it, equal or proportionable to
the grievous burden that it was to the particular
families that were so shut up.
D. Defoe: A Journal of the Plague Year (1722)
As the Authorization Problems Study showed, decisions on the adequacy of policy changes are at
the core of achieving an effective and efﬁcient authorization measure (cf. Section 2.3.3, Req 1). We
saw primarily two consequences of inadequate policies, both impacting the measure’s effectiveness
by increasing the organization’s risks: First, over-entitlements enabled the potential misuse of per-
missions; second, indirectly, restrictive policies caused disruptions of functional tasks and thus led
to circumventions that entailed additional risks (Req 2, Req 5). To address these problems, we need
to address the question of how to design adequate measures for speciﬁc contexts (Q1.1) and how to
arrive at satisfactory approaches for functional (Q4.1) and administrative staff (Q4.2). One particular
point that participants of the Authorization Problems Study raised was the problem of taking com-
prehensive decisions. Addressing this problem, how can we guide the decisions (Q11.1) and what
information can we employ (Q11.2)?
Looking more generally at decisions in organizations, decision theory traditionally distinguishes
between decisions under certainty (complete knowledge of decision consequences), under risk (ac-
curate risk probabilities), and under uncertainty (without prediction of the outcomes; March et al.,
1958, p. 137). Because of the unknowns in organizational authorization – including the future tasks
and behavior of individuals – policy decisions will often fall into the uncertainty category. In prac-
tice, decisions are often not taken individually and consciously; Cohen et al. (1972), accordingly,
describe decisions in “organized anarchies” through a “garbage can” model: In a dynamic envi-
ronment, streams of choices, problems, and solutions can take on the state of garbage that needs
to be processed to take decisions. This can lead to more actions being taken than thinking and,
for example, require the interpretation of superiors’ decisions by subordinates. The problems from
non-comprehensive decisions (cf. Section 5.1) indicate that policy decision-making in organizations
often takes on this form without structured procedures for adequate decisions. The benchmark for
the decision-support measure is thus whether we can improve decisions in such environments.
The aim of this chapter1 is to explore the problems with and approaches to support structured
decision-making with decision-support measures, primarily addressing the effectiveness and efﬁ-
ciency of decision-making (Req 6). This not only involves the challenge of the guidance itself
(Req 11), but requires us also to address the change requests and procedures that surround the deci-
sion (Q9.1, Q9.2, Q10.2), and how stakeholders interact for policy changes (Q8.1).
When designing decision procedures, we can apply either authoritative, consultative, or group de-
cisions (Vroom, 2000). Since one important principle of this thesis is to improve the participation
1The main parts of this chapter appear similarly, but shortened in the security track at the ACM Symposium on Applied
Computing (SEC@SAC: Bartsch and Sasse, 2012).
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of functional staff in authorization management (P1), the artifact in this chapter aims to support con-
sultative or group decisions. The integration of diverse perspectives on authorization is particularly
useful when the information that is required for taking decisions is disseminated insufﬁciently be-
tween the decision maker and subordinates (cf. Vroom, 2000). We aim to support the participation
of non-experts through concrete decisions (P3) and a reduction of the overall burden of decision-
making while increasing the quality of decisions (P2). Depending on the importance and likelihood
of commitment of subordinates (cf. Vroom, 2000), it may also be helpful to increase the security
awareness among functional staff and decision makers as part of the decision process (P6), and, in
extension, increase the motivation of compliance of the individuals (P5).
The approach in this chapter is to systematically develop a decision-support measure and employ
the artifact in formative evaluations to derive insights on how to implement decision support. The
measure in this chapter is an extension of the Policy Override Calculus from Appendix 8, which
focused on the particularities of override policies and on deriving a policy in one pass. Particularly
the latter showed to be problematic in consultations with decision makers due to the required effort.
In contrast, the decision-support measure targets standard authorization models and is more process-
oriented to support evolutionary policy changes.
10.1. The problem of policy decisions
Problems with decision-making have been intensively researched in cognitive psychology, beginning
with the discovery by Kahneman and Tversky in the 1970s of the heuristics and biases that humans
employ when making decisions (Gilovich et al., 2002), eventually leading to the awarding of the
Nobel prize in economics in 2002. In information security, these effects have been shown for pri-
vacy decisions, for which Acquisti and Grossklags (2005) showed how individuals traded short-term
beneﬁts, for example, revealing personal data for discounts despite their general privacy concerns.
Similarly, Ahern et al. (2007) described how social network users decided to share location informa-
tion in practice despite earlier contrary statements.
The reason for this inconsistent behavior is the “bounded rationality” of humans when taking deci-
sions, not carefully weighing the individual arguments of a security decision, but applying heuristics
that, for instance, depend on the framing, whether a risk factor can be easily recalled from memory,
or one of several other biases (Camp, 2009). For authorization decisions, the “satisﬁcing” effect
(March et al., 1958), which we also observed for policy editing (cf. Section 7.3), is particularly rele-
vant, describing behavior of decision makers that choose the ﬁrst option that seems adequate instead
of examining the available options. For policy decisions, problems in decision-making have been re-
lated to the lack of awareness of the consequences of the decisions. For instance, Ahern et al. (2007)
recommend to increase the awareness of social networking users on what aggregated location data
may reveal. West (2008) similarly argues that security decisions are difﬁcult because the risks are
often abstract when compared to functional beneﬁts from taking the risks. This has also been dis-
cussed for medical contexts where abstract rules on treatment (“compliance” with treatment rules)
have shown to be problematic (Martins, 2005).
One could argue that these effects are not relevant to organizational decision-making, since the
decision makers are trained in taking adequate decisions, evaluating the factors comprehensively and
objectively. Instead, policy decisions are often taken ad hoc or well-deﬁned processes are signiﬁ-
cantly modiﬁed. Examples can, for example, be found in the Authorization Personas in Section 4.3:
Emily as technically-informed functional staff needs to take decisions without clear guidance or
training. Brandon as the personal assistant takes the decisions on behalf of his manager. Nicole as
technical staff effectively takes decisions that should rather be taken by the responsible functional
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managers. In the Authorization Problems Study in Chapter 5, we examined problems with the deci-
sions in more detail and discovered three categories of problems:
• Cognitive problems: Cognitive problems involved the effort and complexity of decisions,
caused by missing guidance and leading to non-comprehensive decisions. The consequence
are biased business-, security-, or formality-driven decisions, thus indicating the above-described
effects of bounded rationality on an organizational scale: Decisions are framed by the mindset
of the decision maker so that technical staff tend to take security-driven decisions and func-
tional managers rather business-driven ones.
• Organizational problems: Participants reported various types of organizational problems with
ineffective or inefﬁcient procedures, including conﬂicts of authority and emotional costs of de-
nial. For organizational information security, further problems have been theorized based on
the principal–agent theory, including externalities and information asymmetry (Pallas, 2009).
Externalities are positive or negative effects of the decision on individuals not involved in the
decision, for example, when insecure behavior of individuals endangers the entire organiza-
tion. Information asymmetry refers to different levels of information for staff and managers,
for instance, leading to problematic decisions by managers because they lack the knowledge
of consequences for staff.
• Socio-technical problems: A third category of problems in the study related to socio-technical
problems with the interaction with the respective tools, including non-transparent and incom-
prehensible policies, inadequate model expressiveness, and unusable mechanisms to review
policies.
10.2. Approaches to decision guidance
One important goal of this chapter is to further explore the aforementioned problems and how they
can be addressed. From literature, a number approaches lend themselves to address the problems:
Participation of functional staff Participatory processes have been shown to motivate staff, even
though the effects depend on the context and particularly work for small groups with high identiﬁ-
cation (Wagner III. and Gooding, 1987). Participation may thus increase the acceptance of policy
decisions, leading to higher satisfaction and a higher effectiveness of the authorization measure.
Scully et al. (1995) demonstrate that participation improves the information dissemination and thus
increases the adequacy of decisions and the performance of subordinates, particularly in cases of
information asymmetries when information is unevenly distributed. This indicates that participa-
tion will improve decisions particularly in dynamic and complex contexts where information is not
generally widely distributed at decision time.
Increased security awareness and expertise To make adequate decisions, the involved stake-
holders need to be aware of the associated risks. Siponen (2001) argues that everyone should be
security aware who interacts with information systems. He differentiates between descriptive and
prescriptive awareness, that is, the general security expertise or “action-guiding commitment to the
objectives of awareness”, respectively. While prescriptive awareness is more useful for policy deci-
sions, we need to restrain ourselves from pure indoctrination without the deeper understanding, in
analogy to the effective passing on of morality (Siponen, 2001). In organizational behavior, a typi-
cal approach to awareness-building is reinforcement, that is, supporting appropriate and disciplining
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inappropriate behavior, and social learning, which encompasses the learning from close contact, imi-
tation, and the understanding of concepts (Schermerhorn et al., 2008; Bandura, 1977). We can foster
these effects with appropriate decision-guidance.
Comprehensible decision factors The comprehensibility of security is generally impacted by the
way humans think about the abstract security measures. Humans also need to build mental models
(Johnson-Laird, 1980) of how security measures work to understand the measures at a speciﬁc level
of detail. Generally, it is useful to build a simpliﬁed, “instrumental” mental model of mechanisms to
reduce the cognitive effort of learning to interact with them. Camp (2009) studied what mental model
humans have of security, considering, for instance, a physical security model, through the analogy of
locks and doors, but also a warfare model. As one would expect, Asgharpour et al. (2007) found that
there are stark differences between the mental models of experts and lay users. Mental models have
been employed to improve the comprehensibility and behavior in various ﬁelds. For instance, in the
risk communication for medical drugs, patients were found to understand package inserts, but ignore
the formulated advice (Jungermann et al., 1988). For lay users of security, Wash (2010) studied their
folk models to selectively inﬂuence the models to achieve more secure behavior.
As stated in the previous section, one of the important problems in comprehending decision factors
is the lack of concreteness of risk factors. Through adequate risk communication, we can increase
the level of concreteness in order to make the information more understandable. For medical risk
communications, for example, to enable well-founded choices of treatment options, Rothman and
Kiviniemi (1999) distinguish three different goals of the communication: informing about risks, cre-
ating a personalized awareness of risks, and the persuasion of a change of behavior. In comparison
to simply conveying risk probabilities, contextualizing risks is more successful in creating awareness
and inﬂuence behavior. Cognitive psychology indicates that it is important that people are able to
“simulate” or imagine the antecedents and consequences of risks (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982).
For medical risks, consequences (symptoms) that are easier to picture increased the awareness, as
do testimonials of affected individuals when there is an identiﬁcation with those, and disturbing im-
ages, such as, from car accidents. To actively contextualize medical risks, physicians emphasize
antecedents by letting patients review their personal behavior, for instance, in case of HIV preven-
tion, or provide personalized information about the links between the personal behavior and health
problems, correcting pessimistic and optimistic perceptions (Rothman and Kiviniemi, 1999). Risk
communication has also been researched in sociology: Cannell and Otway (1988) argue that it is
particularly important for risks that the “communication. . . take[s] into account the knowledge and
experience of the audience it addresses.” De Marchi (1991) found that people contextualize risks
when discussing natural hazards.
For authorization policy decisions, we thus need to develop adequate and consistent mental models
in the communication of decision factors and increase the concreteness of the factors by contextual-
izing them for the individual.
Guiding decisions Ahern et al. (2007) argue from their ﬁeld study on privacy decisions in social
networks that supporting decisions through guidance could be useful. For general policy decisions,
effective guidance requires an adequate modeling of the involved risks from the changes. Several
risk models for authorization have been proposed in literature. Han et al. (2009) developed an ab-
stract risk model for evaluating delegation based on difference in ranks and the permission range
of a delegated role. Molloy et al. (2008) instead employ market mechanisms that are based on an
authorization risk-model to guide decisions on permissions. Their simulation shows that under their
authorization model, individuals behave optimally for the organization. However, their model as-
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sumes measurable beneﬁts and risks, and rational individuals. The decision-support approach by
Beresnevichiene et al. (2010) for security investment choices targets authorization measures in their
case study. They base the calculations for their case study on expert consultations, including estima-
tions of user trustworthiness, the ability for unauthorized access, and mitigation effects. However,
the risk models in literature are rather abstract and do not address the practical problem of eliciting
the necessary information for the risk calculations in practice.
The required data to support decisions concerns risks and beneﬁts from a policy decision. Risk
factors for authorization primarily encompass human threat aspects, both from intentional activi-
ties, such as insider attacks (Pﬂeeger and Stolfo, 2009), and from accidental incidents, such as hu-
man errors (Stoneburner et al., 2002). Reason (1990) groups human errors as mistakes (planning),
lapses (storage), and slips (execution). According to the Situation Awareness theory, factors such as
workload, stress, and system complexity inﬂuence the human reliability (Bedny and Meister, 1999;
Endsley, 1995).
10.3. Decision-support study
To explore how selected approaches to decision support help in improving the policy decision-
making and what problems we are faced with in practice, we built a decision-support prototype based
on the risk factors stated by employees of a large enterprise. We conducted formative evaluations
with policy makers and functional staff from a variety of backgrounds to evaluate the practical viabil-
ity of the decision-support tool. Of the aforementioned problems in decision-making, the prototype
is primarily focused on the cognitive effort of providing the information necessary for the decision
support and of making comprehensive decisions, and on the organizational challenges of integrating
a supporting tool into organizational processes without incurring disproportionate overhead.
10.3.1. Elicitation of decision factors
The ﬁrst part of the study pertains the elicitation and structuring of the factors that need to be con-
sidered in policy decisions. For this we again employed the data from the large, multi-national
organization: 118 interviews of about 45 minutes each in two countries (cf. Section 4.3). One re-
searcher who is not afﬁliated with the organization coded transcripts of these interviews on security
compliance. The coding resulted in 172 quotes and 62 raw codes on risk and beneﬁt factors that
participants of the study considered relevant in a variety of contexts and systems, including in highly
critical and privacy-relevant areas.
Using a Grounded Theory approach (Cairns and Cox, 2008; Glaser and Strauss, 1967), we related
risk factors to arrive at ﬁve high-level decision-factor groups: “beneﬁt”, “high-level policy”, “data
sensitivity”, “impact”, and “threat”. For example, the quote:
“. . . but it could do damage to the company, you know, the company share price and
markets and so forth”
was coded as “Impact: Organizational: Share value”, thus part of the factor group “impact”. We then
built the decision-support prototype by creating six spreadsheets as decision artifacts: We assigned
the factor groups to the spreadsheets to enable the efﬁcient collection of information and formulated
questions for each factor.
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Pseud. Role Perspective Position Organization Organizational conf.
M1 Manager Technical Program man-
ager, leading dev.
team of 26
Software industry,
multi-national, 1000
emp.
Simple Structure,
divisionalized
M2 Manager Technical Project leader of
6
Web agency, 15 emp. Simple Structure
M3 Manager Technical Unit manager of
25
Development company
for large bank, 300
emp.
Professional bureau-
cracy
S1 Staff Non-technical Quality assur-
ance
Food industry, multi-
national, 2500 emp.
Divisionalized pro-
fessional bureaucracy
S2 Staff Non-technical Customer rela-
tions
Regional utilities com-
pany, 2500 emp.
Machine Bureau-
cracy, divisionalized
S3 Staff Technical Technical quality
assurance
Security-sensitive elec-
tronics, 1500 emp.
Professional bureau-
cracy
Table 10.1.: Study participant sampling
10.3.2. Formative evaluation with functional staff and decision makers
We conducted the second part of the study as a qualitative evaluation to arrive at rich descriptions of
problems and causation (cf. Section 7.3.1; a subjective empirical laboratory study, cf. Section 2.5).
This part consisted of formative evaluations based on the decision-support prototype with three func-
tional staff and three policy makers from a variety of practical backgrounds. The main questions that
we addressed in the evaluations were:
• In what context is a decision-support tool in what form appropriate?
• What data can be collected from whom? Who has the information with the necessary degree
of precision?
• How comprehensible are the collected decision factors and how can we improve their compre-
hensibility?
• Which information are individuals willing to provide?
The participants were selected in an “information-oriented” sampling (cf. Section 7.3.1) to arrive at
a broad sampling with respect to organizational type (size and Structural Conﬁguration of Mintzberg
(1980), cf. Section 4.2) and position as shown in Table 10.1. The evaluations were not geared to
result in representative and comprehensive coverage of decision-support problems, but rather provide
us with rich subjective data to inform further research. We chose to cover a limited number of
participants thoroughly, since this should allow us to gain a broad overview of the problems to be
expected with decision support (cf. Section 7.3.1 and Nielsen and Landauer, 1993).
The evaluations lasted about one hour each and were semi-structured: They ﬁrst covered prelim-
inary questions on the participant’s background and relation to authorization in practice. Then, the
interviewer went with the participant through a participant-speciﬁc scenario, asking the participant to
complete the questionnaires. While making the evaluations more difﬁcult to compare, the individual
scenarios allowed us to reduce the effect of participants having to understand the possibly remote
scenario (cf. Wash, 2010). The participants were asked to “think out aloud” while completing the
forms and the walk-through was enriched with in-situ prompts (Cairns and Cox, 2008). Following
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Figure 10.1.: Screenshot of the decision-support prototype (permission proﬁle)
the walk-through, additional a-posteriori questions were asked on the perception of the adequacy and
usefulness for the participant’s organizational context.
The evaluations were audio-recorded and transcribed. The analysis followed the principles of
Grounded Theory (cf. Adams et al., 2008; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The transcripts were coded for
the context at the participant organization, the comments on and problems with the decision factors,
and statements on the adequacy and usefulness of decision support. The open coding resulted in
114 raw codes that were consolidated as shown in the ﬁndings below. While all evaluations were
conducted in German, the coding occurred in English and the quotes were translated for inclusion in
the ﬁndings.
10.4. Decision-support prototype
The general idea of the decision-support prototype is to separate different categories of risk factors
so that each group can be elicited individually when appropriate as part of the change procedure.
The prototype consists of interrelated spreadsheets (artifacts) to collect the risk and beneﬁt factors,
and present aggregations of the factors to guide decisions. The permission-proﬁle artifact is shown
in Figure 10.1.
In line with the aforementioned approaches to decision support, the prototype aims to increase the
participation of functional staff in the decision process by asking them to provide their estimation of
risks and beneﬁts (P1). The collection and presentation of risks and beneﬁts is designed in a way
to increase the awareness of the interacting stakeholders for the different factors involved (P6). The
prototype relies on concrete, contextualized inputs for collection of data and outputs for evaluation to
achieve comprehensible decision factors (P3). The prototype provides decision guidance, reducing
the burden of decision makers (P2), even though the focus does not currently lie on a comprehensive
risk model. The prototype is designed to ﬁt in a variety of organizational measures (P8) that should
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Artifact Example
role
Activity Information Source
Change re-
quest
Requester Permission
request
Purpose of, beneﬁt from change, reg-
ulatory/qualiﬁcation aspects, awareness
of risks
Manual input
Usage en-
vironment
Requester Permission
request
Risks from the environment in which
the requester uses the permission (e.g.
“ofﬁce” in contrast to “on the road”)
Manual input, reusable
Change
approval
Requester
manager
Approve re-
quest
Summary of the beneﬁts and risks of
the request
Aggregation of request
and usage environment
Permission
proﬁle
Resource
owner
Verify
request
Risks associated with granting a per-
mission of a speciﬁc activity on a set of
data
Manual input, reusable
Role pro-
ﬁle
Resource
owner
Verify
request
Aggregate of the risks from role mem-
bers and from permissions assigned to
the role
Aggregation of data
from previous requests
Change
decision
Resource
owner
Verify
request
Summary of the beneﬁts and risks from
permission–role and user–role assign-
ments
Aggregation of data
from prior artifacts
Table 10.2.: Artifacts produced and used in the decision-support tool as part of the change procedure
be applicable in dynamic environments (P7).
10.4.1. Prototype design
The artifacts encompass questions to elicit the decision factors and aggregations of the factors. The
questions aim for qualitative input, requiring either ratings (1–5 for a given scale, e.g. expected
beneﬁt), binary yes/no answers (e.g. having a speciﬁc awareness), or textual inputs (type of activ-
ity, informal beneﬁt). Each question and output is accompanied by contextualizing clues, such as
examples from the factor-elicitation study. The six artifacts of the tool are listed in Table 10.2.
While the decision-support tool does not prescribe a speciﬁc policy-change process, we can as-
sume an example procedure for didactic reasons that the roles in Table 10.2 refer to:
1. A “requester” completes a request form for a concrete activity in a system on a speciﬁc set of
data and chooses an adequate usage proﬁle for the request;
2. The manager of the requester signs off the request, verifying the necessity of the request;
3. The “owner” of the resource decides on whether to enact the requested changes and how.
Change request
The change request is primarily thought to be completed by staff who require extended permissions,
or on behalf of them. The artifact encompasses questions on the general task, the speciﬁc activity
and data, beneﬁt of providing the permission, and a self-assessment of security awareness. While the
participants were generally comfortable answering the questions, we still noted interesting difﬁcul-
ties. For example, there was contradicting feedback on the concreteness of the beneﬁt to be speciﬁed.
A rather abstract question (“How high would you rate the beneﬁt for the organization granting this
permission?”) can be difﬁcult:
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S1: “This is difﬁcult to say [as one factor] since [activity] only makes out a small part
of my work, but I need that transaction a lot if I do [activity]”
Conversely, a more concrete form (frequency, beneﬁt per use) demonstrated the problem of speciﬁc
beneﬁts not ﬁtting the given schema of frequency and time savings:
S3: “Productivity improvement would be from 0 to 100, because else I could not do
it. . . there are also cases. . . [in which] having access improves the quality of work”
Another beneﬁt factor that the prototype asked for were indirect risks, that is, risks that result from
not granting the permission and staff needing to take more dangerous approaches to addressing the
business needs (e.g. sharing passwords). We found problems caused by the concept being unfamiliar
or not applicable in the domain. S2, for instance, ﬁrst misunderstood the question and then states on
further prompting:
“We don’t share passwords among each other. . . that is not wanted. . . and if then some-
thing happens while I’m away, then I’m held accountable, so we won’t do that”
S1 similarly has problems understanding the concept, but rather because it is common practice to
share logins, only developing the awareness of potential problems in the course of the discussion:
“In our team, for example, when a person is coming back from parental leave. . . and
the IT has not set the permissions correctly in time, she would have sat there three
days not able to work. . . so I log in with my permissions on her PC. . . I don’t think the
company has problems with that, even though my name would appear next to something
she saves”
Usage environment
The artifact on the usage environment should elicit risk factors that concern the context in which
the permission would be used if granted. This includes, among others, the physical security of the
environment, the satisfaction of staff, and stress in the speciﬁc environment. Generally, participants
agreed to distinguish the contexts as it is common practice to take it into account for decisions, for
example, distinguishing between desktop and laptop computers (e.g. S3 and M3).
Problems were seen in the added value of speciﬁc factors. For example, multiple participant raised
doubts on whether the satisfaction has a signiﬁcant impact on the threat of malicious activity (without
referencing the participant):
“Well, the overall satisfaction in the company is not really high, but as I hear it people
are all very loyal and rather shocked if someone takes information to another company”
A more practical problem with the collection of the data was that staff stated that they would not
answer honestly, fearing that the data could be misused:
“I could answer the employee satisfaction. . . but I would not answer questions on satis-
faction, unless it is anonymous”
Instead, it was suggested to reuse available data, for example, from employee surveys.
It was also interesting to observe how the physical-security factor was misunderstood or unclear
depending on the framing of the participant. In case of organizations with a high emphasis on
physical safety (e.g. utilities in case of S2), physical security is understood as the safety of the
workplace (S2: “Is this about tripping hazards?”).
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Permission proﬁle
The permission proﬁle deﬁnes the risks associated with misusing a speciﬁc permission, such as
“read source code from project X”. The factors of this artifact cover the general sensitivity of the
data (e.g. personal data, commercial sensitivity), impact of misuse (e.g. from commercial or legal
consequences), and the threat (the probability e.g. of a misuse or of accidental incidents). For higher
precision of the risk estimation, we would need to elicit the impact and threat values for individual
scenarios, and aggregate the risk scores. However, to reduce the burden of completing the form, we
decided to approximate the overall risk from separate elicitations.
Whether staff was able to complete the form depended on the individual context. For instance, for
the legal impact:
S3: “The data are also sometimes part of the contract. . . [the technical project manager]
knows better about that than me”
In other cases, the variation of the impact is high:
S1: “It depends on the kind of information. . . it might be already rounded. . . or aggre-
gated. . . in other cases you don’t want to hand it out [at all]”
Or, similarly, the potential attack scenarios are complex:
S1: “This data alone would not help, you need the actual product with the data. . . and I
don’t know which way they need to go to get the product”
Generally, there were doubts about the scalability of this kind of data collection:
M1: “What would be in the case that you had 20 different projects. . . Then, one would
want to have a hierarchy, ‘general project’ and an ‘override’ for speciﬁc ones.”
Role proﬁle
The role proﬁle is generated from aggregations of data on assigned permissions and contexts of
assigned users. First, this artifact can inform decisions on whether it is appropriate to assign a role
to a user, that is, whether the risks from the role are adequate for the beneﬁt and the context of the
request. Second, the artifact can support the decision of whether the users already assigned to a role
make it adequate to assign an additional permission to the role. M1 noted that he would need more
information on the users in a role. He also remarked potential problems of scalability:
“Many roles are like ‘developer’, so have a too broad spread, so you can only get
sensible data in the role proﬁle for focused roles.”
Change approval and decision
Aggregating risks and beneﬁts can support both an approval, for example, by the line manager of the
requester, and the ﬁnal decision of a policy maker. For the approval by a manager of the requester,
the approval artifact aggregates information on the request beneﬁts and context risks. For the actual
decision, the policy maker may derive insights on the adequacy of different change options from the
risks and beneﬁts. The decision artifact, in addition to the approval data, aggregates the information
on the risks from the requested permission, from the users assigned to a role and from permissions
assigned to a role (see role proﬁle). Problems stated by participants with respect to the aggregations
of values primarily related to the transparency of the source of the aggregations (M2: “I haven’t
realized where those numbers come from.”).
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Request addressee Approval Decision Reported by
Line manager – Line manager M2, S1, S2
Line manager Line manager (implicit by forward) Application/resource owner M1
Resource owner – Resource owner S3
Administrator Project manager Unit manager M3
Table 10.3.: Change request processes in the study
10.4.2. Change procedures with decision support
Organizations implement very distinct procedures for policy changes, ranging from informal direct
communication to highly regulated form-based procedures (cf. the processes analyzed using INDUSE
in Section 9.5). The decision-support prototype does not prescribe a speciﬁc degree of formalization
or process model. Of the participants’ authorization contexts, ﬁve had an informal and one had a
formal procedure.
Although the forms of the decision-support prototype introduce extra effort to informal proce-
dures, the participants did not categorically reject employing such a system and saw advantages even
for small organizations:
M2: “The current size of our company would not justify this tool, but in larger compa-
nies where you cannot have the overview over all areas and the applications. . . In our
case, it would be a nice way to structure the decisions”
S3, for example, further remarked with respect to the change-request artifact:
“Actually, I already provide this kind of information – only, I. . . formulate it as an email”
Apart from the additional effort that the tool introduces, we also need to examine whether the
artifacts ﬁt in the current processes. Thus: who is the addressee for the change request, is there an
approval and by whom, and who decides. The participants of the study report four distinct models
(cf. Table 10.3), which ﬁt the artifacts: In each case, the requester would complete the change re-
quest and choose the usage environment. If there is an approval step, the person responsible would
receive both original artifacts and the approval summary. Finally, the decision is taken, additionally
considering the generated role proﬁle, the permission proﬁle, and the decision summary.
In addition to the actual procedure, participants also report rich discussions before the actual re-
quest to assign a permission that the tool needs to support:
S1: “That has been agreed upon with [other department] beforehand. . . we discuss with
them how I can access that transaction. . . then my manager requests the permission from
IT”
10.4.3. Expected effort
One of the central requirements for authorization measures is its efﬁciency with respect to the man-
agement overhead (Req 1). Although the decision-support tool is aimed to be light-weight, a certain
amount of cognitive effort is inevitable to collect input and evaluate output of a decision-support tool.
This may not necessarily increase the overall effort, since non-supported processes incur efforts as
well. In the following, we analytically compare the expected costs of decision-supported procedures
to non-supported ones.
Authorization contexts can be diverse. For a broad perspective of decision-support costs, the
analysis targets two distinct authorization contexts from hypothetical organizations:
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Original process Decision-support process
Frequency Effort per Mean effort Frequency Effort per Mean effort
per request occurrence per request per request occurrence per request
Open form/tool 1 1 1 1 1 1
Establish permissions 1 15 15 1 15 15
Enter permissions 1 2 2 1 2 2
Explain/answer questions 1 10 10 1 20 20
Create usage proﬁle – – – 0.01 15 0.15
Send request 1 1 1 1 1 1
29 39.15
Table 10.4.: Detailed analysis of activities for the request step in the formal context
• Formal context: The baseline process is formalized and involves form-based requests of per-
mission changes as it can be found in many organizations (compare the Shared folder proce-
dure in Section 5.1):
1. Requester: Completes a form for a permission request, informally stating the motivations
for the change,
2. Requester manager: Checks and acknowledges request,
3. Resource owner: Checks and acknowledges request.
• Informal context: This process is rather informal and only requires requesters to click on a link
and provide a reason to request a change from the resource owner (compare the Sharepoint
procedure in Section 5.1):
1. Requester: Clicks a link, informally stating the motivations for the change,
2. Resource owner: Receives email, checks, and acknowledges request.
Each of the steps in the original, unsupported processes involve several activities with respective
cognitive efforts. The decision-supported processes in each of the baseline contexts encompass dif-
ferent activities or the activities will incur different efforts. Table 10.4 shows the activities for the
request step in the formal context in detail, both for the unsupported and supported process. We apply
a simpliﬁed model of effort for the individual activities, inspired by the GOMS model (Card et al.,
1983). For each activity, we note the frequency relative to the requests, the effort at each occurrence,
and the derived mean effort. For example, “Establish permissions” needs to be executed for each
unsupported request (frequency: 1), has a relative effort of 15, resulting in a mean effort per request
of 15. The sum of the mean efforts indicates the effort for the entire step in the process.
Table 10.5 summarizes the efforts per step for the formal and informal context and the respective
unsupported and supported processes. For the formal context, the analysis indicates a reduction by
10% for the supported process. While the request has a notable higher effort, due to the necessity
of entering more precise information on the request, both the approval and the decision step proﬁt
from the support. For the approval step, this is due to a reduced effort to understand the request
(better structured data) and less need to query the background of the request. Both effects also
reduce the effort for the decision step, offsetting the infrequent need to create permission proﬁles.
Overall, in comparison to formalized processes we can expect similar or slightly reduced efforts from
introducing decision support.
For the informal context, the overall effort per request for the informal context should be similar
as well. While, again, the request requires higher effort, the reduction in decision-making makes up
for that. We assume here a good integration into the application as for the informal process, thus not
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Formal context effort Informal context effort
Step Role Original Supported Original Supported
Request Staff 29 39 12 24
Approve Manager 19 16 – –
Decide Resource owner 38 23 35 23
86 78 47 47
Table 10.5.: Comparison of efforts with and without decision support in formal and informal contexts
requiring the requester to establish the necessary permissions. Still, the formulation of the request
incurs the higher mental effort of answering decision-support questions.
Overall, the analytical results indicate that it should be possible to implement decision support
as a light-weight measure with similar overhead as existing procedures. There could be negative
effects from the increased request effort by the functional stakeholder who might instead be tempted
to circumvent the measure. Apart from an empirical validation of these results, it also remains
to be researched whether the potential increase in security awareness through the decision-support
approach offsets these effects. Moreover, we need to explore whether the overall beneﬁts for the
organization through more traceable processes and more effective reviews and monitoring make up
for this downside.
There are a number of potential optimizations that will lead to an even further reduction of the
effort, including automatic data collection, for example, of security trainings and employee qual-
iﬁcation, supporting proﬁle creation with existing ones as templates, and a deep integration with
administrative tools. Parts of the procedure could also be limited to permissions with a risk above a
certain threshold. Moreover, existing risk information from organizational ISMS can be incorporated
into the risk model and reduce the amount of data to be collected.
10.4.4. Security awareness
We asked the participants of the study as part of the introductory phase what kind of risks they are
aware of regarding granted permissions. The participants either primarily stated unintentional risks,
such as “stolen laptop” (M1), or intentional risks, such as “data manipulation” (M2, S2, S3), no
one stated a comprehensive range of threats. Moreover, in the evaluations, the awareness of risks
depended on the framing from the work practice as described, for example, for the indirect risks in
the change-request artifact or the physical security for the usage-environment artifact. Despite the
missing clarity, the respective participants (e.g. M2, S2) self-assessed no gain in awareness from the
discussions after the evaluations. Conversely, M1 remarked:
“On our level, we only look at. . . the beneﬁt, and ignore the risk. . . that’s why this could
be helpful”
Thus we observed two phenomena: Participants who discussed new risks on the basis of the factors
and presumably increased their awareness, and participants who see the tool as helpful to improve
overall awareness. Still, future work is needed to explore whether completing a form is already
helpful or whether it requires accompanying discussions.
10.5. Categories of problems
In the course of the evaluations of the decision-support prototype, several problems recurred that we
categorize in the following to guide further research on the collection of decision factors. Generally,
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we need to distinguish problems related to the collection of information (the main focus of this work)
from those related to the interpretation of aggregated data that support the actual decision. Of the
problems enumerated below, only the comprehensibility of the factor and transparency were brought
up for aggregations, with the latter exclusively for aggregations.
Availability of precise knowledge Depending on the perspective of the individual completing the
form, certain information may be difﬁcult to elicit. One reason in the study was that the data was
not available to the speciﬁc role (see permission proﬁle). In other cases, the participants lacked the
comparison (e.g. for satisfaction in the usage-environment artifact). Third, problems can occur due to
the complexity of the elicited data, as described for potential attack scenarios (see permission proﬁle).
Fourth, the precision of the data collection is also impacted from the status-quo bias (Gilovich et al.,
2002): individuals relying overly on the current situation (S1: “So many have the permission, I don’t
see it as critical”).
Acceptability of information request Problems also occurred when the request for the data is seen
as sensitive. Apart from the usage-environment factor of satisfaction (see artifact), this could also
be observed for the stress level in the team due to a general mistrust of how stress levels would be
interpreted by superiors.
Adequate degree of abstraction The goal of the prototype design was to achieve a high level
of concreteness. However, we observed both problems due to overly abstract and overly concrete
factors. Too abstract factors primarily affected questions that covered an overly broad area (e.g.
the beneﬁt rating for the change request, see artifact). Conversely, the questions could also be too
concrete when they excluded a speciﬁc kind of input that does not ﬁt the given questions (see request
artifact).
Comprehensibility of the question and the factor Questions are difﬁcult to understand if they are
too distant for the individual. For instance, S2 found it difﬁcult to relate to the physical security (see
usage environment). Thus, the contextualizing clues need to match the environment of the individual.
Moreover, the factor behind the question can be difﬁcult on a conceptual level: It was difﬁcult to
explain what the aim was of the question on indirect risks if participants cannot relate to those risks
(see indirect risks for change request). Similarly, a participant had problems to distinguish impact
and threat for the permission proﬁle – two concepts that are difﬁcult to separate for non-security
experts.
For the aggregation of data, participants noted similar problems of relating to factors. For example,
M1 advocated a clear separation of personal and organizational impact to simplify the interpretation
of the aggregations.
Applicability of the factor One reason for the incomprehensibility of a factor can be that it is not
applicable to the speciﬁc environment, as seen for the indirect risks. More speciﬁcally, M3 stated
that indirect risks are not an issue in their environment since password sharing is prohibited and users
go through the ofﬁcial channels instead. Also, a factor can be inapplicable if it is irrelevant in the
context. M2, for example, stated that the amount of external contacts is irrelevant for her decision on
granting permissions.
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Transparency of aggregations For aggregations of factors, participants stated problems with the
transparency of the presented information. For example, for the change-approval artifact, M2 was
missing the indication of where the data came from (see artifact). M1 similarly requested for the role
proﬁle to receive richer information on its members (see artifact).
10.6. Discussion
General problems with decision support As part of the evaluations, participants questioned
whether a risk- and beneﬁt-based decision is generally realistic:
M3: “If someone should develop. . . and needs a permission for that, we cannot say ‘not
possible’ ”
Further, participants argued that a certain level of trust is necessary in a work relationship:
M3: “If I had someone who I cannot trust, I should maybe rather let him go”
Both arguments show how context-dependent decision support is.
Perceived usefulness Participants stated a number of positive effects from such a system:
• Improves awareness: Participants found the prototype to increase their security awareness (cf.
Section 10.4.4).
• Improves decision transparency: The reasoning for decisions on granting permissions can be
intransparent:
M1: “What would be important, is a certain transparency in the decision. . . currently
it’s rather just ‘no’. . . if some details were known, it would be more understand-
able”
• Improves request communication: Participants remarked that a decision-support tool may im-
prove the communication for changes to permissions:
S2: “It would reduce misunderstandings if I could formulate through such a form
what permissions I require and for what reason”
Validity of the results The study relies on subjective data from individual employees of different
contexts. Consequently, we cannot expect to achieve a precise and comprehensive picture of the
individual contexts. Because of the broad range of contexts in practice, this study also cannot pro-
vide a representative result, despite the careful sampling to achieve a broad picture of the problems
involved in collecting and aggregating data for decision support. Nevertheless, because of the rich
data, the study ﬁndings should offer a good hypothesis for further research on this subject.
Recommendations From the elicited problems and the feedback by the participants, we can derive
the following recommendations on the design of distributed data collection for decision support:
• Adequately embed collection in procedures: A separate collection of the decision factors incurs
high effort in dynamic environments. Despite the problems found in the study, the results indi-
cate that a distributed data-collection is possible and may reduce the effort (P2, P7). However,
the procedures in practice vary with the organizational environments. Considering the required
formality and centralization, a decision-support system must be adequately integrated for the
speciﬁc environment (cf. Section 10.4.2; P8).
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• Contextualize factors: Several of the problems surrounding the factors related to their com-
prehensibility. When participants misunderstood questions, they could often still answer them
after further explanations framed the questions in a way that was more familiar. Question-
naires for collecting information thus need to be concrete, domain-speciﬁc, and tailorable to
provide appropriate clues to those completing the form (P3, P8). This might be challenging
for the diversity of large organizations.
• Respect the sensitivity of factors: We need to respect that certain data is very sensitive and
cannot be directly collected for privacy reasons (P5). The sensitivity of factors needs to be
elicited, and potential indirect sources and the necessity of the factors should be considered.
• Offer ﬂexibility in data collection: For efﬁciency, the forms must be ﬂexible to provide for
varying security needs, for example, requiring a baseline evaluation of risks in uncritical cases,
but more details for critical ones (cf. Section 10.4.1; P8, P2).
• Reuse existing data: Every question in a form will require cognitive effort and threatens its
acceptability if we assume a limited motivational “budget” (Beautement et al., 2008). More-
over, additional information from further sources may validate manually provided information.
As shown in this chapter, we can reuse data between requests (P2), but also need to leverage
additional available information, such as employee surveys and application logs.
• Support discussions: A decision-support system should not only guide a streamlined proce-
dure, but also take into account that decision processes often involve negotiations between
stakeholders (cf. Section 10.4.2). Stakeholders discuss the needs, risks, and technical alterna-
tives as part of the process and decision guidance should support this to enable its thorough
use (P1, P5, P8).
10.7. Conclusion
This chapter examined the problems regarding decision support for authorization and evaluates a
systematically developed, concrete prototype to derive insights on the practical viability of deci-
sion support for authorization. A formative evaluation explored particularly how well the numerous
relevant beneﬁt and risk factors can be collected in a distributed form to achieve the required efﬁ-
ciency. Participants stated insightful critique, both relating to problems with individual factors and
the general concept, and positive feedback on the use of a decision-support system. We can derive
the following insights on the design of decision guidance from the study:
Q11.1 What kind of guidance for authorization-related decisions is effective and efﬁcient? Appropri-
ate decision-support showed to be highly context-dependent (P8). For example, the general ne-
cessity of decision support depends on how difﬁcult the decisions on granting permissions are
and how distant policy makers are from the requesting staff. Moreover, a decision-support sys-
tem needs to be embedded in the organization-speciﬁc procedures to offer sufﬁcient efﬁciency
for the frequent decisions (P7). The system also needs to reﬂect the actual decision-process,
that is, support the negotiations between stakeholders if necessary.
Q11.2 How can the information that is required for decision guidance be elicited? There are two
aspects to this questions: First, how can the factors be collected? The study in this chapter
showed that it is important that the factors are comprehensible (through appropriate contextu-
alization; P3) and respect the sensibility of certain factors. Second, how can the collection be
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implemented efﬁciently? As stated in the recommendations, we can implement the collection
in a distributed manner as part of the policy change procedure – and integrate functional staff
(P1). Flexible forms can adapt the required effort to the expected security needs and the reuse
of existing data, both from earlier requests and from external sources, can reduce the effort for
completing the forms (P2).
The study on decision support for authorization further gave insights on related questions:
Q4.1 In what ways does the satisfaction of functional staff interrelate with functional disruptions,
security awareness and expertise, and organizational culture? / Q4.2 How is satisfaction
impacted for the authoring and making of policies? The study participants mentioned how
the denial or withdrawal of permissions affect individuals emotionally. It can thus be useful
to increase the transparency of decisions (cf. Section 10.6) or even factor in this aspect as a
beneﬁt factor when evaluating whether to withdraw a permission.
Q5.2 How must mitigations to undesirable circumventions be designed to be effective and efﬁcient?
Decision support may help in two ways to guide functional staff to circumvent authorization
only when adequate. First, it can improve the transparency of the decisions through more
structured decisioning. Second, it can increase the awareness for the potential risks from
modiﬁcations or disclosure of information through the participation in the decision-making
(P6). Both ways may foster the overall acceptability of authorization denials and reduce the
temptation to circumvent the authorization measure (P5).
Q9.1 How do requests for changes to the policy take place in practice and what are the obstacles
for functional staff? / Q9.2 How can we foster adequate requests for changes from functional
staff? Study participants mentioned misunderstandings of change requests as one problem
in requesting changes. A structured decision procedure may reduce these problems. Together
with the aforementioned increased transparency and awareness, this may result a higher overall
acceptability of the change procedure and thus make it more likely that changes are actually
requested.
Q8.1 How do policy authors interact with policy makers and functional staff for implementing
changes? / Q10.2 How can we uphold the procedures and prevent procedure circumven-
tions? The policy changes can take place informally through email or face-to-face, or formally
through forms in an approval process. Particularly in the former case, we need to expect ne-
gotiations between functional departments and technical staff on how to grant permissions (cf.
Section 10.4.2, P1). When honoring these needs, we may be able to reduce decisions that are
taken outside of the deﬁned process (P2).
Q1.1 What type of organization requires what authorization measure and what are the inﬂuencing
factors? We observed a number of factors in the participants’ contexts that inﬂuence the
design of authorization measures and support earlier ﬁndings. The design of the procedure
(who to address for changes, the degree of formalization, approvals) depends on organizational
characteristics, such its conﬁguration (Mintzberg, 1980). New factors that inﬂuence the design
of the authorization measure are how the context deﬁnes the comprehensibility of decision
factors and how clear the decisions on permissions are.
Future work on decision support for authorization needs to encompass thorough case studies of
employing a decision-support system in practice in a number of authorization contexts to further
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explore its practical viability and its beneﬁts. More speciﬁcally, we may study which factors are
acceptable and completable by whom in what context, generating insights on Q11.2 Guidance data.
Continuing the work on security awareness in this chapter, we may further examine the connection
between participation and completing questionnaires, and gains in security awareness (e.g. related to
Q5.2 Circumvention guidance). Further open questions that may be addressed relate to:
• Regulation: How can we systematically integrate regulatory obligations into guidance (Q3.1 Reg-
ulation in decisions)?
• Additional uses of risk data: The collected data on risks and beneﬁts of permissions, usage
contexts, and permission assignments can be considered a “risk policy.” How can this in-
formation inform risk-based reviews (Q7.1 Effective reviews, Q7.2 Review interaction) and
risk-based monitoring (Req 7 Reviews and monitoring, Q7.3 Monitoring support)?
• Additional sources of data: We need to integrate further sources of information on risks
and beneﬁts. How can we, for example, make use of results from compliance monitoring
(Req 7 Reviews and monitoring), employee surveys, and related processes, such as ISMS
(Q10.3 Process integration)?
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And though their soil be not very fruitful, nor
their air very wholesome, yet against the air they
defend them with temperate diet, and so order
and husband their ground with diligent travail,
that in no country is greater increase and plenty
of corn and cattle, nor men’s bodies of longer
life and subject or apt to fewer diseases.
Thomas More: Utopia (1516)
In the beginning of this dissertation, we brieﬂy discussed how the political exercises authority. The
central points were the acceptability of authority through legitimate laws and regulations (“rational
authority”: Weber, 1968) and its ﬂexibility through speciﬁc judgments in court. We applied these ap-
proaches – acceptability and ﬂexibility – to authorization in information systems, and formulated two
research questions on the problems surrounding authorization and their mitigations, and ﬁve respec-
tive hypotheses. We explored approaches from security usability, and from secure and agile software
engineering as the more concrete basis to address the problems – leading to the formulation of eight
Authorization Principles. An analysis of authorization contexts allowed us to more clearly deﬁne
the problem domain through a taxonomy and scope this dissertation to organizational authorization.
We empirically studied the problems with authorization in practice to derive requirements and open
research questions. To explore the open questions, we applied the principles in the development and
evaluation of six artifacts that cover a broad range of authorization problems.
At this point, we are now in a position to draw overall conclusions on the usefulness and complete-
ness of the principles. We will also discuss the methodology of this thesis, and the implications of
the results for the design of authorization measures in organizational and other contexts. Consider-
ing research directions for authorization, we emphasize particularly ethics as an important area. The
thesis concludes with a consideration of the implications of the results for the research in information
security beyond authorization, and argues for participatory approaches and interdisciplinarity.
11.1. Discussion of the contributions
11.1.1. Critical evaluation of the artifacts
We explored six artifacts as practical contributions, grouped into four chapters, to test the validity of
the principles and hypotheses, and address a subset of the identiﬁed detailed research questions. The
selection of the artifacts aimed to cover a broad range of research questions (cf. Table 6.5 on p. 113
and the overview in Table 11.1), covering development efﬁciency, participation in policy changes,
ﬂexible authorization, and the adequacy of procedures and policy decisions.
One question is how universally applicable the artifacts are. To better understand their scoping,
we relate characteristics according to the Authorization Taxonomy (cf. Section 4.1) to the artifacts
in Table 11.1, both for the contingency factors (i.e. in what environment the artifact can be applied)
and the design parameters (for what kind of authorization measure the artifact is useful). From the
original intentions and the evaluation results for the individual artifacts, we can, for example, infer
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that four of the artifacts are independent of the speciﬁc kind of resource owner (they can be used
to protect the security interests of individuals and organizations, content and entity owners) and two
aimed at organizational owners, since the latter artifacts aim to support the interrelation of multiple
stakeholders. Security needs are affected by what level of criticality the artifact is adequate for – for
example, whether the minimally imposed overhead is acceptable for low security needs. Resources
and principals need to be structured for ﬁve of the artifacts, for example, in roles. For the necessary
security expertise of involved stakeholders, we ﬁnd limitations such as the requirement of at least
medium security expertise. Similarly, the adequate levels of complexity of the context may limit
the contexts to those with policies of medium sizes. In case of the design parameters, the main
limitation is that the authorization scope is generally expected to be of organizational type, since the
artifacts assume a surrounding organization for which the policy is speciﬁed. Since the limitations
of the artifacts’ scopes were primarily necessary to arrive at concrete artifacts to be evaluated, we
may extend those boundaries as part of future work to transfer the approaches to other authorization
contexts.
We need to address two potential problems with the argumentative basis of the evaluation of the
artifacts. First, the quantitative empirical arguments are derived from a very focused authorization
context: a business Web application in a medium-sized enterprise. The reason is that the practical
evaluation required a clear focus on a context for the case studies to generate rich and meaningful
results (Flyvbjerg, 2007; Yin, 2009). Second, four contributions are based upon subjective empirical
work. Generally, broad objective and quantitative studies may result in more profound evidence and
thus in higher validity. However, the aim of the contributions was not to generally prove the superior-
ity of speciﬁc approaches or claim comprehensiveness or representativeness, but to explore solutions
to problems and derive rich insights for the application of principles and approaches. For this, HCI
research generally applies qualitative methods for richer results (Adams et al., 2008; Glaser and
Strauss, 1967)1. Regarding the credibility (construct and internal validity, reliability) and generaliz-
ability (external validity) of evaluation results, each artifact chapter describes the respective rationale
of the study design and the scope validity. Generally, while most studies have a limited scope of
generalizability, they, in sum, provide well-founded hypotheses. Overall, the exploratory approach
allowed us to observe interesting shortcomings for the individual artifacts – also summarized in Ta-
ble 11.1 – and derive well-founded recommendations (cf. Table G.2). Both represent useful points
of departure for future research, which are discussed below, and for their implementation in practice.
11.1.2. Further empirical contributions
Apart from the evaluation of the artifacts, two further empirical contributions should be mentioned.
One relates to the secure development with agile methods (Section C) and is based on interviews
with ten agile practitioners. Despite this limited number of interviews, the study allowed us, in
combination with a review of the analytical literature on the subject, to derive three principles for
authorization measures in dynamic environments – with a particular emphasis on participation.
Second, we conducted the Authorization Problems Study, which was based on interviews with
120 individuals from a variety of backgrounds in a large corporation (Section 5.1). Together with the
literature on problems with authorization in organizations, this study enabled us to derive a holistic
model of those problems. Although the participants were recruited from a single company, the variety
of contexts and the richness of the feedback resulted in a useful description of the problems and a
profound basis for the problem model.
1See Section 5.1.1 for the rationale of conducting qualitative research
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11.1.3. Supporting theoretical contributions
Apart from the main theoretical results (the Authorization Principles, discussed in Section 11.1.5),
two further theoretical contributions supported and guided the research in this dissertation:
First, the Authorization Taxonomy describes and structures contexts of authorization measures
(Section 4.1). The taxonomy is based on a systematic literature review, considering the authorization
contexts in 145 publications. Using the criteria and their dimensions helped us to clearly describe or-
ganizational authorization contexts on the basis of the Structural Conﬁgurations (Mintzberg, 1980),
and how organizational characteristics inﬂuence authorization measures (cf. Section 4.2). Moreover,
the taxonomy allowed us to differentiate the priorities of the requirements with respect to authoriza-
tion contexts (Section 6.2), to describe differences between the authorization contexts contrasted in
the Authorization Problems Study (Section 5.1), and to evaluate the applicability of the practical con-
tributions (Section 11.1.1). Thus, while not explicitly validated, the taxonomy showed to be useful
in differentiating between contexts in the thesis, and improved the understanding of differences and
applicability.
Second, from the thorough empirical analysis of the problems surrounding authorization in the
Authorization Problems Study, we derived the holistic problem model (Section 5.3). The model is
an abstraction of the problems in organizations, their interrelation, and the affected perspectives –
thus, primarily aimed at providing a structured description (cf. Minsky, 1965). The model proved
useful for structuring the requirements and the open research questions, and thus a substantial part of
this thesis. However, this does not represent a validation of the model, since the requirements were
based on the same empirical data that the model was originally derived from. On the other hand, all
problems that we discovered in the course of the artifact evaluations ﬁt this problem model, offering
an indication of its usefulness.
11.1.4. Requirements and detailed research questions
From the problems surrounding authorization, we derived a set of requirements that authorization
measures may need to fulﬁll – depending on the speciﬁc context (cf. Sections 6.1 and 6.2). Consid-
ering the existing approaches to these requirements, we arrived at a number of detailed open research
questions to address in this thesis (cf. Section 6.3). We already gave a brief overview of how the de-
veloped artifacts cover the questions in Section 6.4 (Table 6.5). Having described and evaluated
those artifacts, we now summarize the respective insights on the questions and requirements2. In the
following, we will discuss the key points for each authorization perspective:
Organizational and functional perspective
As expected, authorization measures are multifaceted and the effectiveness, efﬁciency, and satisfac-
tion depends both on the context (size, formality, risks) and on the design of the measure (mech-
anisms, procedures, accompanying measures). The artifacts and their evaluation indicate how the
design needs to ﬁt the context to reduce interferences with the functional work, and satisﬁed func-
tional and administrative staff. We saw how mechanisms (e.g. policy override) in combination with
adequate procedures (e.g. based on INDUSE) and further support (decision support) can lead to an
improved authorization measure, depending on the context. Conversely, we also observed, in the
case of policy override, how missing organizational measures can reduce the overall effectiveness of
an authorization measure.
2The summary is primarily based on the results on the questions given in the conclusion sections of the artifact chapters
and the respective argumentative basis given in Table 11.1.
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While we also addressed how to improve overall satisfaction and how to reduce undesirable cir-
cumvention of authorization, the question of how satisfaction impacts effectiveness (Q4.3) and when
staff will resort to circumvention (Q5.1) remains to be researched in future work. Also, further
studies into a broader range of contexts could deepen the current exploratory ﬁndings and develop
descriptive and prescriptive theories on authorization-measure design.
Policy making and authoring
Policy makers and authors have a very central role in achieving adequate authorization: The deci-
sions they take and the changes they make to the policy will determine how frequently authorization
interferes with functional work. We saw a variety of ways in which and by whom decisions are
taken and changes are made, depending on the characteristics of the context. For instance, we are
more likely to ﬁnd informal decision-making in small and informal contexts, while responsibilities
are in part assigned key users and role owners in more structured contexts. Nevertheless, we found
that adequate (e.g. institutionalized) interaction between functional staff, policy makers, and authors
is important and that we can support interaction through procedures, mechanisms, and tools. For
example, change-support tools can support the policy author in interacting with policy makers and
misunderstandings may be reduced through a decision-support system. Whereas we addressed most
questions of these perspectives, we only touched on approaches for monitoring and policy reviews.
Also, the approaches here could again proﬁt from further, more thorough studies that target a broader
range of contexts.
Security tactics and strategy
The perspectives of security tactics (processes) and strategy (decisions) are primarily supported in
process design through the process model INDUSE, and in guiding decisions through the decision-
support prototype. As indicated from both artifacts, change requests, procedures, and decisions are
often approached on a rather informal level, but can beneﬁt from an adequate degree of formalization
– supported, for example, through a decision-guidance tool. Then, the more transparent and less
arbitrary decisions may improve the change-request and procedure effectiveness. Further systematic
case studies with broader scopes could clarify what type of processes and guidance is appropriate for
what contexts.
Development
The practical contributions indicated that it is beneﬁcial when developers strive for ﬂexibility and
comprehensibility of the policy, particularly to foster the interactions between functional staff, pol-
icy makers, and authors. For the models to actually achieve their goals (e.g. regarding ﬂexibility),
mechanism must be integrated in an adequate way. For example, we must signal to staff where pol-
icy override can be of use and help with the semantics of policies as indicated by the problems in
policy management. We further need to study how the expressiveness and comprehensibility of au-
thorization models interrelate. The interactions with developers are also important to enable dynamic
changes to system functionality and policies. Here, an adequate controls framework can support the
agility in development. One of the questions that we have not addressed in this thesis is how we
can foster the trust in the reliability of the mechanism and controls. Generally, a more thorough ex-
amination from the development perspective would target a broader range of contexts, models, and
mechanisms.
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Concluding remarks
The authorization usability requirements were derived from a systematic elicitation of problems sur-
rounding authorization. A broad literature review of existing approaches led to the formulation of
the detailed research questions. Despite their systematic roots, the choice of the speciﬁc questions
contains a subjective element. However, as shown in the conclusions of the individual artifacts and
in the overview above, the questions worked well for providing a solid foundation for the research
in this thesis, and for structuring the breadth of problems and the insights from the artifacts. Since
several of the questions were not addressed or can be further studied more thoroughly, the detailed
research question will also be useful to guide future research.
11.1.5. Usefulness and completeness of the Authorization Principles
The Authorization Principles (Section 6.4) are the main contribution of this thesis on how to solve
problems surrounding authorization. The principles were derived from two sources: ﬁrst, from se-
curity usability, for which we extended and generalized context-speciﬁc approaches from prior lit-
erature to apply to (organizational) authorization problems; second, from agile security, for which
approaches either had similarly been mentioned in the relevant literature or were based on the results
of the empirical study on practitioners’ perspectives on security in agile development.
To assess the quality of the proposed principles, the set of principles can be considered a syn-
thetic or prescriptive theory – providing qualitative (rather than quantitative) guidance, scoped to a
speciﬁc domain (Dix, 2008). While, generally, theories need to explain and be veriﬁable (Popper,
1935/2002), generative theories, such as those common in HCI, are difﬁcult to verify, since “the
evaluation of generative artifacts is methodologically unsound” (Dix, 2008, p. 194): How can you
show that the application of a theory – the principles, in this case – produces the desired outcome
with numerous variables in design and development tasks? Dix (2008) argues to focus on the “jus-
tiﬁcation” (p. 195) of the theory, that is, on the “audit trail” (ibid.) from the original assumptions to
the derived theory.
Speciﬁcally, to evaluate – and justify – the usefulness of the Authorization Principles, we need
to assess their correctness (Does adhering to them actually improve the usability of authorization
measures?) and the completeness of the list (Does the list include all necessary aspects?). Further
important properties of a theory are the simplicity3 (Is the list as short as possible?) and its transfer-
ability (Can the list be applied to other problems in organizational authorization?) (Dix, 2008).
For the Authorization Principles, we can draw on two sources for their validation that are both in-
dependent of the original formulation of the principles: The application of principles in artifacts and
the relation of the principles to the recommendations derived from empirical work. Considering the
ﬁndings from the application of the principles is most useful for assessing the principles’ correctness:
Which principle did actually improve usability? A summary of the insights and shortcomings derived
from applying the principles is given in Table G.1 in Appendix G, including the respective coverage
and argumentative basis. In contrast, the second source (the recommendations, cf. Table G.2), is
rather appropriate to assess the completeness of the principles: Are all the recommendations from
the empirical work covered by the principles?
We will ﬁrst discuss the correctness and transferability separately for each principle before con-
sidering the entire list’s completeness and simplicity4:
3There are a number of arguments on why simpler theories are better. For example, Popper (1935/2002) argues that
simpler theories are easier to falsify. Simplicity is also one important criterion of Occam’s razor.
4This discussion only considers the scope of this thesis – organizational authorization. For a brief discussion of applying
the principles beyond organizations, see Section G.1.
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P1 Interaction and participation
Integration is the primary research paradigm of this thesis and it is applied on several layers. On
the layer of practical approaches to authorization problems, integration is represented through the
principle of interaction and participation. This principle is applied in each of the artifacts, fostering
interactions between administrative staff and developers, among administrative staff, or the partici-
pation of functional staff. These interactions resulted in “knowledge integration” (Fischer, 1999), for
example, when functional staff provided decision factors in the decision-support study. Moreover,
we could also witness “informed participation” (Brown et al., 1993) with the authorization measure
as the “boundary object” (Star and Griesemer, 1989) to support the interaction – for example, when
policy makers and authors perceived the change support as a good basis to discuss policy-change
alternatives.
In most cases, integration was seen positively; for example, participants of the study on decision
support stated that transparency of decisions and the overall satisfaction could improve. Conversely,
the study of policy override in practice resulted in an overuse of the participation means (policy
override) due to a lack of accompanying organizational measures. Similarly, some participants in the
studies were careful about its transferability to their speciﬁc context, particularly to integrate policy
makers with a low technical afﬁnity. Thus, assuming that participative measures are adequately
encompassed with organizational measures and given an adequate context, the artifacts strongly
indicate the usefulness of this principle.
P2 Reduced burden
Reducing the burden of individuals interacting with information systems has been a wide-spread
approach for HCI and security usability. We applied the principle for all six artifacts, reducing
functional staff’s change-request effort, policy makers’ decision effort, authors’ change effort, and
developers’ implementation effort. We found that any approach to actually reduce the burden needs
to ﬁt the context – for example, for the different modes of policy management or through contextual-
ization of the elicited factors in decision support. While the impact of the reduced burden varied so
that the concrete approaches may not be universally applicable, there are strong indications that this
principle is useful in improving authorization usability.
P3 Concreteness
We applied the principle of concreteness to improve comprehensibility in two ways: to reduce the
cognitive effort of changing abstract policies and to reduce the abstractness of factors in policy
decision-making. For policy management, while concrete change suggestions from the change sup-
port were useful, this at the same time also brought about new abstractions on the actual changes
because the actual policy is rather distant in this case. For the collection of the factors for decision
support, problems with the abstractness were prevalent and increased concreteness improved com-
prehensibility. Even though further studies need to extend our knowledge on how the concreteness is
best achieved (e.g. contextualization), this principle shows to be a good candidate for authorization
usability.
P4 Multidisciplinary
Each of the artifacts required technical and non-technical approaches. Most artifacts are techni-
cally informed from information security, employing models or algorithms relating to authorization.
We relied on further particular technical disciplines for effective and efﬁcient approaches, including
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software engineering for the integration of enforcement controls and artiﬁcial intelligence for change
support. In case of technical artifacts, the adequate interaction of stakeholders – whether developers,
administrative, or functional staff – with the mechanism depended on socio-technical approaches.
Organizational, risk, and decision sciences provided the basis for the processes and the decision
guidance surrounding authorization. The multidisciplinary approach was not only necessary to real-
ize the artifacts, their evaluation even indicated the necessity of considering additional disciplines –
for example, for policy override, for which organizational measures were lacking.
P5 Individuals’ behavior
Considering the rationale of individuals’ behavior guided the design of the policy-override mech-
anism (offering convenient, but controlled options for exceptional cases) and the participatory ap-
proach of the decision-support prototype (increasing acceptability of restrictions through participa-
tion). While this principle lacks a broader argumentative basis in this thesis, the policy-override
study indicated how useful this approach is in two ways: First, it reduced the number of potential
circumventions of authorization. Second, rational behavior also led to an over-use of the mecha-
nism, indicating that policy override was perceived as an easy option even for continuous application
and that, conversely, adequate long-term mitigation strategies (changes to the policy or to the ap-
plication) were perceived as requiring too much effort. The statements of the participants of the
decision-support study indicate that transparency and improved communication are a means to in-
ﬂuence behavior. Even though only applied to two artifacts, ten recommendations relate to this
principle, demonstrating its importance.
P6 Security awareness
Raising the general security awareness to inﬂuence the individuals’ behavior was only directly ap-
plied and evaluated for the decision-support prototype. The study indicated that security awareness
can be increased through participation in the decision-making process, but focused research is nec-
essary for more solid conclusions. The importance of this principle additionally showed in the study
on policy override in practice. Here, increased awareness for the drawbacks of policy override could
have led to a more adequate use of the mechanism. Raising the awareness should thus be an important
factor in inﬂuencing the behavior of functional and administrative staff. Overall, six recommenda-
tions relate to improving the security awareness.
P7 Design for dynamics
Several of the practical contributions, both technical artifacts (e.g. the enforcement framework and
the policy-override mechanism) and non-technical (e.g. INDUSE) aimed to improve authorization in
dynamic environments. The addressed dynamics related to the security needs, policies, or system
functionality. This principle helped to reduce the functional disruptions (e.g. through policy over-
ride), and the administrative (decision support) and development overhead (enforcement), indicating
the usefulness of this principle – given that the context allows for low-overhead approaches (cf.
INDUSE). Moreover, ﬁve of the recommendations relate to this principle.
P8 Tailor for context
In four artifacts, we explored how the authorization measure or supporting tools have to be designed
to ﬁt the diverse contexts of authorization. Most generally, the INDUSE study showed the interde-
pendence of authorization process design and the characteristics of the organization (centralization,
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formality). The evaluation of policy management demonstrated how the adequate mode depends on
the stakeholders’ backgrounds, and organizational and policy complexity. The decision-support pro-
totype showed how important it is that the guidance ﬁts the process and ﬂexibly adapts to different
security needs for efﬁciency. The empirical studies in this dissertation – both on individual artifacts
and the Authorization Problems Study – further demonstrated the variety of contexts and their re-
spective requirements. This principle thus should help remind designers to take the speciﬁc contexts
into considerations – between as well as within organizations.
Completeness and simplicity of the principles
Concerning the correctness, P1 Interaction and participation, P4 Multidisciplinary, and P2 Reduced
burden are best represented and show high impact. Conversely, others – particularly P6 Security
awareness, P3 Concreteness, and P5 Individuals’ behavior –, despite appearing useful, would beneﬁt
from further examination, both more thorough and broader in scope. When addressing the simplicity
of the set of principles, we cannot compromise on the principles’ approaches due to their usefulness,
but might at most subsume less important ones under others. One candidate is P3 Concreteness,
which was only applied to two artifacts, is only related to three recommendations, and is covered
by P6 (concreteness is often necessary to increase awareness) and P2 (concreteness improves un-
derstanding and reduces learning effort). However, its importance for the usability of authorization
appears to be high enough to justify its explicit naming. All other principles were either broadly
successfully applied or relate to numerous recommendations and should thus be kept.
Regarding the completeness of the principles, Table G.2 shows that all recommendations are cov-
ered by at least one principle. Additional aspects in the recommendations listed in the table as
not explicitly covered by the principles can still be related to the existing ones: The satisfaction of
stakeholders, observing the authorization measure for potentials of improvement, and intuitive user
interface are all implicitly addressed by or a prerequisite for P2 Reduced burden. Improving the
decision-making can be achieved through P2 Reduced burden and P6 Security awareness. Deriving
consequences from observations inﬂuences behavior (P5) and is necessary to reduce the burden (P2).
Adequate procedures and ﬂexibility are both more speciﬁc forms of P8 Tailor for context.
Overall, the validation shows how arbitrary the selection of the principles is. While we may reduce
the list to a small number of core principles to increase its simplicity, we would lose the ability
to emphasize important corollaries. Conversely, the more speciﬁc additional aspects, even though
important and worth noting here, would increase the redundancy if added as principles. Overall, the
selection of the principles – particularly the granularity of the list – will necessarily be subjective.
11.1.6. Hypotheses and main research questions
The ﬁrst two of this dissertation’s hypotheses target the manifestation of problems surrounding au-
thorization. Based on supporting examples from the problem analysis, their validity was already dis-
cussed after the problem analysis in Section 5.4. The conclusion there is that, indeed, problems affect
several interrelated perspectives on authorization (H1) and interfere with their interaction (H2). To
complete the evaluation of the hypotheses, we will consider the second three hypotheses on problem
mitigation in the following, before we address the main research questions from the introduction.
Hypotheses on problem mitigation
Two aspect are of interest with respect to the validity of the hypotheses on problem mitigation:
First, and more importantly, whether the hypotheses are correct and are, accordingly, reﬂected in
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Hypothesis Corresponding principle Related principles
H3: Technical/non-technical P4 Multidisciplinary Applied to P5, P6
H4: Dynamics of the environment P7 Design for dynamics Supported by P2, P5, P8
H5: Interaction and participation P1 Interaction and participation Supported by P2, P3, P6
Table 11.2.: The relation of the hypotheses to the Authorization Principles
the principles (summarized in Table 11.2); second, whether they are complete and cover all the
principles. We examine both properties in the following:
Hypothesis H3, which calls for a combination of technical and non-technical approaches, largely
corresponds to the principle of multidisciplinary approaches (P4). Other principles (P5 Individu-
als’ behavior, P6 Security awareness) successfully combine non-technical and technical approaches;
their broad application supports the hypothesis. Moreover, the policy-override study showed the
consequences of overly relying on technical approaches: a reduced effectiveness of the measure.
Accounting for dynamics of the environment (H4) received a similar amount of coverage in the
artifact development through principles: Apart from the corresponding principle (P7), the hypothe-
sis is supported by further principles (P2 Reduced burden, P5 Individuals’ behavior, P8 Tailor for
context). The empirical results related to these principles offer a strong indication in support of the
hypothesis. For example, the data on the enforcement implementation showed the consequences of
a lack of provisions for dynamics: a high implementation effort.
The third hypothesis on problem mitigation concerns the integration of perspectives, the inter-
action of stakeholders, and their participation (H5). The empirical work on the application of the
corresponding principle (P1) as well as of the supporting principles (P2 Reduced burden, P6 Secu-
rity awareness, P3 Concreteness) support this hypothesis. The positive effect can be particularly
strongly observed in the studies on decision and change support: reduced effort for policy changes
due to improved interactions.
The existence of corresponding principles for each of the hypotheses indicates the correctness of
the hypotheses. For their completeness, we need to consider whether all principles can be subsumed
under the hypotheses, since we showed in the previous section that the principles are complete with
respect to our empirical work. First, it is implausible that P2 Reduced burden and P3 Concreteness
are only relevant regarding the dynamics and integration in authorization. Instead, they appear to also
increase usability for infrequent changes by dedicated experts. Along the same lines, P6 Security
awareness and P5 Individuals’ behavior solve problems independent of the dynamics – for example,
preventing circumvention in static environments. Lastly, it is also obvious that P8 Tailor for context
not only helps in dynamic contexts, but can particularly improve effectiveness in cases where more
reliable procedures may be employed. Thus, the hypotheses on problem mitigations are correct (are
reﬂected in the principles) and served as a good point of departure for exploring mitigating principles
– but cannot be considered complete.
Main research questions
We asked two main research questions in the introduction (Section 1.2):
1. What authorization problems do stakeholders face in information systems and how do their
problems and perspectives interrelate?
We discussed this question subsequent to the problem analysis (cf. Section 5.4), referring to
the model of perspectives on authorization (Section 4.4) and the holistic model of authorization
problems (Section 5.3). We identiﬁed a broad set of authorization problems for six perspectives
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– functional staff, policy makers, policy authors, developers, strategics (decisions), and tactics
(processes) – and the problems’ interrelations, enumerated in Table 5.4 and summarized in the
layered diagram in Figure 5.4.
2. What methods, procedures, and technologies are required to address the authorization prob-
lems and achieve usable authorization measures in information systems, and what ﬁelds of
research do we need to draw upon?
Concluding from the practical contributions and the related empirical work, we observed that
with the broad range of authorization contexts, there is no “one grand solution” to the us-
ability problems surrounding authorization. However, addressing the identiﬁed detailed open
research questions and applying the Authorization Principles (including a multi-disciplinary
research approach), authorization measures can become more effective and efﬁcient, and in-
crease the productivity of and satisfaction within organizations. Due to the variety of contexts,
problems, and mitigations, this dissertation primarily offers guidance on addressing problems
with authorization through principles, but cannot offer a prescriptive theory on the concrete
measure design with respect to context characteristics.
Both research questions were posed broadly and make it difﬁcult to arrive at a deﬁnitive answer.
However, addressing the questions allowed us to explore a variety of problems and mitigations from a
broad range of contexts. While the model of authorization problems and the Authorization Principles
are rather comprehensive for the organizational scope, the mitigations through concrete artifacts
could only be shown to be useful in solving speciﬁc problems for a limited scope.
One might generally criticize that the results are primarily qualitative: They rather address how we
can improve usability, instead of – quantitatively – how much improvement can be achieved. How-
ever, it is common in HCI research to focus on qualitative research – particularly, if the problems are
not clear at the beginning (Adams et al., 2008). Moreover, with the breadth of contexts, quantitative
results would have forced us to focus on a smaller evaluation scope and to pose narrow research
questions, reducing the richness, usefulness, and transferability of the results5. Thus, despite the
qualitative nature of the results, the proposed principles and mitigations should provide an important
contribution to improve authorization usability in practice and to guide further research.
11.1.7. Critical evaluation of the methodology
The methodology underlying this thesis is to thoroughly analyze the problem domain, to scope the
treated area to a speciﬁc context, and to identify and structure the problems in the area – considering
an extensive vertical scope of diverse perspectives and problems. Based on these problems, require-
ments and open research questions lead to the development of concrete artifacts to explore the open
problems and mitigating principles. The two central aspects of this methodology are:
• Vertical integration with a limited horizontal scope: A broad range of problems along the
vertical axis – that is, the range of problems from different perspectives (e.g. functional and
administrative staff) – but a limited scope of distinct contexts to cover (e.g. only organizational
authorization),
• The exploration of problem mitigations through artifact development: Approaching the prob-
lems by developing a selection of artifacts and evaluating their respective characteristics for
insights on solving the problems.
5For further discussion of the qualitative research approach, refer to Section 5.1.1.
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Both aspects have implications that should be interrogated here as a critical evaluation of the method-
ology. We formulate and refute three potential pieces of critique in the following:
“The vertical integration of problems reduces the analytical and empirical depth when
compared to focused single-issue research approaches.”
It is a valid argument that further depth can be reached when focusing on individual problems. How-
ever, the hypothesis underlying this methodology is that usability in information security is suffering
from the fragmentation that results from the ever-increasing specialization in research6. Highly ef-
fective and efﬁcient solutions to problems from very focused research can be ineffective or inefﬁcient
when applied in practice. One example from authorization are editing tools: Even if they are per-
fectly usable for policy authors and would thus be considered effective and efﬁcient, broadening the
focus to include the actual procedures in organizations shows that authors need to discuss restrictions
with policy makers so that such a tool may be suboptimal if it does not support the interaction.
The integrative approach in this thesis instead emphasizes the consideration of a broad range of
perspectives on authorization measures. This focus naturally leads to a more exploratory, hypothesis-
building approach than objective and representative empirical evidence. The goal is rather to under-
stand and explain problems and potential mitigations than to universally prove the mitigations efﬁ-
cacy. This thesis’ approach is particularly useful when the contexts are very diverse and mitigations
need to be adequate for the context to be effective and efﬁcient. Then, any representative empirical
proof is difﬁcult to acquire without imposing a very narrow scope, which offers little added value in
practice7.
“A broader horizontal scope of more diverse contexts with less vertical integration
would offer insights from the overlap of problems and on the universality of mitiga-
tions.”
One could choose to integrate horizontally instead of vertically, considering only singular problems
or perspectives on problems, but from more diverse contexts than possible with the vertical spread
in this thesis’ approach. While the insights from the horizontal breadth would certainly be valuable
– particularly on a theoretical level to craft complete models of the problems and mitigations – this
approach would not solve the problems from the fragmentation of the ﬁeld. Moreover, the autho-
rization problems are often related to the interaction of people. For example, functional staff need to
interact with administrative staff to achieve adequate policies. Here, it is more fruitful to aim to solve
the problems more fundamentally by vertically integrating the problems than horizontally. Further-
more, universality as to be gained from broad theoretical models is unlikely to have the necessary
level of detail to further practical mitigations due to the above-argued context-speciﬁcness of miti-
gations. Lastly, the scope of authorization in organizations cannot actually be considered “narrow”
as the broadness within this scope has shown; organizations are very diverse. Even if we forgo a
number of additional characteristics of further contexts that could be exploited for optimization in
those contexts, we see many of the challenging problems in the organizational scope: the necessity of
complex coordination, complexity and dynamics, and the necessity of efﬁcient and effective security.
This aspect is further discussed below in Section G.1.
“Focusing on an individual artifact allows for more sophisticated technical results and
a more thorough empirical validation.”
6Dogan and Pahre (1989) argue for social sciences that the increasing specialization and fragmentation requires re-
searchers to form informal hybrids as interdisciplinary ﬁelds. We elaborate on interdisciplinarity in Section 11.4.4.
7Again, compare the discussion of the qualitative research approach in Section 5.1.1.
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A narrower focus on one artifact would indeed allow for a more thorough exploration and validation.
However, a higher validity of results would be primarily useful if we strove for universality. In
contrast, as argued above, this is not the aim of this thesis and that approach would not result in the
most useful results. Instead, this thesis’ approach is to understand the problems more thoroughly and
derive principles for addressing the problems in a more general way. This, in turn, requires a number
of artifacts to cover the vertically integrated scope. For instance, this approach allowed us to both
study how to design procedures surrounding authorization and how to integrate decision support in
the processes.
Reviewing the critique and the arguments defending the chosen approach, we can ﬁnd that the
representativeness and validity of individual artifacts from this thesis may be threatened. However,
the more global contribution – the exploration and understanding of problems and mitigations – is
only affected to a limited extent by this critique, since we can describe and argue for promising
mitigations for the problems.
The methodology presented here is thus suited for research areas that are in need of exploratory
research and of an integrative approach. Particular indicators are the fragmentation of the research
and a research bias towards individual subﬁelds, when problems actually interrelate and affect the
interaction of people from a variety of perspectives on the problems. A further indicator is the
diversity of contexts in which the problems occur and for which the mitigations need to apply.
In comparison to the traditional, more focused methodology, this thesis’ approach can be consid-
ered closer to practical application. More theoretically sound results that result from focused research
are often primarily shown to be effective in isolation. This approach can lead to problems when the
produced artifacts are confronted with the complexities of reality8. While both approaches – the
focused and the broad one – are needed in research, the focused one dominates information security
research. The apparent consequence is that research results are primarily of rather theoretical nature
and are thus often unsuitable as short-term solutions to the pressing practical security problems.
11.2. Implications for authorization measure design
From a more practical perspective, the important question is how usable authorization is achieved in
concrete organizations. For abstract guidance, we can refer to the Authorization Principles. More
speciﬁc are the recommendations that we derived from evaluating the individual artifacts (cf. Ta-
ble G.2). However, even though the full list of principles and recommendations is helpful (cf.
Section 11.1.5), we can summarize them as follows – loosely corresponding to H5, H4, and H3,
respectively:
• Design authorization measures for participation (P1): We need to source the tacit knowl-
edge of the stakeholders from the diverse perspectives on authorization in organizations to
achieve an effective and efﬁcient measure. This thesis analyzes where interaction is beneﬁcial
(Section 5.3) and how we can solve problems through integration and participation (P1) – for
example, between policy authoring and controls integration through an adequate enforcement
framework. We address the motivation of individuals (P6, P5), reduce their burden (P2) – for
example, by providing decision guidance for policy makers –, and improve the comprehensi-
bility of policies and decisions (P3).
• Account for the context (P8): Organizations and the information systems that are protected
by authorization are diverse (cf. Section 4.1). Many organizations and systems are subject to
8We further argue for a more holistic approach to research in Section 11.4.4.
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Security needs Complexity Dynamics Expertise
P1 Interaction and participation +
P2 Reduced burden + + −
P3 Concreteness −
P4 Multidisciplinary
P5 Individuals’ behavior + + −
P6 Security awareness + −
P7 Design for dynamics +
P8 Tailor for context ± ± ± ±
Table 11.3.: Correlation between context characteristics and Authorization Principles
(+ positive, − negative correlation; ± either way)
change and require ﬂexible and efﬁcient measures; other organizations require a high level
of conﬁdence in changes to the permissions. In this thesis, we improve the ﬂexibility (e.g.
through policy override; P7), adapt processes to the context (INDUSE) and demonstrate how
security needs and stakeholders’ expertise govern decisions (decision support; P2, P5, P6).
• Combine technical authorization mechanisms with non-technical means: Technical mecha-
nisms are not the only means of protection. Instead, organizations should combine the mech-
anisms with socio-organizational measures. If the security needs permit, and social controls
and the individuals’ awareness can be relied upon (P6), the ﬂexibility of the measure can be
increased (policy override) and with it the effective security (P5). Moreover, authorization
measures also require adequate procedures for requesting and deciding on changes (P8, IN-
DUSE). Drawing on the technical and the socio-organizational can improve the effectiveness
and efﬁciency of, and the satisfaction with the authorization measure (P4).
To explore the relative importance of the principles for concrete organizational contexts, we can
analytically correlate the principles to context characteristics (cf. Chapter 4) as shown in Table 11.3:
We ﬁnd that most principles positively correlate with the security needs, complexity, and dynamics
of the context (e.g. higher security needs lead to an increased importance of the security awareness).
Conversely, the security expertise is negatively correlated with several principles (higher expertise
will reduce the importance of those principles). Lastly, P8 Tailor for context relates to all char-
acteristics, independent of their manifestation since the authorization measure has to adapt to the
characteristics in any case. Now, we can refer to characteristics of typical organizations, given in
Table 4.8, to determine the relative impact of the principles with respect to concrete organizations –
for example, particularly designing for dynamics (P7) in Simple Structures and Adhocracies.
11.3. Directions for future research on authorization
The results from this dissertation indicate a range of directions for further research. We ﬁnd research
challenges in extending the practical research on the artifacts in this thesis, by targeting those detailed
research questions that are not comprehensively covered, and by further following the central theme
of this dissertation: integrating research approaches and the perspectives of affected stakeholders.
11.3.1. Expanding on the artifacts
As indicated in the evaluation of the artifacts, one of the limitations of some of the practical contri-
butions is the breadth and depth of the respective empirical work. Regarding breadth, it would, for
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instance, be useful to analyze the integration of controls with an agile authorization framework in
further contexts (cf. Chapter 7), or implement and evaluate policy override in further contexts (cf.
Chapter 8). These contexts might also extend beyond organizational authorization (cf. Section G.1).
For depth, we could, for example, beneﬁt from thorough case studies on designing and implementing
adequate authorization-processes in practice (cf. Chapter 9), and from implementing and evaluating
decision support in organizational practice (cf. Chapter 10). Both breadth and depth would further
our understanding of authorization problems and mitigations in practice.
The conducted empirical evaluations also indicated avenues for practical work to improve the
individual artifacts and generate further research results. In case of the authorization framework,
interesting options include the optimization of the authorization API for efﬁciency – particularly
the passing of context to the decisioning – to further decrease the threshold for the enforcement
implementation. On a higher level, the policy-override study showed shortcomings of the override
measure that would be worth rectifying in future work. This includes adequate processes to ensure
consequences from policy override, improved administrative tools – particularly for efﬁcient moni-
toring of override use – and improved application integration to highlight to functional staff where
they can beneﬁt from policy override.
On the organizational level, the process model INDUSE currently offers a descriptive model to
support the modeling of authorization development processes. From more careful analysis of the
interrelation of context factors and successful or problematic process designs, we could extend the
process model and derive a prescriptive model from correlations. Reﬂecting the characteristics of
the respective context, authorization-process building-blocks could then be proposed to improve the
process. The building blocks could, amongst others, emphasize the stakeholder interaction, establish
performance indicators for continuous process improvement, provide for compliance with regulatory
obligations (Q3.2), and enable the integration with higher-level organizational processes such as
ISMS (Q10.3). Ideally, the prescriptive model would be implemented as a supporting tool for the
process design.
Concerning policy decisions, we could expand on the decision guidance through decision support.
The current guidance model could be enriched with a systematic integration of regulatory and other
high-level decision-factors (Q3.1). The data collection could be supported by making use of existing
data that is explicitly or implicitly collected in organizations, for instance, from staff surveys or
application-usage logs (Q11.2). Generally, it would be useful to develop the current prototype into
a tool that could be employed and evaluated in an organizational setting. An important aspect to
address would then be the tool’s ﬂexibility regarding the context, offering both extensive and compact
data collection, depending on the involved risks. We need to develop a methodology to derive the
context-speciﬁc decision support and decision factors. Moreover, we could further emphasize the
integrative nature of the decision-support tool and position it as a platform for the discussion of policy
changes, supporting the feedback loops that occur currently in implicit procedures when negotiating
the necessary permissions (Q8.1).
11.3.2. Further addressing the open research questions
As indicated above in the evaluation of the requirements and open research questions, this thesis
covers a broad range of questions, but not all are covered or covered comprehensively. For the
covered questions, the conclusions of the individual artifact chapters include further research that
could be undertaken for the requirements and questions. Apart from deepening and broadening
existing empirical work and the extension of the existing artifacts, both described above, potential
future research concerning the detailed questions is discussed below:
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Organizational and functional From the organizational perspective, one important aspect is the
design of effective and efﬁcient authorization measures. Similar to the work on adequate autho-
rization processes, further research on measure design could study the correlation of successful and
problematic measures with context characteristics and design factors (Q1.1). From the correlation,
we would ideally be able to develop a prescriptive model of authorization measure design (Q1.2).
This effort complements (and needs to be coordinated with) further work on the process design,
discussed above as extension to the work on INDUSE.
Further advances on the adequacy of authorization measures could be realized by systematically
studying the way in which authorization measures cause disruptions, and then use the gained insights
to formulate recommendations to reduce their impact (Q2.1). A related aspect is the connection be-
tween the satisfaction of individuals and the effectiveness of authorization measures (Q4.3). In both
cases, we need to apply research methods from the social sciences and their models, for example,
on power relationships and social learning (cf. Section 11.3.4), to gain insights on how to improve
authorization measures for the affected stakeholders. Similar methods are necessary to more compre-
hensively address circumventions – both to estimate their likelihood and to prevent undesired ones –
acknowledging the need for ﬂexible handling of exceptional situations, but guide the circumventions
(Q5.1, Q5.2).
Policy making and authoring While the authoring of policies is well covered by prior literature
and in this thesis, we can further expand on how decisions on policy changes are made. The work on
decision support focused on guiding the decisions and improving the related procedures. This leaves
room for more thorough analysis of the decision process itself. Similar to the models on process
and measure design, empirical work on successful and problematic forms of decision-making and
correlated decision and context characteristics could lead to a prescriptive decision-model (Q6.1).
The decision model could then be employed to recommend responsibilities and how the necessary
information can be acquired.
Reviews of authorization policies were only touched upon in this thesis. The effective security
would proﬁt from more effective reviews. Interesting ﬁelds here concern the design of adequate
review procedures and the integration of different perspectives in this task (Q7.1, Q7.2). Risk esti-
mations from decision support could be reused for more efﬁcient risk-based reviews. Cooperative
reviews, including self-reviews by functional staff, could similarly improve the review efﬁciency –
given adequate organizational and technical means, that is, procedures and tool support. In simi-
lar ways, we could address the problems surrounding monitoring, which also incurs a high effort.
Adequate technical means could streamline the procedures, offer support based on the risk estima-
tions, and ofﬂoad the monitoring to broad ranges of stakeholders to efﬁciently identify problems
with policies in daily application use (Q7.4). Moreover, we could carry over anomaly detection to
authorization problems as known from network security (Q7.3).
Security tactics and strategy We already addressed a range of problems with the processes in
authorization measures and the strategy of how policy decisions are made. In addition to prescrip-
tive models on procedures and decision guidance, further research could employ sociology to focus
on power structures and compliance – improving our understanding and the inﬂuencing of change
requests (Q9.2) and the circumvention of procedures (Q10.2).
Development A number of further technical aspects can be addressed from the development per-
spective in future research. For example, the effectiveness of the ﬂexibility of authorization mecha-
nisms need to be further explored, particularly comparatively: contrasting the approaches of delega-
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tion, risk-based policy models, and policy override for different contexts (Q12.3). More generally,
the interaction of the technical factor of expressiveness with the perceived complexity and the com-
prehensibility leaves room for further research: What factors inﬂuence the comprehensibility (e.g.
its concreteness P3) and when should we resort to simpler models (Q12.1, Q12.2). Can modular
authorization models be helpful to arrive at adequate models for speciﬁc contexts?
For effective integration of non-technical staff in the policy authoring, one identiﬁed barrier is
the necessity to understand the application model, both to choose the required permission and to
formulate authorization constraints. In both cases, improved mechanisms could take these problems
into account and support the request of and decision on speciﬁc policy changes (Q14.1).
Further interesting challenges regarding the mechanism can be found in the assurance of individ-
uals and organizations on the reliability of the controls, particularly for extensible systems, such as
third-party applications on smartphones (Q14.2). Here, the user granting permissions to applications
needs to trust that the system and the application adequately protect the personal data from other ap-
plications. Viable approaches could include usable static and dynamic analyses of the applications.
A related problem, but affecting the developer instead of the functional and administrative staff, is
integrating authorization controls reliably in the application program ﬂow (Q15.1). Static or dynamic
analysis methods of programs can help here as well. For instance, a control or data ﬂow analysis may
indicate missing authorization enforcement on speciﬁc paths.
Further tool integration A common theme of the future work are supporting tools, both for the
artifacts and for further open questions, such as the measure design. Considering the thesis’ theme
of integration (P1), we could apply this approach on a practical level to these tools. Considering
the developed artifacts, a comprehensive decision and change-support tool could offer risk-based
change suggestions, based upon concrete change requests, and, at the same time, offer the traceabil-
ity of policy changes and their rationale (Q13.1). Further, an INDUSE tool, as described above, could
not only support the process design, but also generate the conﬁguration for the integrated decision
and change-support tool. The integrative approach does not have to stop at the developed artifacts,
though. A common model for authorization usability tools would facilitate the integration of all
activities of the authorization lifecycle. This could begin with the design of the measure, decision
strategies, and processes, and continue with the operative part of requesting changes, making deci-
sions, and authoring policy-changes. Related activities would include policy reviews and monitoring.
The model could then also interact with other organizational processes, such as ISMS.
11.3.3. The ethics of authorization
One important aspect that needs to receive further attention in future research is how we can design
ethical authorization measures. Whereas we touched upon the legitimacy of restrictions as one re-
quirement to increase the satisfaction of the affected stakeholders and thus to increase the overall
effectiveness of the measure, legitimacy is only one aspect of ethics in authorization. In the grander
picture of ethics, we primarily need to consider authorization a means to exercise power since “tech-
nology is society made durable” (Latour, 1991). Power is exercised either technically through mech-
anisms in systems, socio-technically by combining social factors with the technical mechanisms,
or socially by relying entirely on the social factors (cf. the socio-technical design of authorization
enforcement in Section 4.2.2). Critical philosophers scrutinize the tacit aspects of exercising power
and examine the “workshops where ideals are manufactured” to manipulate (Nietzsche, 1913/2003,
p. 27) – and “criticize the workings of institutions that appear to be both neutral and independent. . . in
such a manner that the political violence that has always exercised itself obscurely through them will
be unmasked” (Foucault in Chomsky and Foucault, 2006, p. 41). In case of authorization and the
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Authorization Principles put forward in this dissertation, we need to reconsider the persuasion and
manipulation that organizations employ as the means to achieve effective security in this respect.
Persuasion appears most openly in P5 Individuals’ behavior where we attempt to predict and change
the behavior by applying insights from cognitive psychology and sociology to the decision-making
of individuals. One way to inﬂuence behavior is to make restrictions legitimate by increasing aware-
ness for the security issues at stake and explaining the organization’s rationale (internalization, P6),
and by increasing participation (P1).
In the broader context of society, the ethics of persuasion and manipulation have been discussed
in a number of ﬁelds. Very prominent is the case of advertising, for which practices such as exag-
gerated claims and explicit persuasion are considered to violate individuals’ rights, to cause human
addictions, and to be simply dishonest (Tsalikis and Fritzsche, 1989). More subtle is the situation in
case of medical communication intervention, which should improve the health of people, but cause
“concerns. . . related to persuasion, which can infringe on people’s autonomy or privacy” (Guttman,
1997, p. 109), since “justiﬁcations embedded in health interventions tend to be paternalistic” (ibid.).
In case of virtual reality, Brey (1999) argues that designers are responsible for encouraging ethical
behavior of users and an ethical representation of the virtual world (e.g. concerning stereotypes and
portrayed values), but need to avoid paternalism. Fogg (2003), writing on “persuasive technology”,
is more careful, draws on moral relativism, and only calls for “those who design, study, or use per-
suasive technologies. . . to become sensitive to the range of ethical issues involved,” since there is “no
single ethical system.”
The second aspect of the ethics of authorization is what ends are accomplished with the mea-
sures. For this, we can turn to the organizational ethics of decision-making, where individuals as
part of organizations need to be aware of the dangers of the rationalization of organizational goals –
potentially leading to dehumanization (Clegg et al., 2007). Clegg et al. (2007) see “management’s
task. . . [as] one of enhancing and maintaining structures within which moral agents face, understand
and act” responsibly.
What follows for the ethics of authorization? First, we need to interrogate the principles and
recommendations for manipulation/persuasion and paternalism. One result could be to establish ad-
ditional principles to ensure ethical authorization measures9. A principle of ethical authorization
measures could demand that the technical, socio-technical, and social means of enforcing authoriza-
tion are employed in an ethical way with respect to the speciﬁc cultural framing. For an organization,
ethical authorization would not only serve as an end in itself, but may also support the overall orga-
nizational culture and allow stakeholders to take part in the organization more wholeheartedly (cf.
Clegg et al., 2007). Since such a principle would be rather imprecise, it would need to be instantiated
for speciﬁc cultural contexts. Nevertheless, moral actors would be certainly faced with a broad spec-
trum of difﬁcult decisions with regard to what is considered ethical, both within a speciﬁc society
and interculturally.
More concretely, a principle of the transparency of the means could help to resolve the ethi-
cal problems of paternalism and manipulation by respecting the dignity of the affected individuals
and indicate how authority is exercised. On a technical level, transparency could mean to indicate
additional activities and information not available to the current user – even though this kind of in-
formation can already pose a security threat in itself. From this principle, it also follows that we need
to require consent to the logging of activities to respect the privacy of the users. On a social level,
we would need to avoid covert and manipulative awareness campaigns or participation that should
9Since ethics are a common means of inﬂuencing behavior (cf. Clegg et al., 2007), the additional principles can be
subsumed under P5 Individuals’ behavior. Thus, they would not contradict the completeness of the existing set (cf.
Section 11.1.5).
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only shape behavior – for instance, by openly communicating the actual goals of the campaign or
approach to the affected individuals.
11.3.4. Further integration of research disciplines
On a research level, we can integrate further research disciplines to address the most challenging
problems surrounding authorization: an overall adequate measure (Req 1, Req 4, Req 2), the inter-
action of the stakeholders, particularly between perspectives, adequate circumventions (motivation
to comply, Req 5), procedures, and decision guidance. We can beneﬁt in these areas from promising
approaches in other areas of information-security research and social sciences – some of which we
already touched on in this thesis:
• Information-security decision-making of individuals: Individuals can be considered to act ra-
tionally, weighing the perceived costs and beneﬁts of alternatives before deciding – for exam-
ple, to comply with the rules (e.g. not sharing the password) or rather work more productively.
Research on the security economics and the motivation of compliance of the individual can be
found in the Compliance Budget (Beautement et al., 2008) and similar approaches on the eco-
nomic reasoning of individuals (Herley, 2010). Extending the view of individual rationality,
we may also take the cognitive heuristics and biases into account that inﬂuence individuals’
intuitive decisions as modeled by the Prospect Theory (Kahneman et al., 1982).
• Sociology of behavior and decisions: Social interactions inﬂuence the decisions and the actions
of individuals – for example, when social rules are formed and learned through observation,
as described by the Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1986). These effects inﬂuence the
individuals from the different perspectives on authorization and can be employed to arrive at
more secure behavior.
• Sociology of power relations: Sociologists consider different layers of power that inﬂuence
the interaction of individuals with socio-technical artifacts. For example, the Actor-Network
Theory allows us to analyze how technical artifacts and humans interact. Theories on power,
such as the Circuits of Power (Clegg, 1989), for instance, distinguish between the “episodic”
power relations (when individuals actually experience restrictions, e.g. when access is denied),
social norms that inﬂuence decisions, and the technology or formal rules that govern the sit-
uation (e.g. forbidding the sharing of passwords, cf. Inglesant and Sasse, 2011). This offers
another promising approach to understand and inﬂuence individuals’ behavior.
• New institutional economics on information-security coordination and motivation: We can
apply economic theories, such as the Agency Theory, to study how security-related decisions
are taken in organizations, how the coordination occurs, and how individuals are motivated
(Pallas, 2009). A promising approach could be to analyze the actual communication ﬂows
within organizations with respect to behavior and decision-making for information security –
and how conﬂicting goals interfere with secure behavior.
• Organizational communication for authorization procedures: Interaction and coordination oc-
cur in organizations either in formalized or informal relations. The work of Barnard (1938) on
the utilitarian connections between actors could be the point of departure for further research
on the actual information ﬂows in organizations regarding authorization decisions. Organi-
zational communication provides research approaches on formal and informal networks in
organizations (cf. Monge and Contractor, 2000), enabling the extension of the work on IN-
DUSE.
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Figure 11.1.: Example of a hierarchy of information-security ﬁelds to be integrated
• Insider-threat modeling: Risk models are needed to guide information-security decisions. In
case of authorization decisions, the risks particularly relate to the threat from malicious insiders
who would abuse the granted permissions. Improved insider threat modeling, for example,
based on criminological research, could improve the precision of decision guidance (Pﬂeeger
and Stolfo, 2009).
• Ethics in information security: As discussed in the previous section, ethics are important on
several levels for authorization measures and need further scrutiny: One area in policy man-
agement is the handling of (sensitive) personal data and the protection of the privacy of the
involved individuals. For example, to support decisions on policy changes, we may need to
analyze usage data or ask for sensitive information (cf. Chapter 10). Another area and more
generally is applying psychological and sociological models and methods to inﬂuence individ-
uals’ behavior – and the dangers of paternalism and manipulation (cf. the previous section and
the “disciplines” as discussed by Foucault, 1977).
11.4. Implications for information security research
11.4.1. Practical integration beyond authorization
On a practical level, we can extend the integrative approach in future research beyond authorization.
Instead of limiting the integration of tools to authorization, we could integrate the management of
the numerous interrelated aspects of information security. This should include the general informa-
tion security management system (ISMS) as well as the management of speciﬁc areas (e.g. mobile
security, network security), measures (authorization, security monitoring), and speciﬁc means to im-
plement the measures (RBAC, anomaly detection). Roughly, we can consider these ﬁelds to relate to
each other in a hierarchy (cf. Figure 11.1), with general security management at the top, above the
management in speciﬁc areas, which, in turn, lies above the speciﬁc measures. There are overlaps
between the activities of many of the ﬁelds, both on the same level (e.g. between measures, such
as authentication and authorization) and between higher and lower layers. For example, decisions
within speciﬁc measures, such as on the granting of access in authorization, are based on related fac-
tors as in other measures, for example, judging the appropriateness of activities in an application log
as part of the monitoring measure. Similarly, these factors also need to be considered in higher-level
security decisions, for instance, on whether to introduce a speciﬁc measure.
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In a ﬁrst step, the integration between ﬁelds requires common models of decision factors, such
as the risks and contingencies, to enable the exchange between tools from different ﬁelds. Having
established the integration between the ﬁelds, optimized processes would organize the collection of
data at different levels of abstraction and their re-use between the ﬁelds to complement and vali-
date the data. Further steps could include the coordinated decision-support between ﬁelds: decision
factors collected at different levels would be employed to guide high-level decisions (e.g. on the
introduction of speciﬁc measures), but would also result in guidance on the implementation of the
concrete measure. The latter would then inform lower-level (technical), measure (design), and op-
erational decision-support (permission granting). Analogously, monitoring of the effectiveness and
the correct implementation could occur in detail at the speciﬁc measure, could propagate upwards
to high-level analysis, and feed into improvement plans to complete the Plan–Do–Check–Act cycle
(ISO/IEC 27001:2005, 2005).
11.4.2. A broader application of the principles
The practical integration of the perspectives is not the only way in which the theme of this dissertation
can be extended to improve the effectiveness and efﬁciency of information security management. We
can also transfer the Authorization Principles to other ﬁelds. In Table 11.4, we sketch analytically
how a number of ﬁelds of information security relate to the hypotheses and principles from this
dissertation. The considered ﬁelds include high-level (security management), area-speciﬁc (network
security), and measure-speciﬁc (identiﬁcation) management, and foundational ﬁelds (cryptography).
Taking a closer look at the hypotheses on interrelation of perspectives (H1, H5), we can identify
perspectives for the ﬁelds that have a similar structure as the ones for authorization: Individuals that
strive to complete their primary tasks and are affected by security (functional perspective), those
organizing and deciding on measures (administrative), and those implementing and integrating secu-
rity mechanisms in systems (development). Similarities can also be found for the usability problems
between perspectives (H2), the multidisciplinary nature (H3), and dynamics (H4) of the measures.
While the degree of impact on the measures will vary, the structural similarity warrants further ex-
amination and efforts to transfer the approaches from this thesis.
Considering the principles, the analysis in Table 11.4 further indicates that the principles apply
in several of the selected ﬁelds. The applicability is most pronounced for the ﬁelds most dependent
on management, less so for foundational ﬁelds, such as cryptography. While increasing awareness
(P6) and reducing the individuals’ burden (P2) are already broadly applied in several ﬁelds, others,
such as the integration of perspectives (P1), increased concreteness (P3), and designing for dynamics
(P7) are not widespread in any of the considered ﬁelds. It may thus be beneﬁcial to further integrate
perspectives as discussed in the following section. The second major approach is to further guide
behavior of the different perspectives – implicitly by reducing the burden of adequate behavior (e.g.
P2 Reduced burden) or explicitly by providing decision support (cf. decision-support prototype).
11.4.3. Fostering “informed participation”
The lack of integrative approaches may be one reason for the persisting attitude among information
security practitioners that “users are the enemy” (Adams and Sasse, 1999), even though research
has long shown this attitude to be counterproductive. The design of the measure – both of socio-
organizational means and technical mechanisms – needs to ﬁt the context (P8; Sasse, 2011) and thus
the speciﬁc problems of the different perspectives. The ﬁrst goal is to lessen the interference from
security measures and improve the design process. As Fischer (1999) argued for cooperative design
in the area of Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), the integration of viewpoints not
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only leads to conﬂicts, but also to “social creativity.” Where knowledge cannot be held by one indi-
vidual alone due to the complexity, it also cannot be expected to be simply “passed on”, but instead
needs to be rebuilt in collaborative knowledge construction: The process of “knowledge integration”
overcomes the “symmetry of ignorance” of differing perspectives and “melds the information that is
collaboratively constructed into the problem-solving context” (P1; Fischer, 1999).
Having understood the concrete problems of the different perspectives (P3), decision makers may
be able to make transparent the rationale and why security-related effort cannot be further reduced
(cf. Section 2.6; P5, P6). Increased integration of the diverse perspectives and, particularly, partic-
ipation of functional staff could thus not only help to improve the measure, but also the change the
mindset of the decision makers (P1). Even more important is the opportunity of increased democracy
and empowerment through “informed participation”. We observed this effect in the decision process
for policy changes when study participants saw a chance to improve the communication of their ben-
eﬁt and increase the transparency of the decision. Even though information technologies “are not
inherently democratic or empowering10”, Brown et al. (1993) argue that informing and participat-
ing “brings democracy and technology into the same arena” – and may improve an organization’s
robustness to changes and disruptions11.
Organizations need to recognize their primary responsibility for the effectiveness, efﬁciency, and
satisfaction of security measures: This depends to a large extent on the organization’s structure, in-
teractions, and processes; adequate organizational decisions on technical and non-technical security
measures are rather the result of optimal organization.
11.4.4. Integrative research: Interdisciplinarity
It is not only the mindset of practitioners that hamper effective information security. This thesis
also argues that we need an integrative approach to the research as an addition to the focused tra-
ditional approach. While focused disciplinarian research is necessary to solve problems in detail
and delivered respectable results, the growing fragmentation can be a limiting factor in achieving
usable security measures in practice. Finkenthal (2001) argues that interdisciplinarity is necessary,
since it “enables us to cope with complexity and prevents excessive divisions within our culture”,
and overcomes the “reductionist” approach of “disciplinarian thinking” (p. 9).
With regard to security usability, we can observe this kind of complexity in the actual implemen-
tation of security measures in practice. For example, we saw for decision support and policy changes
how context-dependent the actual application of such technical means are. Inﬂuencing factors were,
for instance, the formality and centralization of the organization, and the security expertise of the
involved stakeholders. If we limit our scope to the technical perspective, we are likely to encounter
(usability) problems from the complexity of combining the mechanism with organizational means
into practical security measures. The “emergent properties” of multicomponent systems are also one
of the core argument of Kline (1995) for interdisciplinarity. It helps us to understand the charac-
teristics that combinations of components exhibit and that often differ from those of the individual
components (p. 4). Conversely, interdisciplinarity is the “understanding [of] knowledge as a whole”
(Finkenthal, 2001, p. 80). Similarly to the security practitioners’ mindset, the mindset of researchers
might also need to open to more integration, both to reduce fragmentation in the ﬁeld and to integrate
10According to Brown et al. (1993), “deskilling technology in the workplace, for example, has shown that technology can
at times be fundamentally disempowering.”
11Organizational robustness is closely linked to the organizational culture and thus extends beyond information security or
a superimposed “security culture” in an organization: Handling problems from information security interrelates with
how an organization addresses problems from other areas – another argument for the integration of organizational and
information security research.
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the existing approaches from related disciplines (cf. Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001).
Even though interdisciplinarity was seen in social science as “old hat” by the late 1950s (Frank,
1988), we still ﬁnd obstacles in the research communities when attempting to integrate disciplines.
These may relate to the problems claimed to be caused by “weak” interdisciplinarity (Finkenthal,
2001, p. 10), that is, the mechanical application of research methods or models from foreign disci-
plines. The “nonsensical use of foreign concepts” can lead to “botched interdisciplinarity” (p. 87).
Snow (1993) claims that there even is “a gulf of mutual incomprehension. . . hostility and dislike”
(p. 4) between social and natural sciences. Two examples of problems surrounding the integration
of research disciplines in security research can be found in the following quotes from anonymous
reviews on a submission on the problems surrounding authorization in organizations (overlapping
with Section 2.3.3) and the INDUSE paper (Bartsch, 2011c), both for mainline security conferences:
“The problems discussed in this paper, while of interest to ACSAC, do not beg technical
resolution. . .While security is often termed a ‘human problem’, ACSAC’s mission [is]
to pursue practical technical solutions, which effectively removes this work from further
consideration.”
“I am afraid that the purported contribution is rather tailored for the (enterprise) IS
community than for a strictly security community, which makes the paper somehow in-
appropriate – i.e. out of scope – for the conference at stake”
The reviews were for the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) and for
the Conference on Network and System Security (NSS), respectively. ACSAC rejected the submis-
sion, even though they call for “contributions in any aspect of applied security.” In contrast, NSS
accepted the submitted paper, but the reluctance of the reviewer is revealing, since NSS calls for “re-
search on all theoretical and practical aspects related to network and system security.” Even though
only anecdotes, this viewpoint can be observed to be widespread in the information security research
community: The “strictly security community” is only concerned with technical mechanisms, not
the surrounding “soft” problems. Thimbleby (2004) argues for HCI that a general problem of in-
terdisciplinarity is that researchers in new combinations of disciplines suffer from reviewers of the
established disciplines who measure the merits of a paper or of a funding proposal by their respective
discipline’s standards only, neglecting the added value of the combination of work, and thus reduce
overall diversity by rejecting the idea. However, after 15 years of continuously growing security-
usability research, one would expect that an integrative research approach would be a mainstay. In
the end, information security research will need to further open up to the integration of research ﬁelds
and disciplines to achieve more effective, efﬁcient, and satisfactory security.
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A. Security in plan-driven software development
Most research regarding security in plan-driven software development has been published on secure
software processes and models, followed by approaches on security requirements engineering (Yee,
2006). We will brieﬂy discuss security in plan-driven development before turning to the achieving
secure software in agile development in the following section. First, we introduce common plan-
driven development models as a backdrop of what secure development has to apply to. Then, we
discuss common secure development methods and security practices in plan-driven development.
A.1. Plan-driven software development
Traditionally, software development has been divided into a set of development activities that struc-
ture the development process. Although the process models in software development differ, most
development models distinguish the following activities:
• Requirements engineering: In the requirements elicitation activity, engineers specify the be-
havior of the system in requirements. The requirements and their priorities are documented
in the requirements-speciﬁcation document. Typically, non-functional requirements, such as
performance requirements (Chung and Leite, 2009), are distinguished from functional require-
ments that describe the functionality of the system.
• Modeling and design: Architects design a software architecture that fulﬁlls the requirements.
Typically, the platform is chosen, and software components and similar structural artifacts are
deﬁned at this stage.
• Implementation: Developers implement the program ﬂow in source code that reﬂects the soft-
ware architecture and fulﬁlls the requirements speciﬁcation.
• Assurance: The program is veriﬁed and validated against the requirements on whether it de-
livers the functionality and adheres to the non-functional requirements as expected. Assurance
activities may include testing, reviews, and external auditing of the program code.
• Integration and operation: The program is conﬁgured, deployed, maintained, and operated in
the production environment. The conﬁguration is managed and defects are removed as part of
maintenance.
In the waterfall development model, the development activities are passed through as consecutive
phases (Royce, 1970). Thus, developers ﬁrst deﬁne a precise plan of the user needs and requirements
so that subsequent phases, such as design and implementation, can produce the intended results.
Derivations from the successive execution of the development phases, for example, to reﬁne the
requirements, is seen as an unintended effect. At the end of each phase, a veriﬁcation and a validation
of the result is conducted, assuring that the result is as planned and the result is as intended by the
customer, respectively. In contrast, empirical data from case-study projects implementing waterfall
processes show, on average only half of the design work in the design phase and as much as 16% after
the implementation phase (Zelkowitz, 1988). The V-model is an adaptation of the waterfall model
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and focuses to a larger extent on validation and veriﬁcation (van Vliet, 2008). The core phases are
similar to the waterfall model and include requirements engineering, global design, detailed design,
and coding. The main difference is that every phase is linked to a corresponding assurance phase,
aligned in a “V” shape.
When it became evident that waterfall and similar models did not deliver the required reliabil-
ity, more formal development models were proposed. Cleanroom software engineering uses formal
methods and statistical testing to improve the software quality (Mills et al., 1987). Since no auto-
matic software veriﬁcation was available at the time of the process development in the 1980s, the
development team conducted manual veriﬁcation of speciﬁcation through team review.
On the other hand, the practice of developing sophisticated software architectures led to processes
that were centered around the architectures. The Rational Uniﬁed Process (RUP) is a very elaborate
and complex process, with heavy tool support including a broad application of UML modeling (van
Vliet, 2008). RUP is similar to agile development in that the plan may be continually adapted and
users participate through use cases. In contrast to agile principles, RUP is a very document-centric
and well-deﬁned processes. The RUP is structured in two dimensions. First, several workﬂows,
such as business modeling, implementation, and deployment run in parallel. Second, each workﬂow
passes through the phases inception, elaboration, construction, and transition with multiple iterations
within the phases.
In the 1990s, the focus shifted from achieving reliability through implementing predeﬁned pro-
cesses to the management of the reliability of processes and development teams. To systematically
improve development processes, process management models were developed, for example, the Ca-
pability Maturity Models (CMM) (van Vliet, 2008). The CMM deﬁne ﬁve levels of maturity of the
process management in organizations. Beginning at the lowest level, each level introduces additional
measures of process reliability. For level 2, for instance, the focus lies on the repeatability of pro-
cesses, requiring that the organization conducts, amongst others, project planning and requirements
management. In higher levels, it is then required to conduct quantitative process management and
continuous process improvement.
A.2. Secure software development methods
As noted above, the interconnectedness and complexity increased the likelihood of vulnerabilities
and attacks, and the increased importance of systems their severity. One reaction was to improve
the software development methods and processes. A prominent example of mitigating these threats
in the process was Microsoft’s announcement of “Trustworthy Computing” in 2002, including the
development of a security SDL. While high-reliability development methods had been in use for
safety-critical systems, now, practices were deeply integrated into the processes that explicitly aimed
at security issues, such as threat modeling. Within the range of security SDL, methods still differ
in the degree of focus on reliability and defects reduction in contrast to addressing speciﬁc security
challenges (Goertzel et al., 2007).
There are several surveys of security SDL, either aiming to provide a comprehensive state-of-the-
art report as in the IATAC Software Security Assurance report (Goertzel et al., 2007) or comparing
processes (Davis, 2005) and practices (Davis et al., 2004). According to Davis (2005), the focus
areas of security SDL are:
• Security engineering, including the elicitation of security requirements, secure design and im-
plementation, and security testing,
• Security assurance through external reviews, veriﬁcation, and validation,
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• Organizational and project security management, providing policies, roles, and planning on an
organization-wide and project level,
• Security risk management.
Security SDL can be roughly categorized according to their weight. On the one end of the spec-
trum, light-weight methods provide practices as enhancements to existing processes. On the other
end, elaborate methods deﬁne the entire development process in detail. Two methods that claim to
fall into the category of light-weight enhancements to existing processes are McGraw’s Seven Touch-
points of Software Security (McGraw, 2006) and OWASP’s Comprehensive, Lightweight Application
Security Process (CLASP, OWASP). The Touchpoints include a risk management framework and
are particularly tailorable to development processes already in use. The CLASP is also targeted at
enhancing existing processes with light-weight security practices, but provides a broader set of guid-
ance for the individual roles in development contexts, including a description of 24 activities, seven
best practices, and a list of typical vulnerabilities.
The Microsoft Trustworthy Computing Secure Development Lifecycle (Microsoft SDL) is a more
integrated approach to secure software development, based on a waterfall model, which is heavily
enhanced with security activities. The SDL draws from four high-level principles: secure by design
(design, implementation), secure by default for adequate conﬁguration, secure deployment (tools,
updates, documentation), and communication (e.g. with users on vulnerabilities). Microsoft reported
a reduction of security bulletins in two case studies for subsequent releases after implementing the
SDL (Lipner, 2004). De Win et al. (2009) compared Microsoft’s SDL, CLASP, and the Touchpoints
from each method’s activities and process-wise on how the method affects the process. They noted
that all three development processes have undergone validation in industry projects and cover a
broad spectrum of the development lifecycle. They criticized that the methods often do not provide
the methodology on how to implement the practices and lack thorough cost and usability trade-offs.
Similar to the Microsoft SDL, the Team Software Process for Secure Software Development (TSP-
Secure) is an integrated approach and builds upon the Team Software Process, for which a reduction
of defects in case studies by a factor of 10 to 100 has been reported (Davis and Mullaney, 2003).
TSP-Secure introduces security practices and roles, and multiple defect removal points (ﬁlters) be-
tween phases (Davis, 2005). Correctness by Construction also originates in the reliable software
development (Hall and Chapman, 2002), but is considerably more rigorous in its approach. The
method heavily relies on formal methods and veriﬁcation to achieve low defect rates. When ap-
plied to security-critical development, system states are categorized by their impact on the system’s
security and critical states accordingly veriﬁed more rigorously.
In contrast to the speciﬁc descriptions of methods, such as the Microsoft SDL or TSP-Secure, the
aforementioned CMM focuses on the process management to improve the software quality through
organizational, project management, and assurance measures. To cover the speciﬁc security risks
apart from defect-caused vulnerabilities, CMM require additional security engineering and security
risk management to adequately mitigate malicious intent, for instance malicious code introduced by
developers (Davis, 2005). Several models enhance CMM with security practices. One example is
the Systems Security Engineering – Capability Maturity Model (SSE–CMM, ISSEA, 2003; Menk,
1996), which has also been published as ISO/IEC 21827. SSE–CMM does not deﬁne a speciﬁc
process, but rather extends CMM and proposes security practices. The additional “Base Practices”
are concerned with security best-practices for development and organization.
Apart from secure development methods, assurance frameworks were developed to guarantee spe-
ciﬁc levels of security in software products. The most commonly implemented framework is Com-
mon Criteria (CC, ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, 2009). For CC evaluations, organizations that plan to
acquire evaluated systems develop a Protection Proﬁle (PP) that describes the security requirements.
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The requirements are formulated in an implementation-independent way, both for functional and
non-functional (assurance) requirements. A system developer then develops a Security Target (ST),
an implementation-speciﬁc security requirements document that is evaluated to comply with the PP.
Lastly, the system developer provides the product (Target of Evaluation, TOE), which is evaluated
against the ST. There are several evaluation levels that differ in the rigor of the developer’s imple-
mentation practice, including testing, reviews and formal veriﬁcation (Davis, 2005).
A.3. Security practices
Numerous practices have been proposed to improve the security of the software. We categorize the
practices by the development activities that the practices primarily relate to:
A.3.1. Pre-process practices
Before the development process begins, security practices for the project inception may be neces-
sary. The Microsoft SDL advises to check the applicability of the security development method and
conduct general tool and personnel organization, for example, assigning a suitable security adviser
(Lipner, 2004). CLASP proposes to identify security metrics at this point. Moreover, if not yet exist-
ing, the organizational policy on project-independent security requirements should be deﬁned. The
policy formulates global security requirements, which are then evaluated for their applicability to the
current project (OWASP).
A.3.2. Process-accompanying practices
A number of practices need to be constantly applied throughout the SDL and thus accompany the
process. One process area of this kind is education, awareness, and motivation of team members.
The Microsoft SDL, for instance, requires baseline education for every team member to increase
the awareness and teach security-engineering basics not only to developers, but also to management
staff (Lipner, 2004). Security knowledge management frameworks help to organize and share the
acquired information among team members and across project boundaries (McGraw, 2006). CLASP
suggests a proactive sharing of security artifacts with all developers to improve awareness. To further
increase motivation, CLASP advocates the institutionalized accountability for defects and rewards
for prevented issues (OWASP).
The risks that the product and process are prone to constantly change throughout the develop-
ment process. New attack vectors are discovered and need to be mitigated, but also the development
context changes over the course of the project. McGraw (2006) developed a risk-management frame-
work that is deeply integrated into the SDL to accommodate evolving risks. McGraw’s Touchpoints
also include the continuous execution of an improvement program, primarily targeting the measure-
ment strategy and the development process (McGraw, 2006). Typical metrics are, for example, the
attack surface, reported defect rates, or security test coverage (De Win et al., 2009). Goertzel et al.
(2007) list eleven metrics with very different approaches and target audiences.
A.3.3. Requirements engineering
From a security perspective, the requirements engineering activity poses several challenges. Firstly,
software developers generally consider security requirements as quality attributes, formulated as
non-functional requirements, or as negative ones, describing events that should not occur. The prob-
lem with negative and non-functional requirements is that these types of requirements are difﬁcult to
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implement and test. One approach is to not document non-functional and negative requirements at
all, but turn them into functional requirements (Goertzel et al., 2007). Similar challenges originate
from the different levels of abstraction between high-level policies and functional requirements (De-
vanbu and Stubblebine, 2000). Conversely, there is the tendency to describe security requirements
through mechanisms, unnecessarily anticipating design and implementation decisions (Firesmith,
2003). Moreover, there is the secondary goal problem with security: Software developers strive to
implement functional requirements; secondary goals, such as security aspects, can be problematic,
particularly with a low customer security-awareness (Tondel et al., 2008).
To meet the challenges that the engineering of security requirements poses, a wealth of meth-
ods and activities have been proposed. In a survey of different elicitation methods, Tondel et al.
(2008) identiﬁed eight task categories, including deﬁning central concepts, high-level objectives,
and identifying threats and assets. Security requirements engineering methods range from very
detailed, complex, and broad approaches, such as SQUARE (Mead and Stehney, 2005), to very
simple, misuse/threat-only approaches as in McGraw’s Touchpoints (van Wyk and McGraw, 2005).
SQUARE, the Security Quality Requirements Engineering, provides guidance for eliciting, catego-
rizing, and prioritizing security requirements (Mead and Stehney, 2005).
One starting point for the elicitation of security requirements are business requirements, laws and
regulation, and contractual obligations that need to be fulﬁlled by the software product, as proposed,
for instance, by the Touchpoints (McGraw, 2006). To turn the high-level and non-functional secu-
rity requirements into functional requirements, practitioners need to identify the threats that should
be mitigated. There are two distinct approaches: Either explore the threats starting from known at-
tack patterns or starting from the resources and assets to be protected, thus with the attacker or user
perspective, respectively. Attack patterns have the problem that they are limited to the attacks in
the current knowledge base of threats and miss further attacks (Goertzel et al., 2007). More gener-
ally, threat modeling approaches can be conceptual or technical, functionality- or attack-driven, and
systematic or pragmatic (De Win et al., 2009). Threat modeling should be conducted as a require-
ments and as a design activity because the architecture may introduce additional attack vectors not
foreseeable from functional requirements (OWASP; Viega, 2005).
Several pragmatic methods have been proposed to elicit threats. As the negative counterpart to use-
case deﬁnition, abuse cases or abuser stories deﬁne activities that a malicious user must not be able
to conduct (McDermott and Fox, 1999; Sindre and Opdahl, 2005). The Touchpoints describe threat
modeling with abuse cases, deﬁning threat agents, anti-requirements of what might go wrong and the
attack pattern of how an threat agent causes the anti-requirement (McGraw, 2006). The SDL threat
modeling method version 1, STRIDE has a very pronounced attacker perspective of speciﬁc attack
vectors (Shostack, 2008). Although STRIDE’s very pragmatic approach from typical attacks might
be very accessible to developers, it might be too narrowly deﬁned because of its explicit limitation
on speciﬁc attack vectors (Hernan et al., 2006). Another method to analyze threats from the attack
perspective are attack trees, attack paths modeled in a tree structure (Moore et al., 2001). Attack
trees are based on the observation that attacks often occur in several steps and have several subtasks
that need to be completed to succeed. Beginning from the threat target, for each node, the subgoals
(either AND or OR decompositions) are collected recursively, resulting in a tree structure. A path
from a leaf subgoal to the root is an attack path.
Threat mitigation measures turn negative requirements into functional requirements. Haley et al.
(2004) propose problem frames with threat information as constraints that are subsequently trans-
formed into functional requirements. Also, speciﬁc processes have been deﬁned to manage non-
functional requirements and relate non-functional to functional requirements (Chung and Nixon,
1995), or reﬁne non-functional requirements into subgoals until implementable (Yu and Cysneiros,
2002; Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007).
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The number of security requirements can quickly explode for non-trivial systems, requiring a
prioritization according to the risks. Risk assessment usually includes the aspects of threat and vul-
nerability assessment as well as the impact analysis. For requirement risk assessment, the Microsoft
SDL proposes the DREAD model that takes the damage potential, the reproducibility, the exploitabil-
ity, the number of affected users, and the discoverability into account (Howard and Leblanc, 2002).
Threats are ranked according to each of the categories, resulting in a relative risk score from the mean
of each of the threats’ rankings. Another requirements trade-off may be necessary between security
and usability (Braz et al., 2007).
To validate the completeness of and the lack of conﬂicts between security requirements, the re-
quirements can be analyzed, for example, informally in externally audits (OWASP). More formally,
Liu et al. (2003) analyze requirements as relationships between actors, stakeholders, users, and ag-
gressors to analyze security requirements. Correctness by construction uses the programing language
Z for this purpose (Hall and Chapman, 2002). Having a formal model of the requirements may en-
able an analysis of the security requirements with formal methods, for example, the veriﬁcation that
a high-level policy is complied with.
A.3.4. Architecture and design
In the architecture and design activity, the individual measures to address the security requirements
are decided upon and result in the security architecture. While plan-driven development traditionally
distinguishes between the requirement and design phases, the ties between these phases are very
close for the security architecture. In addition to mitigating threats, the security architecture the
architecture often at the same time introduces additional attack surface, and thus calls for further
functional security requirements. With insufﬁcient security requirements engineering, a typical effect
is that the security architecture is only added as an afterthought, potentially resulting in suboptimal
designs (Devanbu and Stubblebine, 2000).
For designing the security architecture, Saltzer and Schroeder (1975) compiled a list of security
design principles. The list is still largely applicable and includes principles, such as least privilege
and economy of mechanism (Beznosov and Kruchten, 2004). A broader list of 33 practices is pro-
vided in the NIST publication on engineering principles for security (Stoneburner et al., 2004). The
problem with design principles is that the principles are rather abstract and, thus, difﬁcult to apply
in practice. More pragmatic are security design patterns that allow practitioners to solve security
challenges in a structured manner by employing best-practice approaches. Schumacher and Roedig
(2001) propose a security-pattern template and give examples for VPN security.
Software architectures can be modeled in graphical modeling languages, such as UML. Designers
can beneﬁt from integrating security constraints and measures: SecureUML focuses on access con-
trol and integrates role-based policies into the model-driven development (Lodderstedt et al., 2002).
UMLsec takes a broader approach and introduces UML stereotypes that impose constraints on the
UML model (Jürjens, 2002).
An analysis of the architecture may strengthen the conﬁdence in the design. Manual, misuse-case-
or risk-based, analyses are often conducted through architecture reviews (Pauli and Xu, 2005; Mc-
Graw, 2006). A formal model of the architecture allows for automatic or semi-automatic analyses
using formal veriﬁcation: For example, the formal language Z provides for logic-based modeling,
and CSP for the formalization of process models. For design-by-contract modeling in UML invari-
ants can be speciﬁed in OCL (Goertzel et al., 2007). The design may then be veriﬁed against the
requirements.
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A.3.5. Implementation
Defects in the source code of software are a common cause of security vulnerabilities (Software
Engineering Institute, 2002). As one of the aforementioned unintentional errors, developers may
forget to properly validate input. As an intentional error, not following the architecture may lead to
vulnerabilities, for example, when developers circumvent protective layers (Sohr and Berger, 2010).
In implementation the focus thus lies on producing reliable (defect-free) and correct (adhering to
the speciﬁed requirements and design) software. On the lowest layer of implementation lies the
syntax and semantics of the program code. There have been conﬂicting ﬁndings on whether there
are differences in the proneness for defects for different languages, for example, from empirically
evaluating the rate of defects for different platforms (Whitehat Security, 2010) or analyzing the “edit
distance” to vulnerabilities (Chinchani et al., 2003). More accepted is the fact that adhering to secure
programming strategies improves the reliability of software. A wealth of strategy lists have been
published, either agnostic (Peine, 2005) or speciﬁc to the platform or language (Seacord, 2005).
Agnostic principles include defensive programming, defense in depth (Stallings and Brown, 2008),
and assuming a hostile environment (Jones and Rastogi, 2004).
A.3.6. Assurance
Concurrently or subsequent to implementation, analyses and tests can assure that the software be-
haves as speciﬁed: securely and deterministically. Analyses are either performed on the source code,
statically, or on executed code, dynamically. Static and dynamic analyses may be conducted man-
ually, semi- or automatically. A typical method for manual static analysis is source-code review, as
mandatory in the Microsoft SDL (Lipner, 2004). Static-analysis tools abstractly execute the source
code to discover defects (semi-)automatically (Chess and West, 2007). While early static analysis
focused on syntax and dangerous constructs through lexical analysis, current tools detect defects in
memory allocation and malicious information ﬂows (McGraw, 2006). A further form of static anal-
ysis is the veriﬁcation with formal methods, proving that certain constraints hold (Mills et al., 1987;
Hall and Chapman, 2002).
For dynamic analysis (testing), program code is executed and the results are compared with expec-
tations. Manual security-focused tests complement manual functionality tests that target the overall
software quality, applying typical attack patterns (Allen et al., 2008). However, not all attack vec-
tors are testable because of resource constraints, so that risk-based testing is often suggested, which
focuses tests on the most critical parts (McGraw, 2006). Manual security tests occur as controlled
attacks as penetration tests, either with knowledge of the system internals (white box) or without
(black box).
Automatic tests are employed in software development to continuously guarantee that the func-
tionality works correctly. For security tests, the test cases may be enriched with explicit testing of the
security mechanisms. Other automatic tests use fuzzers to generate input data to automate black-box
testing and discover input handling defects (Del Grosso et al., 2005).
A.3.7. Operations and maintenance
Security activities in the SDL do not end when the software is released or deployed. First of all, it
is important to guarantee that the software product is deployed unchanged to prevent the addition
of malicious functionality (OWASP). After deployment, the operation environment needs to be kept
secure and security incidents need to be handled. Ideally, the developers provide the assumptions
on the operational environment that guided the architectural decisions (Lipner, 2004) as well as on
secure conﬁguration, such as on auditing and backups (Stallings and Brown, 2008; Fraser, 1997).
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For security incidents, a response plan should be prepared, including communication policies to
customers and security update procedures (Lipner, 2004). An incident management process (Kill-
crece, 2008) should cover prevention (following vulnerability reports and technological develop-
ments), detection (e.g. log ﬁle analysis), the triage process (prioritize reports), and response (con-
tainment of the damage, vulnerability ﬁxing, updates). Often, dedicated computer security incident
response teams (CSIRT) are formed in organizations to systematically handle the incidents. It is
important that lessons learned from the incidents ﬂow back into the development process to prevent
recurring vulnerabilities.
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While the Agile Manifesto stems from 2001, one important aspect, the iterative and incremental
development to address imprecise and changing requirements, has a long history in software de-
velopment. It has been employed since the 1950s with varying parameters (Larman and Basili,
2003), including combinations of up-front speciﬁcation with time-boxed, incremental development.
The common goal was to avoid the problems of single-pass, document-driven development with
“big-bang” deployment. While the plan-based, waterfall development process model was still seen
as the “ideal model,” it was already accepted that the waterfall method was not suitable in many
projects with changing requirements, such as the NASA Shuttle program. Since the 1980s, sev-
eral development methods such as the Spiral Model have been proposed that strongly emphasize
incremental development. According to Nerur and Balijepally (2007), such paradigm shifts from
plan-based to adaptive are not speciﬁc to development and can be observed in other disciplines, such
as management, as well. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, the ﬁrst of today’s agile methods were
formed, including the Dynamic Software Development Method (DSDM) as one of the earliest from
the model-driven development community, but also Scrum and Extreme Programming (XP). In con-
trast to earlier iterative and incremental approaches, the agile methods take a more comprehensive
approach to provide for dynamic contexts: the agile values.
B.1. Empirical ﬁndings on agile development
Since the spreading of agile development methods and practices in industry, empirical research has
been conducted to back the claims of agile practitioners and counter the argument of missing scien-
tiﬁc evidence. While the absolute number of empirical studies on agile development is constantly
increasing, the quality of the evidence is still challenged (Dybå and Dingsøyr, 2009). Most exist-
ing studies are surveys or case studies; surveys rather measure the perception of the development
method, case studies are difﬁcult generalize. When experiments are conducted, these are typically
undertaken in academic contexts with student participants since it is difﬁcult to control the variables
and have control groups in industry context. Despite these shortcomings, the existing literature does
give indications on the consequences of employing agile development.
The literature review in the following originates from two sources. Firstly, in an oft-cited meta
study, Dybå and Dingsøyr (2008) compiled the evidence from studies on agile development that had
been published until 2005. From the 1,900 scientiﬁc publications on agile development, they found
36 studies with empirical evidence of acceptable rigor. The second source is a systematic literature
research for agile development studies published between 2005 and 2010 through searches at IEEE
Xplore, ACM Digital Library, Springer Link, Science Direct and Wiley Interscience on the search
terms “agile development empirical”. Studies were selected based on whether original empirical
research was presented, the acceptability of the scientiﬁc methods and whether the results concerned
the effects of agile development. The results are grouped by the effect in the following:
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B.1.1. Software quality and development productivity
The effects of agile development on software quality and productivity have been studied with several
empirical methods, including surveys, case studies and experiments. The perception of agile methods
of students was investigated by Melnik and Maurer in two publications. Students from very distinct
backgrounds broadly agreed that agile development improved code quality and productivity (Melnik
and Maurer, 2002, 2005). Similarly, professionals also perceive agile development to increase quality
and productivity as shown in a large survey of developers from the software industry (Parsons et al.,
2007). In a survey at Microsoft, Begel and Nagappan (2007) found that the practitioners thought that
increased quality, quick releases, and faster responses are among the most important beneﬁts of agile
development.
Other ﬁndings have been derived from case studies. In two industry case-studies on Lean soft-
ware development, quality problems were found in one of the cases because of missing social skills
resulting in error-prone software (Middleton, 2001). In contrast, a migration to agile development
resulted in above-average quality and average to above-average productivity when compared to in-
dustry benchmarks (65% and 35% improvement in pre- and post-release defect-rates, respectively:
Layman et al., 2006, 2004). Another industry case-study showed a 13% reduction of reported de-
fects in agile teams when compared against a baseline team (Ilieva et al., 2004). In a case study at
Ericsson, a higher product quality with less fault slips, a reduced rise of maintenance costs, and im-
proved testing was found after the migration from plan-driven to agile development. Although there
was a higher release frequency and a reduction of “waste,” no productivity gains were observed in
this study (Petersen and Wohlin, 2010). At Intel, a combination of Scrum and XP worked best and
cherry-picking practices resulted in reduced defect density and ahead-of-schedule delivery (Fitzger-
ald et al., 2006). Further ﬁndings were reported on speciﬁc agile practices. A qualitative ﬁeld study
indicated that pair programming and test-ﬁrst development, two important agile practices, improved
the software quality (Tessem, 2003).
Formal experiments with students in academic contexts have resulted in mixed ﬁndings. In one
experiment, two teams of 16 and 17 students worked in plan-based or agile development. The ag-
ile team achieved consistently better code metrics, but developed a less consistent user interface
(Wellington et al., 2005). In a larger experiment with 93 students, the students were divided into
agile and plan-based approaches with 20 teams in total, of which each team was assigned to one of
four real customers. This experiment showed no difference in internal or external quality (Macias
et al., 2003).
B.1.2. Motivation and satisfaction
Motivation and satisfaction have several indirect effects, and are thus an important indicator of soft-
ware development success (Baddoo et al., 2006). Motivated developers achieve higher productivity,
remain longer in the organization, and take less sick-leave (Beecham et al., 2008). For agile develop-
ment, a large-scale survey of professional agile developers showed that the satisfaction is perceived
to be higher (Parsons et al., 2007). Similarly, in a Web-based survey of 55 professional agile devel-
opers, most developers approve their companies’ development process, report greater satisfaction,
and see XP practices favorable (Mannaro et al., 2004).
In case studies, the results are similar. In a Canadian organization that shifted from plan-driven
to agile development, developers stated that agile development is a “pleasant experience” in contrast
to the unpleasant previous development model (Bahli and Zeid, 2005). Along the same lines, a
multi-case study at three large independent software vendors showed increased motivation from agile
practices such as the empowerment of the engineering (Karlström and Runeson, 2005). In two case
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studies on the characteristics of successful agile development teams, several aspects are seen as
motivating: higher responsibility, preserving the quality of life, and increased respect and trust.
Also, the team receives motivating feedback from customer satisfaction and encouragement from
each other (Robinson and Sharp, 2004).
In contrast, no positive motivational effect was found in an industrial pilot case study with only
a limited number of agile practices (Auvinen et al., 2006). Moreover, apart from factors that posi-
tively affect the motivation in observed mature XP teams (self-organization, regulating information
load, communication-rich team), de-motivating aspects were found (career aspects with team effort)
in another industry case-study (Beecham et al., 2007). Also, Ilieva et al. (2004) found in a case
study that speciﬁc practices have negative side-effects, for example, being exhausting in case of pair
programming.
B.1.3. Internal and external communication
Software development depends on knowledge to create products that deliver added value. Knowledge
is passed between stakeholders, such as customers and developers, through communication (Korkala
et al., 2006). When studying communication in software development, one may distinguish between
internal communication between software developers in the development team and external commu-
nication with external stakeholders, such as customers. In agile development, verbal communication
is the primary form of knowledge passing and program code is practically “talked into existence”
(Mackenzie and Monk, 2004). At Microsoft, developers perceived the improved communication as
the most important beneﬁt from agile development (Begel and Nagappan, 2007). Communication
has also been an important aspect in case studies on agile development. In a case study at F-Secure,
positive effects on internal communication, both informal and formal, were observed, but also that,
if the proper communication media are lacking, such as open ofﬁce space, negative effects can occur
(Pikkarainen et al., 2008). At Ericsson, improved communication was also an important effect of
agile development, mostly credited to the concentration of developers in one place and the reduction
of formalized documentation (Petersen and Wohlin, 2010).
At F-Secure, agile practices improved the common understanding of short-term goals between the
customer and the team. The communication success is very dependent on the speciﬁc communica-
tion skills with less formalized channels (Pikkarainen et al., 2008). In three case studies, a reduction
in defects was linked to the more informative communication media (Korkala et al., 2006). Agile
development gives the developers a better high-level view of the customer’s goals (Mann and Mau-
rer, 2005). Similarly, it was found that the communication improved the requirements deﬁnitions
(Dagnino et al., 2004). In contrast, in a study from the customer perspective, the customer stake-
holders perceived that there was no change in the amount of communication after the introduction of
agile methods (Svensson and Höst, 2005b).
B.1.4. Conclusion
Studies on agile development methods and speciﬁc agile practices indicate increased software qual-
ity and productivity with no difference in the worst case as well as higher job satisfaction. In a
large-scale ex-post-facto study, Misra et al. (2009) identiﬁed important factors for the successful
adoption of agile development, including customer satisfaction, customer collaboration and commit-
ment, decision time, corporate culture, qualitative control, personal characteristics, societal culture,
and training/learning. However, generally, the evidence remains rather weak (Dybå and Dingsøyr,
2008). Most studies are either surveys, showing primarily the developers’ perceptions, or case stud-
ies that depend on the speciﬁc circumstances. Only very few of the studies are experiments and then
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only in artiﬁcial academic environments. Interestingly, we can observe that the results from surveys,
representing the developer perception, are more positive than from case studies or experiments.
The overall corollary from reviewing the empirical ﬁndings thus is that we still need better studies
with broader scopes of validity, particularly in professional contexts. Moreover, most studies focus
on the programming practices. More empirical work is needed on management-oriented aspects and
the core agile ideas (Dingsøyr et al., 2008). Because the ﬁeld is still nascent, qualitative studies
should currently be the primary target (Dybå and Dingsøyr, 2008).
B.2. A comparison of agile development methods
The deﬁnition of which software development methods actually are “agile” is unclear. According to
van Vliet (2008), many methods incorporate agile aspects but are not “purely” agile. The prototyping
development models and the Spiral model have similar incremental and iterative approaches. These
models are agile in the sense of “working software” and “responding to change”, but may also be
implemented in a plan-driven way (van Vliet, 2008; Boehm, 1988). Rapid Application Development
(RAD) also employs agile practices, such as time-boxing, incremental development, user involve-
ment, and small development teams, but is a heavy-weight and very structured process (van Vliet,
2008).
In essence, each agile development method is a collection of practices, which are supported by
values and principles. Kent Beck states for XP that the combination of the XP practices “amplify”
each individual practice’s effect (Beck and Andres, 2004). Concas et al. (2008) found that the con-
sequences of abandoning practices for speciﬁc phases as measured in quality metrics were dramati-
cally negative. Conversely, agile development proponents, such as Kent Beck, downplay the idea of
“method purity”, stressing the importance of the agile values, such as sustainability and producing
value (Beck and Andres, 2004). In a highly-experienced development context, there have been posi-
tive results from augmenting standard processes with agile practices, leading to higher performance
(Ramasubbu and Balan, 2009). At Microsoft, many teams use agile methods that are loosely based
on Scrum (Begel and Nagappan, 2007). Similarly, Parsons et al. (2007) and Fitzgerald et al. (2006)
found that combinations of XP and Scrum worked best, for example, with Scrum providing project
management and progress monitoring, and XP additional practices.
Several agile development methods have been formulated since the late 1980s. To analyze the
breadth in agile development, we compare popular methods – Scrum and Extreme Programming,
and, less widely-spread, Crystal Clear, Lean development, the Dynamic Software Development
Method (DSDM) and Feature-driven Development (FDD). The comparison should enrich the reason-
ing on agile development and its relation to security in software development (cf. Chapter 3). While
neither comprehensive nor representational, the comparison covers a wide range of approaches to ag-
ile development and, thus, offers a good overview of the agile “ecosystem” (Highsmith, 2002). Each
method is described brieﬂy followed by a systematic comparison. Other methods, such as Kanban,
which focuses on “pull” work assignments and on limiting the work-in-progress items to improve
the development ﬂow (Kniberg and Skarin, 2010), are still evolving and for that reason not included
in the comparison here.
In the following, we discuss each of the studied development models brieﬂy. The values, princi-
ples, and practices of the models are contrasted in Tables B.1 and B.2.
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B.2.1. Scrum
Scrum implements “empirical process control” through feedback loops between development and
process adaption (Schwaber and Beedle, 2001; Highsmith, 2002). Scrum emphasizes the roles and
responsibilities in the process, and high-level practices for requirements management, and thus fo-
cuses on the project management perspective. The product owner (customer) is in charge of setting
priorities, developers in the team create the product, and a Scrum master is responsible for an effec-
tive Scrum process. Central to the Scrum process are the iterating development phases of 30 days,
called “sprint”, each resulting in a deliverable product. The sprint is planned in a planning meeting
and the product owner places work items into the sprint backlog, a list of features that need to be
completed by the team within the sprint.
While a sprint is running, daily stand-up meetings, in which each team member states the cur-
rent status, are the main institutionalized form of communication. Further informal communication
among developers is encouraged. At the end of each sprint, a sprint review meeting is held to present
the progress to the product owner. Moreover, the team conducts sprint retrospectives to identify
potentials of improvement in the Scrum process as part of the feedback loop.
B.2.2. Extreme Programming
Extreme Programming (XP) is a bottom-up development method in that speciﬁc programming prac-
tices play a central role in deﬁning the development process (Beck, 1999; Beck and Andres, 2004)1.
The XP development process is similarly structured as the Scrum process, but the iterations are
shorter with weekly cycles. In a planning game, the customer chooses the work, which is described
in stories, for the subsequent iteration. In addition, XP proposes quarterly cycles for long-term, “big-
picture” planning. In contrast to Scrum, XP implements more speciﬁc practices concerned with the
project environment and the development, such as informative workspaces and pair programming.
B.2.3. Crystal Clear
Crystal Clear is part of the Crystal family of agile development methods. The Crystal methods should
provide “barely sufﬁcient” process guidance and, thus, offer different method weights for different
project types (Cockburn, 2004; Highsmith, 2002). As a side effect, the Crystal family is an example
of how different the actual implementations of agile processes are for speciﬁc development contexts
in terms of team size and product criticality. Crystal Clear is the most liberal with a small number of
characteristics and leaves the team room for individual practices. When compared to XP, for instance,
with its strict approach to development practices, Crystal Clear should be easier to implement and
can even serve as a backup if the introduction of XP fails. An interesting aspect that is explicitly
formulated as a practice in Crystal is “personal safety”: Participants need to trust each other and
no-one should be hindered by fear of personal consequences of mistakes.
B.2.4. Lean Development
Lean Development is the adaption of lean-production principles as implemented by Toyota in man-
ufacturing to software development (Poppendieck and Poppendieck, 2003) and has a pronounced
management perspective (top-down). Accordingly, the ﬁrst of four process phases, a start-up phase,
is used to identify and reduce project risks. In a “steady state”, development cycles (shorter than 60
1This analysis refers to the second edition of the XP book since most practices from the ﬁrst edition are still present in
the “primary practices” and “corollary practices” of the second edition.
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days) integrate incremental analysis, design, tests, and integration. The last two phases, transition
and renewal, are enacted to continue development after the customer accepted a product’s delivery. In
Lean Development, everything should be changeable, resulting in one principle to “build the applica-
tion to be more tolerant” to changes (Highsmith, 2002). This principle is in contrast to the principle
of choosing the simplest approach in XP. Similarly, a Lean-Development principle is “Domain, not
point solutions”, thus explicitly not targeting a very speciﬁc and simple solution, but broader ones
that are often more complex.
B.2.5. Dynamic Software Development Method
The Dynamic Software Development Method (DSDM) originates in the Rapid Application Develop-
ment (RAD) community and formalizes RAD practices (Highsmith, 2002; Stapleton, 2003). DSDM
deﬁnes three interrelated development phases that are iteratively applied. In the functional modeling
phase, requirements are deﬁned by way of functional prototypes. The design/build phase produces
design prototypes, which are them turned into the ﬁnal product and deployed in the implementation
phase. With 15 deﬁned types of process deliveries and 11 roles, DSDM has a considerable process
complexity. However, most deliveries may occur in form of prototypes, thus corresponding to the
agile principle of early running code.
B.2.6. Feature-driven Development
Feature-driven development (FDD) combines model-driven development with agile practices (Palmer
and Felsing, 2001). The FDD method is precisely and formally deﬁned. The method is divided into 5
processes, of which three (developing an overall model, building a feature list, and planning features)
are run once and two (designing a feature and building a feature) are run iteratively for every feature.
The up-front processes are the main differences to the simpler agile methods like Scrum. While these
processes should only take up a limited amount of project resources and are ongoing in case of later
changes, the focus is on having a more precise plan and less need for rework and refactoring. In
this respect, FDD is more plan-driven then the other agile methods (Highsmith, 2002). On the other
hand, FDD is reported to be particularly well suited for scaling agile development to larger projects.
Development roles are more differentiated, for example, including a chief-programmer role, respon-
sible for assigning work items to individual programmers. Another difference between FDD and
other agile methods is that, instead of a collective code ownership, as in XP, FDD requires individual
class ownerships by developers. When compared to DSDM, the other analyzed agile method with
a complex process model, FDD shows a stronger focus on modeling than prototyping (Highsmith,
2002).
B.2.7. Key characteristics of agile methods
The agile development methods evolved independently, prior to the publication of the Agile Mani-
festo, and differ in coverage and the approach to their speciﬁcation, regarding principles, practices,
roles, and concreteness (Abrahamsson et al., 2003). Due to this heterogeneousness agile methods
were often described alongside each other as by Highsmith (2002), without a systematic compari-
son. Cohen et al. (2004b) target in their systematic comparison formal aspects, such as team sizes
and iteration lengths, and which practice of each method supports which development phase. Abra-
hamsson et al. (2003), on the other hand, systematically compared which part of the SDL the agile
methods cover and whether the processes are adaptable. Qumer and Henderson-Sellers (2008) take
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Individuals and interactions over processes
and tools
Process formalization, Averseness to
change, Process overhead
Working software over comprehensive doc-
umentation
Process formalization, Averseness to
change, Process overhead, Size/reliability
Customer collaboration over contract nego-
tiation
Formalization, Size/reliability
Responding to change over following a plan Process formalization, Averseness to
change
Table B.3.: Direct interrelations between agile values and agility dimensions
a partly quantitative approach to the comparison of agile methods along dimensions of scope, ag-
ile features, agile values, and process characteristics. Quantitative metrics of agility are assigned to
each development phase and practice according to “agile features”, such as ﬂexibility, speed, and
“leanness”. The sum of agility values as well as qualitative evaluations result in an overall degree-of-
agility score. However, the equal weights of the difference aspects result in ﬁndings that are difﬁcult
to interpret.
In practice, the decision of which agile method to apply cannot be taken based on a one-dimensional
score, but needs to compare the given context to the characteristics of the methods. Accordingly, the
comparison given in Tables B.1 and B.2 aligns the concepts, principles, and practices as character-
istics of each of the agile methods according to the topic. The low-level comparison in the tables
reveals the focuses of the studied agile development methods by highlighting which areas are cov-
ered to what extent. The methodology of the analysis was to start off from the characteristics for
each method and contrast these for the aspects of project management, requirements elicitation,
design/implementation and team/human aspects. The characteristics are based on primary and sec-
ondary practices and principles, if given, as well es extracts from textual descriptions of the processes
in primary sources.
To further systematically analyze the agile methods, we examine four major dimensions of agility
for a high-level comparison. The four dimensions – process formalization, averseness to change,
process overhead, project size/reliability – are strongly interrelated with the agile values as deﬁned in
the Agile Manifesto (Beck et al., 2001) as shown in Table B.3. In contrast to the model of Qumer and
Henderson-Sellers (2008), which estimated the overall “degree of agility”, even though interrelated
as well, these dimensions offer a more differentiated picture of the continuum of agility. We discuss
the rationale for the relative and qualitative ﬁndings on the methods for each of the dimensions in the
following and present the results schematically in Figure B.1.
Process formalization
Depending on the method’s background, each has a distinct approach on how formal and concrete
the deﬁnitions of the processes and practices are – in contrast to a more liberal approach of teams
adapting process and practices as needed in speciﬁc environments. High process formalization often
increases the method’s averseness to change (ﬁxations from formalized procedures) and also entails
higher process overhead (from prescribed activities), but may increase the process reliability (ac-
tivities are prescribed) and its adequacy for large projects (more formalized interaction). Similarly,
process formalization conﬂicts with agile values, for example, with the focus on individuals and
(implicit) interactions, and on working software.
Lean development has a high-level perspective from management on practices and thus a low for-
malization. Scrum does not formalizes any explicit development practices and only simple process
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Figure B.1.: Characteristics of the compared agile methods
management practices. Crystal Clear even deﬁnes less process management than Scrum, but de-
scribes some development practices for testing, building, and tool support. XP, although not very de-
tailed on the speciﬁc process, has a wealth of very speciﬁc practices for development and the project
environment. In contrast, DSDM has very speciﬁc process descriptions, naming subprocesses and
work products as well as some development practices, such as testing. FDD is very speciﬁc in terms
of processes as well, but also formulates more guidance on development, concerning for example
tool support, testing and code ownership.
Averseness to change
Depending on the process, methods may be more or less open to changes to an original plan and to the
process itself. While larger teams may work more efﬁciently with less volatile requirements – since
this improves parallel development –, changes to requirements are likely to occur during the devel-
opment process if the resulting product should deliver added value. Scrum, XP and Crystal Clear are
similar with respect to their openness to changes. XP has weekly iterations and quarterly high-level
planning, which both allow modiﬁcations of the plan. Scrum advocates planning for sprints of 30
days, limiting changes to between the sprints. Crystal Clear describes longer iterations and a release
plan. Lean development is more ambivalent with respect to the rigidness of requirements. On the one
hand, changeability is part of the method philosophy (“everything is changeable”) and development
is conducted in short, time-boxed iterations. On the other hand, there are up-front feasibility studies
in the start-up process. In DSDM, high-level requirements are formulated early on and formalized in
prototypes at several stages, but re-entry into previous phases are allowed. In FDD, an overall plan
is formulated up-front to enable the deﬁnition of a high-level object model so that the main changes
later on occur on feature-level and leave the object model unchanged.
Process overhead
A high process formalization may lead to more overhead when implementing and operating a method.
Process complexity is dominated by the number and depth of hierarchy of different processes and
phases that are enacted as part of the development method. Another aspect is the number of required
practices and of roles that are deﬁned as part of the method. Crystal Clear and XP advocate simple
iterative development, with the addition of longer-term release plans or quarterly cycles, respec-
tively. Scrum only increases the process complexity marginally by inserting simple inner-iteration
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loops, daily scrums. Both Scrum and Crystal Clear suggest reﬂective process improvements through
retrospectives. Lean development has a slightly higher number of distinct processes with start-up,
transition and renewal phases in addition to a steady-state phase that is similar to development it-
erations. In contrast, DSDM and FDD have more complex process models, comprised of multiple
phases or processes with multiple steps each. DSDM has separate processes for functional modeling,
designing and building, and implementation. FDD implements ﬁve processes, of which three are run
once and two iteratively for each feature.
Appropriateness for large projects and high reliability
Larger projects typically require more deﬁned communication processes since “osmotic” communi-
cation loses its efﬁcacy (Highsmith, 2002). Similarly, high reliability often requires more deﬁned
processes to implement formal process requirements and traceability (Poppendieck, 2002). Some of
the analyzed agile methods are explicitly tailored for small teams and medium reliability require-
ments. Crystal Clear has been speciﬁcally targeted only at small teams and medium reliability re-
quirements, although other methods from the Crystal family should be applicable in larger projects.
XP is also primarily targeted at small teams with practices such as “sit together”. Beck and Andres
(2004) explicitly state that XP alone is not sufﬁcient for high-reliability projects. Scrum has also
been developed with small teams in mind, else practices such as stand-up meetings are not viable.
Still, there are Scrum adaptations for larger projects, involving multiple small Scrum teams that are
coupled through meetings of individual members from each team. Lean development demands that
the process should not be applied to contexts that it is not designed for (“Never push beyond limits”).
It has been reported to work well on projects with 50 person-years of effort. DSDM and FDD have
both been developed in larger project contexts with high reliability requirements.
B.2.8. Conclusion
The high-level comparison of the agile methods indicates that the methods are compartmentalized
into two groups. On the left-hand side, Figure B.1 shows the more liberal methods Crystal Clear,
XP, Scrum, and Lean development. On the right, the more heavy-weight agile methods FDD and
DSDM represent the other end of the spectrum of agile methods. These two methods have more
complex processes but are claimed to be better suited for larger, high reliability projects. Two distinct
philosophies can be contrasted here: The liberal and optimistic view that development teams can
tailor the most efﬁcient process for their particular development environment against the pessimists
who rather specify the process in detail to prevent failures or turmoil in projects. Despite the popular
view of agile development as light approach, the comparison shows that there is a broad spectrum of
methods that adhere to the agile values, including more more complex models.
B.3. Agile practices
Most of the popular agile practices are only explicitly formulated in one agile method: XP. As seen in
the previous section, many of the agile methods provide rather abstract guidance. When practices are
recurring between methods, they are similar, but their selection varies widely. Below, the individual
practices are categorized into common high-level practices. From the wealth of practices in the agile
methods, we discuss those that are either broadly applied in the agile ecosystem or are exemplary
for the implementation of agile values. Two large surveys give insights into the actual use of agile
practices. In a study by Begel and Nagappan (2007) on the dominant practices at Microsoft, most are
employed “at least sometimes” by between 60 and 80% of the respondents. Test-driven development
277
B. Agile development
Agile values
(Beck et al., 2001)
Principles in
Highsmith (2002)
Common practices
Individuals and inter-
action
Rely on people
Encourage collaboration
Technical excellence
Communication and trust
Team effort and responsibility
Reﬂective process improvement
Inner quality
Working software Deliver something useful
The simplest thing possible
Iterative, incremental development
Automated testing
Customer collabora-
tion
Encourage collaboration Customer participation
Responding to
change
Be adaptable Iterative, incremental development
Inner quality
Tool support
Table B.4.: Agile values, principles, and the corresponding practices
and pair programming were less frequently used (50 and 35% “sometimes”, respectively). In a large
survey, Parsons et al. (2007) found that eight of twelve practices were used by more than 10% of
the respondents. The dominant practices of both studies can be related to the high-level practices
described in the following. In addition, Table B.4 relates the common high-level practices to the
agile values from the Agile Manifesto and Highsmith’s principles.
Iterative and incremental development In iterative and incremental development, the develop-
ment process is cyclic, instead of continuing in one pass through the phases of development. The
software is developed piece by piece and requirements elicitation, designing, implementation and
deployment are conducted repeatedly. The advantage is that the plan may be adjusted between iter-
ations while the development is ongoing. Studying the requirements engineering approach in agile
processes, Cao and Ramesh (2008) found that it is an iterative process with intense communication
with customers, but no formal process. The observed beneﬁts are an improved understanding of
customer needs and adaption to dynamic changes. On the other hand, several challenges from ag-
ile requirements engineering were identiﬁed, including problems with non-functional requirements.
Short-term planning and adapting to change is incorporated into XP through weekly and quarterly
development cycles and in FDD through planning each feature separately when it should be imple-
mented. Crystal Clear and DSDM also require frequent delivery of working software, while FDD
mandates developers to not only plan, but also develop each feature separately. In addition to im-
proved planning and requirement elicitation, the progress can also be monitored more precisely and
potential release-date slips can be detected earlier and prevented in iterative development. Crystal
Clear thus calls for progress monitoring through the delivery of working software.
Reﬂective process improvement Agile practitioners not only consider the plan to be changeable,
but also the process. Agile development is often called “empirical software development”, since the
development teams are encouraged to tailor the development process to the development context. To
integrate developers into the process design, reﬂections are built into several agile methods, in Scrum
by proposing sprint retrospectives after each iteration, in Crystal Clear, more broadly, by calling for
reﬂective improvement. In their study on reﬂection in agile development, Talby et al. (2006) found
that reﬂections were perceived as highly efﬁcient by team members.
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Customer participation Together with the iterative development, the close integration of the cus-
tomer allows for changes in plans and re-evaluation of priorities during development, resulting in
more precise requirements. Moreover, the customer’s control of the development is increased. All
studied agile methods have customer participation as an important aspect: in Scrum as part of the
sprint planning meetings, XP as the corollary practice “real customer involvement”, Crystal Clear
as the principle of easy access to customers, and in FDD through the domain walk-throughs. In
practice, an on-site customer, as one variant of customer participation, is perceived as “an arena for
discussions” (Svensson and Höst, 2005a). The planning game, a practice where customers prioritize
requirements, is perceived to improve the collaboration between customer and developers (Svensson
and Höst, 2005b). In a small independent software vendor, customer participation was found to incur
higher costs, but improved the motivation and the conﬁdence of the developers (Hanssen and Fægri,
2006).
Communication and trust Agile development strives to create only the necessary documentation
to reduce the overhead and problems of outdated documentation, and acknowledging the value of
implicit documentation, such as source code and tacit knowledge. For example, XP advocates infor-
mative workspaces and in DSDM prototypes are used as part of the documentation. Instead, agile
methods encourage direct and informal communication between stakeholders and developers. Crys-
tal Clear suggests “osmotic communication”, which may be fostered through XP’s “sit together”
practice: All developers should share one room to lower the communication threshold. In Scrum,
communication is encouraged through short daily stand-up meetings. The aforementioned empirical
ﬁndings on communication (Section B.1) indicate that there is, indeed, more communication among
participants of agile development, but also that challenges arise when communication does not work
as intended. For example, in studies on story cards and the effect of a shared wall for communication,
physical cards showed to be very important internally for industrial development teams (Sharp and
Robinson, 2008). Since communication works effectively only in an environment of trust and low
risk for the individual, Crystal Clear also calls for “personal safety” of the participants.
Team effort and responsibility A well-working team can improve the communication and motiva-
tion to develop more productively (see Section B.1). The team effort and responsibility is emphasized
in agile methods in several ways. XP proposes “team continuity” to these ends. Lean Development
stresses that a project is a team effort, and DSDM calls for a collaborative and cooperative approach.
To decrease the barriers to communication between the different roles in a development project, agile
methods rely on cross-functional teams. In XP this approach is part of the “whole team” practice.
FDD explicitly employs cross-functional feature teams. The planning game, for example employed
in XP, integrates all team members in the planning activities. Mackenzie and Monk (2004) found
that the planning game reduces the gap between developers and project manager.
The members of development teams can typically identify obstacles to efﬁcient development.
Thus, in agile development, the team has a higher responsibility for the development process, taking
advantage of the knowledge of each participant and, at the same time, increasing motivation. In
addition to the reﬂective process improvement (see above), Scrum promotes “self-organizing teams”
and DSDM “empowers” teams to make decisions.
Inner quality A range of different types of defects threaten the quality of software (cf. Section 3.1).
In addition, maintainability is of importance to sustain the continuous, incremental development in
agile processes. Accordingly, FDD requires code reviews to keep the quality of source code high.
XP advocates pair programming, a practice in which two developers share one desktop as a pair. XP
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proponents claim that one pair is more efﬁcient than two individual developers: Pair programming
should lead to a higher focus and to ﬁnding superior solutions to development challenges. Some
studies show shorter development time and higher quality for pair programming as well as pair pro-
gramming to be more enjoyable (Hulkko and Abrahamsson, 2005; Tessem, 2003). Interestingly, in
an experiment with student and professional developers, the professional developers were slower
in pair programming than the students as the professional developers refactored more intensively
(Höfer and Philipp, 2009). Similarly, a case study showed that pair programming might not consis-
tently result in higher productivity and improved quality. Instead, pair programming is most useful
for learning (Auvinen et al., 2006) and complex tasks, and, consequently, more often employed at
the beginning of a project (Hulkko and Abrahamsson, 2005).
In addition to programming procedures, agile methods propose practices related to code owner-
ship to improve the quality and maintainability. FDD suggests individual class ownership to have
individual team members hold responsibility of the maintainability of the source code. XP, in con-
trast, advocates a shared-code approach in which all developers equally care for the produced source
code and build up redundant source-code knowledge.
Automated testing Agile developers need to have a high conﬁdence in the reliability of the de-
veloped program. One reason is that working software is delivered frequently and lengthy quality-
assurance phases would be inefﬁcient. In addition, refactoring is part of the daily routine with con-
tinuous changes to the original plan. Automated test support allows developers to efﬁciently assess
whether the previously implemented functionality is still working as intended. As a secondary as-
pect, test cases can be used as implicit documentation since test cases are typically more verbose
than the functional code and help to clarify which functionality is implemented and what the seman-
tics of the programming interfaces are. Accordingly, automated testing is a common requirement in
agile methods: FDD requires unit tests, Crystal Clear “automated tests”, and DSDM suggests testing
throughout the lifecycle.
More speciﬁcally, XP proposes test-driven development (TDD) with a test-ﬁrst practice: the de-
veloper iteratively ﬁrst implements a test case for new functionality and followed by as much func-
tionality as necessary for the test case to succeed. Proponents of TDD state that TDD improves the
design by requiring the developer to ﬁrst think about an appropriate interface and then implement the
underlying functionality. Additionally, TDD results in a high test coverage. Scientiﬁc literature is
similarly broad on TDD as on pair programming. Tessem (2003) found in a case study with students
and researchers in an academic setting that Test First was perceived to increase the software qual-
ity. In industrial case-studies at Microsoft and IBM, TDD lowered the pre-release defects rates by
between 40 and 90% at an estimated 15 to 25% extra effort (Nagappan et al., 2008). In a compara-
tive case-study, it was found that TDD did not change the design much, measured in object-oriented
metrics, but increased the test coverage (Siniaalto and Abrahamsson, 2007). An experiment in an
academic setting with undergraduate students in 12-week projects showed that test-ﬁrst groups spent
more time on testing. Regardless of test-ﬁrst or test-last, higher testing effort improved the external
product quality with a non-linear correlation (Huang and Holcombe, 2009).
Tool support To support the frequent changes to requirements and lean approach to documenta-
tion, agile methods heavily rely on adequate tool support. Crystal Clear and FDD explicitly require
conﬁguration management, which includes revision-control systems for source code. DSDM has the
more high-level requirement that all changes are reversible. Other tools support progress monitor-
ing, for example, Scrum’s burn down charts. The build process is supported through continuous-
integration tools, allowing for “frequent builds” (XP) of the entire system, “frequent integration”
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(Crystal Clear), or “regular builds” (FDD). In addition to conﬁguration management and build sup-
port, Kelter et al. (2002) found tools for development and documentation, communication and coor-
dination adequate for agile development in their study on agile tools. They demand that tools in agile
processes need to offer ﬂexibility, support communication and adapt to the speciﬁc environment.
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C. Practitioners’ perspectives on security in
agile development
To expand the limited evidence on how agile practitioners approach security, this appendix1 presents
a study on the practitioners’ perspectives on security in agile development. Due to the lack of ev-
idence in the area, we apply an exploratory approach through interviews with agile practitioners.
Aiming to understand the effects of agile development concerning security, one question is how de-
velopers and customers interact on security. A further goal is to study what implications the security
awareness and expertise of developers have and how they employ security practices.
C.1. Study design
The goal of this study is to expand on the theoretical ﬁndings on security-sensitive agile development
through an exploration of the problems and their alleviation in typical agile development projects.
Since there is little prior research in this area, we chose an exploratory approach and conducted semi-
structured interviews. While limited in sampling size, the interviews allowed us deeply explore the
problems and alleviations in practice. Based on the prior work, we identiﬁed the following areas to
cover in the interviews:
• Customer involvement: Due to its theoretical nature, prior research is thin on the implications
of customer involvement, particularly, how customers relate non-functional and functional
security requirements.
• Developer security awareness and expertise: Prior research recommends security training for
developers. How security-aware are developers typically and where do expertise and aware-
ness originate?
• Effects of “agile” on security: Theoretical works assume a number of mostly negative ef-
fects of agile methods on security. Which effects do practitioners see from agile methods and
practices?
• Security practices: Several security practices are suggested to improve security in agile devel-
opment. Are they present and how well do they integrate?
• Authorization: Authorization is a particularly dynamic security measure (Sinclair et al., 2008).
How is it affected by agile development?
The sampling of the participants was conducted in a way to represent a wide variety of agile de-
velopment contexts. The sampling dimensions included the interviewee’s process role and project
characteristics, such as team size and development platform. Table C.1 lists the ten interviewees
from nine companies. The interviewees were directly contacted primarily through agile development
meet-ups. The interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes, ﬁve were conducted on the telephone
1This study has been published in an earlier, but similar form in the proceedings of ARES 2011 (Bartsch, 2011b).
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Pseud. Role Afﬁliation type Project characteristics
Moritz Developer Small to medium dev. comp. External, 7 dev., JavaEE
Ben Developer Small to medium dev. comp. External, 3–6 dev., Rails
Max Developer Small dev. company External, 4–6 dev., Rails
Herbert Developer Small dev. company External, 3 dev., Rails
Stefan Developer Medium-sized company Internal, safety-critical, 11 dev., C#
Niels Developer Medium-sized company Internal, security-critical, 10 dev., JavaEE
Wolfgang Developer Consultant developer in
medium-sized company
Internal, 4–9 dev., Rails
Günther Coach Consultant Internal, ca. 1000 dev.
Klaus Customer CEO Medium-sized company External, 1–3 dev., Rails
Jan Business ana-
lyst
Consultant, in medium-sized
organization
External, 3 dev., 2 QA at customer, Del-
phi/ASP.NET
Table C.1.: Interviewee sampling
Literature Mentions
Process/lifecycle model
Process dynamics Poppendieck (2002) –
Emergent requirements, design changes De Win et al. (2009); Davis (2005); Beznosov and
Kruchten (2004); Goertzel et al. (2006)
6
Security is difﬁcult to retroﬁt Chivers et al. (2005); Wäyrynen et al. (2004) –
Assurance does not ﬁt with lifecycle model Beznosov and Kruchten (2004); Goertzel et al. (2006) 1
Communication/interaction
Neglected non-functional security reqs. Goertzel et al. (2007); Cao and Ramesh (2008) –
Missing requirements traceability Poppendieck (2002) –
Missing assurance objectivity Beznosov and Kruchten (2004); Goertzel et al. (2006) 1
Lack of/outdated security documentation Goertzel et al. (2006); Beznosov and Kruchten (2004) 2
Lack of customer awareness/sec. reqs. – 5
Trust in team and individuals
Implicit trust in developers Goertzel et al. (2006) –
Lack of specialist expertise on team Goertzel et al. (2006, 2007); Wäyrynen et al. (2004) –
Neglected practices from pressure – 1
Table C.2.: Challenges in literature and the number of mentions in this study
and ﬁve in face-to-face settings. Based on detailed notes on each interview, we structured the state-
ments by common concepts iteratively with each interview and clustered related aspects to derive
the ﬁndings on problems and alleviations (cf. Tables C.2 and C.3, respectively, which include the
relation to the literature from the previous sections and the number of interviewees who mentioned
each concept).
C.2. Findings
C.2.1. Unclear security requirements
The interviewees portrayed the security awareness among customers as covering a broad range, from
marginally to highly aware. Five interviewees mentioned problems related to the lack of security
awareness. Ben noted that the security awareness on the customer side “depends on the speciﬁc
person that you talk to.” Interviewees generally observed that the awareness on the customer side is
often driven by speciﬁc values at risk and requirements and threats need to be discussed in concrete
terms (6 mentions).
284
C.2. Findings
Literature Mentions
Process/lifecycle model
Deﬁning and auditing the process – 3
Adapting the process for security – 3
High-level security architecture up-front, ear-
ly/late security sprint
Sullivan (2008); Beznosov and Kruchten (2004);
Ge et al. (2007)
3
Iterative, incremental security design Aydal et al. (2006); Chivers et al. (2005) 6
Individual sec. activities per sprint Sullivan (2008) –
Close customer integration – 6
Security requirements
Abuse cases Kongsli (2006); Boström et al. (2006); Heikka
and Siponen (2006); Mellado et al. (2006)
–
Security requirements traceability Poppendieck (2002) –
Explicit risk analysis Aydal et al. (2006) 2
Implicit security requirements – 7
Concrete requirements and threats – 6
Non-functional reqs. as done-deﬁnition – 2
Design, implementation, assurance
Secure design and implementation Beznosov and Kruchten (2004) 2
Test cases/code as documentation Wäyrynen et al. (2004) 2
Automatic sec. testing, static analysis Beznosov and Kruchten (2004); Kongsli (2006);
Tappenden et al. (2005); Erdogan et al. (2010)
4
Security review meeting Kongsli (2006) 2
Implicit/explicit code reviews – 4
Formal change and integration proc. Beznosov and Kruchten (2004) 2
Early secure deployment Kongsli (2006) –
Security awareness and expertise
Prevalent security – 7
Implicitly and explicitly spreading awareness
and expertise
– 6
Rotating experts on team Wäyrynen et al. (2004) 1
Security training Ge et al. (2007) 2
Self-teaching security expertise – 4
Holistic development approach – 5
Table C.3.: Mitigations in literature and the number of mentions in this study
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Max: Security “is only of interest [to the customer] when money-aspects are con-
cerned.”
Security incidents involving similar systems increase the customer’s high-level security awareness:
Moritz: “The shop leak at [newspaper], that’s where customers wake up.”
Klaus: “There was a hacker attack in the newspapers on a shop in [close-by town,
redacted] last week.”
Security requirements are discussed, “if at all, then only unspeciﬁc, together with functions” (Klaus)
and are characterized as being approached from the positive side (“what is allowed” instead of “what
is forbidden”).
Jan’s case is an exception in that the customer was very security-aware and developed very speciﬁc
security requirements because the developers were rather unaware.
C.2.2. Implicit security requirements
Often, developers derive the security requirements from the functional requirements as implicit se-
curity requirements (7). For example, Moritz’ development team has good domain knowledge in
electronic commerce and can therefore propose adequate security requirements. For Herbert’s team,
the developers’ best practices led to agreements between the customer and developers to minimize
risks and outsource the handling of payment data to a service provider.
According to Klaus, the trust relationship between the customer and the development team is
very important in this respect. Customers often cannot comprehend the technical background for
decisions on security measures. The necessary level of trust is built up during the close development
participation. The trust on the technical level is perceived to be similar to the trust on the inner quality
of the software product, for which customers usually assume that the developers conduct adequate
quality-assurance measures without speciﬁcally prescribing exact procedures.
C.2.3. Close customer participation
Six interviewees mentioned that, irrespective of the customer’s security awareness, close customer
participation improves the elicitation of security requirements through their domain knowledge. The
security requirements are usually reﬁned over several discussions and iterations (6 mentions). For
example, developers propose technical approaches, which are discussed with the customer, then
implemented and adapted in subsequent iterations. In Jan’s project, authorization requirements were
difﬁcult to elicit bottom-up due to large variations among the customer stakeholders, causing overly
complex requirements. The simpliﬁed, top-down model that was implemented instead then needed to
be adapted in production over time, with changes even after 1.5 years in production. Another reason
for discussions are functional changes: Moritz reported that over the course of the project, functional
changes, such as new interfaces between the ERP and the shop system, repeatedly required security
discussions. In his experience, adaptations to the original plan are mostly necessary when the best
practices of the developer team do not ﬁt as expected in the customer context.
There was a broad consensus among the interviewees that authorization requirements change fre-
quently, often once per iteration. The reasons that were named are the evolving functionality, new
user groups accessing the system and the realization that permissions are inappropriate in production.
The style of customer interaction on authorization varies. A permission matrix can be appropriate,
but more common are natural language discussions without a document as basis.
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Max: Developers refer “ﬁrst to the conﬁguration then to source code and then to the
behavior of the application.”
In some projects, such as Jan’s, a process handbook is provided by the customer as a high-level
foundation of authorization restrictions. Two interviewees mention that missing or outdated security
documentation is a problem. In Jan’s case, a ﬁve-page document is necessary to describe the high-
level authorization concept used in the application in addition to seven separate lists with the actual
permissions that are maintained in parallel to the actual permission conﬁguration.
C.2.4. Awareness and expertise spreads among developers
Seven interviewees described security as being generally present within the developer teams and the
expertise as being rather homogeneous. Exceptions are interns and new employees:
Max: They “need some time to take up the necessary security awareness.”
There are several ways in which the security awareness and expertise is built. Generally, security
expertise and awareness spreads between developers (6 mentions) and security is part of informal
discussions.
Moritz: “There is an exchange of information between the people of the team and be-
tween the teams, ‘how have you handled the problem?’ ”
Self-taught awareness and expertise from the news and blogs was also mentioned frequently (4). One
reason is the motivation of feeling “responsibility for the project” due to the holistic development
approach (5). Holistic development also increases the awareness and expertise: New developers, for
example, rotate through multiple project teams to work on various parts of a project. Comparing
the motivation to pre-agile development, Stefan stated that the improved communication among
developers and quality assurance helped. Other motivating factors were the external audits and the
inner-company competition for quality between teams.
Less common are explicit trainings for security requirements that are required from regulations
(2). Other institutionalized knowledge sharing occurs through security review meetings (2). Moritz
also reported on coding Dojos (collective development sessions), in which developers train speciﬁc
quality-improving agile practices, such as test-driven development.
C.2.5. Developing securely
Three interviewees mentioned that there are problems of integrating assurance into the agile lifecycle,
or, similarly, of neglected assurance practices from the pressure of short iterations. The full-stack
tests can be more difﬁcult with agile processes because the effort is too high for rigorous testing
on each iteration. Short iterations can cause pressure to make visible progress, in some cases even
causing practices, such as test-driven development, to be neglected.
Two interviewees stated that the iterative and incremental development allows them to ﬁnd more
direct approaches and keep the software design simpler as recommended in secure software design.
Herbert reported that the developers always attempt to keep the authorization model simple to prevent
side effects by asking the customer which limitations are actually necessary. The design also beneﬁts
from the holistic development approach (5) since it offers a more complete picture for the individual
developers. If non-functional requirements, such as quality and high-level security aspects, should
be made explicit, they can be formulated as “done deﬁnitions” (2) that specify when a feature is
considered complete. For instance, this may include a security review.
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C.2.6. Employing low-overhead assurance
In most cases, the assurance practices are integrated into the development process. Four interviewees
mentioned testing and test-driven development, typically conducted by the development team. In
contrast, the customer took over most of the testing activities in Jan’s project to achieve the necessary
quality. Penetration tests were conducted in two cases, either as part of the done criteria, or in parallel
to the development on the production system. Code reviews are more common (4), for example, as
a four-eye principle on each software repository check-in or as part of the done criteria. Three
interviewees reported that the practices are adapted over time to changing contexts, so that, for
example, the code-review practices evolved with the company and development processes.
C.2.7. Adapting the process model to high criticality
In three cases, the processes were deﬁned and externally audited in parallel to development to assure
the process quality. The same three projects also employed dedicated security or release iterations
before the actual release to create the required documents and thoroughly test the product. Explicit
risk analysis and management was mentioned by two interviewees, either assessing the risk for indi-
vidual features before deployment or following regulations on a systematic risk management process,
including explicit risk meetings and sign-off procedures.
C.3. Discussion
This study explored the problems with security in agile development and respective alleviations
through interviews with practitioners. The interviews offer only subjective data and are prone to re-
searcher or participant bias. Since the sample size is limited for interviews, we focused on covering a
broad range of development contexts. The results are, by study design, not sound and representative,
but extend the prior theoretical ﬁndings with a practical perspective and offer a description as an
initial hypothesis for further research.
Overall, the problems and alleviations from prior work are mentioned in the study where applica-
ble to the study’s scope. Tables C.2 and C.3 contrast the key concepts of challenges and alleviations
from literature with those mentioned by study participants for security in agile development. Six
of the challenges from literature were not mentioned in the study, four are present in both, and two
challenges mentioned in the study were not covered by previously. Three of the challenges not men-
tioned by participants are outside of the core focus of the study and apply to highly critical contexts,
such as “Requirements traceability” and “Implicit trust”. Others may not be as critical as seen in
the theoretical prior work (“Lack of specialist expertise”, “Retroﬁtting security”). Not previously
covered problems are the very practical issues with the customer awareness and pressure leading to
neglected security practices. In case of the alleviations, four of the 14 alleviations in literature were
not mentioned in the study and participants stated 11 further alleviations. The alleviations from liter-
ature without mention were primarily very speciﬁc (“Abuse cases”, “Individual security activity per
sprint”), or applied to high criticality (“Requirements traceability”). The alleviations not present in
previous work primarily leverage the strengths of agile development (“Close customer integration”,
“Spreading awareness and expertise”), but also regard speciﬁc problems with security (“Implicit
security requirements”, “Concrete requirements”). We discuss the key results in the following:
Institutionalize customer involvement Despite not covered in prior work, a good interaction con-
cerning security between developers and customers is a prerequisite to adequate security measures.
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In this study, the interaction differs greatly among projects and customers can often only state un-
clear security requirements, leading to implicit security requirements. Non-functional requirements
need to be elicited together with customers and then iteratively turned into functional requirements.
Thus, customers and developers need a common understanding of the roles in the project regarding
security, including:
• Which side has how much security awareness and expertise,
• Who is responsible for triggering discussions of non-functional and functional security re-
quirements.
Risk assessments are often only implicitly part of functional discussions. While not necessarily as
an explicit security iteration as suggested in literature (Sullivan, 2008), customers and developers
should explicitly address the risks and the non-functional security requirements early in the project
to have a common framing for the later decisions on security measures and implementation practices.
In discussions, developers should focus on concrete threats and security requirements to improve the
common understanding (West, 2008).
Foster developer security awareness and expertise The overall security in a project depends on
the security expertise of the individuals, both on the customer or developer side. This corresponds
to the agile value of “individuals and interaction over processes and tools” (Beck et al., 2001). The
developers in this study for the most part feel responsible to craft secure systems and are motivated to
learn and spread security expertise, also supported by the communicative nature of agile processes.
Nevertheless, this cannot be taken for granted, as shown in Jan’s case. The spreading of awareness
and expertise among developers should thus be further fostered. Not only through explicit security
trainings (Ge et al., 2007) and experts on teams (Wäyrynen et al., 2004), as suggested in literature,
but also by motivating the exchange between developers, for example, through agile practices with
positive effects on internal communication.
Continuously improve the process for security Three teams in this study are actively adapting
the development processes over time for it to optimally suit the environment. While this has not
been the focus in literature, developers should consider security aspects of the development process
in retrospectives and adapt it to meet security needs. Retrospectives are also a good place to consider
the integration of secure development practices, for example, from SSE–CMM (ISSEA, 2003). Three
cases in this study show that it is possible to integrate heavy-weight security practices, in contrast to
the skeptical prior work.
Promote implicit documentation Literature and two cases in this study point to the problem of
outdated security documentation in agile development. Not only test cases (Wäyrynen et al., 2004),
but also other artifacts, such as authorization policies, can provide implicit documentation. Devel-
opers should consider to move the security documentation into the code where possible to create
current documentation as the basis for discussions with customers.
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D. Literature on problems surrounding
authorization
As part of the existing body of literature on authorization, numerous problems surrounding this mea-
sure have been identiﬁed. Relevant publications are listed in the following table. Each publication
has a speciﬁc focus, targeting one or more authorization perspectives in one of the variety of au-
thorization contexts. We refer to this list as part of the analysis of problems in prior literature (cf.
Section 2.3), particularly noting the respective study design and the perspectives covered.
Source Study design Environment Focus/scope Perspective
Sikkel and
Stiemerling
(1998)
Subjective: inter-
views
Private and public organi-
zations
How users specify
policies
Authoring
Whalen et al.
(2006)
Subjective: survey,
interviews
Medium-sized research
laboratory
Individuals’ problems
from mechanisms
Authoring, mak-
ing, functional
Bauer et al.
(2009)
Subjective: inter-
views
Diverse organizations Challenges for policy
professionals
Authoring, mak-
ing
Smetters and
Good (2009)
Objective: historical
policy data
Medium-sized corporation Usage of authorization
features and models
Authoring, mak-
ing
Inglesant et al.
(2008)
Subjective: inter-
views
E-Scientist collaboration Authoring through
controlled natural
language
Authoring
Bauer et al.
(2008a)
Subjective: inter-
views, objective:
usage data
Physical security in of-
ﬁces with smartphone
system
How can users imple-
ment ideal policies
Making, author-
ing
Ahern et al.
(2007)
Objective: usage
data, subjective:
interviews
Social networking, photo
sharing
Privacy decisions in
mobile/online sharing
Authoring, mak-
ing
Kim et al. (2010) Subjective: inter-
views
Home, allowing guest
access
What kind of policies
are needed?
Authoring, mak-
ing
Wool (2004) Objective: policy
data
Firewall rules in organiza-
tions
Mistakes in ﬁrewall
rules
Authoring
Sinclair et al.
(2008)
Field study Financial organization Security in organiza-
tions
Functional,
making
Gallaher et al.
(2002)
Case study, survey Organizational authoriza-
tion
Beneﬁts of RBAC Authoring
Jaeger et al.
(2004)
Case study Linux Kernel Authorization enforce-
ment
Developing
Vaniea et al.
(2008b)
Laboratory: usabil-
ity
Privacy in organizations Natural language pol-
icy authoring
Authoring
Herzog and Shah-
mehri (2006)
Laboratory: usabil-
ity
Java application policy
authoring
Setting of Java policies Authoring, De-
veloping
Maxion and
Reeder (2005)
Laboratory: usabil-
ity
OS ﬁle permissions Prevent mistakes in ﬁle
permission setting
Authoring
Reeder et al.
(2007)
Laboratory: usabil-
ity
Enterprise privacy policies Challenges in privacy
policy authoring
Authoring
Table D.1.: Literature on problems surrounding authorization (continued on next page. . . )
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Source Study design Environment Focus/scope Perspective
Zurko and Simon
(1996)
Laboratory: user-
centered design
– Policy editing usability Authoring, De-
veloping
Zurko et al.
(1999)
Laboratory: usabil-
ity
Distributed research envi-
ronments
Usable policy editor Authoring, De-
veloping
Rode et al. (2006) Laboratory: usabil-
ity
Ad hoc ﬁle sharing Challenges in policy
authoring
Authoring, mak-
ing
Reeder et al.
(2008)
Laboratory: usabil-
ity
File permissions Challenges in ﬁle per-
mission setting
Authoring
Brostoff et al.
(2005)
Laboratory: usabil-
ity
E-Scientist collaboration Improve policy author-
ing tool
Authoring
Reeder et al.
(2011)
Laboratory: usabil-
ity
File permissions Conﬂict resolution Authoring
Bertino et al.
(2008)
Analytical Enterprise authorization Role-mining and us-
ability
Authoring
Blakley (1996) Analytical Organizational authoriza-
tion
General problems in
information security
management
Authoring
Chadwick and
Sasse (2006)
Analytical E-Scientist collaboration Policy formulation Authoring
Al-Shaer and
Hamed (2003)
Analytical Firewall rules in organiza-
tions
Discover anomalies
and support editing
Authoring
Yee (2005) Analytical General security mecha-
nisms
Design guidelines for
system security
Authoring
Johnson et al.
(2009)
Analytical File sharing in organiza-
tions
Laissez-faire ﬁle-
sharing
Functional,
making
Kapadia et al.
(2004)
Analytical Organizational authoriza-
tion
Provide feedback on
denials
Functional
Becker and Nanz
(2008)
Analytical Organizational authoriza-
tion
Support policy editing,
delegation
Authoring
Bonatti et al.
(2006)
Analytical Web access control Explaining proof fail-
ures in authorization
decisions
Authoring
Vaniea et al.
(2008a)
Analytical Large policies Linking policy prob-
lems to the source
Authoring
Joshi et al. (2005) Analytical GTRBAC policies How the model affects
policy complexity
Authoring
Table D.1.: Literature on problems surrounding authorization
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Authorization in information systems has been extensively researched in the last decades (cf. Sec-
tion 2.4.4). To assess how well the requirements on usable authorization (cf. Section 6.1) are already
addressed by prior research, we list important works in the following. We base the elicitation of open
research questions (cf. Section 6.3) on this body of work. Apart from approaches directly from liter-
ature, the table also includes the interrelation between the requirements as these build upon another
– for example, Req 1 Authorization measure is addressed through Req 5 Circumventions.
Approach Description Type Argument Source
Req 1 Authorization measure
Circumventions How and when to circumvent authorization
measures
Requirement Req 5 Circum-
ventions
Change requests Ability to request changes with reasonable
effort
Requirement Req 9 Change
requests
Decision-
making
Precise decisions to prevent over-
entitlements at low effort
Requirement Req 6 Policy
decisions
Procedures Decisions by authoritative staff and accept-
able coordination effort
Requirement Req 10 Change
procedures
Reviews and
monitoring
Monitoring functional staff for their com-
pliance in using the measure and regularly
reviewing permissions for over-entitlements,
both at low effort
Requirement Req 7 Reviews
and monitoring
Policy changes Formalizing the policy decisions correctly
and efﬁciently
Requirement Req 8 Policy
changes
Controls integra-
tion
Reliably integrate authorization enforcement
and decisioning in systems, expending low
effort
Requirement Req 15 Con-
trols integra-
tion
Req 2 Functional productivity
Reduce disrup-
tions
Integrate in workﬂows Recommenda-
tion
Field study Whalen et al.
(2006)
Reduce disrup-
tions
Minimal friction Principle Analytical Johnson et al.
(2009)
Reduce disrup-
tions
Adequate restrictions from the formalize pol-
icy decisions
Requirement Req 8 Policy
changes
Reduce disrup-
tions
Adequately restrictive policy from adequate
policy decisions
Requirement Req 6 Policy
decisions
Reduce disrup-
tions
Enable and communicate requests to change
restrictions with low disruptions and prompt
request processing
Requirement Req 9 Change
requests
Reduce disrup-
tions
Reduce disruptions through acceptable cir-
cumventions
Requirement Req 5 Circum-
ventions
Reduce disrup-
tions
Flexible restrictions with adequate authoriza-
tion models, e.g. implementing delegation
and policy override
Requirement Req 12 Model
usability
Req 3 Regulatory requirements
Table E.1.: Approaches in literature and requirement interdependence (continued on next page. . . )
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Approach Description Type Argument Source
Measure effec-
tiveness
Effectively enforce regulatory requirements
through authorization
Requirement Req 1 Au-
thorization
measure
Compliant pro-
cedures
Implement procedures to guarantee ade-
quate decisions and formalization of policy
changes
Requirement Req 10 Change
procedures
Compliant
decision-making
Honor regulatory requirements in policy de-
cisions
Requirement Req 6 Policy
decisions
Req 4 Individual satisfaction
Functional work Reduce unnecessary disruptions in functional
work
Requirement Req 2 Func-
tional produc-
tivity
Circumventions Guide circumventions to reduce disruptions Requirement Req 5 Circum-
ventions
Efﬁcient mea-
sure
Reduce necessary effort for the changing of
policies
Requirement Req 1 Au-
thorization
measure
Efﬁcient mea-
sure
Reduce necessary effort for the management
of authorization measure
Requirement Req 1 Au-
thorization
measure
Req 5 Circumventions
Reduce disrup-
tions
Reduce disruptions to reduce necessity of cir-
cumventions
Requirement Req 2 Func-
tional produc-
tivity
Increase risk
awareness
Foster informal rules on circumvention Recommenda-
tion
Field study Section 5.2
Increase risk
awareness
Training, education, awareness, motivation General ap-
proach
Roper et al.
(2005)
Increase security
awareness
Training and awareness campaigns Best practices ISO/IEC
27002:2005
(2005)
Guide circum-
ventions
Foster formal rules on circumvention Recommenda-
tion
Field study Section 5.2
Monitor circum-
vention
Derive insights on authorization problems
from circumventions
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Section 5.2
Disciplinary
measures
Formal and fair disciplinary process Best practices ISO/IEC
27002:2005
(2005)
Req 6 Policy decisions
Adequate re-
strictions
Task analysis General ap-
proach
Hollnagel
(2006)
Adequate re-
strictions
Less restrictive, support social controls Recommenda-
tion
Field study Whalen et al.
(2006)
Decision guid-
ance
Provide high-level policies on authorization
changes
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Section 5.2
Decision guid-
ance
Guidance to enable adequate decisions and
reduce the decision complexity through sup-
port
Requirement Req 11 Deci-
sion guidance
Improve exper-
tise
Increase the expertise and awareness of deci-
sion makers
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Section 5.2
Improve exper-
tise
Collaborative action learning General ap-
proach
Ngwenyama
(1993)
Model expres-
siveness
Improve authorization models Recommenda-
tion
Field study Section 5.2
Table E.1.: Approaches in literature and requirement interdependence (continued on next page. . . )
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Model expres-
siveness
Expressiveness of authorization model inﬂu-
ences the granularity and thereby the number
and precision of decisions
Requirement Req 12 Model
usability
Functional staff
integration
Integrate functional staff in security manage-
ment
Principle Analytical Church (2008)
Functional staff
integration
Integration of tasks, monitoring, conﬁgura-
tion
Approach Laboratory
experiment
Rode et al.
(2006)
Functional staff
integration
Integration of policy decisions into workﬂow
UI
Approach Analytical Karp and
Stiegler (2010)
Functional staff
integration
Transparency of authorization decisions and
the implemented policy to facilitate change
decisions by non-experts
Requirement Req 14 Mecha-
nism usability
Authorization
requirement
elicitation
Goal-driven requirements for privacy policies Method Field study He and Antón
(2009)
Authorization
requirement
elicitation
Requirements analysis Approach Analytical Koch and
Parisi-Presicce
(2003)
Authorization
requirement
elicitation
Scenario-based role engineering Method Field study Neumann and
Strembeck
(2002)
Authorization
requirement
elicitation
Evolutionary role engineering Method Analytical Takabi and
Joshi (2010)
Req 7 Reviews and monitoring
Monitoring
practice
Discover unintended information disclo-
sures, non-compliance, access violations
Best practices ISO/IEC
27002:2005
(2005)
Monitoring
practice
Auditing in health care information system
for authorization
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Røstad and
Edsberg (2006)
Monitoring
implementation
Enable efﬁcient and effective monitoring
through adequate implementation of mecha-
nism
Requirement Req 15 Con-
trols integra-
tion
Review practice Regular reviews Best practices ISO/IEC
27002:2005
(2005)
Review practice Self-review of staff Approach Field study Sinclair et al.
(2008)
Review tool
support
Comprehensible policies, adequate policy re-
view tool for precise and efﬁcient reviews
Requirement Req 13 Pol-
icy and tool
usability
Req 8 Policy changes
Concrete
changes
Concreteness reduces cognitive load General ap-
proach
Analytical Blackwell et al.
(2008)
Concrete
changes
Use examples Approach Field study Inglesant et al.
(2008)
Concrete
changes
Employ email metaphor Approach Analytical Johnson et al.
(2009)
Concrete
changes
Security by designation Principle Analytical Yee (2005)
Improve usabil-
ity
Comprehensible policies, adequate editing
and supporting tools, and usable policy syn-
tax for precise changes with low effort
Requirement Req 13 Pol-
icy and tool
usability
Table E.1.: Approaches in literature and requirement interdependence (continued on next page. . . )
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Approach Description Type Argument Source
Reduce com-
plexity
Small rule sets Recommenda-
tion
Field study Wool (2004)
Reduce com-
plexity
Expressiveness of authorization model to for-
malize decisions adequately at low effort
Requirement Req 12 Model
usability
Reduce com-
plexity
Adequately ﬂexible and restrictive policy de-
cisions for reduced authoring effort
Requirement Req 6 Policy
decisions
Improve proce-
dures
Effective and efﬁcient communication with
policy makers
Requirement Req 10 Change
procedures
Functional staff
integration
Integrate functional staff in security manage-
ment
Principle Analytical Church (2008)
Req 9 Change requests
Procedure ade-
quacy
Adjust degree of centralization and formal-
ization
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Section 5.2
Change effort Reduce the (perceived) change lead-time and
change effort
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Section 5.2
Procedure
awareness
Deﬁne and communicate procedures Recommenda-
tion
Field study Section 5.2
Req 10 Change procedures
Management
approach
Process-based role management Recommenda-
tion
Field study Sinclair et al.
(2008)
Process model Multi-level policy lifecycle Method Analytical Dai and Alves-
Foss (2002)
Process model High-level policy lifecycle Method Analytical Rees et al.
(2003)
Process model High-level policy change procedure model Method Analytical OGC (2007c)
Process model RBAC policy lifecycle model Method Field study Kern et al.
(2002)
Process model Technical policy lifecycle model Method Analytical Mönkeberg and
Rakete (2000)
Change manage-
ment
Security conﬁguration management Best practices ISSEA (2003)
Change manage-
ment
Change management approaches General ap-
proach
Joeris (1997)
Validation and
veriﬁcation plan
Plan of which artifacts need to be assured by
whom
Best practices ISSEA (2003)
Procedure ade-
quacy
Adjust degree of centralization and formal-
ization
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Section 5.2
Procedure
awareness
Deﬁne and communicate procedures Recommenda-
tion
Field study Section 5.2
Req 11 Decision guidance
Authorization
requirement
elicitation
Policy requirements based on organizational
structures
Method Analytical Crook et al.
(2003)
Authorization
requirement
elicitation
Combination of bottom-up and top-down role
analysis
Method Field study Kern et al.
(2002)
Authorization
requirement
elicitation
Role mining Approach Analytical Bertino et al.
(2008)
Authorization
requirement
elicitation
The use of inheritance in organizational poli-
cies
Recommenda-
tion
Analytical Moffett (1998)
Risk assessment Practices for the speciﬁcation of security
needs
Best practices ISSEA (2003)
Table E.1.: Approaches in literature and requirement interdependence (continued on next page. . . )
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Approach Description Type Argument Source
Risk assessment Business requirements surrounding autho-
rization
Best practices ISO/IEC
27002:2005
(2005)
Awareness of
consequences
Awareness of consequences from decisions Recommenda-
tion
Field study Ahern et al.
(2007)
Decision support Decision support from prior decisions to pre-
vent mistakes
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Ahern et al.
(2007)
Decision support Provide decision support Recommenda-
tion
Field study Section 5.2
Decision support Risk-based analysis of permission assign-
ments
Approach Analytical Nissanke and
Khayat (2004)
Decision support Market mechanisms for risk-based decision
guidance
Approach Analytical Molloy et al.
(2008)
Decision support Model of incentives to manage escalation
risks
Approach Analytical Zhao and John-
son (2009)
Req 12 Model usability
Cognitive effort Learnability, reduced cognitive effort, main-
tainability
Recommenda-
tion
Analytical Blakley (1996)
Cognitive effort Simpler models, patterns Recommenda-
tion
Field study Smetters and
Good (2009)
Cognitive effort Adequate conﬂict resolution algorithm Approach Laboratory
experiment
Reeder et al.
(2008)
Cognitive effort Speciﬁcity-based conﬂict resolution works
best
Approach Laboratory
experiment
Reeder et al.
(2011)
Model expres-
siveness
Precise limitation of scopes, handling excep-
tions
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Sikkel and
Stiemerling
(1998)
Model expres-
siveness
Improve models to handle unexpected events Recommenda-
tion
Field study Bauer et al.
(2009)
Model expres-
siveness
Fine-grained controls Recommenda-
tion
Field study Ahern et al.
(2007)
Model expres-
siveness
Policies based on presence, logging, asking
for permission; grouping of people
Approach Laboratory
experiment
Kim et al.
(2010)
Model expres-
siveness
Logging, notiﬁcations, transitivity, grouping
granularity
Approach Field study Bauer et al.
(2008a)
Flexibility Improve ﬂexibility Recommenda-
tion
Analytical Blakley (1996)
—Delegation Delegation formalization for RBAC Approach Analytical Ahn et al.
(2003)
—Delegation General option of delegation for users Principle Analytical Johnson et al.
(2009)
—Policy over-
ride
Requirements for optimistic security Recommenda-
tion
Analytical Povey (2000)
—Policy over-
ride
Policy override in clinical information sys-
tems
Approach Field study Denley and
Smith (1999)
—Policy over-
ride
Policy override model in health care environ-
ment
Approach Field study Ferreira et al.
(2009)
Flexibility Uno-tempore authorization through negotia-
tion
Approach Field study Stiemerling
and Wulf
(2000)
Flexibility Authorization through audits Approach Analytical Cederquist
et al. (2007)
Flexibility Risk-based authorization decisions Approach Analytical Diep et al.
(2007)
Table E.1.: Approaches in literature and requirement interdependence (continued on next page. . . )
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Approach Description Type Argument Source
Flexibility Risk-based multi-level security Approach Analytical Cheng et al.
(2007)
Req 13 Policy and tool usability
Policy usability Comprehensible authorization model to en-
able comprehensible policies
Requirement Req 12 Model
usability
Policy-editing
tool usability
Make controls simpler to manage Recommenda-
tion
Field study Whalen et al.
(2006)
Policy-editing
tool usability
Better authoring tools Recommenda-
tion
Field study Smetters and
Good (2009)
Policy-editing
tool usability
Requirements: integrates management of
policy aspects, convenient interface, consis-
tency checks, consequences of rules, applica-
ble rules
Recommenda-
tion
Analytical Zurko and
Simon (1996)
Policy-editing
tool usability
Privacy-editing requirements: group ob-
jects, consistent terms, comprehensible de-
fault rules, policy structure, rule conﬂict res-
olution
Recommenda-
tion
Laboratory
experiment
Reeder et al.
(2007)
Policy-editing
tool usability
Smooth transition between authoring phases Approach Laboratory
experiment
Vaniea et al.
(2008b)
Policy-editing
tool usability
Support communication of authors and mak-
ers
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Bauer et al.
(2009)
Policy-editing
tool usability
Appropriate level of abstraction Method Analytical Dai and Alves-
Foss (2002)
Policy-editing
tool usability
Developer and user mode, usage of the error
log
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Inglesant et al.
(2008)
—Presentation
and visualization
Error avoidance through effective permission
display; necessary information in screens; no
misleading constructs in UI
Approach Laboratory
experiment
Maxion and
Reeder (2005)
—Presentation
and visualization
Presentation of whole policy, visualization of
exceptions and overrides
Approach Laboratory
experiment
Reeder et al.
(2008)
—Presentation
and visualization
Good visualization of large policy Recommenda-
tion
Analytical Bertino et al.
(2008)
—Presentation
and visualization
Clear consequences, understandable terms
and identiﬁers
Recommenda-
tion
Analytical Yee (2005)
—Presentation
and visualization
Comprehension of consequences Approach Laboratory
experiment
Rode et al.
(2006)
—Presentation
and visualization
Help on semantics Recommenda-
tion
Laboratory
experiment
Herzog and
Shahmehri
(2006)
—Presentation
and visualization
Visualize analysis output, show effects of
changes
Approach Laboratory
experiment
Vaniea et al.
(2008b)
—Editing sup-
port
Anomaly detection and supported editing Approach Analytical Al-Shaer and
Hamed (2003)
—Editing sup-
port
Explaining decisions through proof explana-
tions
Approach Analytical Bonatti et al.
(2006)
—Editing sup-
port
Intentional access management through deci-
sion support
Approach Laboratory
experiment
Cao and Iver-
son (2006)
Supporting tools Role mining by clustering users and permis-
sions from business processes
Approach Analytical Kuhlmann
et al. (2003)
Supporting tools Role mining by clustering users and permis-
sions from similar users
Approach Analytical Schlegelmilch
and Steffens
(2005)
—Analysis tools Change impact analysis Approach Analytical Fisler et al.
(2005)
Table E.1.: Approaches in literature and requirement interdependence (continued on next page. . . )
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Approach Description Type Argument Source
—Analysis tools Role analysis tool Approach Analytical Gofman et al.
(2009)
—Assurance
tools
Policy analysis with UML and OCL Approach Analytical Sohr et al.
(2008)
—Assurance
tools
Analysis of organizational controls Approach Analytical Schaad et al.
(2006)
—Assurance
tools
Traceability from high-level requirements to
policy
Approach Analytical Verhanneman
et al. (2005)
—Assurance
tools
Analysis of inherent policy quality Approach Analytical Dougherty
et al. (2006)
—Assurance
tools
Analysis of inherent policy quality: XACML
coverage
Approach Analytical Martin et al.
(2006)
—Assurance
tools
Analysis of inherent policy quality: domi-
nance, conﬂicts, coverage
Approach Analytical Agrawal et al.
(2005)
—Assurance
tools
Policy test-case generation Approach Analytical Hwang et al.
(2008)
—Assurance
tools
Veriﬁcation of property-set quality Approach Analytical Martin et al.
(2008)
Language us-
ability
Concrete syntax: distance between human re-
quirement and abstract syntax
Recommenda-
tion
Laboratory
experiment
Pane et al.
(2001)
Language us-
ability
Controlled natural language, iterative proce-
dure
Approach Field study Inglesant et al.
(2008)
Language us-
ability
Tool support: syntax highlighting Approach Laboratory
experiment
Vaniea et al.
(2008b)
Language us-
ability
Procedural support: iterative transformation
of natural language into policy
Approach Laboratory
experiment
Vaniea et al.
(2008b)
Tool, language
usability
Comprehensible authorization model to im-
plement usable tools and languages
Requirement Req 12 Model
usability
Req 14 Mechanism usability
Transparency Make authority transparent Principle Analytical Yee (2005)
Transparency Make access control decisions visible: easier
to see what has been conﬁgured
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Whalen et al.
(2006)
Transparency Feedback on why requests are denied Approach Analytical Kapadia et al.
(2004)
Transparency Explaining denials, necessary changes Approach Analytical Becker and
Nanz (2008)
Transparency Principle of transparency Principle Analytical Johnson et al.
(2009)
Transparency Suggest responsible policy maker Approach Field study Bauer et al.
(2008b)
Transparency Comprehensible model to enable comprehen-
sible and transparent authorization decisions
Requirement Req 12 Model
usability
Decision inte-
gration
Integrate policy decisions in workﬂow Approach Analytical Karp and
Stiegler (2010)
Delegation Delegation assistance Approach Analytical Brucker et al.
(2009)
Model imple-
mentation
Interactive decisions, reactive delegation Approach Field study Bauer et al.
(2008a)
Model expres-
siveness
Expressive authorization model to implement
usable mechanism
Requirement Req 12 Model
usability
Req 15 Controls integration
Enforcement
integration
Need to support developers in integrating
controls
Recommenda-
tion
Field study Herzog and
Shahmehri
(2006)
Table E.1.: Approaches in literature and requirement interdependence (continued on next page. . . )
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Approach Description Type Argument Source
Manage controls Maintenance and review of controls Best practices ISSEA (2003)
Integrated devel-
opment
Integrate policy speciﬁcation into software
development
Method Field study He and Antón
(2009)
Vulnerability
management
Technical vulnerability management Best practices ISO/IEC
27002:2005
(2005)
Security patterns Authorization enforcement patterns Approach Analytical Priebe et al.
(2004)
Enforcement
architecture
Decoupling authorization from application
logic
Principle Analytical Beznosov et al.
(1999)
Enforcement
architecture
OS-based controls Approach Analytical Harrison et al.
(1976)
Enforcement
architecture
API-based controls in Java Approach Analytical Gong and
Ellison (2003)
Enforcement
architecture
Language-based enforcement Approach Analytical Goguen and
Meseguer
(1982)
Enforcement
architecture
Aspect-oriented programming for authoriza-
tion
Approach Analytical Kiczales et al.
(1997)
Enforcement
validation
Analysis tools to identify missing enforce-
ment
Approach Field study Jaeger et al.
(2004)
API usability Cognitive dimensions model General ap-
proach
Analytical Clarke (2004)
Table E.1.: Approaches in literature and requirement interdependence
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As described in Chapter 8, policy override allows functional users to temporarily extend their per-
mission to prevent interferences from missing permissions. When deﬁning an authorization policy
with override options, security and domain experts not only need to assign the normal privileges of
each role. For the normal privileges, experts usually evaluate the authorization requirements from a
need-to-know or least-privilege perspective. In policies for policy override, a second, hard boundary
needs to be deﬁned in addition to the soft boundary, which is derived from the need-to-know evalua-
tion. The hard boundary is a result of the balancing of risks and beneﬁts. The risks arise from access
to additional, not routinely needed knowledge and abilities of each role. Beneﬁts are the potential
advantages of policy override from the higher ﬂexibility.
The decision-making of which override extent is appropriate is difﬁcult, as stated in the policy-
override study (Section 8.3), since various threats and risks as well as several factors relating to the
beneﬁts need to be considered. When the authorization-override model allows ﬁne-grained settings
of who may override to what extent, a considerable amount of effort needs to be spent to analyze
risks and gains for each case. To help with this decision and integrate functional staff in the policy-
making task (P1), this chapter1 proposes one approach of supporting the decision-making through the
Policy Override Calculus. The calculus guides the decision and gives an estimate of how appropriate
speciﬁc hard boundaries for individual roles are. Through a systematic collection of risk and beneﬁt
inputs and the appropriateness output, the calculus reduces the cognitive effort for the policy maker
(P2). The calculus employs formulae based on qualitative risk-management principles and combines
approaches from several disciplines, including risk and decision sciences, and criminology for the
risk and decision models, and the socio-technical for a comprehensible decisioning model (P4). The
Policy Override Calculus estimates the override adequacy by employees’ roles and override extent.
The calculus is implemented in an override risk management tool, which we evaluate brieﬂy on the
adequacy of its guidance and the approach of data collection for the calculus (Req 11, Q11.1, Q11.2).
F.1. Decisions on policy override
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no prior publications on decision support for the
conﬁguration of policy override. However, risk assessment has been been included in override au-
thorization models by Cheng et al. (2007) in their optimistic authorization model as discussed above.
Without explicitly offering override functionality, the risk-based access control model RAdAC bal-
ances operational needs versus security risk (Choudhary, 2005). Britton and Brown (2007) analyzed
risk factors to be used in the RAdAC model. Similarly, Diep et al. (2007) described an authorization
model with context-based decisions that includes a quantitative risk assessment on each action. For
a similar mechanism, Dimmock et al. (2004) suggest a Prolog-based risk and trust decision-making
mechanism, in which each action is checked against a risk function for the current state, ensuring
that it is below a certain threshold. Molloy et al. (2008) implement authorization through a trading
or auction metaphor, employing a risk calculation function. These models use quantitative methods
1The Policy Override Calculus was ﬁrst proposed at the SIN conference 2010 (Bartsch, 2010b) and appears here in a
slightly revised form.
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to automatically judge about the risk of actions and, thus, authorization. In practice, quantitative
risk assessment is missing the necessary reliability for automatic decision-making in many contexts
because of insufﬁcient input data quality and many speculative factors (Straub and Welke, 1998).
Qualitative methods are also more common in practice. Therefore, this chapter focuses on qualita-
tive decision-support, which should be more practical.
In the broader realm of information security, other decision-support approaches have been pro-
posed. For example, in the Quality of Security Service (Irvine and Levin, 2000), the functional
user chooses a variable amount of security according to the current needs and balances with respect
to performance and ﬁdelity. Beresnevichiene et al. (2010) use a utility function to model the eco-
nomic beneﬁt from security investments. Taking security usability into account, Parkin et al. (2010)
suggest a tool to allow information security ofﬁcers to choose an adequate password policy. These
approaches lack the ﬁt for the speciﬁc problems of deciding on authorization, though.
F.2. Risk management
Risk assessment is the second major building block for information security decisions. Systematic
evaluation of system security through threats and security features has a long history (Hoffman et al.,
1978). The underlying risk assessment approaches can be – again – categorized according to their
quantitative or qualitative nature. Quantitative approaches, based on numerical calculations of val-
ues and probabilities, have for example been proposed for information security by Guarro (1987).
Post and Diltz (1986) suggest a stochastic dominance approach to quantitative risk analysis to more
precisely compare different mitigation options. Jaisingh and Rees (2001) describe the Value at Risk
methodology, which results in a monetary evaluation of the current risk. More common in practice
is qualitative risk assessment, such as the example given in ISO/IEC 27005:2008 (2008), that results
in a relative risk estimation. It is also common to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches,
for example by combining several risk assessment methods and only using quantitative calculations
in the last step as discussed by Rainer et al. (1991). Karabacak and Sogukpinar (2005) use question-
naires to collect qualitative inputs, which are then combined with quantitative methods to normalize
responses.
There is a wealth of publications available on risk management (Baskerville, 1993; Campbell and
Stamp, 2004). First, there are national and international standards on risk management. ISO/IEC
27005:2008 (2008) provides a general framework for risk management in IT systems. The U.S.
FIPS-65 standard, withdrawn in 1995, applied the well-known quantitative approach “Annualized
Loss Expectancy” (ALE: NIST, 1975). The most widely-used management approaches are of qual-
itative nature, though. Among other problems, quantitative estimations suggest a precision that is
not realistic with the available input (Stoneburner et al., 2002; Peltier, 2005). For example, humans
are very imprecise when estimating frequencies of occurrences (Gilovich et al., 2002) and risk esti-
mations depend on the context (Borge, 2001; Adams, 1999). Also, many aspects, such as attacker
motivation in case of insider threats, are difﬁcult to quantify. A well-known qualitative approach
is the NIST Special Publication 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 2002) that supersedes the quantitative
FIPS-65 standard. Other wide-spread approaches are CRAMM (The CRAMM Manager, 2005) and
OCTAVE (Alberts et al., 2003). These standard methods enact very similar processes: They start
with a qualitative valuation of assets or impacts of incidents. Then, threats and vulnerabilities are
identiﬁed and categorized with likelihood estimations, again by way of qualitative values. In a risk
assessment step, the inputs are combined into risk estimations and, in the risk management part,
mitigations are chosen (United States General Accounting Ofﬁce (GAO), 1999). To further support
the risk assessment, the manual aggregation can be converted into calculations. There are primarily
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Figure F.1.: Calculus formula overview
two options for risk assessment: either quantitatively, through calculations of values at risks and
probabilities of incidents, or qualitatively (Alter and Sherer, 2004).
The risk management processes are very powerful methods for general assessment of risks and
may serve as a basis for the input to more speciﬁc risk assessment. However, to derive the appropriate
override privileges – the objective of this chapter – the standard processes operate at a too high-level
and are too coarse. Speciﬁcally, we, for example, need to differentiate between different roles.
Moreover, to reduce the effort, we need to focus on relevant threats.
F.3. A calculus for the Policy Override conﬁguration
Accounting for the above remarks on prior work, the proposed policy override calculus needs to aim
for qualitative evaluation of the relevant risks from speciﬁc granting of authorization: In the policy
override calculus, the adequacy of override is derived by role and override extent from qualitative data
collected from domain and security experts. The calculus does not employ a quantitative assessment
because of the problems indicated above. For the policy override calculus, a qualitative and relative
risk that allows one to rank the risks should sufﬁce as decision support. The calculus estimates the
additional risk for speciﬁc extents when compared to the default authorization of a speciﬁc role.
The primary factors of the override adequacy calculus are the risk and beneﬁt associated with
speciﬁc override extents. As depicted in Figure F.1, both risk and beneﬁt are derived from a number
of inputs that are combined through formulae. In risk management, the implementation of possible
mitigations are often decided based on a risk/cost relationship (Hoffman et al., 1978). Similarly,
we balance risks against potential beneﬁts for the policy override calculus, thus replacing costs with
the beneﬁts of policy override. The reasoning is that the lost beneﬁt from not allowing override
is analogous to the costs of mitigating the risk caused by policy override. By not allowing policy
override, the potential override beneﬁts are lost, but, equally, the risks mitigated. First, we will
consider the risks that an organization is exposed to when granting override options to users. The
qualitative values that are collected for the input components are either Normal, High or Very High,
abbreviated “N”, “H” and “V” in the tables.
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Protection Need
⊗ Normal High Very High
T
hr
ea
t Normal N N N
High N H H
Very High N H V
Table F.1.: Speciﬁc Risk: (Protection need) ⊗ (Threat likelihood)
F.3.1. Risk
In information security, it is common to aggregate the individual risks for the security objectives
conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability into a single risk value, as suggested by Stoneburner et al.
(2002) and ISO/IEC 27005:2008 (2008). The policy override calculus follows this approach. The
Risk is a function of a system user’s role and a speciﬁc privilege extent, for example permitting access
to only individual objects of a type or all related to an organization’s branch.
Risk(role,extent) = ∝ (SpeciﬁcRisk(Conﬁdentiality,role,extent),
SpeciﬁcRisk(Integrity,role,extent),
SpeciﬁcRisk(Availability,role,extent))
Following Lenstra and Voss (2004), the aggregation operator (∝) is deﬁned as the maximum of the
individual risks. The individual risks do not need to be weighted in this aggregation as weights are
implicitly present in each individual risk’s value through the protection need, as described below.
Speciﬁc Risk For each security objective, conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability, the Speciﬁc
Risk is calculated for each user role and override privilege extent. In risk models, risk is typically
deﬁned as the expected loss resulting from a threat as calculated from the product of an incident’s
potential damage and its likelihood (Stallings and Brown, 2008). Following this approach for the cal-
culus, the Speciﬁc Risk is derived as the individual risk to the security objective from the Protection
Need2 as the expected impact and the Threat Likelihood as the likelihood of the incidents.
SpeciﬁcRisk(ob jective,role,extent) = ProtectionNeed(ob jective,extent)⊗
ThreatLikelihood(ob jective,role,extent)
The ⊗ operator is deﬁned as a look-up matrix shown in Table F.1 that follows loosely the Risk-Level
Matrix proposed in the NIST 800-30 guidelines, in which the risk levels are determined through
multiplication (Stoneburner et al., 2002).
One operand for the calculation of the Speciﬁc Risk is the impact of incidents that is approximated
through the Protection Need as deﬁned in BSI IT-Grundschutz, the German information security
standard for baseline protection (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), 2008).
In the standard, the protection levels are deﬁned as follows:
• Normal: The impact of any loss or damage is limited and calculable.
• High: The impact of any loss or damage may be considerable.
• Very High: The impact of any loss or damage could be of catastrophic proportions threatening
the survival of the organization.
2Throughout the formulae, sans-serif fonts are used to signal direct input data.
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Figure F.2.: Example of risk varying according to the privileges of a role
The IT-Grundschutz standard deﬁnes the protection need levels for the impacts regarding the vio-
lation of laws, regulations or contracts, privacy rights, physical injury, the ability to complete tasks
at hand, internal and external effects and ﬁnancial consequences (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI), 2008).
The protection need values are differentiated according to the exposure extent. A company with
several branches may be able to absorb the losses of a single incident at one branch. On the other
hand, if the whole company is affected, the damage might be disastrous. The potential damage thus
depends on the extent of data exposed. An example for the different risk levels by privilege extent is
shown in Figure F.2. In the example, the disclosure of only some contracts’ quality data has a much
smaller impact than the disclosure of all of the company’s contracts.
Threat Likelihood The second operand for the Speciﬁc Risk is the Threat Likelihood, deﬁned as the
likelihood of the occurrence of an incident. The Threat Likelihood is calculated for a given security
objective and role for the case that a speciﬁc policy override extent has been assigned to that role:
ThreatLikelihood(ob jective,role,extent) =
RoleThreat(role)
OpportunityThreat(ob jective,extent)
Two aspects are taken into consideration to arrive at an estimation of the threat likelihood: the threat
induced by the personal factors of users in speciﬁc roles (Role Threat) and the differences in threat
caused by different privileges (Opportunity Threat). This separation is based on criminological mod-
els on insider threat. The insider threat models in literature separate the aspects of the capability of
users, the motivation and the opportunity in the information systems (CMO model) (Schultz, 2002;
Wood, 2000; Willison, 2006; Willison and Backhouse, 2006). The capability is of minor interest
for the risk in the case of policy override, since the risks are expected to originate from ordinary
activities similar to an insider’s daily routine rather than sophisticated attacks. On the other hand,
motivation and opportunity of users are of high importance. To facilitate the collection of input data
for opportunity and motivational factors with a reasonable effort, these factors are collected by the
two separate input types, Role Threat and Opportunity Threat. This separation can also be found with
Magklaras and Furnell (2002), who suggest a similar insider threat model that depends on reasons
and system role. Schultz (2002) also uses the privilege of users as attributes of insiders in his CMO
model, further backing the modeling of the Opportunity Threat in the calculus.
Role Threat As described above, the Role Threat captures threat likelihood aspects that differ re-
garding the system roles. Intuitively, for personal factors, experts need to evaluate how trustworthy
a group of employees in a speciﬁc role is (Shaw et al., 1998). Magklaras and Furnell (2002) deﬁne
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Intentional Accidental
Threat likelihood
factors
Trust in employees; Employee
Satisfaction; Seniority; Previous
issues with employees of speciﬁc
roles; Deterrents
Frequency of application usage;
Application usability; Work en-
vironment; Training level
Threats to conﬁ-
dentiality
Selling of data Inappropriate data handling
Threats to avail-
ability, integrity
Intentional data manipulation Accidental removal, modiﬁca-
tion of data
Table F.2.: Likelihood factors and threats related to the role-threat likelihood
a taxonomy of insider threat considering the user’s system role, reasons of attack and the attacks’
consequences. We follow their approach on the reasons of attack and differentiate accidental from
intentional threats. On the intentional side, following the CMO model, the role threat foremost re-
lates to the motivation that causes insiders to harm the employer. The NIST 800-30 risk management
guide lists human threat sources (Stoneburner et al., 2002). From practice, Randazzo et al. (2005)
assembled a detailed study on insider threat incidents in the banking and ﬁnancial sector and describe
different motivations. Further motivations are described in a U.S. CERT report on critical infrastruc-
ture sabotage, including disgruntled employees, previous sanctions and personal predispositions that
may be mapped to users in roles (Moore et al., 2008). According to Cappelli et al. (2009), insiders
tend to occupy foremost lower-level, non-technical positions, another factor that supports the correla-
tion between the system roles and threat likelihood. Similarly, a study by the Association of Certiﬁed
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) (2006) of 1134 fraud and abuse incidents, not limited to computer system
activities, shows that the perpetrator’s position and department affects incident frequencies.
In addition to motivational factors, threats from accidental incidents need to be considered. Acci-
dental aspects can be derived from previous incidents for speciﬁc roles, the training level of employ-
ees in a role and similar aspects (Bedny and Meister, 1999; Endsley, 1995). A selection of aspects
and typical incidents relating to the system role that security experts need to take into account for
the Role Threat estimation is listed in Table F.2. The qualitative threat values for the Role Threat
correspond to an estimation of the likelihood of incidents. The input value Normal stands for highly
unlikely, High for unlikely and Very High for likely that an incident occurs.
Opportunity Threat The second dimension of the insider threat likelihood is the opportunity that
is caused by the extent of privilege in override cases. The Opportunity Threat is differentiated by
privilege since the differences of data exposure and of possible actions in the system inﬂuences the
threat likelihood. In the criminological CMO model, opportunity is one of the three primary cate-
gories. According to the Rational Choice Perspective from the Situational Crime Prevention theory,
crimes are deliberate and purposive even though the decisioning of perpetrators may be imperfect
(Willison and Backhouse, 2006). Thus, the motivation might be higher with increased opportunity
that causes, for example, higher interests for the data for espionage and higher impact in case of
sabotage. Financial gain motivates most perpetrators (Randazzo et al., 2005). In an insider threat
prevention guide, Cappelli et al. (2009) list motivations for theft and modiﬁcation for ﬁnancial gain
and business advantage, stating that insiders acted mostly for ﬁnancial gain by stealing and selling
data or modify data for their own or friends’ proﬁt. Another insider threat aspect is that “opportunity
makes a thief” as described for insider threats in the Audit Commission (1994) report.
The Opportunity Threat is estimated independently from personal factors, which are already con-
sidered for the Role Threat. Moreover, the opportunity threat likelihood depends only on the mo-
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Threat Likelihood factors
Conﬁdentiality Selling data for industry espi-
onage
Data value to competitor; Risks
in selling
Integrity, Availability Data manipulation Gain from fraud; Value of sabo-
tage to competitor
Table F.3.: Likelihood factors and threats related to the opportunity-threat likelihood
Role Threat
 Normal High Very High
O
pp
or
t. Normal N H V
High N V V
Very High H V V
Table F.4.: Threat Likelihood: (Role Threat)  (Opportunity Threat)
tivational factors for harmful actions so that only intentional aspects are taken into account. The
varying impacts from accidental incidents caused by different privileges are already taken into ac-
count for the Protection Need. A selection of relevant aspects of threats to Conﬁdentiality, Integrity
and Availability are given in Table F.3.
Threat Likelihood Aggregation Automatically aggregating the Role Threat and Opportunity Threat
values is a key challenge. The aim is to aggregate the different input dimensions of the threat like-
lihood for speciﬁc roles with the values for the speciﬁc privileges. The proposal of the look-up
operator  is shown in Table F.4. It is based on the assumption that “opportunity makes a thief”
(Audit Commission, 1994). The operator result starts out from the threat estimation for the speciﬁc
role, which is then modiﬁed according to opportunity effects. For Very High opportunities, even solid
employees might be tempted to commit a malicious insider act so that the aggregated threat is High.
For High and Very High Role Threat, the aggregated threat increases with higher opportunities.
F.3.2. Beneﬁt
While there are potential risks related to allowing policy override, an organization may signiﬁcantly
beneﬁt from the increased ﬂexibility. The beneﬁts are estimated with the following formula for users
of a role with a speciﬁc override extent conﬁguration:
Beneﬁt(role,extent) = Frequency(role)×
BeneﬁtPerOverride(role,extent)
The beneﬁt is calculated from the frequency of override incidents and an estimate of the beneﬁt that
may be achieved on average from each override incident. Following quantitative calculations, the ×
operator acts similar to multiplication as shown in Table F.5.
Frequency The daily routine of system users often varies signiﬁcantly according to the role. In the
same way, each role may have different frequencies of situations where quick responses are needed.
Thus, domain experts estimate the frequency of override cases by role. Aspects to consider should
include the structuredness of daily routine, the frequency of unforeseeable incidents and whether
there is direct customer contact. Existing application log data and interviews can provide the basis
for this factor.
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Override Frequency
× Normal High Very High
B
en
eﬁ
t Normal N H H
High H H V
Very High H V V
Table F.5.: Beneﬁt: (Beneﬁt per Override) × (Override Frequency)
Effort per Override
− Normal High Very High
G
ai
n Normal N N N
High H N N
Very High V H N
Table F.6.: Net Gain per Override: (Gain per Override) − (Effort per Override)
Beneﬁt per Override The second component for the calculation of the beneﬁt is the beneﬁt that
may be gained in each override incident:
BeneﬁtPerOverride(role,extent) = EﬃciencyGainPerOverride(role,extent)−
EﬀortPerOverride
Beneﬁt Per Override follows the intuition that each case of policy override brings beneﬁt, but also
causes auditing effort for the superior who is responsible for auditing the case. Depending on the au-
diting implementation, auditing effort may reduce the beneﬁt from policy override cases, particularly
with high numbers of policy override cases. Accordingly, Beneﬁt Per Override derives the net gain
that is achieved in each override case from the efﬁciency gain in each case and the auditing effort per
case (−). Efforts estimated as High and Very high reduce the net gain similar to subtraction as shown
in Table F.6.
Efﬁciency Gain per Override The efﬁciency gain per override action is estimated separately for
each role and permission extent. Beneﬁt scenarios help with this step. In the example of a quality
operator in Figure F.2, domain experts may foresee cases in that the company may proﬁt to a larger
extent from the access of data of the whole assigned branch because the operator might jump without
any bureaucracy from one local contract to another. On the other hand, the experts may ﬁnd it
unlikely that the same employee would need to switch branches quickly. Aspects to be considered
are the company gain per override, the time saved by not requiring a formal delegation of permissions
and the likelihood of work in the context of a speciﬁc extent. The qualitative input values should only
be above Normal if there is additional gain when compared to the original privilege extent of a role.
In addition to beneﬁts from the functional perspective, it is also necessary to consider the effort from
saved administrative tasks, which is often signiﬁcant (Gallaher et al., 2002). Instead of assigning new
permissions for temporarily required authorization, the functional user may resort to policy override,
reducing the administrative overhead.
Effort per Override The additional effort that the company needs to invest per override is foremost
caused by the need to audit override actions afterwards. For the Policy Override Calculus, domain
experts estimate the typical effort that is spent on auditing the actions per override.
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Aggregated Risk
 Normal High Very High
G
ai
n Normal N L L
High H N L
Very High V H N
Table F.7.: Override Adequacy: (Aggregated Risks)  (Net Gains)
F.3.3. Override adequacy
From the risk and beneﬁt estimations, the policy override adequacy is determined as decision sup-
port for the policy override authorization conﬁguration for each role with a speciﬁc override extent
assigned:
Adequacy(role,extent) = Risk(role,extent) 
Beneﬁt(role,extent)
The  operator balances risks with beneﬁts. The interpretation of the outcome of this operator de-
pends on the company policy with regard to acceptable risks. The U.S. FIPS 191 guideline suggests
to calculate risk/cost relationships for the balancing of security-mechanism costs against risks based
on qualitative data (NIST, 1994). Similarly, the look-up table for the operator deﬁnition given in
Table F.7 is derived from the risk/beneﬁt relationship. In this case, the costs are the lost beneﬁts
from not employing override as a way to mitigate the risks from override actions. The adequacy
values are calculated by quantifying Normal as 1, High as 2 and Very High as 3. The result from
the ratio a = Gain/Risk is interpreted as Low for values a < 1, Normal for 1 ≤ a < 1.5, High for
1.5 ≤ a < 2.5 and Very High for values a ≥ 2.5. Results from this operator do not offer an abso-
lute estimation of the override adequacy. Rather, the results help by providing an order of the most
suitable role/privilege extent combinations.
F.4. Preliminary case studies
For the evaluation of the proposed calculus, the Web-based Override Risk Assessment tool was de-
veloped, depicted in Figure F.3, to facilitate the collection of input data and calculation of the override
adequacy. In the override risk tool, input tables are provided for each of the input types. If neces-
sary, even the operator tables may be modiﬁed here. The resulting override adequacy is continuously
calculated and displayed in the bottom area, so that stakeholders who provide the input for the eval-
uation can directly see the consequences of inputs. Inputs and results are colored according to the
qualitative value to ease the collection of data and interpretation of results.
We evaluate the proposed override calculus in two distinct environments as case studies. The con-
text of the ﬁrst evaluation is the medium-sized enterprise from the policy override study described
in Section 8.3. With policy override in place, the employees have already built up experience with
the policy override concepts. To evaluate the developed calculus, the author worked together with
the company’s managing director to collect the necessary data. Parts of the results from the analysis
with the Override Risk Assessment tool are shown in Table F.8 by role and privilege extent. The
privileges correspond to application areas in the authorization policy. Five roles of employees from
the authorization policy are shown. Employees with the Inventory role manage stock in the ware-
house. Logisticians are ofﬁce workers concerned with logistics coordination. Operators perform
the quality control tasks. Secretaries and Project managers fulﬁll administrative and project-speciﬁc
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Figure F.3.: Override Risk Assessment tool
management duties, respectively. Due to space considerations, the individual input values are not
shown.
As shown in the result table, the calculus only outputs values for permissions not already assigned
for the conventional need-to-know permission. The results are very heterogeneous. For example,
the results strongly suggest policy override for Project managers with two Very high and two High
results. Operators, on the other hand, should only receive override privileges for some extents as
indicated by the Low values. After the data collection, the author interviewed the managing director
from the studied company on the plausibility and relevance of the results. The managing director
agreed with the results and decided to adapt the original override policy. The override calculus thus
supported the domain experts’ intuition in the complex evaluation of risks and gains.
The second evaluation context is a large enterprise from the food industry with about 1,000 em-
ployees. In this case, an IT management person used the Override Risk Assessment tool with as-
sistance. While the ﬁrst evaluation focused on usefulness of the adequacy results, the second case
was aimed at the usability of the calculus. Primarily, the evaluation explored the necessary effort
and the comprehensibility of the involved risk and beneﬁt concepts. For that reason, the policy over-
ride calculus was only collected for part of the company’s roles and an interview was conducted on
the studied context and the participant’s impressions. In the studied environment, no explicit risk
assessment had been conducted for authorization policy decisions before. Thus, the estimation of
protection needs and threat likelihoods were initially perceived as a challenge. Still, the concepts
that are used in the calculus could be applied. One minor issue was that the available levels to choose
from are abstract and natural-language categories instead of “Normal” and “High” could improve the
process. In the company’s ERP system, only a ﬂat role structure has been implemented, resulting in
a large number of roles. The participant thus saw a high effort required to fully analyze the company
with the policy override calculus. Here, similar to the initial role engineering, external support might
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Privilege Extent
Override Logistics Contracts Quality data
Adequacy Branch Company Branch Company Spec. contracts Branch Company
Inventory N N N N N L
Logistician H H N
Operator N L H L H L
Secretary H H H N
Project manager V H V H
Table F.8.: Example result for the override adequacy by role and privilege extent
be necessary. On the other hand, he was unsure whether the role-based distinction was ﬁne-grained
enough to estimate personal threat likelihoods.
From the two small-scale evaluations, we can draw the conclusion that the current design of
the calculus and implementation of the Override Risk Assessment tool may be helpful in small to
medium enterprises. For large enterprises, the effort may be high, at least when there is no structured
risk assessment data available. Still, further research and larger-scale evaluations are necessary to
show the broader validity of the proposed approach.
F.5. Conclusion
This chapter addresses the challenge of formulating the override policy. Since not only the need-
to-know is considered, but two levels of risks need to be balanced against the beneﬁts, the task is
more complex than deﬁning the default policy. To support this task, a novel calculus estimates the
adequacy of policy override for speciﬁc roles and extents. The qualitative result is derived from
indicator inputs, including the protection needs, threats, and beneﬁts.
The preliminary evaluation of the calculus shows that it may be viable for small to medium en-
terprises for insights into the adequate extent of policy override. Domain experts of a medium-sized
company could improve the policy-override conﬁguration from the calculus results and gave positive
feedback on the usefulness of the results (P1). In large enterprises, the implementation of an override
risk assessment is more challenging, though. Regarding the aim of the calculus to explore how policy
decisions can be guided (Req 11), we can derive the following insights on open research questions:
Q11.1 What kind of guidance for authorization-related decisions is effective and efﬁcient? Adequate
guidance depends strongly on the context. In small to medium enterprises, it is plausible that a
risk-based policy-wide calculus of permission adequacy is useful in guiding the decisions and
reducing the decision effort (P2). For environments with a large number of functional roles
and unstructured permissions, the calculus approach may require too much effort.
Q11.2 How can the information that is required for decision guidance be elicited? The calculus
took a one-time approach to input collection, which may work for smaller contexts. However,
the approach can be prohibitively expensive for larger contexts. For the latter, a more process-
oriented approach that integrates with existing procedures for policy changes might be more
adequate.
Future work involves the further development and evaluation of the calculus on a larger scale. This
may include re-using the calculus results for the creation of conventional policies, using different lev-
els of abstraction for input collection, and experimenting with directly employing the calculus result
for override permissions without expert intervention. Similarly to improve the viability for larger
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environments, we should consider re-using data from Information Security Management Systems
and existing risk assessments to reduce the effort of collecting the input data.
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G. Principles applied in the artifacts
In this dissertation, we explored the usefulness of eight Authorization Principles by developing six
artifacts. Each of the artifacts employed a subset of the principles as summarized in Table 6.4. The
respective insights on the principles from their application in the artifacts are listed below in Ta-
ble G.1. Moreover, the evaluation of the artifacts resulted in numerous recommendation that relate
to principles as listed in Table G.2. Both aspects are further discussed in Section 11.1.5. Lastly, we
discuss how the principles apply to contexts outside of the scope of this thesis.
Artifact Coverage Insights Limitations (argument)
P1 Interaction and participation
Enforcement Integration of policy
changes and application
development
Better reactions to problems of staff
due to separation of concerns
Single case study (Objective
empirical/analytical)
Policy Participation of func-
tional staff in policy
discussion
Difﬁcult due to cognitive load,
unknown semantics; context-
dependent
Needs validation in practice
(Subjective empirical)
Change sup-
port
Participation of func-
tional staff, interaction
between perspectives
Helps in the communication of
change options and consequences,
but context-dependent
Limited policy expressive-
ness, needs validation in
practice, (Subjective empiri-
cal)
Policy over-
ride
Integration of functional
staff in policy making for
the own permissions
Need to support functional staff’s
understanding of what is possible in
override – and what is appropriate
Single case study (Subjective
empirical)
INDUSE Interactions between per-
spectives
Deﬁned interrelations can be useful
and can be indicated by INDUSE
Needs validation in practice
(Subjective empirical)
Decision
support
Participation of func-
tional staff in decisions;
foster interactions of
policy maker and author
Context-dependent; functional
staff can provide decision factors;
improved communication, trans-
parency, and security awareness;
support discussions
Prototype only, needs vali-
dation in practice (Subjective
empirical)
P2 Reduced burden
Enforcement Implementation effort of
controls
Reduced effort from the separation
of concerns
Single case study (Objective
empirical/analytical)
Policy Comprehending and re-
viewing policy
Adequate management-mode re-
duces effort, depends on context;
policy semantics are problematic
Needs validation in practice
(Subjective empirical)
Change sup-
port
Identifying and choosing
policy-change option
Improvement over interaction with
policy, but abstraction can be prob-
lematic, depends on context
Needs validation in practice
(Subjective empirical)
Policy over-
ride
Interference with func-
tional tasks and effort of
policy changes
The override cases indicate a reduc-
tion of both efforts, but caused addi-
tional effort for policy makers
Single case study (Objective
empirical/analytical)
Decision
support
Effort of change request
(functional staff) and
comprehensive decisions
(policy makers)
Needs comprehensible factors,
honor actual processes, efﬁciency
through participation, ﬂexibility in
collection, integration in process
Prototype only, needs vali-
dation in practice (Subjective
empirical)
Table G.1.: Insights from the application of the Authorization Principles (continued on next page. . . )
313
G. Principles applied in the artifacts
Artifact Coverage Insights Limitations (argument)
P3 Concreteness
Change sup-
port
Concrete policy-change
goals and alternatives
More effective and efﬁcient, but also
leads to problematic abstraction
Needs validation in practice
(Subjective empirical)
Decision
support
Decision-factor collec-
tion and presentation
Contextualizing factors is necessary
for comprehensibility
Prototype only, needs vali-
dation in practice (Subjective
empirical)
P4 Multidisciplinary
Enforcement Controls integration:
Software engineering,
socio-technical
Improved comprehensibility of con-
trols, changeability of enforcement
(Artifact development)
Policy Management-mode de-
sign: Socio-technical,
inf. security
Improved comprehensibility of
model and representation
(Artifact development)
Change sup-
port
Algorithm, tool design:
Socio-technical, informa-
tion security, artiﬁcial in-
telligence
Increases concreteness of changes Context-dependent adequacy
(Artifact development)
Policy over-
ride
Model, implementation:
Socio-technical, informa-
tion security
More effective security through in-
formal rules and mechanisms (lim-
its, monitoring)
Requires socio-organizational
measures (Artifact develop-
ment)
INDUSE Process model, activi-
ties: Organization sci-
ences, software engineer-
ing, inf. security
Effective relation of activities from
diverse perspectives
Further organizational re-
search for prescriptive process
model (Artifact development)
Decision
support
Factors, prototype: Risk
and decision, socio-
technical
Contextualizing factors (risk com-
munication, mental model)
(Artifact development)
P5 Individuals’ behavior
Policy over-
ride
Offer convenient alterna-
tives to circumvention
Reduced circumventions, but exces-
sive override use
Single case study (Objective/-
subjective empirical)
Decision
support
Inﬂuence behavior
through participation
Behavior may be inﬂuenced by
transparency, improved communica-
tion
Prototype only, needs vali-
dation in practice (Subjective
empirical)
P6 Security awareness
Decision
support
Awareness through par-
ticipation in decision pro-
cess
Indications of improved security
awareness through completing form
Prototype only, needs vali-
dation in practice (Subjective
empirical)
P7 Design for dynamics
Enforcement Separation of concerns
of policy and functional
changes
Reduced necessity of functional or
policy changes
Single case study (Objective
empirical/analytical)
Policy over-
ride
Flexibility of the model Reduced disruptions of functional
work and policy-changes quantity
Single case study (Objective/-
subjective empirical)
INDUSE Interaction and proce-
dures for system and
policy changes
The process must ﬁt the context’s
dynamics and INDUSE can indicate
adequate processes
Needs validation in practice
(Subjective empirical/analyti-
cal)
Decision
support
Decision support for dy-
namic changes
Context-dependent; needs to be in-
tegrated in procedures for low over-
head
Prototype only, needs vali-
dation in practice (Subjective
empirical/analytical)
P8 Tailor for context
Policy Adequacy of manage-
ment mode
Depends on individual’s back-
ground, organizational context
Needs validation in practice
(Subjective empirical)
Change sup-
port
Adequacy of policy
change-support
Depends on complexity of policy,
model
Needs validation in practice
(Subjective empirical)
Table G.1.: Insights from the application of the Authorization Principles (continued on next page. . . )
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Artifact Coverage Insights Limitations (argument)
INDUSE Adequate processes for
contexts; adaptability of
process model
Contexts require tailored processes
(e.g. formality, centralization), as
described by INDUSE for a broad
range
Needs validation in practice
(Subjective empirical/analyti-
cal)
Decision
support
Context-dependency of
supporting decisions
Highly context-dependent; needs to
ﬁt process and to be ﬂexible regard-
ing security needs
Prototype only, needs vali-
dation in practice (Subjective
empirical)
Table G.1.: Insights from the application of the Authorization Principles in artifact development
Recommendation Principles Additional aspects
Authorization Problems Study (Section 5.2) Subjective, qualitative
Foster acceptable circumventions P6 P5 P7 Satisfaction, decision-making
Monitor circumventions and the use of additional controls P5 P2 Observation, consequences
Deﬁne and communicate procedures P1 P5 Procedures
Reduce the (perceived) change lead-time and change effort P8 P5 Procedures
Adjust the degree of centralization and formalization P8 P6 Procedures
Provide high-level policies and guidance on decisions P2 P6 Decision-making
Increase the expertise and awareness of policy makers P6 P3 P1 Decision-making
Improve authorization models and management tools P2 Intuitive UI
Modes of policy changes (Section 7.3.5) Subjective, qualitative
Support policy decisions P2 P3 P1
Take the context into account P2 P8
Support the problem-solving strategies P2 P8
Improve the user experience P2 P5 Satisfaction, intuitive UI
Policy override in practice (Section 8.3.5) Objective/subjective, qualitative
Awareness for appropriate override usage and availability P6 P5 Intuitive UI
Adequate tool support P2 P7
Organization for consequences P2 P6 P5 P8 Observation, proc., consequences
Decision support P2 Decision-making
Authorization processes in practice (Section 9.5.4) Subjective, qualitative
Integrate functional staff P1 P8 P5 Decision-making, procedures
Establish operative activities P7 P5 P6 Observation, consequences
Integrate systems development P1 P7 P8
Improve stakeholder interaction P1 P8 Procedures
Decision-support study (Section 10.6) Subjective, qualitative
Adequately embed collection in procedures P2 P8 P7 Procedures
Contextualize factors P8 P3
Respect the sensitivity of factors P5 Satisfaction
Offer ﬂexibility in data collection P2 P8 Flexibility
Reuse existing data P2 Observation
Support discussions P8 P1 P5 Decision-making, procedures
Table G.2.: Relation of the Authorization Principles to recommendations
G.1. Applicability of the principles beyond organizational contexts
Whereas we developed the Authorization Taxonomy (cf. Chapter 4) and used it to limit the scope
of this thesis to organizational authorization contexts, we already considered brieﬂy for the autho-
rization requirements how they apply to non-organizational example contexts (cf. Sections 4.1.2 and
6.2.2, and Tables 4.4 and 6.3). The primary ﬁnding there was that the priorities of the individual
requirements are diverse. Most requirements are less critical for contexts of less complexity and
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P1 Interaction and participation − Not for functional/administrative interaction, often less dynamic
P2 Reduced burden + Diverse expertise, though less complex and dynamic
P3 Concreteness + Diverse expertise
P4 Multidisciplinary − Fewer organizational aspects
P5 Individuals’ behavior + Diverse expertise, security needs
P6 Security awareness + Diverse expertise, security needs
P7 Design for dynamics − Often less dynamic
P8 Tailor for context + Very diverse contexts
Table G.3.: Importance of principles in non-organizational contexts
dynamics, but there is no trend of speciﬁc requirements being generally of less importance. Con-
tinuing from that preliminary analysis, we will now examine analytically how the requirements and
Authorization Principles relate to the characteristics of non-organizational contexts – summarized in
Table G.3, based on the characteristics described below and the correlation between characteristics
given in Table 11.3.
Even though the scope allowed us to make a number of concrete assumptions on the breadth of
the context factors, the actual restrictions of the scope were limited: We only allowed for organiza-
tional resource owners (not individual authors or entity owners), human principals (excluding e.g.
applications as principals), and organizational authorization scopes (not personal, inter-personal, or
inter-organizational). Further assumptions relied on an organization as a formative structure for indi-
viduals (resource owners, policy makers, policy authors, principals). However, even if the formative
structure is absent, individuals are still under the inﬂuence of power structures of society – based on
morale and ethics, social norms, and laws (cf. e.g. Lessig, 1998).
Generally, authorization measures outside of organizational environments have to ﬁt the context
(P8 Tailor for context). The security needs will often depend on personal characteristics of the
resource owner (e.g. risk tolerance for privacy) instead of organizational characteristics or an or-
ganization’s regulatory obligations (Req 3 Regulatory requirements). Availability may be similarly
important as in organizational contexts since the acceptability of the measure highly depends on ap-
propriate permissions (P5 Individuals’ behavior). For the principals, the primary difference is that
we need to consider non-human principals, such as smartphone applications, which we explicitly
excluded for the scope of this thesis. Non-human principals need to be judged differently than hu-
man ones (e.g. based on the trustworthiness of the application’s developer), leading to a different
approach to decision-making (Req 6).
In case of the security expertise, non-organizational contexts can be considerably different from
organizational ones: Whereas organizations generally have the ability of inﬂuencing awareness and
expertise of stakeholders, society only has indirect and rather remote means (e.g. school education or
public awareness-campaigns). Thus the motivation of individuals and comprehensibility of the mea-
sure may need to receive increased attention (P5, P6, P2, P3). Conversely, the complexity factor can
reduce the impact of many problems, since non-organizational context often have lower quantities
and dynamics – reducing the effort of decisions (Req 6, Req 11), and the need for expressive models
(Req 12), usable policies (Req 13), and P7 Design for dynamics.
Regarding design parameters, the management measures are less signiﬁcant, since administra-
tive and functional roles seldom separate. Only the interaction with development will remain, even
though to a lesser extent since the distance from development tends to be larger (P1 Interaction and
participation). Primarily, this removes the necessity for adequate procedures (Req 10) and change
requests (Req 9). Generally, organizational measures are less important (P4 Multidisciplinary), in-
cluding reviews and monitoring (Req 7). In case of enforcement, while models on power structures –
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such as laws and social rules (Lessig, 1998) – apply, we can assume that non-technical enforcement
will be less effective without the authority of the organization, in some cases leading to increased
need for technical means (Req 1).
Overall, we ﬁnd a reduced importance for the Authorization Principles related to the complexity
and dynamics of the context, but wide variations regarding security expertise and the security needs
(cf. Table G.3). This also results in a somewhat reduced signiﬁcance for integration and partici-
pation (P1) since there is often a smaller number of distinct perspectives outside of organizations.
Thus, while a large proportion of requirements and principles still apply, the priorities are shifted
considerably and warrant further research.
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